IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH **** RSA-3977-1999 (O&M) Reserved on: 16.07.2025 Pronounced on: 23.07.2025 SURJIT KAUR AND OTHERS . . . . APPELLANTS Vs. MALKIAT SINGH AND OTHERS . . . . RESPONDENTS **** CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA **** Present: - Mr. Akash Singla, Advocate, for the appellants. Mr. Vinay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, for respondents No.2, 4 & 5. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the concurrent findings of the Courts below, whereby the suit for declaration filed by the plaintiffs seeking the right to redeem 1/4th share of mortgaged property was dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 04.01.1996; and the appeal by them against the same was dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 17.04.1999. 2. For convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status before the learned Trial Court. 3. 1 Factual Matrix: One Partap Singh was the original owner of the suit land. In May 1943, he mortgaged the entire land with Mehar Singh and Arjan Singh for a sum of ₹2345/-, as reflected in mutation No.5120 (Ex.P12). Eventually, Mehar Singh purchased Arjan Singh’s mortgagee rights and became the sole mortgagee. 3.2 Upon the death of Partap Singh (who died unmarried and issueless), his estate devolved as follows: VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA-3977-1999 2025:PHHC: 090545 p. 2  1/2 share to Mehar Singh son of Wasawa Singh (predecessor of the plaintiffs),  1/4 share to defendants No.1 to 7 (legal heirs of Kehar Singh son of Hazara Singh), and  1/4 share to Sham Kaur defendant No.8, daughter of Mehar Singh son of Sahib Singh. Thus, Mehar Singh held a dual status — as mortgagor to the extent of 1/2 share, and mortgagee of the remaining 1/2 share. 3.3 In 1974, defendants No.1 to 7 applied to the Collector for redemption not only of their own 1/4 share, but also for the share of Sham Kaur. Although Sham Kaur filed a reply (Ex.P2) and made statement (Ex.P3) expressing that she would redeem her own share separately, the Collector passed an order on 10.05.1974 (Ex.P4) permitting redemption of their own 1/4 shares + Sham Kaur’s ¼ share in favour of defendants No.1 to 7. 3.4 The said order was challenged by plaintiffs by way of Civil Suit No.151/1974, which was dismissed on 18.11.1976 (Ex.P5). Their appeal was dismissed on 27.04.1979 (Ex.P7), and even RSA No.219 of 1980 before this High Court met the same fate on 04.08.1980. 3.5 Subsequently, the plaintiffs purchased Sham Kaur’s 1/4 share via registered sale deed dated 06.12.1979 (Ex.P9) and applied to the Collector for redemption of the same. The application was rejected on 09.04.1990 (Ex.P11). 4. Plaintiffs’ Claim: Plaintiffs then filed the present suit on 09.04.1991, assailing the Collector's order of rejection dated 9.4.1990, and seeking right to redeem Sham Kaur’s 1/4th share on payment of proportionate mortgage money on the premise that they had stepped into her shoes and had a mortgagee’s right. 5. Stand of contesting defendants: Contesting the suit, defendants No.1 to 6 contended that they had already gotten the share of VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA-3977-1999 2025:PHHC: 090545 p. 3 Sham Kaur redeemed by virtue of the order dated 10.05.1974 of the Collector, which was upheld up to this Court; that Sham Kaur was also a party to the earlier application for redemption and at that time, she did not get her share redeemed. Even after order dated 10.05.1974, she never applied for getting her share redeemed and therefore, the present suit filed in April 1991 being beyond 12 years from the order dated 10.05.1974, was barred by limitation. 6. Necessary issues were framed. Evidence produced by the parties was taken on record. The trial court dismissed the suit by holding that suit was barred by limitation, and the First Appellate Court affirmed the findings. 7. Rival Contentions: Assailing the aforesaid concurrent findings, ld. Counsel for the appellants - plaintiffs contended that since earlier litigation challenging the 1974 order ended only in 1980, limitation would begin from that date. Further, they argued that under Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act, 1963, they had 30 years to redeem the mortgaged share. Ld. Counsel relies on principle of ‘once a mortgage always a mortgage’ and therefore, states that there is no limitation for redemption. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents - defendants argued that  Redemption had already been lawfully completed in 1974,  All Courts up to this High Court had upheld that redemption,  Sham Kaur never redeemed her share, and the plaintiffs' suit filed in 1991 was hopelessly time-barred,  Plaintiffs had no right of redemption or possession, as no subsisting mortgage remained post-1974. 9. After considering submissions of both the sides, this court does not find any merit in the appeal. VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA-3977-1999 2025:PHHC: 090545 p. 4 10. Points for Determination: The following legal questions arise for consideration:  Whether Article 61(a) of the Limitation Act is applicable to the plaintiffs' claim?  Whether the plaintiffs, as successors of Sham Kaur, retain any right to redeem the 1/4 share?  Whether the defendants No.1 to 7 are subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee?  Whether the plaintiffs, being mortgagees of 1/2 share, can claim possession or redemption of Sham Kaur’s share by paying proportionate mortgage money? Court Analysis: 11.1 Limitation: It is correct that Article 61(a) provides a 30-year period for a mortgagor to redeem mortgaged property. However, this presumes the existence of a subsisting mortgage. 11.2 The legal principle is well-settled that once a mortgage is redeemed and such redemption is upheld through judicial affirmation, the mortgage stands extinguished. Consequently, no independent or revived right to redeem can be claimed later by the mortgagor or her assignee. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Pillai Rajasekharan Nair v. Padmanabha Pillai, (2004) 12 SCC 754 held that the right of redemption under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act ceases to exist once the mortgage is lawfully redeemed. 11.3 In the present case, the redemption was completed in 1974, not just for the 1/4 share of defendants No.1 to 7 but also for that of Sham Kaur’s share, and this was upheld in multiple rounds of litigation culminating in this Court’s decision dated 04.08.1980. Thus, the right of redemption under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act stood extinguished. Plaintiffs, having purchased Sham Kaur’s share in the suit VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA-3977-1999 2025:PHHC: 090545 p. 5 property in 1979, stepped into her shoes, who no longer had a right of redemption. 11.4 Therefore, Article 61(a) is not applicable, as the mortgage had already been redeemed. The plaintiffs' 1991 suit was essentially a challenge to a concluded administrative order and was barred by general limitation law. 12.1 Subrogation: Under Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, a co-mortgagor redeeming the property steps into the shoes of the mortgagee vis-à-vis the remaining co-mortgagors. 12.2 In this case, defendants No.1 to 7, as co-mortgagors, redeemed not only their 1/4 share but also that of Sham Kaur, and the order of redemption has attained finality. Therefore, defendants No.1 to 7 became subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee vis-à-vis Sham Kaur’s share. Plaintiffs, having acquired Sham Kaur’s interest after such redemption, could not reassert the right of redemption. 13. Right of Mortgagee-Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs also claimed that since they are mortgagees of 1/2 share (inherited from Mehar Singh), they could seek possession of Sham Kaur’s share by paying proportionate mortgage money to defendants. However, such a partial redemption of already redeemed property is not recognized under Section 91 or 92 of the Transfer of Property Act. In fact, Section 92 expressly prohibits subrogation unless the mortgage has been redeemed fully. Plaintiffs neither redeemed the mortgage nor had any legal basis to claim subrogation after redemption was completed by defendants N: 1 to 7. 14. Conclusion: Based on above discussion, it is held that the Courts below have rightly concluded that the plaintiffs had no subsisting right of redemption, and their suit filed in 1991 was barred by limitation, having been filed more than 12 years after the final redemption order of 1974. The plaintiffs’ claim for redemption is unsustainable in law due to - completed redemption; no revival of right under Article 61(a); bar under Section 92 TPA; and finality of earlier judgments. There is neither any VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh RSA-3977-1999 2025:PHHC: 090545 p. 6 factual error nor any illegality in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below, calling for any interference. 15. Consequently, the present Regular Second Appeal is hereby dismissed being devoid of merit. The concurrent findings of the Courts below are upheld. No order as to costs. 23.07.2025 Vivek (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes Whether reportable : No VIVEK PAHWA 2025.07.24 14:20 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh