JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.10.2012, passed by learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act. It was asserted that Satpal died on 1.10.2008. Satpal had executed a Will of his property in the name of the informant Devender Singh. The informant presented the Will before Harnam Singh (accused) Patwari, Patwar Circle, Gurchal (accused) and Puran Singh, Patwari, Patwar Circle, Sadwan. Both the Patwaris entered the mutation in the informant’s name on the basis of the Will. Chain Singh, Jaswant Singh and Tek Singh objected to the attestation of the mutation, and Tehsildar Nurpur attested the mutation in the names of Satpal’s brother. The informant wanted to prefer an appeal against the order passed by Tehsildar, Nurpur. He demanded the documents from Harnam Singh (accused). However, the accused prevaricated. The informant went to Gurchal on 2.6.2009 to obtain the documents of the land, but he was told that Harnam Singh had gone to the Tehsil office, Nurpur. The informant went to the Tehsil Office in Nurpur and demanded documents of the land. The accused demanded Rs.2,000/- for supplying the documents. The informant talked to Nardev, who advised him to make a complaint to the police. The informant made a statement to the police, who registered an FIR (Ex.PW1/A). Inspector Baldev Ram (PW13) demonstrated the use of phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate powder. He prepared the solution of both the chemicals in two separate glasses, and the water remained colourless. He mixed the solutions, and the water turned pink. He prepared the memo (Ex.PW1/B) and put the solution in a nip. He sealed the nip with seal ‘H’. The informant produced four currency notes of Rs.500/- each. Inspector Baldev treated each currency note with phenolphthalein powder. He mixed the solutions, and the water turned pink. He prepared the memo (Ex.PW1/B) and put the solution in a nip. He sealed the nip with seal ‘H’. The informant produced four currency notes of Rs.500/- each. Inspector Baldev treated each currency note with phenolphthalein powder. He noticed the serial numbers of the currency notes in the memo (Ex. PW1/C). He handed over the currency notes to the informant Devender Singh. He advised the informant not to fiddle with the currency notes unnecessarily and hand them over to the Patwari on demand. A trap party consisting of Inspector Baldev Ram, SI Kirpa Ram, SI Ram Swaroop, Constable Navneet Kumar, Constable Akshay and Constable Veer Singh was constituted. The informant Devinder Singh and witness Nardev Singh were taken with the trap party to the spot. All of them reached Gurchal at about 4.15 PM. The informant and Nardev were sent to Patwarkhana, and the remaining members of the trap party concealed themselves around Patwarkhana. Nardev Singh was told to signal the members of the trap party about the acceptance of the bribe by circling his hand on his head. The informant and Nardev returned at about 5.30 PM and said that Patwari had not prepared the revenue record and had called the informant on the next day. The informant produced the currency notes, which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/D). Inspector Baldev Ram directed the informant and Nardev to meet the trap party at 10.00 AM near the well on the next day. The police went to Gurchal on 4.6.2009 and met the informant and Nardev near the well. The currency notes were handed over to the informant vide memo (Ex.PW1/E). The informant returned after one and a half hours and told the trap party that Patwari had called him to the office of Kanungo, Sadwan. The trap party, the informant and the shadow witness went to Sadwan. The informant and shadow witness went to the office of Kanungo at Sadwan at around 12.00 noon. The police also joined Shakti Prasad as a member of the trap party. The shadow witness signalled the trap party at 1.30 PM, and the trap party rushed to the office of Kanungo, where the accused was sitting on the chair with currency notes in his hands. He threw the notes on the table after seeing the police. The police also joined Shakti Prasad as a member of the trap party. The shadow witness signalled the trap party at 1.30 PM, and the trap party rushed to the office of Kanungo, where the accused was sitting on the chair with currency notes in his hands. He threw the notes on the table after seeing the police. Constable Navneet Kumar and Akshay Kumar caught hold of the accused. The hands of the members of the trap party were washed with water. When sodium carbonate powder was added to it, the water remained colourless. A solution of sodium carbonate was prepared, and when the hands of the accused were washed with it, the water turned pink. The solution was put in a nip, and the nip was sealed with seal impression ‘P’. The serial numbers of currency notes kept on the table of the accused were tallied with the serial numbers noted in the memo. These were put in an envelope, and the envelope was sealed with seal impression ‘B’. The hand wash was preserved in the nip. The notes and the envelope containing bribe money were taken into possession vide memo (Ex.PW1/F). The informant produced copies of Jamabandi (Ex.PA to Ex.PG), which were seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/G). The accused produced the receipt book (Ex.PW6/A1), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW6/A). Kanungo Satpal produced Rojnamcha Vakyati Register (Ex.PH), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW6/B). Inspector Baldev investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW13/A) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. The case property was deposited with MHC Satpal (PW5), who made an entry in the Malkhana register and deposited it in Malkhana. He sent the nips, specimen seal and docket to FSL on 8.6.2009 vide RC No. 19/9/21 through HHC Jagrup Singh. HHC Jagrup Singh deposited the case property with FSL and handed over the receipt to MHC Satpal on his return. The result of the analysis (Ex. PX) was issued, in which it was shown that the nips contained phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate. The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The result of the analysis (Ex. PX) was issued, in which it was shown that the nips contained phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate. The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses to prove its case. Devender Singh (PW1) is the informant. Akshay Kumar (PW2), Inspector Ram Swaroop (PW11), Kirpa Ram (PW14) and Nardeep Singh (PW16) were members of the trap party. Nirpalishwar (PW3) proved the appointment and posting order of the accused. Raman Kaistha (PW4) proved the prosecution sanction. Satpal Thakur (PW5) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Satpal Singh (PW6) was working as a Kanungo who had produced the receipt books and Rapat Rojnamcha. Sanjay Sood (PW7) produced the record regarding the departmental inquiry conducted by SDO (Civil). Shakti Prasad (PW8) did not support the prosecution's case. Paras Ram (PW9) proved the FIR. HHC Jagroop Singh (PW10) carried the case property to FSL, Junga. Diwakar Sharma (PW12) prepared the challan. Baldev Ram (PW13) conducted the investigation. Subhash Bhardwaj (PW15) brought the record regarding the departmental inquiry conducted against the accused. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., admitted that he was posted as Patwari in Patwar Circle, Gurchal. He admitted that deceased Satpal had executed a Will in favour of the informant Devender Singh and his brother Virender Singh. He admitted that informant Devender Singh had produced a copy of the Will for the entry of the mutation. He also admitted that the Tehsildar had rejected the mutation. He admitted that the informant demanded the documents of the land from him. He stated that he told the informant that the documents were not ready and would be delivered the next day. The relevant documents could not be completed for want of the mutation register, which was available in the office of Kanungo at Sadwan. Devender Singh entered the office of Kanungo. Nardev Singh did not enter the office. Devender Singh took out a few currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/-. He handed over one currency note of Rs. The relevant documents could not be completed for want of the mutation register, which was available in the office of Kanungo at Sadwan. Devender Singh entered the office of Kanungo. Nardev Singh did not enter the office. Devender Singh took out a few currency notes of the denomination of Rs.500/-. He handed over one currency note of Rs. 500/- to him as a fee for the documents. He was receiving cell phone calls from his sister to go to her house to take meals. He told the informant to bring the change. He left the chair, came outside and bolted the door. He told Devender Singh that he would be returning soon after taking the food. He was apprehended by the Vigilance team near the boundary wall of his sister’s house and brought back to the Kanungo office, where he was made to sit in the chair. The colour of the solution did not change after washing his hands. Inspector Vigilance caught his hands and rubbed them with his own hands. The colour of the hand wash changed thereafter. The revenue papers were lying on the table and were picked up by the police. Devender Singh wanted the mutation to be entered and sanctioned based on the Will, which was rejected by the Tehsildar. Devender Singh presumed that the accused was instrumental in the rejection of the mutation. He nourished a grudge against the accused. The accused never received any money from the informant. He was falsely implicated. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the shadow witness Nardev was related to the informant. The testimonies of trap witnesses are inferior to ordinary witnesses and should be corroborated by independent sources. There was no evidence that the raiding party had given their personal search to the accused, which would make the prosecution's case highly suspect. The Investigating Officer was unable to say whether the informant had shaken hands with anyone, and the Investigating Officer had failed to comply with the requirements of the PC Act. It was not proved that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind before granting the prosecution sanction. There were contradictions, improvements and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution witnesses highly suspect. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the charged offences. 7. It was not proved that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind before granting the prosecution sanction. There were contradictions, improvements and omissions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution witnesses highly suspect. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. The accused was acquitted on flimsy grounds. The testimonies of Inspector Ram Swaroop, Inspector Baldev Ram and Kirpa Ram were wrongly ignored. It was duly proved that four currency notes worth Rs.500/- were recovered from the accused. Shakti Prasad (PW8) admitted his signature in the memo. He was a literate person and did not sign any document without reading it. His testimony corroborated the recovery of the tainted money from the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent-accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record. The informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the members of the raiding party. Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the prosecution’s case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms Sheetal Vyas, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. There was no corroboration of the informant’s testimony regarding the demand for a bribe. Mere recovery of the tainted money by the accused would not be sufficient, and the prosecution was required to prove the demand and acceptance of the bribe money. Prosecution sanction was not given after due application of mind. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. Prosecution sanction was not given after due application of mind. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: 23. Recently, in Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka [Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 535], a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus : (SCC pp. 163-64, paras 38-41) “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) ‘29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” ’ 40. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the accused's innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” ’ 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.’ 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 . 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant Devender Singh (PW1) stated that he visited Patwar Circle, Sadwan with Nardev. The Vigilance Police were standing on the road. Accused Harnam Singh was sitting on the chair of Kanungo, and Nardev Singh was sitting near the door. The accused asked him to sign some papers and give him money. He (Devender) signed the papers and handed over the currency notes of Rs.2,000/- to the accused. The Vigilance Police were standing on the road. Accused Harnam Singh was sitting on the chair of Kanungo, and Nardev Singh was sitting near the door. The accused asked him to sign some papers and give him money. He (Devender) signed the papers and handed over the currency notes of Rs.2,000/- to the accused. Nardev Singh signalled the police, and the police reached the spot. He stated in his cross-examination (conducted on 27.2.2012) that he had deposed before the SDM, Palampur, during the inquiry, that he handed over Rs.2,000/- to the accused. The Patwari returned Rs.1,000/- to him and kept Rs.1,000/- on the table. He volunteered to say that the statement was made by him under pressure from the accused and his brother. He admitted that he had not reported the incident to anyone. He denied that he had produced one currency note of Rs.500/- for supplying the copies of the revenue record, but the accused told him that he had no change and asked him (Devender Singh) to bring the change. He denied that he was making a false statement. 