[2025:RJ-JP:39693] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 201/2018 Dinesh Bhargava S/o Late Shri Laxmi Narain Bhargava, R/o Plot No. 592, Scheme No.10 Alwar Raj ----Defendant-Appellant Versus 1. Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And District Alwar Through Pujari And, R/o Bada Charan Das Mandir, Bahadurpur, District Alwar Raj 2. Mahendrasingh S/o Shri Chiranjilal, aged about 52 years, 3. Ramjas S/o Shri Mangturam, aged about 42 years, 4. Veer Singh S/o Shri Ramanand, aged about 48 years, All Bhaktagan Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj Kasba Dahra, R/o Gram Nagli Munshi Kasba Dahra Tehsil And District Alwar Raj ...Plaintiffs Respondents 5. Gopal Das Chela Shri Puran Das Ji Charan Das Sadhu, R/o Mandir Charan Das Ji Maharaj Gram Bahadurpur, Tehsil And District Alwar Raj (Deceased) 6. Smt. Bhuteri Yadav W/o Shri Yadram, R/o Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And District Alwar Raj ----Defendants-Respondents Connected With S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 200/2018 Murari Lal S/o Shri Sampat Rai Sharma R/o Kasba Dahra, Teh. And Distt. Alwar ----Appellant Versus 1. Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, Teh. And Distt. Alwar Through Pujari And Prabandhak Baba Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand Chela Gopal Das Mahant, Aged About 35 Years, R/o Bada Charan Das Mandir, Bahadurpur, Distt. Alwar 2. Mahendrasingh S/o Shri Chiranjilal, aged about 50 years, 3. Ramjas S/o Shri Mangturam aged about 42 years, 4. Veer Singh S/o Shri Ramanand, aged about 48 years All Bhaktagan Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, R/o Gram Nagli Munshi, Kasba Dahra, Teh. And Distt. Alwar ...Plaintiff-respondents [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (2 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 5. Gopal Das Chela Shri Puran Das Ji Charan Das Sadhu, R/o Mandir Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Gram Bahadurpur, Teh. And Distt. Alwar 6. Smt. Bhuteri Yadav W/o Shri Yadram R/o Kasba Dahra, Teh. And Distt. Alwar ----Defendants-Respondents S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 355/2018 Smt. Bhuteri Yadav W/o Shri Yadram, R/o Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And District Alwar Rajasthan ----Appellant Versus 1. Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And District Alwar Through Pujari, And Prabhandhak Baba Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand Chela Gopal Das Mahant, Aged 35 Years, R/o Bada Charan Das Mandir, Bahadurpur, District Alwar Rajasthan 2. Mahendrasingh S/o Shri Chiranjilal, aged about 50 years, 3. Ramjas S/o Shri Mangturam, aged about 42 years, 4. Veer Singh S/o Shri Ramanand, aged about 48 years, All Bhaktagan Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, R/o Gram Nagli Munshi, Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And District Alwar Rajasthan ----Plaintiffs -Respondents 5 Gopal Das Chela Shri Puran Das Ji Charan Das Sadhu, R/o Mandir Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Gram Bahadurpur, Teh. And Distt. Alwar 6 Dinesh Bhargava s/o Late Sh. Laxmi Narain Bhargava, resident of Plot No. 592, Scheme No.10, Alwar. ----Defendants-Respondents S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 359/2018 Smt. Bhuteri Yadav W/o Shri Yadram, R/o Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And Distt. Alwar. ----Appellant Versus 1. Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And Distt. Alwar, Through Pujari And Prabandhak Baba Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand Chela Gopal Das Mahant, Aged About 35 Years, R/o Bada Charan Das Mandir, Bahadurpur, Distt. Alwar. 2. Mahendrasingh S/o Shri Chiranjilal, aged about 52 years, [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (3 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 3. Ramjas S/o Shri Mangturam, aged about 42 years, 4. Veer Singh S/o Shri Ramanand, aged about 48 years, All Bhaktagan Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Ka, R/o Gram Nagli Munshi, Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And Distt. Alwar. ...Plaintiff/respondents 5. Gopal Das Chela Shri Puran Das Ji Charan Das Sadhu, R/o Mandir Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Gram Bahadurpur, Tehsil And Distt. Alwar (Deceased). 6. Murari Lal S/o Shri Sampat Rai Sharma, R/o Kasba Dahra, Tehsil And Distt. Alwar. ----Defendants-Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Parag Rastogi (In CFA Nos.201/2018 & 200/2018) Mr. Akhil Simlote Mr. Vaibhav Bhargava Mr. Ashwani Raj Tanwar Mr. Dikshant Jain (In CFA Nos.355/2018 & 359/2018) For Respondent(s) : Mr. Manak Chand Jain with Mr. Ankit Jain & Mr. Prayag Jain (for respondent No.1) Mr. Ajay Goyal (for respondent Nos.2 to 4) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Judgment Reserved on ::: September 24, 2025 Pronounced on ::: October 08, 2025 1. All these four appeals arise out of common judgment and decree and the controversy involved in all these appeals are also similar, hence, these four appeals are being decided by a common judgment. 2. These four appeals have been filed by the appellants for quashing and setting aside the judgment and [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (4 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] decree dated 12.01.2018 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar (for short ‘the court below’) in Civil Suit No. 41/2011 (49/2008) and in Civil Suit No.42/2011 (48/2008)-in First Appeal No.359/2018. 3. Facts of First Appeals No.201/2018, 200/2018 & 355/2018:- The facts emerge out from the pleadings are that on 17.11.2008 the plaintiff - respondents No. 1 to 4 filed a suit against the defendants appellants and defendant - respondent No. 1 and 3 for declaration and permanent injunction stating therein apart from other facts that the plaintiff respondent Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj is situated in Kasba Dahra, earlier which was known as Mandir Bihari Ji, but due to tapsaya by Sant Charan Das Ji Maharaj between 1859 to 1871 in the temple it is being called as Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Dahra. Erstwhile Alwar His Highness Sawai Bakhtawar Singh granted agricultural land as Mafi to the aforesaid temple between 1859 to 1871, ad-measuring about 26 Bigha 8 Biswa and about 50 Bigha in total about 76 Bigha in Gram Dahra and Gram Bahaurpur, which was recorded in the name of Sadhu Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj and expenses of seva puja in temple, etc are being borne out of the income from aforesaid land. After demise of Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj aforesaid land was recorded in the name of his Chela Shri Puran Das Ji [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (5 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Maharaj and after demise of Shri Puran Das Ji Maharaj aforesaid land was recorded in the name of his Chela Shri Gopal Das Ji Maharaj being Mahant of Mandir Charan Das. A suit was filed by another Mahant Seva Das Chela Prem Das against Gopal Das Chela Puran Das before the Court of S.D.O., in which compromise was filed by both the parties in collusion and they got decree in aforesaid suit on 04.04.2007. On the basis of aforesaid decree entries were also changed and they got recorded the aforesaid in their respective names on the basis of aforesaid collusive decree. Thereafter, the defendant respondent No. 5 has illegally executed three gift deeds, described in Para No. 1 of the plaint, in favour of the defendant No. 2- appellant which were registered on 24.09.2007 in the office of Sub - Registrar which are liable to be declared as void. After execution and registration of aforesaid three gift deeds in favour of the defendant No. 2- appellant mutation entries No. 267, 268 and 269 dated 20.02.2008 were made in his favour, which were challenged by the plaintiff respondents by filing appeals before the Collector, Alwar. The defendant No. 2- appellant has sold 92 air land bearing khasara No. 515 through sale deed dated 23.07.2008 in consideration of Rs. 4,75,000/- in favour of defendant No. 3 which is also liable to be declared void against the rights of the plaintiff - respondent No. 1. Aforesaid land is in the possession of the plaintiff - [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (6 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] respondent No. 1 and is being cultivated by management and bhaktgan of the temple and out of its income, expenses of temple are being borne. