APHC010680132011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] THURSDAY, THE TENTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1190/2011 Between: PILLA RAMESH, S/O VENKATA RAO, R/O TUMMALAVA, RAJAHMUNDRY, E.G.DIST. CONVICT NO.2052, CENTRAL JAIL, RAJAHMUNDRY. ...PETITIONER AND 1.THE STATE OF A P, Represented by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. ...RESPONDENT Revision filed under Section 397/401 of CrPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the CriminalRevisionCase, the High Court may be pleased toto submit this memorandum of Crl.R.C., to this Hon'ble Court against the Judgment passed in Crl.A.No.383 of 2010, dated 03.06.2011 on the file of the VIII Addl. Sessions Judge (FTC), E.G.Dist., at Rajahmundry, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed in C.C.No.719 of 2003 by the III Addl. Judl. First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, dated 03.11.2010 convicting the petitioner U/s. 224 of I.P.C., for a period of one year and imposing a fine of Rs.3,000/-. IA NO: 1 OF 2011(CRLRCMP 1700 OF 2011 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the sentence imposed in C.C.No.719 of 2003, dated 03.11.2010 on the file of the III Addl. Judl. 2 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, as confirmed by the learned the VIII Addl. Sessions Judge (FTC), E.G.Dist., at Rajahmundry, dated 03.06.2011 in Crl.A.No.383 of 2010, by releasing the petitioner on bail. Counsel for the Petitioner: 1.K S MURTHY ASSOCIATES Counsel for the Respondent: 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 3 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 The Court made the following order: The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred under Sections 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C’.) challenging the judgment dated 03.06.2011 in Crl.A.No.383 of 2010 on the file of VIII Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), East Godavari at Rajahmundry, confirming the conviction and sentence for the offences punishable under Section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the IPC’.) by the learned III Additional judicial First Class Magistrate, Rajahmundry, in C.C.No.719 of 2003 vide judgment dated 03.11.2010. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while reiterating the grounds of the revision, submits that even though there was no corroborative evidence against the petitioner, learned Court below erroneously appreciated the evidence and wrongly convicted the petitioner. As such, learned counsel for the petitioner urges this Court to allow the present revision petition. Alternatively, it is submitted that the petitioner was convicted and sentenced in S.C.No.308 of 2001 on the file of learned Sessions Court, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District, vide judgment dated 23.07.2022, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the 4 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 Indian Penal Code (for brevity ‘IPC’.) and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Later, while undergoing the imprisonment for about nine months, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner in Crl.A.No.915 of 2002. A Division Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 24.04.2003, acquitted the petitioner for the charge under Section 302 of ‘the IPC’. While bringing the above said facts, learned counsel for the petitioner urged this Court to invoke the power under Section 427 of ‘the Cr.P.C’., and order the petitioner for to suffer the sentence already undergone in another offence. 3. On the other hand, Ms. P. Akhila Nayudu, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, submits that the learned Trial Court and the Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, who unequivocally stated that the petitioner had intentionally absconded from the police custody on 09.10.2002 at 5:40 a.m. from the Government General Hospital, Rajahmundry, while he was a pre-trial detainee undergoing life imprisonment. The Trial Court and the Appellate Court rightly found the petitioner guilty for the charge under Section 224 of ‘the IPC’. Hence, the Criminal Case may be dismissed, as it is not feasible to re-appreciate the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution, while deciding the 5 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 Criminal Revision Case and urged this Court to dismiss the Criminal Revision Case. 4. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. I have perused the record. 5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in Crl.A.No.383 of 2010 on the file of VIII Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Rajahmundry, East Godavari District, is valid and sustainable in the eye of law? 6. It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioner, who was undergoing life imprisonment for the charge under section 302 of ‘the IPC’. by the judgment of the learned Sessions Court, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District, in S.C.No.308 of 2001 on 23.07.2002, allegedly fell sick and he was referred to the Government General Hospital, Rajahmundry for treatment on 08.10.2022. The petitioner, being a convicted prisoner, was escorted by the police on 09.10.2002. When the petitioner reported to the escort police that he needed to attend natural calls, he was allowed to attend them. However, the petitioner escaped from the custody of the escort party, who were waiting outside the toilets. The evidence 6 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 of the escort party P.W.2 is that when the convict asked the escort police for answering calls of nature, the convict was sent into the lavatory and escort party was waiting outside of the doors, the convict, who went inside, bolted the doors from inside and did not open the doors even in expected time, thereupon the escort police got suspicion and went to the rear side of the lavatory and found that the convict has escaped from the ventilator of the lavatory, leaving the saline bottle in the lavatory. Thereupon, the escort party informed the same to the P.W.1, who is the Superintendent of prisons, Rajahmundry. Later P.W.1 presented a report to the police. 