16. The admission made by the informant in the cross- examination that he had told the SDM that the accused had kept Rs.1,000/- and returned Rs.1,000/- to him will make his testimony highly suspect. He explained that he was pressurised by the accused and his brother to depose falsely against the accused; however, his explanation becomes doubtful because of his admission that he had not reported the matter to any person. It is difficult to believe that the informant, who was conscious enough to make a complaint to the police regarding the demand for a bribe, would not have made any complaint to anyone about the threats having been advanced to him. Thus, he is shown to have made inconsistent statements before the learned SDM during the inquiry and before the Court, which would make his testimony in the Court highly suspect. 17. HHC Akshay Kumar (PW2) stated that Patwari was sitting on the chair and holding the currency notes, but when the police caught hold of Patwari, he kept the currency notes on the table. Baldev Ram (PW13) stated that after getting the signal from the shadow witness, the trap party rushed to the office of Kanungo. The accused was sitting on the chair with currency notes in his hands. He kept the currency notes on the table. Baldev Ram (PW13) stated that after getting the signal from the shadow witness, the trap party rushed to the office of Kanungo. The accused was sitting on the chair with currency notes in his hands. He kept the currency notes on the table. Kirpa Ram (PW14) also stated that all the members of the police party rushed to the first floor of Patwarkhana. The accused was holding the money at the time of their entry; however, he dropped the money after seeing the police. Nardev Singh (PW16) stated that Patwari was holding the notes, and they were kept on the table after the arrival of the police. These were tallied with the memos, and the numbers were found to be the same. 18. Thus, all the witnesses are consistent in saying that the accused was holding the currency notes in his hands when the police party went inside the office of Kanungo, and he threw the money after seeing the police. This was not possible because the accused had returned Rs.1,000/- to the informant as per his earlier statement made to the SDM. This discrepancy made the whole of the prosecution's case highly suspect. 19. Nardeep Singh (PW16) was cited as a shadow witness; however, he was not examined before the Court. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that his examination was necessary because he was a witness to the demand of the bribe. When the statement of the informant is contradictory, the examination of the shadow witness was essential to prove the demand for the bribe, and in the absence of the examination of Nardeep, the essential ingredients of Section 7 of the PC Act that there was a demand for a bribe are not satisfied. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banarsi Dass v. State 2010 (4) SCC 450 that in the absence of demand and acceptance, the accused cannot be held liable. It was observed:- “23. To constitute an offence under Section 161 of the IPC, the prosecution must prove that there was a demand for money and the same was voluntarily accepted by the accused. Similarly, in terms of Section 5 (1) (d) of the Act, the demand and acceptance of the money for doing a favour in the discharge of its official duties is the sine qua non to the conviction of the accused. 24. Similarly, in terms of Section 5 (1) (d) of the Act, the demand and acceptance of the money for doing a favour in the discharge of its official duties is the sine qua non to the conviction of the accused. 24. In the case of M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala 1996 (11) SCC 720 , this Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the same and said that it was put in the drawer without his knowledge, held as under : “...It is in this context that the courts have cautioned that, as a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all such type of cases of bribery, two aspects are important. Firstly, there must be a demand, and secondly, there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other aspect, namely, acceptance, is very important, and when the accused has come forward with a plea that the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been put in the drawer as an illegal gratification. Unfortunately, on this aspect in the present case, we have no other evidence except that of PW-1. Since PW-1's evidence suffers from infirmities, we sought to find some corroboration but in vain. There is no other witness or any other circumstance which supports the evidence of PW-1 that this tainted money, as a bribe, was put in the drawer, as directed by the accused. Unless we are satisfied on this aspect, it is difficult to hold that the accused tacitly accepted the illegal gratification or obtained the same within the meaning of Section 5(1) (d) of the Act, particularly when the version of the accused appears to be probable". 25. Reliance on behalf of the appellant was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu (supra), wherein the facts of the case, the Court took the view that mere recovery of money from the accused by itself is not enough in the absence of substantive evidence for demand and acceptance. 25. Reliance on behalf of the appellant was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu (supra), wherein the facts of the case, the Court took the view that mere recovery of money from the accused by itself is not enough in the absence of substantive evidence for demand and acceptance. The Court held that there was no voluntary acceptance of the money, knowing it to be a bribe, and giving an advantage to the accused of the evidence on record. The Court, in Para 18 and 20 of the judgment, held as under: "18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4) SCC 725 , this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, Para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of a bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. 20. A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. 