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 Murti Mandir is a perpetual minor, its puja and all management is being made by Shyam Das Pujari, so he is competent to file the present suit and plaintiff - respondent No. 2 to 4 are bhaktagan of murti mandir. Mahant Gopal Das defendant No. 1 has got no right to execute and register gift deed of agricultural land of murti mandir. It was mentioned in the Will dated 16.12.1983 executed by Shri Puran Das in favour of Mahant Gopal Das that after demise of Shri Puran Das, Gopal Das will manage the aforesaid agricultural land and out of the income of the aforesaid land, he may make development in the place but he may not alienate, mortgage, sale it and in case Gopal Das defame the name of the place villagers may substitute him by choosing some other competent mahatma. Gopal Das has also executed a will on 30.06.1997 in favour of Baba Shyam Das. The defendants are intending to get possession of the aforesaid land and they have threatened on 29.09.2008 to dispossess, to divide the aforesaid land in small plots and to construct boundary wall and houses thereon, so the defendants are required to be restrained through permanent injunction. 4. Facts of First Appeal No.359/2018:- [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (7 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] The facts borne out from the pleadings are that on 17.11.2008 the plaintiffs (respondents No. 1 to 4 herein) filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the present appellant and defendants (respondent No. 5 and 6 herein) stating therein that Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj is situated in Kasba Dahra, which was earlier known as Mandir Bihari Ji, but due to the tapsaya by Sant Charan Das Ji Maharaj between 1859 to 1871 in the temple the Mandir is being called as Mandir Murti Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, Dahra. Erstwhile Alwar His Highness Sawai Bakhtawar Singh granted agricultural land as Mafi to the aforesaid temple between 1859 to 1871, ad-measuring about 26 Bigha 8 Biswa and about 50 Bigha in total about 76 Bigha in Gram Dahra and Gram Bahaurpur, which was recorded in the name of Sadhu of the Mandir, Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj, and out of the income from aforesaid land the expenses of seva puja in temple, etc are being borne. The aforesaid land is a mandir maufi land. After demise of Shri Charan Das Ji Maharaj the aforesaid land was recorded in the name of his Chela Shri Puran Das Ji Maharaj and after demise of Shri Puran Das Ji Maharaj aforesaid land was recorded in the name of his Chela Shri Gopal Das Ji Maharaj. A conspiracy was hatched and another Mahant Seva Das Chela Prem Das filed a suit against Gopal Das Chela Puran Das before the Court of S.D.O., in which compromise was filed by both the [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (8 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] parties and they got decree in aforesaid suit on 04.04.2007. On the basis of collusive decree dated 4.4.2007, entries were also changed and they got recorded the aforesaid in their respective names. Thereafter, the defendant respondent No. 5 has illegally executed two gift deeds, described in Para No. 1 of the plaint, in favour of the defendant No. 2 which were registered on 24.09.2007 in the office of Sub Registrar which are liable to be declared as void. After execution and registration of aforesaid two gift deeds in favour of the defendant No. 2 mutation entries No. 270 and 271 dated 20.02.2008 were made in his favour, which were challenged by the plaintiff - respondents by filing appeals before the Collector, Alwar. The defendant No. 2 has sold 1/2 share of 80 air land bearing khasara No. 516 and 10 air land bearing khasara No. 527 through sale deed dated 23.07.2008 in consideration of Rs. 2,35,000/- in favour of the appellant which is also liable to be declared void against the rights of the plaintiff - respondent No. 1. Aforesaid land is in the possession of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 and is being cultivated by management and bhaktgan of the temple and out of its income, expenses of temple are being borne. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 Murti Mandir is a perpetual minor, its puja and all management is being made by Shyam Das Pujari, so he is competent to file the present suit and plaintiff -respondent No. 2 to 4 are bhaktagan of murti mandir. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (9 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Mahant Gopal Das had no right to execute the gift deed of the said land. When Gopaldas was sworn on the Gaddi by Shri Poorandas and the will which was written by Poorandas in favour of Gopal Das clearly prohibited Gopaldas from transferring the said land. Gopal Das has also executed a will on 30.06.1997 in favour of Baba Shyam Das. The defendants are intending to get possession of the aforesaid land and they have threatened on 29.09.2008 to dispossess, to divide the aforesaid land in small plots and to construct boundary wall and houses thereon, so the defendants are required to be restrained through permanent injunction. 5. The written statements of denial was filed. 6. On the basis of pleadings of both the parties, the learned court below framed the issues including the relief as under:- “In Civil Suit No.41/2011(49/2008) “1- vk;k okni= ds iSjk la[;k&1 esa of.kZr tehu efUnj ewfrZ dh tehu gS] bl dkj.k izfroknh la[;k&1 }kjk izfroknh la[;k&2 ds gd esa fnukad 24-09-07 dks iathÑr djk;s x;s rhu nkui= o muds vk/kkj ij [kqys bUrdky fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSa\ 2- vk;k izfroknh la[;k&2 }kjk izfroknh la[;k&3 ds gd esa fnukad 23-07-08 dks iathÑr djk;k x;k c;ukek oknh ds fo:) ckfry] csvlj o 'kwU; ?kksf"kr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\ 3- vk;k oknhx.k fookfnr vkjkth ds laca/k esa fo:) izfroknhx.k LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk dh fMdzh izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gaS\ [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (10 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 4- vk;k leqfpr U;k;'kqYd vnk ugha fd;k x;k gS\ 5- vk;k oknhx.k 'kq}gLr gksdj ugha vk;s gSa] ;fn gkW rks bldk okn ij vlj\ 6- vuqrks"k\“ “In Civil Suit No.42/2011(48/2008) “1- vk;k okni= ds iSjk la[;k&1 esa of.kZr tehu efUnj ewfrZ dh tehu gS] bl dkj.k izfroknh la[;k&1 }kjk izfroknh la[;k&2 ds gd esa fnukad 24-09-07 dks iathÑr djk;s x;s nks nkui= o muds vk/kkj ij [kqys bUrdky fujLr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSa\ 2- vk;k izfroknh la[;k&2 }kjk izfroknh la[;k&3 ds gd esa fnukad 23-07-08 dks iathÑr djk;k x;k c;ukek oknh ds fo:) ckfry] csvlj o 'kwU; ?kksf"kr fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS\ 3- vk;k oknhx.k fookfnr vkjkth ds laca/k esa fo:) izfroknhx.k LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk dh fMdzh izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gaS\ 4- vk;k leqfpr U;k;'kqYd vnk ugha fd;k x;k gS\ 5- vk;k oknhx.k 'kq}gLr gksdj ugha vk;s gSa] ;fn gkW rks bldk okn ij vlj\ 6- vuqrks"k\“ 7. After hearing the court below passed the impugned judgment and decree. 8. Counsels appearing for the appellants in Appeal Nos. 201/2018, 200/2018, 355/2018 and 359/2018 argued that the impugned judgment and decree has been passed without considering the material available on record as well as the provisions of law,. They submitted that court below [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (11 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] has failed to consider that Baba Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand is neither Pujari nor Prabandhak of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 and Baba Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand and the plaintiff -respondent No. 2 to 4 have no locus standee to file the present suit on behalf of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 against the defendant appellant and defendant respondent No. 5 and 6. Counsels further submitted that court below has failed to consider that from perusal of the plaint it is crystal clear that the relief claimed pertains to agricultural land, so the suit was triable by Revenue Court and the Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to try the dispute involved in the present case and, therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Civil Procedure Code or in the alternative the plaint was liable to be returned under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code for presentation before the competent court having jurisdiction. Counsels further submitted that the court below has failed to consider that Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) provides that all suits and applications of the nature specified in Schedule- III shall be heard and determined by a Revenue Court and further it has been provided that no Court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (12 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application. The explanation appended to Section 207 of the Act of 1955 provides that if the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the Civil Court is greater than, or additional to or is not identical with that which the revenue court may possibly grant. Counsel also submitted that the court