7. The evidence of the P.W.2 is crystal clear that it does not require any corroboration. The petitioner was not supposed to escape from the custody of escort party, as the petitioner was a convicted prisoner for the life imprisonment. There are no grounds whatsoever to appreciate the fact that he had not committed the offence. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence at this juncture, in the court of revision, by invoking the powers under section 397 and 401 of ‘the Cr.P.C’. 8. Therefore, conviction for the charge under Section 224 of ‘the IPC’., in regard to the sentence of imprisonment for one year and 7 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 fine of Rs.3,000/-, imposed on the petitioner by the learned Trial Court, and confirmed by the Appellate Court, shall be maintained. While preferring appeal, the petitioner paid fine of Rs.3,000/-. There were no adverse antecedents against the petitioner of similar nature when he was convicted. Therefore, imposition of one year is not proportionate to the gravity of the case, inasmuch as Section 224 of ‘the IPC’. gives power either to impose two years imprisonment or fine or both. It is important to note that challenging the sentence of life conviction, the petitioner preferred appeal before this Court in Crl.A.No.915 of 2002. This Court, on 24.04.2003, did not appreciate the judgment of the learned Trial Court in S.C.No.308 of 2001 and acquitted the petitioner, as the prosecution could not prove the guilty of the petitioner and other accused therein beyond doubts. From the date of the judgment of the learned Trial Court i.e., from 23.07.2002 and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court i.e., on 24.04.2003, altogether the petitioner was incarcerated for a period of nine months. 9. The Section 427 of Cr.P.C says as under. 1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, 8 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of A.P. v. Vijayanagaram Chinna Reddappa1, at paragraph No.12 held as under: “12. ... Under Section 427(2) Cr. P.C., the subsequent sentence should run concurrently along with a previous sentence, if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life, is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab2, at paragraph No.5 held as under: “5. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 427, if a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such subsequent term of imprisonment would normally commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he was previously sentenced. Only in appropriate cases, considering the facts of the case, the court can make the sentence run concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed. The investiture of such discretion, presupposes that such discretion be exercised by the court on sound judicial principles and not in a mechanical manner. Whether or not the discretion is to be exercised in directing sentences to run concurrently would depend upon the nature of the offence/offences and the facts and circumstances of each 1 2023 SCC OnLine SC 975 2 (2017) 5 SCC 53 9 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 case.” 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana3, at paragraph No.10 held as under: “…It is manifest from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary power shall have to be exercised along the judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of exercise of such discretion by the courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation of Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises.” 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh4, at paragraph Nos.8 and 9 held as under: “8. Sub-section (1) of Section 427 CrPC provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment. In other words, sub-section (1) of Section 427 CrPC deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life. In such a situation, the first sentence, being for a fixed term, expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is made. Sub-section (1) says that in such a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. Obviously, in cases covered by sub-section (1) where the sentence is for a fixed term, the subsequent sentence can be consecutive unless directed to run 3 (2013) 7 SCC 211 4 (1991) 4 SCC 304 10 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 concurrently. Sub-section (2), on the other hand, provides for an offender “already undergoing sentence of imprisonment for life” who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or for life. It is well settled since the decision of this Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse [(1961) 3 SCR 440 : AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736] and reiterated in Maru Ram [(1981) 1 SCC 107 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 112 : (1981) 1 SCR 1196] that imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the life of the offender unless the remaining sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. This being so at the stage of sentencing by the court on a subsequent conviction, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life must be understood in this manner and, therefore, there can be no question of a subsequent sentence of imprisonment for a term or for life running consecutively which is the general rule laid down in sub-section (1) of Section 427. As rightly contended by Shri Garg, and not disputed by Shri Lalit, the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life being understood to mean as a sentence to serve the remainder of life in prison unless commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority and a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to the earlier life sentence and certainly not added to it since extending the life span of the offender or for that matter anyone is beyond human might. It is this obvious situation which is stated in sub-section (2) of Section 427 since the general rule enunciated in sub-section (1) thereof is that without the court's direction the subsequent sentence will not run concurrently but consecutively. The only situation in which no direction of the court is needed to make the subsequent sentence run concurrently with the previous sentence is provided for in sub-section (2) which has been enacted to avoid any possible controversy based on sub-section (1) if there be no express direction of the court to that effect. Sub-section (2) is in the nature of an exception to the general rule enacted in sub- section (1) of Section 427 that a sentence on subsequent conviction commences on expiry of the first sentence unless the court directs it to run concurrently. The meaning and purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 427 and the object of enacting sub-section (2) is, therefore, clear. 9. We are not required to say anything regarding the practical effect of remission or commutation of the sentences since that question does not arise in the present case. The limited controversy before us has been indicated. The only question now is of the meaning and effect of the above quoted direction in this Court's judgment dated September 30, 1983. It is obvious that the direction of this Court must be construed to harmonise with Section 427(2) CrPC which is the statutory 11 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 mandate apart from being the obvious truth. The subsequent sentence of imprisonment for life has, therefore, to run concurrently with the earlier sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to the petitioner. The real exercise is to construe the last sentence in the direction which reads as under: “We, therefore, direct that in case any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence is granted to him the present sentence should commence thereafter.” It is in the background of this ultimate direction that the preceding portion has to be read. This last sentence in the direction means that in case, any remission or commutation is granted in respect of the earlier sentence of life imprisonment alone then the benefit of that remission or commutation will not ipso facto be available in respect of the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment which would continue to be unaffected by the remission or commutation in respect of the earlier sentence alone. In other words, the operation of the superimposed subsequent sentence of life imprisonment shall not be wiped out merely because in respect of the corresponding earlier sentence of life imprisonment any remission or commutation has been granted by the appropriate authority. The consequence is that the petitioner would not get any practical benefit of any remission or commutation in respect of his earlier sentence because of the superimposed subsequent life sentence unless the same corresponding benefit in respect of the subsequent sentence is also granted to the petitioner. It is in this manner that the direction is given for the two sentences of life imprisonment not to run concurrently.” 14. The Section 427 (2) mandates that when a person already undergone a sentence of imprisonment for life, his subsequent sentence would run concurrently with such previous sentence. Undeniably, the petitioner underwent sentence of imprisonment for some time, but later his appeal was considered by the Division Bench of this Court and it was allowed. 15. In obtaining peculiar circumstances of the case, the sentence 12 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 which the petitioner had undergone for a period of nine months can be reckoned towards the sentence of imprisonment imposed in this case, in the interest of justice, for the reasons that the conviction and sentence for the charge under Section 302 of ‘the IPC’., was set aside by the learned Appellate Court. 16. While reading Section 427 of ‘the Cr.P.C’., carefully, the case of the petitioner would not come strictly within the parameters of Section 427 of ‘the Cr.P.C’. However, in view of the fact that his life conviction was set aside by the learned Division Bench of this Court, the appropriate sentence would be sentencing the petitioner to pay fine of Rs.3,000/-, which he already paid while preferring appeal. Had the learned Division Bench of this Court confirmed the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, the petitioner would have been in life incarceration by this time. However, the learned Division Bench set aside the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. 17. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is disposed of, confirming the conviction for the offence under Section 224 of ‘’the IPC’, and confirming the payment of fine of Rs.3,000/-, modifying the sentence of imprisonment which he had already undergone. No order as to costs. 13 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. ___________________________ JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO Date: 10.07.2025 ANS 148 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO 14 Dr. YLR, J Cr.R.C.No.1190 of 2011 10.07.2025 CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 1190/2011 Date: 10.07.2025 ANS