1 2025:CGHC:48268-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2701 of 2024 1 - Smt. Kamla Devi W/o Kalpnath Yadav Aged About 54 Years Presently R/o 70/g Street No. 18 Ward No. 21 Camp-01, Bhilai, P.S. Chawani, Tahsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh 2 - Kalpnath Yadav S/o Late Jainarayan Yadav Aged About 64 Years R/o 70/g Street No. 18 Ward No. 21 Camp-01, Bhilai, P.S. Chawani, Tahsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh (Father Name Is Correctly Mentioned) 3 - Smt. Jyotsna Yadav W/o Om Prakash Yadav, D/o Kalpnath Yadav Aged About 31 Years R/o 70/g Street No. 18 Ward No. 21 Camp-01, Bhilai, P.S. Chawani, Tahsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Thana Incharge, Police Station - City Kotwali, District Durg Chhattisgarh 2 - Omprakash Yadav S/o Ramchandra Yadav Aged About 35 Years Police Constable Number - 711, Presently R/o Ews 1898/99 M.P. Housing Board, Industrial Area, Kailash Nagar Jamul, Tahsil And District - Durg Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Jha and Gunjan Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, G.A. and Mr. Vedant Bhelonde, Advocate MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.09.19 19:10:00 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 19.09.2025 1. Heard Mr. Sandeep Jha and Gunjan Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, learned Government Advocate for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Vedant Bhelonde, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 2. The petitioner has filed this petition with the following prayer: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow this petition and set- aside the impugned first information report (1073/2022) and entire criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to impugned first information report dated 30.09.2022 for the offence punishable under section 294, 323, 506, 186 and 353 of Indian Penal Code registered at P.S. City Kotwali, Durg in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of the case are that the complainant is residing at the address mentioned in the complaint and is serving as a Police Constable, Serial No. 711, in the Chhattisgarh Police. Petitioner No. 01 is working as a teacher in a private school, while petitioner No. 02 is a retired Principal of a Government School. Both petitioner Nos. 01 and 02 are residing 3 along with petitioner No. 03 at Bhilai, District Durg (C.G.). 4. The marriage of petitioner No. 03 was solemnized with respondent No. 02 on 12.12.2016 at Bhilai in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. After marriage, respondent No. 02 along with his family members took petitioner No. 03 to Ballia (U.P.), where she was subjected to cruelty, both mental and physical, on account of dowry demands. Owing to such harassment, petitioner No. 03 lodged a complaint at Jaunpur (U.P.) against respondent No. 02 and his family members. It is further the case of the prosecution that respondent No. 02, at the relevant time, was employed as Court Muharir in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shri Umesh Upadhyay, Durg. On 20.09.2022, while respondent No. 02 was engaged in dispatching and distributing summons/warrants in the court premises, petitioner No. 02 allegedly threatened him to grant divorce to petitioner No. 03 immediately, failing which he would be killed. Petitioner No. 02 is also alleged to have abused respondent No. 02 and assaulted him with a helmet, thereby causing injuries on his right shoulder and waist. It is also alleged that petitioner No. 02 tore certain government/court papers which were in possession of respondent No. 02, thereby obstructing him from discharging his official duties. On account of the aforesaid incident, respondent No. 02 lodged a report, pursuant to which FIR was registered and charge-sheet No. 374/2022 was filed against the petitioners. 4 5. The petitioners, however, contend that they had first submitted a complaint against respondent No. 02 on 29.09.2022 before the Thana Incharge, Police Station City Kotwali, Durg, but no FIR was registered thereupon. On the very same date, i.e., 29.09.2022, the petitioners had also addressed a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Durg, but again no FIR was registered. Petitioner No. 03 further made a complaint before the learned District & Sessions Judge, Durg on 29.09.2022, narrating that respondent No. 02, who was working as a Court Muharir, had abused her and her family members within the court premises while she was preparing an affidavit with her advocate in the Bar Room. The petitioners also addressed complaints to the Protection Officer (Women and Child Development Officer, Durg) on 03.11.2022, and to the President of the State Human Rights Commission, Raipur, on 04.11.2022, alleging that respondent No. 02, upon learning of the complaints filed against him, had started threatening the entire family to withdraw the proceedings, failing which their lives would be put in danger. It is further alleged that since respondent No. 02 is employed with the Chhattisgarh Police, the police officials refrained from taking stringent action against him, which emboldened his conduct. It is further on record that petitioner No. 03 had filed an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the Family Court, Jaunpur, registered as Case No. 571/2018, wherein by order dated 30.09.2019, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jaunpur directed respondent No. 5 02 to pay maintenance of Rs. 7,000/- per month from the date of application. 