below has failed to consider that the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 to 4 were not entitled to claim any relief prayed by them until and unless it is declared that the plaintiff respondent No. 1 is the khatedar-tenant of the disputed land and as the land in dispute is an agricultural land, such declaration can be granted only by a revenue court in a suit filed under the provisions of Section 88 of the Act of 1955 which provides for filing of a suit for declaration by a person claiming to be a tenant in respect of his right as a tenant. Counsels also submitted that the court below has failed to consider the provisions of Section 242 of the Act of 1955 which provides that if, in any suit relating to agricultural land instituted in a civil court, any question regarding tenancy rights arises and such question has not previously been determined by a revenue court of competent jurisdiction, the civil court shall frame an issue on the plea of tenancy and [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (13 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] submit the record to the appropriate revenue court for the decision of that issue. Counsels also submitted that the court below has failed to consider the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act of 1963’) which provides that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief and proviso of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 which provides that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do So. Counsels also submitted that the court below has failed to consider that the plaintiffs respondents No. 1 to 4 have neither sought relief for declaration that the plaintiff respondent No. 1 is the khatedar-tenant of the disputed land nor the plaintiffs - respondents No. 1 to 4 have sought relief for delivery of possession although as per material available on record the land in dispute is possessed and cultivated by the defendant appellant and defendant -respondent No. 6, so no relief ought to be granted by the learned court below to the plaintiff respondent No. 1 to 4 in the present suit. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (14 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] They further submitted that the court below has failed to consider the provisions of Indian Evidence Act according to which burden of proof was on the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 to 4 to prove that the disputed land was mafi mandir land and same was recorded in the record of rights in the khatedari of the plaintiff - respondent No. 1 at any point of time. Counsels also submitted that the whole approach adopted by the learned court below while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 was illegal, irregular and erroneous. They also submitted that while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 the court below has misread and misinterpreted the pleadings of the parties as well as oral and documentary evidence made available on record by the parties, so the findings given by the courts below are perverse. Counsels also submitted that while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 the court below has failed to consider that the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 to 4 were required to stand on their own feet and they were not entitled to get any benefit on the basis of weakness on the part of the defendant-appellant and defendants respondents No. 5 and 6. They further submitted that while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 learned court below has failed to consider the admissions made by the PW-1 to PW-4 during their cross examination, hence the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be quashed and set aside. They further [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (15 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] submitted that while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 the court below has failed to consider that the statement of a witness can not be read in piecemeal and statement of a witness is required to be considered as a whole. They also submitted that while deciding issues No. 1 to 3 and 5 the court below has failed to consider the statements of PW-1 Mahendra Singh, PW-2 Ramjas, PW-3 Veer Singh and PW-4 Shyam Das @ Kailash Chand. They also submitted that the court below has erred in deciding issues no. 1 to 3 and 5 against the defendant - appellant and defendant respondent No. 5 and 6. Counsels also submitted that the court below while deciding issues No. 1 to 3, 5 and 6 failed to consider that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to 4 are not entitled for grant of any relief against the defendant-appellant and defendant respondent No. 5 and 6. Counsels also submitted that the court below while deciding issue No. 1 has erred in holding that the disputed land belongs to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 without any documentary evidence only on the basis of assumption and presumption. They also submitted that the court below while deciding issue No. 1 has erred in holding that the disputed land is mafi mandir land. Counsels also submitted that the court below while deciding issue No. 1 has erred in considering the documents [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (16 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] which were not tendered in evidence by any of the parties in evidence, even otherwise the learned court below while deciding issue No. 1 has misread and misinterpreted those documents because as per none of the documents disclose that the disputed land was recorded in the name of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 in the record of rights at any point of time. They also submitted that the court below while deciding issue No. 1 has erred in holding that the document, namely Will dated 16.12.1983 alleged to be executed by Puran Das in favour of Gopal Das has been admitted by both the parties. Counsels also submitted that the court below while deciding issues No. 5 failed to consider that the plaintiff- respondent No. 1 to 4 are not entitled for grant of any relief against the defendant-appellant and defendant respondent No. 5 and 6 as the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to 4 have not came with clean hands before the Court. The plaintiff- respondent No. 1 to 4 falsely state in the plaint that the disputed land is being possessed and cultivated by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to 4 and the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 to 4 have concealed the material fact from the Court that the appeals filed by them against the mutation dated 20.02.2008 have been dismissed by the Collector, Alwar vide Judgment dated 13.07.2010 and by the Divisional Commissioner, Jaipur vide Judgment dated 21.07.2015. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (17 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Counsel appearing for the appellant in Appeal No.355/2018 argued that the appellant Bhuteri Yadav is a bonafide purchaser for consideration. She has purchased the land bearing Khasra No.515 bearing 92 Are vide registered sale deed dated 23.07.2008 for a consideration of Rs.4,75,000/- without notice. 9. Counsel appearing for the appellant in Appeal No. 359/2018 additionally argued that the court below failed consider the fact that the appellant, Bhuteri Yadav is a bonafide purchaser for consideration. She has purchased the land bearing Khasra no.516 measuring 80 Are and land bearing Khasra no. 527 measuring 10 Are vide registered sale deed dated 23.7.2008 for a consideration of Rs 2,35,000/- without notice. 10. Counsels appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents opposed the submissions advanced by the counsels appearing for the appellants and supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the court below. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents further submitted that while executing the Will in favour of Gopal Das by Puran Das, specific conditions were mentioned that Gopal Das will not alienate, mortgage or sale the subject property and therefore, Gopal Das has no right to gift or sale the suit property still he has transferred the suit property. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (18 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 11. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents also submitted that as per Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short ‘the Act of 1882’), Gopal Das has no right to gift or sale the Mafi land of the suit in question. The Gift Deed made by Gopal Das in favour of Murarilal and Dinesh Bhargava are liable to be cancelled and further the sale deed executed on the basis of the alleged Gift Deeds are also liable to be cancelled. 12. