JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29th December 2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the charged offence.(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the Police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (in short ‘NDPS Act’). It was asserted that Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13), ASI Chet Ram (PW8), Head Constable Prem Pal, Head Constable Gian Chand (PW7), Constable Virender Singh (PW1) and Constable Madan Lal (PW6) were on patrolling duty on 24th September 2003. They received a secret information that the accused was selling and purchasing illicit drugs. He (accused) was going towards Kalibari Road, carrying a polythene bag in his right hand, and a huge quantity of charas could be recovered by searching him. The information was reduced to writing (Ex. PD) and was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Shimla, through Constable Gian Chand. The accused was found coming towards the Grand Hotel with a Polythene bag. Darshan Kumar (PW12) and Pankaj Kumar (PW10) were coming from the Scandal Point towards Kalibari. The police associated them as independent witnesses and told them about the secret information. The Police apprehended the accused. He identified himself as Aehsan. The police told the accused that they had received a credible information regarding the possession of charas by him (the accused), and he could specify in writing whether he wanted to be searched before a Magistrate, gazetted officer or the police. The accused consented to be searched by the Police vide memo (Ex. PN). Inspector Anil Dutt gave his personal search to the accused and prepared a memo (Ex.PA). He searched the carry bag (Ex. P2) being carried by the accused and found two more Polythene bags (Ex. P3 and Ex. P4) in it. Inspector Anil Dutt opened the polythene bags and found a khaki packet (Ex. P3A) and a polythene packet (Ex. P4A). He checked the packets and found pancake and ball-shaped cannabis (Ex. P5) in the khaki packet and pieces of cannabis (Ex. P2) being carried by the accused and found two more Polythene bags (Ex. P3 and Ex. P4) in it. Inspector Anil Dutt opened the polythene bags and found a khaki packet (Ex. P3A) and a polythene packet (Ex. P4A). He checked the packets and found pancake and ball-shaped cannabis (Ex. P5) in the khaki packet and pieces of cannabis (Ex. P6) wrapped in maize cone leaves in the Polythene packet. Many people gathered on the spot. Hence, the police took the accused and the recovered substance to the office of the CIA. Constable Madanlal was sent to bring scales and weights. He brought them from Rajwan, a fruit seller in the lower Bazaar. Inspector Anil Dutt smelled the recovered substance and confirmed it to be cannabis. The weight of the pancake and ball-shaped cannabis was found to be 3 kilograms 400 grams, and the weight of the pieces of cannabis was found to be 1 kilogram and 700 grams. Thus, 5 kilograms and 100 grams of cannabis was recovered from the accused. Two samples weighing 25 grams each were taken from each type of cannabis. In all four samples of 25 grams each were taken out. Each sample was sealed in a parcel, and each parcel was sealed with four seals of seal impression ‘A’. The remaining cannabis was put in the same polythene bag from which it was recovered in the same manner in which it was found. The polythene bag was put in a Cloth parcel (Ex. P1), and the parcel was sealed with 10 seals of seal impressions ‘A’. The NCB-1 form was prepared, and the seal impression was put on the form. The seal impression (Ex. PM) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Darshan Kumar, after the use vide memo (Ex. PP). The parcel containing cannabis was seized vide memo (Ex. PK). Inspector Anil Dutt prepared a memo of the identification of cannabis (Ex. PC). He prepared a rukka (Ex. PD) and sent it to the police station, Sadar, through Constable Virender Singh, along with the case property and NCB-1 form. Inspector Anil Dutt investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex. PR), arrested the accused vide memo (Ex. PQ), and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. PC). He prepared a rukka (Ex. PD) and sent it to the police station, Sadar, through Constable Virender Singh, along with the case property and NCB-1 form. Inspector Anil Dutt investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex. PR), arrested the accused vide memo (Ex. PQ), and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. Constable Virender Singh handed over the rukka and case property to MHC Gopal Singh, who produced them before Sandeep Dhawal (PW11). Sandeep Dhawal registered the FIR (Ex. PE) and resealed the parcels containing remaining charas with 10 seals of seal ‘H’ and each sample parcel with four seals of seal ‘H’. He obtained the seal impression ‘H’ on a separate piece of cloth (Ex. PM) and handed over the case property to MHC Gopal Singh (PW9). MHC Gopal Singh entered the details of the case property in the malkhana register and deposited the case property in a safe condition in the malkhana. He sent the sample parcels, sample seals and NCB-1 form to CTL Kandaghat through Constable Satpal Singh vide RC number 156/2003. Constable Satpal deposited the sample parcel and other articles in safe condition at CTL Kandaghat and handed over the receipt to MHC Gopal Singh on his return. Head constable, Gian Chand, handed over the reports under section 42 (1) and 42 (2) (Ex. PG and Ex. PH) of the NDPS Act to Sub- Inspector Savitri (PW2), who put them up before Superintendent of Police, Shimla. Superintendent of Police, Shimla perused and initialled the reports. Inspector Anil Dutt sent the special report (Ex. PF) to Superintendent of Police, Shimla through Constable Virender Singh, who handed it over to Sub-Inspector Savitri on 24th September 2003 at 6:35 PM. She produced it before Superintendent of Police, Shimla, who signed it and returned it to SI Savitri. The result of the analysis (Ex.PJ) was issued, stating that the samples contained 22% and 29.57% resin, and they were samples of charas. After the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Constable Virender Singh (PW1), Constable Madan Lal (PW6), and SI Chet Ram (PW8) are the official witnesses to recovery. Sub Inspector Savitri (PW2) was working as a Reader to Superintendent of Police, Shimla, to whom the special report and the information under Section 42 of the NDPS Act were handed over. ASI Tej Singh (PW3) partly investigated the matter. Inspector Vijay Kumar (PW4) prepared the challan. HHC Satpal (PW5) carried the case property to CTL Kandaghat for analysis. Head Constable Gian Chand (PW7) accompanied the police party and carried the information under section 42 of the NDPS Act to Superintendent of Police, Shimla. Head Constable, Gopal Singh (PW9), was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Pankaj Kumar (PW10) and Darshan Kumar (PW12) are the independent witnesses to the recovery. Sandeep Dhawal (PW 11) was working as the SHO who signed the FIR and resealed the case property. Inspector Anil Dutt (PW 13) effected a recovery and investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC, denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that two days before the registration of the present FIR, Constable Virender Singh had met him in the Bazaar and enquired about his place of origin. The accused replied that he belonged to Kashmir. Constable Virender replied that the accused would spread terrorism in Shimla, and he should leave the place. The accused told Virender that he would make a complaint to the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir in this regard. Constable Virender threatened to teach the accused a lesson. He did not lead any evidence in defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13) and Constable Virender Singh (PW1) contradicted each other on material aspects, which made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. Inspector Anil Dutt effected the recovery and also conducted the investigation, even though the police team had other investigating officers. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. The learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13) and Constable Virender Singh (PW1) contradicted each other on material aspects, which made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. Inspector Anil Dutt effected the recovery and also conducted the investigation, even though the police team had other investigating officers. The independent witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful; hence, the accused was acquitted after giving him a benefit of the doubt. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the prosecution’s evidence. The testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, Virender Singh, Madan Lal Chet Ram, and Inspector Anil Dutt, were discarded for untenable reasons. It was wrongly held that the place of recovery was doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. The State filed an application (Cr.MP No.322 of 2012) during the present proceedings for sending the remaining bulk and samples to the FSL for analysis, which was allowed and the bulk and samples were sent to the FSL for analysis. Reports of analysis were issued stating that the bulk contained 22.87% w/w, and the samples contained 20.17% w/w resin and were an extract of cannabis. 9. This Court dismissed the appeal on 19th June 2013, after holding that the result of the analysis was not as per the judgment of this court in Sunil Kumar versus State of HP, Latest HLJ 2010 (HP) 207. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgement passed by the Court, the State filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which was allowed, and it was held that the judgment of acquittal passed by this Court was not sustainable because of Hira Singh versus Union of India and another 2022 SCC online SC 382, and the matter was remanded to this Court for a fresh decision. 11. We have heard Mr Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General, assisted by M/s Rakesh Dhaulta, learned Additional Advocate General and Shalabh Thakur, learned Assistant Advocate General, for the Appellant/State and Mr Aditya Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 12. Mr Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General for the State/Appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. 11. We have heard Mr Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General, assisted by M/s Rakesh Dhaulta, learned Additional Advocate General and Shalabh Thakur, learned Assistant Advocate General, for the Appellant/State and Mr Aditya Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 12. Mr Anup Rattan, learned Advocate General for the State/Appellant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The prosecution witnesses consistently deposed about the recovery of charas from the accused. The testimonies of the official witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The accused failed to prove the defence taken by him in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC. A huge quantity of 5 kilograms and 100 grams of charas could not have been planted by the police because of some altercation between the accused and Constable Virender Singh. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 13. Mr Aditya Chauhan, learned counsel for the accused, supported the judgment passed by learned Trial Court and submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this court should not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against the acquittal. Hence he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 14. We have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand,2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC Online SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC Online SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 :(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325), SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8..…8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which canbe recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 16. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 . 17. The present appeal is required to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. When the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are examined carefully, the following discrepancies emerge: a) Pankaj Kumar (PW 10) stated in his cross- examination that the accused was moving ahead of the Police party, and he was going towards Kalibari Temple. 18. When the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are examined carefully, the following discrepancies emerge: a) Pankaj Kumar (PW 10) stated in his cross- examination that the accused was moving ahead of the Police party, and he was going towards Kalibari Temple. Constable Madan Lal (PW6), Head Constable Gian Chand (PW7), ASI Chet Ram (PW8) and Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13), on the other hand, stated that the accused was coming towards the Kalibari side from the CTO. b) Pankaj Kumar (PW 10) stated in his examination-in-chief that the Inspector, Anil Dutt, sent the constable to call other Police officials. He clarified in the cross- examination that Inspector Anil Dutt was accompanying a police official when he met him (Pankaj Kumar). Constable Madan Lal (PW6), Head Constable Gian Chand (PW7), ASI Chet Ram (PW8) and Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13), on the other hand, stated in their examination-in-chief that Inspector Anil Dutt, Constable Madan Lal, ASI Chet Ram, HC Prem Lal, HC Gian Chand and Constable Virender Singh were together. c) Pankaj Kumar (PW10) stated in his examination-in-chief that Inspector Anil Dutt sent a constable to bring a scale and weight, and thereafter proceeded to the office of the CIA. Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13), on the other hand, stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused was taken to the office of the CIA first, and the constable was sent to bring the weight and scale. d) Pankaj Kumar (PW10) did not say anything about giving the option to the accused, the accused consenting to be searched on the spot, giving of search to the accused, or preparing a memo of identification on the spot in his examination-in-chief. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that Inspector Anil Dutt had asked the accused about the contents of the bag and did not tell the accused anything. All the documents were prepared in the office of the CIA, and no document was prepared on the spot. e) Inspector Anil Dutt (PW13) stated that the pieces of charas recovered from the polythene packet were wrapped in the leaves of maize. Pankaj Kumar (PW10) did not state anything about the leaves of maize. The leaves were also not produced before the Court, and no witness stated that the leaves were thrown away on the spot. 19. These discrepancies are significant and affect the core of the prosecution’s case. Pankaj Kumar (PW10) did not state anything about the leaves of maize. The leaves were also not produced before the Court, and no witness stated that the leaves were thrown away on the spot. 19. These discrepancies are significant and affect the core of the prosecution’s case. When the witnesses make different statements regarding the place from where the accused was coming, the steps taken after he was apprehended, the proceedings conducted on the spot and the recovered case property does not tally with the case property produced before the court without any explanation, the whole of the prosecution case becomes suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed: “21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful, independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 20. It was held in David Piper vs Mark Hales 2013 EWHC B1 (QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: - 34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, approved by the courts is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues", published in "The Business of Judging", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985, p 1-27, he wrote: ". . . The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, approved by the courts is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues", published in "The Business of Judging", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985, p 1-27, he wrote: ". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v. Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full: ''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour', which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by too much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes, the memory becomes fainter, and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard orsaw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case: (1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred; (2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence; (3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions; (4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation; (5) the demeanour of the witness. The first three of these tests may, in general, be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable " 35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215-6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215-6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable, and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, when he said at p. 57: - "Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not, and where there is a conflict of evidence, such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added]. That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable, and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence." In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms. "Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important and so infrequently done." 36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14: 11. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14: 11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings. 12. There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge, and he or she has to decide whose evidence and how much evidence to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary, but it could be other oral evidence, for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant seeks or is given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence, and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. 37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour, which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also distort the accurate picture, even though they are meant to assist the court.” 21. Darshan Kumar (PW12) did not support the prosecution’s case. He stated that the Police told him about the apprehension of the accused with the charas. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the police apprehended the accused in his presence and recovered Charas from him. He contradicted the previous statement recorded by the police. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his testimony by the prosecution. 22. The learned Trial Court has also fund that the statement of Virender Singh (PW1) itself is self contradictory in the manner in which he had tried to contact the Gazetted Officer which is in contradiction to the statement of complainant (PW13). The independent witness Darshan Kumar (PW12) has also stated that Memo (Ex.PX) has been signed by him without reading its contents at the instance of the police. Apparently they had gone to CIA office along with other independent witness Pankaj Kumar. Pankaj Kumar (PW10) has also stated that on the spot, no papers were prepared and all the exhibits in question have been prepared in the CIA office. Neither he was present on the spot nor any proceedings took place in his presence. Apparently they had gone to CIA office along with other independent witness Pankaj Kumar. Pankaj Kumar (PW10) has also stated that on the spot, no papers were prepared and all the exhibits in question have been prepared in the CIA office. Neither he was present on the spot nor any proceedings took place in his presence. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the contradictions are not minor and are material contradictions and in view of the defence taken of false implication, has rightly granted the benefit of acquittal. 23. The evidence of the prosecution was inconsistent and was not supported by the independent witness; hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting it. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 24. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 25. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondent/accused is directed to furnish his personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 26. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.