Judgment : Virender Singh, J. Appellant-Bhupinder Singh has preferred the present appeal, under Section 378 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Cr. P.C.’), against the judgment dated 5.8.2015, passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Trial Court’), in Complaint No. 66-3 of 2013, titled as, ‘Bhupinder Singh versus Vinod Ranta’. 2. Vide judgment dated 5.8.2015, the learned trial Court  has  acquitted  respondent/accused  Vinod  Ranta, from the offences, punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act’). 3 For the sake of convenience, parties to the present lis are referred to, in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 4. Brief facts leading to filing the present appeal, as borne out from the record of the case, may be summed up, as under: 4.1 Complainant Bhupinder Singh has filed the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, against accused Vinod Ranta on the ground that complainant and accused had obtained a contract together and they were having cordial and friendly relations with each other. In lieu of the aforesaid contact, accused had to pay a sum of Rs. 8,50,000/- to the complainant and in order to make repayment of the said amount, he has issued a cheque bearing No. 469190, for a sum of Rs. 8,50,000/-, out of the bank account, maintained by him, with UCO Branch, Chopal, on 30.6.2013, with the assurance that as and when, the cheque will be presented, the same will be encashed. Consequently, the complainant presented the cheque to the UCO Bank, Chopal. However, the said cheque was received back dishonoured, on 23.9.2023 with the remarks ‘insufficient funds’. Thereafter, legal notice was got issued by the complainant, through his counsel on 18.10.2013, demanding the amount within a period of 15 days from the receipt thereof. As such, notice is stated to have been served and despite service of notice, accused has not cared to make the payment. As such, complainant, after waiting for the statutory period, has filed the complaint, before the learned trial Court. 5. The learned trial Court, on the basis of documents, so annexed, as well as, from the preliminary evidence, issued noticed to the accused, vide order dated 20.11.2013, after securing his presence. 6. As such, complainant, after waiting for the statutory period, has filed the complaint, before the learned trial Court. 5. The learned trial Court, on the basis of documents, so annexed, as well as, from the preliminary evidence, issued noticed to the accused, vide order dated 20.11.2013, after securing his presence. 6. Notice of accusation was put to the accused, vide order dated 19.7.2014, to which, the accused has not pleaded guilty and claimed to be tried. Consequently, the complainant, as well as, the accused were directed to adduce evidence. 7. After closure of evidence of the complainant, the statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C., vide order dated 24.9.2014. Thereafter, accused has examined his defence witnesses. After closure of the defence evidence, and after hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial Court, has dismissed the complaint, vide judgment of acquittal, dated 5.8.2015. 8. Against the dismissal of the complaint, the present appeal has been filed, before this Court, assailing the judgment of acquittal, on the ground that the complaint filed by the complainant, fulfilled all the necessary ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, whereas, the learned trial Court has erred in concluding that the amount, so paid by the accused, was in part payment of the liability, under the cheque, whereas, according to the complainant, the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the alleged payment was made by the accused, with regard to some other liability, and not to discharge the liability, under the cheque in question. 9. Another ground, upon which, the present appeal has been filed, is that the learned trial Court has also erred in concluding that payment was part performance, as per Section 56 of the N.I. Act. 10 On the basis of grounds of appeal, Mr.Kunal Verma, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, has prayed that the appeal may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the judgment of acquittal, and the accused may kindly be convicted, for the offence, punishable, under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and he may be sentenced accordingly. 11. Per contra, the prayer, so made by learned counsel for the petitioner, has been opposed by Mr.Sanjay Ranta and Mr. 11. Per contra, the prayer, so made by learned counsel for the petitioner, has been opposed by Mr.Sanjay Ranta and Mr. Abhinav Kainthla, Advocates, appearing for the respondent, on the ground that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the provisions of law, and defence of the accused, has rightly been considered. As such, judgment of acquittal, according to learned counsel for the respondent, does not require any interference by this Court. As such, a prayer has been made to dismiss the appeal. 12. In order to decide the controversy, involved in the present lis, it would be just and appropriate for this Court to discuss the oral, as well as, documentary evidence, adduced by the learned trial Court. 13. When, notice of accusation was put to the accused, he has not pleaded guilty, and claimed to be tried. 14. Thereafter, complainant has appeared in the witness box as CW-1, on 2.8.2014, and tendered his affidavit, Ext.CW1/A. 15. In cross-examination, complainant has admitted that he is an Insurance Agent, and also a Govt. Contractor. He has admitted that he has not annexed any document with the complaint, disclosing therein that he is a Govt. Contractor. He has admitted that he has not given any description of the contract, which has been awarded to him. However, according to him, accused Vinod Ranta is his friend, as both of them, had worked together, w.e.f. 2008 to 2010. However, there was no written contract between them. He has further deposed that he and the accused had executed the work of Rs.15- 18 lacs, as Contractor. They had settled the ratio of profit as 70-30. However, about the said partnership, no written contract was executed. 15.1 As per the complainant, accused had made payment  twice,  by  transferring  the  amount  from  his account to the account of the complainant. The said amount is stated to have been transferred, in the month of November-December, 2011 and thereafter, in the month of July-August, 2013. However, he could not disclose about the exact amount, which was transferred, however, again stated that perhaps, for the first time, an amount of Rs. 3-4 lacs was transferred and for the second time, a sum of Rs. 1 lacs was transferred. 15.2 The complainant has further admitted that on 3.4.2010, a sum of Rs.1 lacs was transferred through cheque, whereas, on 13.2.2012, a sum of Rs. 3-4 lacs was transferred and for the second time, a sum of Rs. 1 lacs was transferred. 15.2 The complainant has further admitted that on 3.4.2010, a sum of Rs.1 lacs was transferred through cheque, whereas, on 13.2.2012, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was transferred through RTGS mode, in his account. He has further admitted that on 31.8.2024, a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was transferred through cheque. However, he has denied that the accused had paid a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- in the presence of Dinesh, in the month of February, 2013, in Nalini Restaurant. He has further denied that cheque Ext.CW1/B was handed over by the accused to him, in the year 2010, as security, in order to secure the future transaction. 15.3 The complainant has denied that the said cheque was given as security. He has denied that a sum of Rs. 8,50,000/- was re-paid. He has admitted that when the cheque was presented, accused had made a payment of Rs. 1,00,000/-. He has admitted that there is no reference, regarding the payment of a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in the complaint. Regarding this, he has given the explanation that the amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- was given through another cheque. The complainant is stated to have filed the income tax returns, in which, he has mentioned in the income, derived from the work, jointly executed by the complainant and accused. 15.4 The complainant has further deposed that the accused has paid a sum of Rs. 7,00,000/- from the year 2010 to 2013, but stated that the said amount is not related to the cheque, involved in the present case. He explained about the amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- by stating that the said amount was lent by him, on various dates, on installments. The cheque in question was given to the complainant, in the month of June, 2013. He has further admitted that he is having no record maintained regarding the amount, allegedly paid to the accused. 15.5 Rest, he has denied all the suggestions, which have been put by learned counsel for the accused. 16. In order to rebut the said evidence, the accused has examined DW-1, the Record Keeper of Punjab National Bank, who has proved the statement of account of accused Vinod Ranta as Ext. DW1/A. As per the relevant entry, a sum of Rs. 16. In order to rebut the said evidence, the accused has examined DW-1, the Record Keeper of Punjab National Bank, who has proved the statement of account of accused Vinod Ranta as Ext. DW1/A. As per the relevant entry, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- has been transferred in the name of Bhupinder Singh (complainant), on 3.4.2010. This witness has feigned his ignorance about the cheque, by virtue of which, the amount was transferred. 17. Rajinder Singh, Branch Manager, Punjab National Bank, H.P. Secretariat has been examined as DW-2. He, on the basis of record, proved the statement of the account of Vinod Ranta (accused), Proprietor of Vastukar & Associates, as Ext. DW2/A. According to him, on 31.8.2013, from the account of Vinod Ranta, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- has been transferred in the name of Bhupinder Singh (complainant). This witness has admitted that there is no delay about the account, in which, the amount has been transferred, but, voluntarily stated that the number of cheque, by virtue of which, the amount was transferred, is 099785. The said account is stated to be under the name of Vastukar & Associates. 18. DW-3 is Basant Kumar, Cashier of the Punjab National Bank Branch. He has deposed that he has brought the statement of account of Vinod Ranta and proved the same as Ext. DW3/A. According to him, from the account of Vinod Ranta (accused), a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- has been transferred to the account of Bhupinder Singh (complainant), on 13.2.2015. This amount is stated to have been transferred through cheque. 19. In this case, when, the statement of the accused was recorded, under Section 313 Cr. P.C., he has admitted the issuance of cheque, but, according to him, the same was issued as security, and, according to him, he has made the payment of the amount. 20. The learned trial Court, in the present case, has accepted the contentions of the accused that the accused has rebutted the presumption, which was in favour of the complainant. 21. The complainant has approached this Court by way of present appeal, which has been filed against the judgment of acquittal. 20. The learned trial Court, in the present case, has accepted the contentions of the accused that the accused has rebutted the presumption, which was in favour of the complainant. 21. The complainant has approached this Court by way of present appeal, which has been filed against the judgment of acquittal. It is no longer res-integra that while  deciding  the  appeal  against  the  judgment  of acquittal, the learned Appellate Court should be slow in interfering with the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, until or unless, it has been proved that the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, are soiled with perversity. 22. The scope of interference in an appeal against the judgment of acquittal, has elaborately been discussed by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Anwar Ali & Another Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh’, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 166 . Relevant paragraphs 14 to 14.3 are reproduced, as under:- “14. Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered. 14.1. In the case of Babu (supra), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla  Somasekhara  Reddy  v.  State  of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust  and  unreasonable  based  on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” (emphasis supplied) 14.2 When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Excise and Taxation OfficercumAssessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).” (emphasis supplied) It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 14.3 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh (supra), this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under: “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228 . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) “10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.” 31.1. In Sambasivan  v.  State  of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) “8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a wellconsidered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this noncompliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court’s judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.” 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309 , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807 , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) “5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the wellestablished rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52 ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K.  Gopal  Reddy  v.  State  of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355 , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied) 23. With the judgment of acquittal, passed in favour of the accused, the presumption of innocence, which was available to him, at the time of initiation of the trial, becomes double and it is no longer res integra that the Appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment of acquittal, until or unless, the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 24. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are reproduced, as under:- “22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the trial court and the impugned judgment of the High Court. The trial court very minutely examined the entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is perverse. 23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial court are against the weight of evidence. The law is well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal. 24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court observed that the expression `perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. 25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings. 26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another, the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English – International Edition Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary  of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A  perverse  verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. 5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary  of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse: A  perverse  verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P., the Court observed thus: "8. … We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as under: "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re- appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the  fact-finding  authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 25. Similar view has again been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under:- “30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of Kerala).” 26. Now, this Court would proceed further to consider the fact as to whether the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, are soiled with perversity, warranting interference by this Court? 27. The cheque in question was issued on 30.6.2013 and the complainant himself has admitted that he has received an amount of Rs. 3-4 lacs, and again received a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/-. He has further admitted that the accused has transferred a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- on 3.4.2010, through cheque, and on 13.2.2012, he has transferred a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/-, through RTGS mode, and on 31.8.2013, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- has been transferred, through cheque. 28. The complainant has admitted that he has received the above amount. When, the cheque in question was issued, on 30.6.2013, then, it was incumbent upon the complainant to mention all these material facts, in the complaint, as, he has admitted that he and accused had worked together only w.e.f. 2008 to 2010, and as per the stand taken in the complaint, both of them had worked together, as contractors, and in lieu of the said business, the accused allegedly had to pay a sum of Rs. 8,50,000/-. It is not the case of the complainant that apart from the contractorship business, both of them were having any other business transactions with each other. 29. In such situation, when, the complainant has admitted about the receipt of the money, that too, prior to the issuance of the cheque, which, according to the accused, is stated to be a security cheque, the learned trial Court has rightly considered the evidence, so adduced by the parties and rightly dismissed the complaint, filed by the complainant. 30. No other point has been urged or argued. 31. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution, in this case, and, thereafter, has rightly acquitted the accused from the charges, framed against him. 30. No other point has been urged or argued. 31. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution, in this case, and, thereafter, has rightly acquitted the accused from the charges, framed against him. As such, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court, as, the same do not fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’. 32. Consequently, the judgment of acquittal, passed by the learned trial Court, is upheld and the present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 33. Record be sent back.