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents has also referred to the Circular dated 13.12.1991 issued by the Government of Rajasthan by which the temple land recorded in the name of Pujari is to be transferred back in the name of temple. He also submitted that the validity of the aforesaid Circular has been upheld by the High Court in the case of Modh Giri v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 2004 WLC (Raj.) UC 641. He has also referred the judgment delivered in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Pujari Utthan Avam Kalian Samiti & Anr., reported in 2021 (3) DNJ SC 957 whereby similar Circulars issued by the State of Madhya Pradesh, their validity has been upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 13. As regards the issue of maintainability raised from the appellants’ side, the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents submitted that the suit for cancellation of the Gift Deed and Sale Deed is maintainable before the Civil [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (19 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Court. He also submitted that the cancellation of mutation in favour of donee is axillary relief. He also submitted that entries in the revenue records (Jamabandi) does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record of rights. The entries in the Revenue Records or Jamabandi have only fiscal purpose, i.e. payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. He also submitted that the title of the property concerned can only be decided by the competent Civil Court. 14. Considered the submissions advanced by the counsel appearing for the respective parties and gone through the record of the case including the judgments relied upon. 15. During the pendency of the appeals, the plaintiffs/ respondents preferred applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for taking additional documents on record in Appeals No.201/2018 and 200/2018. Since the documents attached with the applications are not the subsequent documents and they were well within the knowledge of the plaintiffs/ respondents and they have failed to give satisfactory explanation for not submitting the said documents during the suit proceedings. Taking documents attached with the applications on record, would deprive the other side from an opportunity to cross-examination the material witnesses in relation to those documents. Hence, the Court is not inclined [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (20 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] to take such documents on record at the belated stage without there being sufficient reasons for such lapses. Accordingly, the applications filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are dismissed. 16. One legal submission as regards the jurisdiction of the trial court has been raised from the appellants’ side that the Civil Court as like in the present case is not having the jurisdiction to entertain the suit for cancellation of the Gift Deeds and Sale Deeds without seeking declaration by plaintiffs of Khatedari rights before the competent Civil Court. 17. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs /respondents agitated that without raising the issue of jurisdiction before the trial court the appellants cannot raise this issue at the stage of appeal. 18. It is a question of law whether in the facts and circumstances of this case the suit for cancellation of the Gift Deeds and subsequent registered Sale Deeds can be filed before the Civil Court without the plaintiffs/ respondents seeking any declaration of Khatedari rights in their favour from a competent Revenue Court. Whether such question of law can be agitated at the stage of appeal or not? The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors. v. Ravinder Nath & Ors., reported in (2008) 1 SCR 1121 has observed in para Nos. 17, 18 and 19 as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (21 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] “17. In our considered opinion, it cannot be said that there was no question of law involved as we have pointed out that the issues squarely fell in the area covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and was, therefore, specifically barred. The question is whether this issue regarding the jurisdiction could be allowed to be raised before us. The question of jurisdiction came up before this Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr., 2005(4) RCR (Civil) 260 : [(2005)7 SCC 791]. The Court therein was considering the question raised whether the court had jurisdiction under section 16(d) CPC to deal with the matter in question. In short the court was considering whether the amendment could have been allowed raising objection to the territorial jurisdiction. This Court in para 30 observed as under: "We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (22 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity." The Court then proceeded to rely on the case in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu [(1966) 1 SCR 461 : AIR 1966 Supreme Court 634] and observed in para 32 that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. The Court further observed that" "It is well settled and needs no authority that 'where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing'. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice." The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan [(1955)1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 Supreme Court 340] and quoted therefrom: "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (23 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction...strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." Though in the aforementioned decision these observations were made since the defendants before raising the objection to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that the court had the jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot be ignored and it has to be held that such a decree would continue to be a nullity. 18. The aforementioned decision was followed again in Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors., 2007(4) RAJ 142 : [(2007)2 SCC 355] where one of us, Sinha, J. was a party. Ofcourse while following this decision the Court referred to the decisions in Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu [(1979 2 SCC 34];Zila Sahakari Kendrya Bank Maryadit v. Shahjadi Begum, 2007(1) SCT 419 : [(2006)11 SCC 692] as also Shahabad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Special Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, 2007(1) RCR (Civil) 113 : 2007(1) SCT 112 : 2007(1) RAJ 144 : [(2006)12 SCC 404]. CONCLUSION 19. Once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non judice, there would be no question of [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (24 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] upholding the same merely on the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second Appellate stage. It must, therefore, be held that the civil court in this case had no jurisdiction to deal with the suit and resultantly the judgments of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court are liable to be set aside for that reason alone and the appeal is liable to be allowed. In view of this verdict of ours, we have deliberately not chosen to go into the other contentions raised on merits. We, however, make it clear that we have not, in any manner, commented upon the rights of the plaintiffs- respondents, if any, arising out of the Labour Jurisprudence.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in SEBI through its Chairman v. Roofit Industries Limited, reported in (2015) 12 SCR 190 has observed in para No.6 as under:- “6. However, before imposing such a penalty, we must consider the date on which the amendment came into effect, i.e. 29.10.2002. Since the Appellant’s Summons to furnish the required documents was prior to this date and the Respondent failed to do so till well after it, the question before us is when the failure or default took place. While this question does not appear to have been raised before the SAT, it is a question of law and can therefore be raised at any point. As was held by this Court in Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapa Subbanna (1965) 2 SCR 661, a pure question of law, which is not dependent on the determination of any question of fact, may be [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (25 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] raised for the first time at the appellate or even the final stage, even though no reference to it had been made in the Courts below.” Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapa Subbanna & Ors., reported in (1965) 2 SCR 661 has observed as under:- “Chitturi Subbanna, appellant, applied to the High Court for permission to raise an additional ground of appeal to the effect that the trial Court was not entitled to grant mesne profits for more than 3 years from the date of the decree of the High Court. The High Court disallowed that prayer for the reasons that he had not taken such a ground in the memorandum of appeal and had, on the other hand, conceded before the Commissioner and the trial Court that accounts could be taken upto 1943 in respect of A and C schedule properties, that he had elected to have the profits determined by the trial Court upto the date of delivery of possession and that if he had taken the objection earlier, it would have been open to the second plaintiff- respondent to file a suit for the recovery of mesne profits beyond the three years upto the date of delivery of possession. It is urged before us for the appellant that the High Court was in error in not allowing the appellant to have raised the objection based on the provisions of O.20, r. 12, C.P.C. We agree with this contention. The question sought to be raised was a pure question of law and was not dependent on the determination of any question of fact. The first appellate Court ought to have allowed [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (26 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] it. Such pure questions of law are allowed for the first time at later stages too. The appellant could not have claimed - and did not claim - a right to urge the new point which had not been taken in the grounds of appeal. He made a separate application for permission to take up that point. The procedure followed was in full conformity with that had been suggested in Wilson v. United Counties Bank, Ltd. L.R. [1920] A.C. 102 to the effect: “If in exceptional cases parties desire to add new grounds to those of which they have given notice, it will usually be convenient, by a substantive application, to apply to the indulgence of the Court which is to hear the appeal.” In Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [950] S.C.R. 852 this Court allowed a question of law to be raised at the hearing of the appeal even though no reference to it had been made in the Courts below or in the grounds of appeal to this Court. This Court said: “If the facts proved and found as established are sufficient to make out a case of fraud within the meaning of section 18, this objection may not be serious, as the question of the applicability of the section will be only a question of law and such a question could be raised at any stage of the caseand also in the final court of appeal. The following observations of Lord Watson in Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. v. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (27 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Kavanagh [1892] A.C. 473 are relevant. He said : ''When a question of law is raised for the first time in a court of last resort upon the construction of a document or upon facts either admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent but expedient in the interests of justice to entertain the plea. The expediency of adopting that course may be doubted when the plea cannot be disposed of without deciding nice questions of fact in considering which the court of ultimate review is placed in a much less advantageous position than the courts below. Again, it was said in M.K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras: “The High Court had allowed the Respondent 3 to raise the question even at that late stage inasmuch as it was a pure question of law and the learned Solicitor General therefore rightly did not press the first contention before us. 8. In Iittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, this Court did not allow the question of limitation to be raised in this raised in this Court as it was considered to be not a pure question of law but a mixed question of law and fact.” 19. In view of the aforementioned verdict of the Hon’ble Apex Court and further the fact that a decree passed by the Civil Court having no jurisdiction is a nullity and [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (28 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] therefore, the question of jurisdiction relating to the subject property can be agitated at any stage i.e. even at the stage of appeal also. The objection of respondents regarding raising of the legal issue of jurisdiction of trial court at the stage of appeal is not sustainable. 20. As per the facts of the present case, the suit land was recorded in the name of Gopal Das, there is an entry in the Revenue Records in his favour and also there is a decree dated 04.04.2007 of the Court of Sub Divisional Officer. As per the Revenue Records the land was recorded in the name of Gopal Das and mutation was opened in his name. Khatedar Gopal Das, who is defendant No.1 having the right to dispose of / transfer the suit land which was recorded in his name executed through Gift Deeds in the name of defendant- Dinesh Bhargava, the details of which were mentioned in the plaint itself, are as under:- “¼i½ vkjkth [k-ua- 498 jdck 1-01 gSDVj pkgh lks;e dk bardky ,d nku i= jftLVMZ fn- 24-09-2007 tks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 794 ds i`’B la- 55 ds Øe la- 2007007066 ij iathd`r gqvk ¼ii½ vkjkth [k-ua- 515 jdck 0-92 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke dk bardky ,d nku i= jftLVMZ fn- 24-09-2007 tks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 794 ds i`’B la- 51 ds Øe la- 2007007062 ij iathd`r gqvk [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (29 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] ¼iii½ vkjkth [k-ua- 527 jdck 0-10 gSDVj] 516 jdck 0-80 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke] 526 jdck 0-45 gSDVj] 524 jdck 0-20 gSDVj <gjh izFke dqy fdrk 4 dqy jdck 1-55 gSDVj dk bardky ,d nku i= jftLVMZ fn- 24-09-2007 tks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 794 ds i`’B la- 54 ds Øe la- 2007007065 ij iathd`r gqvk“ 21. Khatedar Gopal Das also executed two Gift Deeds in favour of Murarilal, the details of which as per the plaint, are as under:- “¼i½ vkjkth [k- ua- 527 jdck 0-10 gSDVj] 516 jdck 0-80 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke] 526 jdck 0-45 gSDVj] 524 jdck 0-20 gSDVj <gjh izFke dqy fdrk 4 dqy jdck 1-55 gSDVj dk 1@2 fgLlk dk bardky ,d nku i= jftLVMZ fn- 24-09-2007 tks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 794 ds i`"B la- 52 ds Øe la- 2007007063 ij iathÑr gqvkA ¼ii½ vkjkth [k- ua- 604 jdck 0-53 gS- pkgh nks;e] [k- ua- 605 jdck 0-01 gS- xSj eq- pkg] [k- ua- 606 jdck 1-00 gS- pkgh nks;e] [k- ua- 619 jdck 0-24 gS- pkgh lks;e dqy fdrk 4 dqy jdck 1-78 gSDVj dk bardky ,d nku i= jftLVMZ fn- 24- 09-2007 tks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 794 ds i`"B la- 53 ds Øe la- 2007007064 ij iathÑr gqvkA“ 22. On the basis of the aforesaid Gift Deeds, the land was recorded in the name of persons in whose favour the Gift Deeds were executed. The defendant No.2 [Dinesh Bhargava in Civil Suit No.41/2011 (49/2008)] executed registered Sale Deeds dated 23.07.2008 in favour of defendant Bhuteri Yadav and the defendant No.2 [Murari Lal (in Civil Suit No. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (30 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 42/2011)] also executed registered Sale Deeds dated 23.07.2008 in favour of Bhuteri Devi. 23. The plaintiffs who are common in both the civil suits filed two separate plaints with the following relief clause:- “In Suit No. 41/2011 (49/2008): “(i) ;g fd fMØh bLrdjkj gd bl vk”k; dh fd izfroknh la- 1 }kjk fu’ikfnr o izfroknh la- 2 ds gd esa iathd`r rhu nku i= fnukad 24-09-2007 ckcr vkjkth [k-ua- 498 jdck 1-01 gSDVj pkgh lks;e] [k-ua- 515 jdck 0-92 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke] [k-ua- 527 jdck 0-10 gSDVj] 516 jdck 0-80 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke] 526 jdck 0-45 gSDVj] 524 jdck 0-20 gSDVj <gjh izFke dqy fdrk 6 dqy jdck 3-48 gSDVj okds xzke Mgjk rglhy o ftyk vyoj gS] ftu nku i=ksa dk fooj.k okn i= ds iSjk la- 1 esa mifteu i, ii, iii esa ntZ gS] dks “kwU; djkj fn;k tkosA (ii) fMØh ?kks’k.kkRed bl izdkj dh tkjh dh tkos fd mDr nku i=ksa tks rgjhj o iath;u fnukad 24-09-2007 ds vk/kkj ij tks bardky la- 267] 268 o 269 QSlyk fnukad 20-02-2008 Lohdkj fd;s x;s gS o ftudk vey gky tekcanh esa fd;k x;k gS os dkfcy fujLr gS ftUgsa fujLr djkj fn;k tkos o bUnzktkr Hkh dyetu ;ksX; djkj fn;s tkosaA (iii) fMØh ?kks’k.kkRed bl vk”k; dh Hkh ikfjr dh tkos fd cS;ukek izfroknh ua- 2 us izfroknh ua- 3 ds gd esa fnukad 23-07- 2008 dks ys[kc) djkds lkgc miiath;d vyoj ds le{k is”k dj iathc`) djk;k gS tks cS;ukek fnukad 23-07-2008 dks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 827 ds i`’B la- 132 Øe la- 2008004767 ij iathc`) fd;k x;k rFkk ftldh ,d vfrfjDr izfr iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 2389 ds i`’B la- 234 ls 241 ij pLik dh xbZ gS] dks [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (31 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Hkh oknh ua- 1 ds gdwdksa ds ceqdkcys ckfry] csvlj o “kwU; djkj fn;k tkosA (iv) fMØh gqDebErukbZ nokeh bl vk”k; dh fd fookfnr vkjkth ds oknh ua- 1 ds mi;ksx miHkksx o dCts esa izfroknh la- 2 o 3 fdlh Hkh izdkj ls etkger] ck/kk mRiUu ugha djsa o dk;Z dk”r esa :dkoV iSnk uk djsa o Qly ysus] cksus] dkVus esa dksbZ :dkoV iSnk uk djsa o vkjkth eqrnkfo;k dks jgu cS; fgck ds tfj;s eqUrfdy djus ls ckt jgsa o ekSds dh fLFkfr ;Fkkor j[ksaA (v) vU; mfpr nknjlh tks U;k; laxr gks iznku dh tkosA“ “In Suit No. 42/2011 (48/2008): “(i) ;g fd fMØh bLrdjkj gd bl vk”k; dh fd izfroknh la- 1 }kjk fu’ikfnr o izfroknh la- 2 ds gd esa iathd`r nks nku i= fnukad 24-09-2007 ckcr vkjkth [k-ua- 527 jdck 0-10 gSDVj] 516 jdck 0-80 gSDVj ckjkuh izFke] 526 jdck 0-45 gSDVj] 524 jdck 0-20 gSDVj <gjh izFke] 604 jdck 0-53 gS- pkgh nks;e] [k-ua- 605 jdck 0-01 gS- xSj eq-pkg] [k-ua- 606 jdck 1-00 gS- pkgh nks;e] [k-ua- 619 jdck 0-24 gS- pkgh lks;e dqy fdrk 8 dqy jdck 3-33 gSDVj okds xzke Mgjk rglhy o ftyk vyoj gS] ftu nku i=ksa dk fooj.k okn i= ds iSjk la- 1 esa mifteu i, ii esa ntZ gS] dks “kwU; djkj fn;k tkosA (ii) fMØh ?kks’k.kkRed bl izdkj dh tkjh dh tkos fd mDr nku i=ksa tks rgjhj o iath;u fnukad 24-09-2007 ds vk/kkj ij tks bardky la- 270] 271 QSlyk fnukad 20-02-2008 Lohdkj fd;s x;s gS o ftudk vey gky tekcanh esa fd;k x;k gS os dkfcy fujLr gS ftUgsa fujLr djkj fn;k tkos o bUnzktkr Hkh dyetu ;ksX; djkj fn;s tkosaA [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (32 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] (iii) fMØh ?kks’k.kkRed bl vk”k; dh Hkh ikfjr dh tkos fd cS;ukek izfroknh ua- 2 us izfroknh ua- 3 ds gd esa fnukad 23-07- 2008 dks ys[kc) djkds lkgc miiath;d vyoj ds le{k is”k dj iathc`) djk;k gS tks cS;ukek fnukad 23-07-2008 dks iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 827 ds i`’B la- 133 Øe la- 2008004768 ij iathc`) fd;k x;k rFkk ftldh ,d vfrfjDr izfr iqLrd la- 1 ftYn la- 2389 ds i`’B la- 242 ls 250 ij pLik dh xbZ gS] dks Hkh oknh ua- 1 ds gdwdksa ds ceqdkcys ckfry] csvlj o “kwU; djkj fn;k tkosA (iv) fMØh gqDebErukbZ nokeh bl vk”k; dh fd fookfnr vkjkth ds oknh ua- 1 ds mi;ksx miHkksx o dCts esa izfroknh la- 2 o 3 fdlh Hkh izdkj ls etkger] ck/kk mRiUu ugha djsa o dk;Z dk”r esa :dkoV iSnk uk djsa o Qly ysus] cksus] dkVus esa dksbZ :dkoV iSnk uk djsa o vkjkth eqrnkfo;k dks jgu cS; fgck ds tfj;s eqUrfdy djus ls ckt jgsa o ekSds dh fLFkfr ;Fkkor j[ksaA (v) vU; mfpr nknjlh tks U;k; laxr gks iznku dh tkosA“ 24. From the facts on record it is very much clear that on the date when the Gift Deeds were executed, the land was recorded in the name of Gopal Das and not in the names of the plaintiffs. There is no revenue record in favour of the plaintiffs as regards the suit land and also its possession. On the basis of the Gift Deeds by Gopal Das, the entries were recorded in the names of Dinesh Bhargava and Murarilal in favour of whom the Gift Deeds were executed. The plaintiff Baba Shyam @ Kailash Chand by filing an appeal before the [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (33 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] District Collector, Alwar, challenged the mutation entries which is evident from the documents Exhibits 12 and 15. 25. As per the facts brought on record, the appeals filed against the mutation in favour of Dinesh Bhargava and Murarilal were dismissed by the District Collector, Alwar vide its judgment dated 13.07.2010 and revision against the judgment of the District Collector, Alwar filed before the Divisional Commissioner was also dismissed vide judgment dated 21.07.2015. The aforesaid facts clearly reveal that at the time of the alleged Gift Deeds and the Registered Sale Deeds the plaintiffs were having no title over the suit property and they were also not party to the alleged Gift Deeds and the Sale Deeds. On looking to the prayer clause of both the suits, the Court finds that the plaintiffs in the plaints have not sought any relief for declaration in their favour as regards the land in question and possession but have only made the prayer for cancellation of the Gift Deeds and subsequent Sale Deeds, the details of which have been mentioned in the plaints. It is not in dispute that on the date of institution of the suits the land in question was recorded in the name of defendant Bhuteri Devi. 26. Part I of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the jurisdiction of the Courts and res judicata. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of the jurisdiction of the Civil [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (34 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Courts to try all the suits unless barred. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:- “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred .- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation [I]:-A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. [Explanation II:-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.] 27. Section 256 of the Act of 1955 (for short ‘the Act of 1955’) deals with the bar to jurisdiction of Civil Courts as regards certain proceedings. Section 256 of the Act of 1955 reads as under:- “256. Bar to jurisdiction of Civil courts — (1) Save as otherwise provided specifically by or under this Act, no suit or proceeding shall lie in any civil court with respect or any matter arising under this Act or the rule made thereunder, for which a remedy by way of suit, application, appeal or otherwise is provided therein. (2) Save as aforesaid no order passed by the State Government or by any revenue court or Officer in exercise of the powers conferred by this Act or the [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (35 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] rules made thereunder, shall he liable to be questioned in any civil court.” 28. Section 207 of the Act of 1955 provides for the suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only. Section 207 of the Act of 1955 reads as under:- “207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only— (1) All suits and application of the nature specified in the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court. (2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suitor application. Explanation— If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted.” 29. In view of the aforesaid provisions, the Court feels that Section 9 CPC provides Civil Courts to try all the suits of a civil nature unless expressly or impliedly barred by any Statute. Section 256 of the Act of 1955 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts for which a remedy by way of suit, application, appeal or otherwise is provided in the Act of 1955. Section 207 of the Act of 1955 says that no court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any suit or, application of the nature as specified in the Third Schedule, [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (36 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] which can be heard by the revenue court as an exclusive jurisdiction. 30. Third Schedule appended to the Act of 1955 speaks of the suit for declaration of the plaintiff’s right (i) as a tenant; (ii) as a tenant of khudkast; (iii) as a sub-tenant; and (iv) for a share in a joint tenancy. The entries at S.No.9 in the Third Schedule read with Section 207 of the Act of 1955 stipulates that a suit for declaration of right would lie before the Revenue Court. 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pyarelal (supra) after having considered the aforestated law, provisions and the facts of the case that the land in question therein recorded in the name of the defendants and the plaintiff filed a suit to challenge the gift-deed made by one defendant in favour of other before the Civil Court, has observed as under:- “The question before this court was whether a recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour and in possession was required to file a suit in the revenue court, or where the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit seeking relief of cancellation of a void document. Upholding the jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit, a two judge Bench of this Court differentiated between a recorded tenure holder, and an unrecorded tenure holder with the following observations: [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (37 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] “7. …we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court - reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession.” 32. It is a settled principle of law that if the suit property is recorded in the name of the defendant then no relief of permanent injunction, possession etc. can be sought without seeking declaration in his favour by the plaintiff before the competent Court having subject jurisdiction. 