[2025:RJ-JP:44155] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1938/2024 Vijendra Singh S/o Sh. Bachchan Singh, Aged About 58 Years, R/o Nimbas, Teh. Buhana, Dist. Jhunjhunu (Raj.). ----Appellant/Defendant Versus 1. Babulal S/o Sh. Chandgiram, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Langda Wali Dhani, Jatwas Mod, Mahendargarh, Teh. And Dist. Mahendargarh (Hr). 2. Sub-Registrar, Buhana, Dist. Jhunjhunu (Raj.). ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Brahma Prakash For Respondent(s) : Mr. Deepak Soni HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order 03/11/2025 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant assailing the order dated 28.11.2023 passed by Additional District Judge No.1, Khetri, Jhunjhunu, in Civil Misc. Case No.15/2023 titled as Babulal vs. Vijendra Singh, whereby the learned trial Court has allowed the application filed by the plaintiff-respondent under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC and restraining the appellant not to sale/alienate the suit property till disposal of the main suit. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement to sale dated 28.07.2017 and permanent injunction, wherein the respondent No.1 has paid sum of Rs.5,50,000/- in compliance of the said agreement to sale. [2025:RJ-JP:44155] (2 of 4) [CMA-1938/2024] 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the aforesaid agreement dated 28.07.2017, time period of twelve months was prescribed to perform obligations but the respondent- plaintiff herein has prolonged the same for many years and thereafter, filed the main suit. He further submits that the main suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation, therefore, the temporary injunction application ought not to have been allowed, accordingly, he prays that the impugned order dated 28.11.2023 may kindly be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and submits that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement dated 28.07.2017 and the main suit is not barred by limitation. He further submits that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Trial Court and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard and considered the submissions made at bar and perused the material available on record. 6. Looking to the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties as well as the impugned order passed by learned Trial Court, it is evident that the agreement dated 28.07.2017 was entered into between the parties and the main suit has been filed for specific performance of the same. 7. From the perusal of the record, it is also evident that vide the impugned order dated 28.11.2023, learned Trial Court has merely preserved the subject matter of the suit property and restrained the appellant from selling/alienating the suit property during pendency of the main suit and while doing so, learned Trial [2025:RJ-JP:44155] (3 of 4) [CMA-1938/2024] Court has considered all the three factors governing grant of temporary injunction namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss to the plaintiff and has rightly passed the injunction order dated 28.11.2025 preserving the subject matter of the suit property. 8. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Wander Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Antox India P. Ltd.1, while laying down the scope of appeals in case of temporary injunctions, held as under: "In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion." 9. The impugned orders clearly shows that both the courts below have considered the issue of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury in favour of the plaintiff; thus, it cannot be said that the Trial Court has acted capriciously, arbitrarily, perversely or in ignorance of the settled law on grant of temporary injunctions. 10. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the impugned order dated 28.11.2023. Accordingly, the present appeal, having no force and being devoid of merit, stands dismissed. 1 1990 Supp SCC 727 [2025:RJ-JP:44155] (4 of 4) [CMA-1938/2024] 11. However, it is made clear that the learned Trial Court is free to decide the main suit independently without being influenced by the observations made by this Court or the findings arrived at in the impugned order dated 28.11.2023. 12. All other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J PAYAL DHAWAN /48