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2025 DAILYLAW 3824 (HP)

Abhishek Thakur v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-09-09

Virender Singh

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JUDGMENT : VIRENDER SINGH, J. 1. Petitioner-Abhishek Thakur has filed the present petition, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for quashing of FIR No. 213/2018, dated 04.11.2018, (hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR in question’) registered under Sections 307 and 201 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) with Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., as well as, the proceedings resultant thereto, bearing Sessions Trial No. 62 of 2020, which are stated to be pending before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), titled as ‘State of H.P. Vs Abhishek Thakur’, on the basis of the compromise, which is stated to have taken place between the petitioner and respondent No. 2. 2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner on the ground that on 04.11.2018, on the statement of respondent No. 3, FIR in question was registered against him, in which, the police has conducted the investigation and submitted charge sheet before the learned trial Court. 3. It is his further case that during the pendency of those proceedings, matter has now been compromised with the intervention of the respectable members of the society and on the basis of compromise, a prayer for quashing of the FIR in question has been made. 4. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition, as prayed for. 5. When put to notice, police has filed the status report, disclosing therein, that on 04.11.2018, a telephonic information, from Zonal Hospital, Dharamshala, was received in Police Station Dharamshala that a person has been brought in a critical condition for treatment and asked to sent the police. Accordingly, ASI Brij Lal, alongwith other police officials reached Zonal Hospital Dharamshala to verify the situation, where injured Pankaj Kumar (respondent No. 2) was found under treatment. The Medical Officer referred the injured for further treatment to Dr. RPGMC Tanda. Thereafter, Amandeep (respondent No. 3), friend of Pankaj, who had come with him, gave his statement, under Section 154 Cr.P.C., disclosing therein, that on 03.11.2018, he and Pankaj reached Abhishek’s house at Dadi near ITI, on their bike, at around 7:30 pm. There was no other member in Abhishek Thakur’s house, except him. They had food and drinks there. Thereafter, Amandeep (respondent No. 3), friend of Pankaj, who had come with him, gave his statement, under Section 154 Cr.P.C., disclosing therein, that on 03.11.2018, he and Pankaj reached Abhishek’s house at Dadi near ITI, on their bike, at around 7:30 pm. There was no other member in Abhishek Thakur’s house, except him. They had food and drinks there. At around 9:00 pm, Pankaj and Abhishek brought half a bottle of liquor and after eating and drinking, at around 11:30 pm, they started fighting over a trivial matter and arguing with each other went to the other room. After 3-4 minutes, he (respondent No. 3) on hearing the sound of breaking glass in the other room, he went to the said room. Abhishek told him that Pankaj broke the glass of the wash basin and in anger, Abhishek Thakur hit Pankaj on his stomach and left leg with the broken glass, due to which, blood started flowing. He pulled Pankaj out and called Pankaj’s younger brother and informed him about the incident, upon which, Abhishek Raghav brought a car and put Pankaj in the car and brought to Zonal Hospital for treatment. Thereafter, FIR in question has been registered and the criminal machinery swung into motion. On completion of the investigation, challan against the petitioner has been filed, which is pending adjudication, before the learned trial Court. 6. Complainant and injured have been impleaded as respondents No. 2 and 3, in this case, who has put appearance along with his Counsel. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have made a categorical statement that a scuffle had taken place between Abhishek Thakur and Pankaj Kumar on trivial matter, upon which, respondent No. 3 had lodged the FIR in question. Thereafter, the police conducted the investigation and after the investigation, charge-sheet has been filed, which is pending before the learned trial Court. 7. According to respondent No. 2, with the intervention of respectables of the society, the matter has now been compromised, in terms of compromise Annexure P-3, which bears his signatures encircled red at point A. The said compromise is stated to have been effected between the parties in order to maintain good relations between them. He has also deposed that the compromise has been effected, out of his sweet free will and without any coercion. 8. He has also deposed that the compromise has been effected, out of his sweet free will and without any coercion. 8. Similar type of statement has also been made by the petitioner, as well as, respondent No. 3- complainant. 9. Heard. 10. On the basis of above facts, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that there is no previous criminal history of the petitioner, and according to him, the incident in question seems to have taken place in the spur of moment and the same was not pre-meditated. As such, it has been prayed that petitioner, as well as, respondents No. 2 & 3, are young persons and according to him, they have taken positive steps to settle the dispute and said efforts should be recognized by the Court. It has also been argued that the alleged injury on the person of Pankaj Kumar was not on the vital part of the body. 11. However, the prayer so made by the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has been opposed by Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, learned Addl. A.G., appearing for the respondent-State, on the ground that the petitioner has committed a serious offence, i.e. under Section 307 IPC. In this regard, he has relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & others, (2019) 5 SCC 688 . 12. First of all coming to the objections, so raised, by the learned Addl. A.G., qua the fact that in the present case, Section 307 of IPC has been added by the Police, as such, according to him, said matter cannot be compromised. 13. The arguments of learned Additional Advocate General holds no water, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra), has not created absolute prohibition by the Court to exercise powers, under Section 482 Cr. P.C./528 of BNSS. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon paragraphs 14 and 15.4 of the judgment, which are reproduced as under: “14. P.C./528 of BNSS. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon paragraphs 14 and 15.4 of the judgment, which are reproduced as under: “14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” xxx xxx xxx 15.4 offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove” (Self emphasis supplied) 14. Judging the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra), this Court is of the view that it is a case, where evidence of the prosecution has yet not been completed. As such, there is no prohibition of quashing the FIR, even if the same is registered under Section 307 IPC. Moreover, the injury on the person of Pankaj Kumar is not on his vital part and there is nothing on the file/reply to show that there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause death. 15. Moreover, this Court is satisfied with the genuineness of the compromise, Annexure P-3, entered into between the parties. 16. Respondent No. 3, who, at one point of time, had reported the matter of scuffle to the police and on his statement, FIR in question has been registered and police conducted the investigation, today appeared before the Court, and reiterated the said factual position, however, he has stated that now, with the intervention of respectable persons of the society, the matter has been compromised between respondent No. 2 Pankaj Kumar and petitioner Abhishek Thakur. This Court is satisfied with regard to the genuineness of the compromise between the parties and it seems that the compromise is being effected in order to maintain future cordial relations between the parties. This Court is satisfied with regard to the genuineness of the compromise between the parties and it seems that the compromise is being effected in order to maintain future cordial relations between the parties. 17. The primary purpose of law is to maintain peace and harmony in the society. When, the petitioner and respondent No. 2 have buried all their disputes, by compromising the matter, then, permitting the proceedings to continue, before the learned trial Court, would be nothing, but, abuse of the process of law. 18. Even otherwise, acceptance of the compromise, by this Court, will save the precious judicial time of the learned trial Court, which, the learned trial Court will be in a position to devote for the decision of some other serious matters, pending before it. 19. Considering all these facts, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 213/2018, dated 04.11.2018, registered with Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., under Sections 307 and 201 of IPC, as well as, the proceedings, resultant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court, are ordered to be quashed. 20. The compromise deed, Annexure P-3, and the statements of the parties, recorded today, shall form part of the judgment. 21. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.