33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pyarelal v. Shubhendra Pilania (Minor) thorugh Natural Guardian (Father) shri Pradeep Kumar Pilania & Ors., reported in (2019) 3 SCC 692 after having taking into consideration [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (38 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] various provisions of the Act of 1955 and the Code of Civil Procedure, has observed in para Nos. 25, 26 and 27 as under:- “25. The question before this court was whether a recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour and in possession was required to file a suit in the revenue court, or where the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit seeking relief of cancellation of a void document. Upholding the jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit, a two judge Bench of this Court differentiated between a recorded tenure holder, and an unrecorded tenure holder with the following observations: (Ram case, SCC p. 28, para 7) “7. …we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court - reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (39 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession.” 26. Though the above principles emerge in the context of the bar under Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the logic of the judgment extends to the bar under Section 207 read with Section 256 of the of the Tenancy Act. A recorded khatedar stands on a different footing compared to a claimant seeking a decree of their khatedari rights. A claimant seeking a decree of khatedari rights is barred from filing a suit in the civil court prior to their khatedari right being decreed by a revenue court when the relief sought for by the civil court includes a determination of khatedari rights. 27. In the present case, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the suit seeking a declaration of the gift deed relating to disputed agricultural land situated in Sikar as void and restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 from transfer or sale of the agricultural land before the civil court is squarely covered by the bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The claim of the appellant to khatedari rights is pending adjudication by a revenue court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a 13 claim. The appellant has no right to seek relief before the civil court without first getting his khatedari rights decreed by the revenue court.” [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (40 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs & Ors., reported in (2008) 5 SCR 331 has observed in para No.17 as under:- “17. To summarize, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (41 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title [either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar (supra)]. Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straight- forward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (42 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 35. As per the pleadings and evidence on record, the suit land is an agricultural land. The plaintiffs in their plaint in Para Nos. 1, 6 and 8 have stated the aforesaid facts. The appellants/ defendants in their written statements have categorically denied the averments made in the plaint as regards the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property. As per the averments of the alleged Gift Dees and the Registered Sale Deeds, the possession of the suit property has been handed over to the persons in whose favour the Gift Deeds and Sale Deeds were executed. The trial court has not framed the issue as regards declaration or possession. PW1 Mahendra Singh (plaintiff) has admitted this fact in evidence that the plaintiffs are not in possession over the suit property. 36. Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents has relied upon the case of Prahlad Pradhan & Ors. v. Sonu Kumhar & Ors., reported in (2019) 10 SCC 259 and submitted that the entries in the Revenue Records do not make the property as self acquired nor its document of title. He has also referred the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Eureka Builders & Ors. v. Gulabchand & Ors., reported in (2018) 8 SCC 67 and submitted that it is a well settled law that a person can only transfer to other person a right, title or interest in any [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (43 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] tangible property which he is possessed to transfer it for consideration or otherwise. He has also referred the judgment delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court delivered in the case of Mahendra Kumar v. Smt. Maya Devi, reported in 2021 (2) WLC (Raj.) UC 471, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court in para 20 has observed as under:- “20. So far as the judgment in the case of Pyarelal (supra) is concerned, the said judgment only dealt with a case where the allegations made, made out a case of the document being void whereon it was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court that for seeking a relief qua the agricultural land, where the document is void, a prior declaration is required for maintaining the suit. The said judgment in the case of Pyarelal (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case.” 37. Having taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments as quoted above, and particularly in the case of Pyarelal (supra), this Court in the case of Gangaram Meena & Ors. v. Ranjit Singh & Ors. (S.B. Civil First Appeal No.219/2023) decided on Sept. 09, 2025 has already taken a view that if the suit property is recorded in the name of the defendant then no relief of permanent injunction, possession etc. can be sought without seeking declaration in his favour by the [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (44 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] plaintiff by approaching the competent Court having the subject jurisdiction. 38. At the time of filing of the suit, the land was recorded in the name of defendant Bhuteri Devi on the basis of the registered Sale Deeds executed by Dinesh Bhargava (in Civil Suit No. 41/2011) and Murarilal one of the defendant in Civil Suit No.42/2011. The land was recorded in the names of Murarilal and Dinesh Bhargava on the basis of the Gift Deeds executed by Gopal Das who was the then recorded Khatedar of the suit land. One of the plaintiff has challenged the mutation entries recorded in the names of Dinesh Bhargava and Murarilal by virtue of the Gift Deeds in their favour by Gopal Das by filing an appeal before the District Collector, Alwar, which was dismissed. Thereafter, he preferred revision petition against the order of the District Collector, Alwar before the Divisional Commissioner, which was also dismissed. So in view of the aforesaid facts and law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments as quoted above, the suit for merely declaration of the Gift Deeds and Sale Deeds as null and void, is not maintainable before the Civil Court as regards the agricultural land as like in the present case without the plaintiffs seeking declaration in their favour from the competent Revenue Court. The conclusion of the aforesaid discussion is that the suits filed by the plaintiffs /respondents are without jurisdiction. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (45 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 39. Counsel appearing for the appellants has also raised an issue that in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act of 1963 the suit for simplicitor declaration is not maintainable without seeking the consequential relief for possession. PW1 Mahendra Singh, one of the plaintiffs, has admitted this fact that they are not in possession over the suit land and no relief as regards recovery of possession has been sought. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vasantha (Dead) through LR. V. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam (Dead) Thr. LRs, reported in (2024) 2 SCR 326 has observed in para Nos. 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 34 as under:- “24. We now proceed to examine whether the suit for declaration simpliciter was maintainable in view of Section 34 of the SRA, 1963. 25. Section 34 reads as: 34. Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right.- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (46 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. (Emphasis Supplied) 28. We now proceed to examine the law on this issue. As submitted by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant, in Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra (2-Judge Bench)29, this Court while considering Section 42 of the erstwhile Specific Relief Act, 1877 to be pari materia with Section 34 of SRA, 1963 observed that the plaintiff’s not being in possession of the property in that case ought to have amended the plaint for the relief of recovery of possession in view of the bar included by the proviso. 29. This position has been followed by this Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2-Judge Bench) 30 , elaborated the position of a suit filed without the consequential relief. It was observed: “55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [(1973) 2 SCC 60] this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is hit by the proviso of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, thus, not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (47 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] Chandra [1993 Supp (3) SCC 129] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. Similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh [(2011) 4 SCC 567) 57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief. 58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same.” 30. In Venkataraja and Ors. v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (Dead) thr. LRs (2-Judge Bench), the purpose behind Section 34 was elucidated by this Court. It was observed that the purpose behind the inclusion of the proviso is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was further expounded that a mere declaratory decree [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (48 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] remains non-executable in most cases. This Court noted that the suit was never amended, even at a later stage to seek the consequential relief and therefore, it was held to be not maintainable. This position of law has been reiterated recently in Akkamma and Ors. v. Vemavathi and Ors. (2- Judge Bench) . 31. This Court in Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar v. Chandran and Others (2- Judge Bench) while reversing the High Court decree, observed that because of Section 34 of the SRA, 1963, the plaintiff not being in possession and claiming only declaratory relief, ought to have claimed the relief of recovery of possession. It was held that the Trial Court rightly dismissed the suit on the basis that the plaintiff has filed a suit for a mere declaration without relief for recovery, which is clearly not maintainable. 34. In view of the above, the second issue is answered in the favour of the Appellants herein and against the Respondent.” 40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Dir. Health Services, Haryana & Ors., reported in (2013) 8 SCR 77 has observed in para Nos. 7, 8 and 9 as under:- “7. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior Court, and if the Court passes a decree having no jurisdiction [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (49 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/ inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a Court/Tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the legislative animation. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. (Vide: United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230; Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lal Ramnarayan & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 22; Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 537; and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2213). 8. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Thr. Lrs., (1990) 1 SCC 193, this Court, after placing reliance on large number of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke & Ors., (1976) 1 SCC 496; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340; and Chandrika Misir & Anr. v. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is a coram non judice; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the Common Law Court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (50 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] performance in specified manner, “performance cannot be forced in any other manner.” 9. Law does not permit any court/tribunal/authority/forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such a authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject matter. For the reason that it is not an objection as to the place of suing;, “it is an objection going to the nullity of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction”. Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in issue. (Vide: Setrucharlu Ramabhadra Raju Bahadur v. Maharaja of Jeypore, AIR 1919 PC 150; State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2664; Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 4446; and Carona Ltd. v. M/s. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, AIR 2008 SC 187).” 41. It has been categorically held that in case the Court or the Authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject matter and it is an objection going to the nullity of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. 42. In view of the discussion made above, the legal issue raised by the counsel appearing for the appellants that both the suits filed by the appellants are without jurisdiction of the Civil Court and therefore, the judgments and decrees [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (51 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] passed by the trial court are nullity. Now at this stage when the Court has come to the conclusion that the suits filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents are without jurisdiction of the court below and the decrees passed by the court below are also nullity, whether the appeals should be allowed on this count alone by setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by the court below or should further decide the other issues framed by the trial court on their merits. Once the Court has come to the conclusion that the suits filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents are beyond the jurisdiction of the court below then in that situation the judgments and decrees passed by the court below can be set aside on the issue of jurisdiction without making observations on merits on other issues. 43. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors. (supra) has observed in para No.19 as under:- 19. Once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non judice, there would be no question of upholding the same merely on the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second Appellate stage. It must, therefore, be held that the civil court in this case had no jurisdiction to deal with the suit and resultantly the judgments of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court are [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (52 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] liable to be set aside for that reason alone and the appeal is liable to be allowed. In view of this verdict of ours, we have deliberately not chosen to go into the other contentions raised on merits. We, however, make it clear that we have not, in any manner, commented upon the rights of the plaintiffs- respondents, if any, arising out of the Labour Jurisprudence.” 44. In view of the discussion made above, once this Court has come to the conclusion that both the suits filed by the plaintiffs before the Civil Court and the original decrees are without jurisdiction then it would not be justified for this Court to record the merits of the suit on the facts and the evidence because that may affect the legal proceedings if the plaintiffs choose to approach the Forum having the jurisdiction for declaration in their favour as regards the title over the suit property. The Court has also taken into consideration the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chief Engineer, Hydel Project & Ors. (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non judice, there would be no question of upholding the same merely on the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial stage and not chosen to go into the other contentions raised on merits. [2025:RJ-JP:39693] (53 of 53) [CFA-201/2018] 45. In view of the over-all discussion made above, the judgments and decrees dated 12.01.2018 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar in Civil Suit No.41/2011 (49/2008) and in Civil Suit No.42/2011 (48/2008)- in First Appeal No. 359/2018 are held to be without jurisdiction on the subject matter and therefore deserve to be set aside and both the suits filed by the plaintiffs are liable to be dismissed. 46. Accordingly, all the four first appeals filed by the appellants are allowed. The judgments and decrees dated 12.01.2018 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.3, Alwar in Civil Suit No.41/2011 (49/2008) and in Civil Suit No.42/2011 (48/2008)- in First Appeal No. 359/2018 are set aside. The aforesaid numbered civil suits filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed. 47. The Decree be issued accordingly. 48. In view of the judgment passed in the first appeals, the stay applications and pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of. 49. The Registry is directed to place a copy of the Judgment in connected case file. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J Sharma NK/Dy. Registrar