6. The record further reveals that petitioner No. 02 was granted bail by this Court vide order dated 24.04.2023 in MCRCA No. 1596/2022, while petitioner Nos. 01 and 03 were granted bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, vide order dated 21.08.2023 in Bail Application No. 1105/2023. It is also the allegation that respondent No. 02, along with his family members namely, Ramchandra Yadav (father-in-law), Smt. Rajwati Devi (mother-in-law), Smt. Pushpa Devi (sister-in-law), Felkumari, Amrita Devi, and Arjun alias Abhishek Yadav (brother-in-law), subjected petitioner No. 03 to cruelty, both mental and physical, in relation to dowry demands. In this connection, petitioner No. 03 had filed a complaint on 03.07.2018 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaunpur, under Sections 323, 504, 506, 498-A IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 7. Petitioner No. 03 had also initiated recovery proceedings when respondent No. 02 failed to comply with the maintenance order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Consequently, by order dated 13.04.2021, the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jaunpur, directed the Superintendent of Police, Durg, to deduct the maintenance amount directly from the salary of respondent No. 02 and remit the same to the bank account of petitioner No. 03. On account of continuous cruelty and harassment, petitioner No. 03 6 was compelled to file a petition seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The said proceedings, filed on 19.08.2020, are stated to be pending consideration before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg (C.G.). It is lastly alleged that petitioner No. 02 also made a written representation to this Court on 01.10.2022, when His Lordship visited Durg to attend a cultural programme organized by the Durg Bar Association during Navratri festivities. It is stated that the District Magistrate & Collector, Durg, orally apprised His Lordship of the matter and assured that legal action would be taken against respondent No. 02. Hence this present petition. 8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the entire prosecution is mala fide and instituted with an oblique motive. The petitioners point out that petitioner No. 3 is the legally wedded wife of respondent No. 2, against whom several matrimonial disputes are pending. Numerous complaints have been filed by petitioner No. 3 against respondent No. 2 and his family members at Jaunpur (U.P.), including proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance, which have been decided against respondent No. 2. It is argued that to overcome these proceedings and to exert pressure upon petitioner No. 3, respondent No. 2 lodged the present FIR as a counterblast to matrimonial cases. Reliance is placed on Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. (2023 SCC OnLine SC 950) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mala fide prosecutions intended as counterblasts 7 must be quashed to prevent harassment. It is further submitted that petitioner No. 2 had lodged a complaint as early as 27.07.2021 before the Superintendent of Police, Durg, against respondent No. 2 regarding fabrication of his educational qualifications and irregularity in his appointment as a constable. The Superintendent of Police directed an enquiry. This provided a clear motive for respondent No. 2 to take revenge by lodging a false FIR against the petitioners. It has been argued that even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, no offence is made out: • Section 186 IPC requires voluntary obstruction of a public servant in discharge of duty; however, the FIR does not disclose any voluntary obstruction. • Section 353 IPC requires use of criminal force to deter a public servant. The FIR does not specify how summons/warrants were torn or how the petitioners prevented respondent No. 2 from performing his duty. • Sections 294, 323, and 506 IPC are also not made out, as the FIR contains vague and omnibus allegations without naming which petitioner used abusive language, caused hurt, or threatened. 9. learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122, the Supreme Court held that vague and bald 8 allegations without specific overt acts cannot constitute an offence. Further, the independent witness, Balram Dhiman, did not support the prosecution version. His statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. contradicts the FIR. Thus, the substratum of prosecution stands demolished. 10. Counsel for the petitioners pointed out that respondent No. 2 has distorted facts before this Court. He suppressed that his matrimonial case No. 121/2024 at Jaunpur had already been dismissed on 20.11.2024. Such suppression amounts to abuse of the process of law. It is contended that the case falls within Category (1) and (7) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 as the allegations in the FIR do not prima facie constitute an offence and the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with ulterior motives for wreaking vengeance. 11. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 opposed the petition, submitting that the FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offences. The allegations of tearing summons/warrants and assaulting a constable while on duty squarely attract Sections 186 and 353 IPC. It is argued that at the stage of quashing, the Court must only see whether a prima facie case exists, not whether the case is likely to result in conviction. Reliance is placed on Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 6 SCC 73, where the 9 Supreme Court held that FIR should not ordinarily be quashed when allegations disclose cognizable offences. It is further submitted that the MLC report of respondent No. 2 dated 29.09.2022 issued by District Hospital, Durg records injuries on his shoulder and chest caused by a blunt object. This corroborates his allegation that petitioner No. 2 assaulted him with a helmet. He furthe submits that the petitioners themselves have admitted in their pleadings that an altercation did occur on 29.09.2022 at the court premises. Once the factum of altercation is admitted, the correctness or falsity of allegations cannot be gone into in Section 482 proceedings and must be left for trial. The petition raises disputed questions of fact such as who assaulted whom, whether summons were torn, etc. Such issues require trial and cannot be adjudicated at the stage of quashment. Reliance is placed on R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, which laid down that where allegations disclose an offence, proceedings cannot be quashed merely because defence claims falsity. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioners’ reliance on their earlier complaints is misplaced. Merely because the petitioners filed complaints earlier does not mean that the subsequent complaint by respondent No. 2 is false. The law permits both complaints to be investigated and adjudicated independently. It is emphasized that after thorough investigation, police filed charge sheet and the Magistrate has taken cognizance. Once cognizance has been taken, the 10 petitioners must face trial, and the High Court should not stifle the prosecution at this stage. Reliance is placed on State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal (1995) 2 SCC 449. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition. 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases 11 wherein such power should be exercised. (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress 12 for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2016) 9 SCC 1 held as under:- “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Kal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 wherein it was held as under:- “29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are 13 all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable 14 quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied 15 upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arisingt therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 15. In the matter of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, the Supreme Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. It was held as under: “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose 16 of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), the Supreme Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. 17. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is an admitted fact that serious matrimonial disputes are pending between petitioner No. 3 (wife) and respondent No. 2 (husband). Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. for maintenance, complaint cases under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, as well as divorce proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, have been filed against respondent No. 2. Even orders directing deduction of maintenance from his salary are on record. It is not without significance that the FIR in question 17 was lodged immediately after such proceedings were initiated and adverse orders were passed against respondent No. 2. This strengthens the contention of mala fide intention and shows that the FIR is a product of retaliation in the backdrop of strained matrimonial relations. 18. The FIR and charge-sheet contain sweeping allegations without specific attribution. It is not stated who among the petitioners abused, who tore the summons, or who inflicted injuries. Such vague narration without particulars fails to satisfy the legal requirements of Sections 186, 294, 323, 353, and 506 IPC. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122, it was held that when allegations are absurd or inherently improbable and do not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence, continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process. Further, the independent witness, Balram Dhiman, in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., did not corroborate the allegation of tearing the summons. This omission strikes at the root of the prosecution story and demonstrates that the charge-sheet has been prepared mechanically without proper scrutiny. Respondent No. 2 failed to disclose that his matrimonial case before the Family Court, Jaunpur, had already been dismissed on 20.11.2024. Suppression of such material fact is a serious matter and reflects lack of bona fides. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special 18 Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 held that summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter, and the criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of routine or to wreak vengeance. Similarly, in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736, it was observed that when a civil or matrimonial dispute is cleverly dressed up as a criminal offence, such prosecution amounts to abuse of process and must be quashed. 20. In Bhajan Lal (Supra), the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, or instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused due to private and personal disputes, the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR. The present case squarely falls under this category. 21. Although medical examination of respondent No. 2 revealed some injuries, this by itself cannot sustain the prosecution when the FIR lacks essential particulars, is tainted with mala fides, and is a by- product of ongoing matrimonial discord. Injuries could occur in many circumstances, unless specific overt acts are attributed and essential ingredients of the offences are made out, petitioners cannot be compelled to face trial. 22. Further, the argument of respondent No. 2 that cognizance has already been taken and therefore proceedings cannot be quashed is untenable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ARCI v. Nirma 19 Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. (2016) 1 SCC 348 has held that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even after cognizance if continuance of proceedings amounts to abuse of process. This Court cannot be a mute spectator when the criminal process is being misused to settle personal scores. Continuance of such proceedings would result in harassment of the petitioners and wastage of judicial time. 23. On an overall consideration of the facts, material on record, and legal position, this Court is of the firm opinion that the FIR No. 1073/2022 dated 30.09.2022 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, Durg, and all subsequent proceedings are actuated by mala fide intention, devoid of essential ingredients of the alleged offences, and continuation thereof would amount to abuse of process of law. 24. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. 25. FIR No. 1073/2022 dated 30.09.2022 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, Durg, for offences under Sections 186, 294, 323, 353, and 506 IPC and all consequential proceedings in RCC No. 9240/2023 including the cognizance order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, are hereby quashed. 26. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet