1 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 APHC010710362022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3396] WEDNESDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10423/2022 Between: Maddala Dharmaji Rao ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND The State Of Andhra Pradesh and Others ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S) Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. RAMBABU KOPPINEEDI Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S): 1. V VIJAYA VARDHAN 2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following: 2 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10423/2022 ORDER: The instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, “Cr.P.C.”) has been filed by the Petitioner/ Accused, seeking quashment of the proceedings in SC ST SC.No.124 of 2022 on the file of Special Court for Trial of SC-ST POA Cases, East Godavari District at Rajamahendravaram. 2. Heard Sri Rambabu Koppineedi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri V.Vijaya Vardhan, learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 and Ms. K. Priyanka Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner would submit a false case has been lodged against the petitioner who is the sole accused. Learned counsel would further submit that absolutely, the offence under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), of SCs & STs (POA) Act has no application to the facts of the present case since the alleged offence did not occur within the public view. Learned Counsel would further submit that the allegations made regarding Section 506 are frivolous. Mere utterance of words without any criminal intimidation does not fall under Section 506 of IPC. Learned Counsel would further submit that to attract the offence under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), of SCs & STs (POA) Act, the offence must have been committed against the victim on the ground that he belongs to Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe. Learned Counsel would 3 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 further submit that the mere allegation that respondent No.2 was manhandled and caused severe injuries in the hands of the accused does not suffice to attract the offence under Section 323 of IPC. Learned Counsel would further submit that respondent No.2 worked with the petitioner for some time and the petitioner has paid the amount which is due to him. The respondent No. 2 committed theft of some articles while he was working for the petitioner. When the petitioner questioned him, he lodged this false complaint to escape from his liability of theft of the petitioner’s articles. Learned Counsel in support of his contentions placed reliance on judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand and another1, State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal2 and Karuppudar vs. State rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors.3 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner finally prays for quashment of the case against the petitioner for the offence under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), of SCs & STs (POA) Act. 5. Per contra, Learned Counsel for the respondent No.2 would submit that the complaint is very clear to the effect that the alleged incident took place within public view. While, the petitioner was abusing LWs-1 & 2, touched the caste and attacking them, LWs-3 & 4 witnessed the incident. There are prima facie allegations in the complaint to attract the offence alleged against the 1 (2020) 10 SCC 710 2 1992 Supp (1)SCC 335 3 2025 INSC 132 4 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 petitioner. Learned Counsel finally submits that it is not a fit case for quashmentand prays for dismissal of the petition. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the petition and supported the version of the respondent No.2. 7. A bare perusal of Section 482 of the Code makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Section 482 of the Code jurisdiction is not functioning as a trial court, court of appeal or a court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons to prevent abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 8. Specific circumstances warranting the invocation of the provisions must be present. To identify these specific circumstances, it is essential to discuss some precedents. The decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others4is considered as the guiding torch in the application of Section 482. At paras 102 and 103, the circumstances are spelt out as follows; “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law 4 AIR 1992 SC 604 5 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the 6 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Keeping in mind, the guiding factors enunciated supra, present case has to be scrutinized. 10. In the context of “any place within the public purview”, in Hitesh Verma’s case referred supra, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“ Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) 7 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. In Karuppudayar vs. State rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors5, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “13. Taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, it would reveal that what is alleged is that when the complainant was in his office the accused came there; enquired with the complainant; not being satisfied, started abusing him in the name of his caste; and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came there, pacified the accused and took him away. 5 2025 INSC 132 8 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 14. It is thus clear that even as per the FIR, the incident has taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant. The other colleagues of the complainant arrived at the scene after the occurrence of the incident.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. Considering the submissions made, in the backdrop of the legal positions referred supra and a fair look at the complaint would show that while the incident was happening LWs-3&4 passing through witnessed the incident and intervened. There are allegations to the effect that the respondent No.2 was beaten by the petitioner with hands and legs and suffered injuries. The complaint further would show that the respondent No.2 was abused by the petitioner touching the caste and hearing such shouts, LWs -3 & 4 came to the rescue of the victim and another. The Judgment in Karuppudayar’s case referred supra is distinguishable to the facts of the present case, since the alleged incident of abusing touching the caste happened within the four corners of the chamber of the complainant. Other colleagues arrived at the same after the occurrence of the incident. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is the case of the complainant that while the petitioner was shouting on them by using abusive language touching the caste, people witnessed the incident. Such being the case, the contention that the alleged incident did not occur within the public view, cannot be appreciated at this Stage. It requires investigation at the full length of Trial. In that view, when there is verifiable material to proceed further in this matter quashment of the case against the petitioner does not arise. 9 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 13. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________________________ Dr. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA Date: 05.02.2025 UPS 10 DR.VJPJ; CRLP.No.10423/2022 68 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA Crl.P.No.10423 of 2022 Dt.05.02.2025 UPS