2001 (1) SCC 691 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed: (SCC p. 700, Para 24) "24. ... we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us, the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (8) SCC 571 ). The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel: (Madhukar case, SCC p. 577, Para 12) 12. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established, the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as a motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established, the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as a motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Therefore, the word "gratification" need not be stretched to mean reward because the reward is the outcome of the presumption, which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other, like "gratification or any valuable thing". If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word "gratification" must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it." In fact, the above principle is no way derivative but is a reiteration of the principle enunciated by this Court in Suraj Mal case (supra), where the Court had held that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of prosecution against the accused in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. Reference can also be made to the judgment of this Court in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1975 (2) SCC 227 , where a similar view was taken.” 21. Similar is the judgment in B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. 2014 (13) SCC 55 , where it was observed as under: - “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. GirishBabu v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 .” 22. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. GirishBabu v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 .” 22. This position was reiterated in State through the Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Dr Anup Kumar Srivastava 2017 (15) SCC 560 wherein it was observed: - “7. The essential ingredients of Section 7 are: (i) that the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant; (ii) that he should accept the gratification for himself and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function, favour or disfavour to any person. 8. Insofar as Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, its essential ingredients are: (i) that he should have been a public servant; (ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such a public servant and (iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person. 9. In the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India 1997 (9) SCC 477 , this Court had an occasion to consider the word "obtained" used in Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (now Section 13(1)(d) of Act, 1988), and it was held: "12. The position will, however, be different so far as an offence under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act is concerned. For such an offence prosecution has to prove that the accused "obtained" the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant and that too without the aid of the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act as it is available only in respect of offences under Section 5(1)(a) and (b) -- and not under Section 5(1)(c), (d) or (e) of the Act. "Obtain" means to secure or gain (something) as the result of request or effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). "Obtain" means to secure or gain (something) as the result of request or effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In case of obtainment the initiative vests in the person who receives and in that context a demand or request from him will be a primary requisite for an offence under Section 5(1) (d) of the Act unlike an offence under Section 161 IPC, which, as noticed above, can be, established by proof of either "acceptance" or "obtainment." 10. The legal position is no more res integra that the primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. In other words, in the absence of proof of demand or request from the public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, the offence under Section 13(1) (d) cannot be held to be established.” (Emphasis supplied). 23. A similar view was taken in Aman Bhatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013, wherein it was observed: 52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, respectively, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 , categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by the bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “88.4. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by the bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant, and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification, which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and(ii) of the Act. (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant, respectively, have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively, of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant, which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. It was further explained by this Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 , as follows: “23. It was further explained by this Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 , as follows: “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act and in the absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied) 55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. 56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to the meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of the offer of a bribe. 24. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of the offer of a bribe. 24. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence of the demand, and the essential requirement of Section 7 of the PC Act has not been proved. 25. It was submitted that the recovery of the currency notes would shift the burden to the accused to rebut the presumption contained in Section 20 of the PC Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paritala Sudhakar v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1072, that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act will not be triggered without the evidence of the demand. It was observed: “21. As far as the submission of the State is that, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act, as it then was, would operate against the Appellant is concerned, as our analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand, in the backdrop of an element of animus between the Appellant and the complainant, is not proved. In such circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250 : ‘22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the prosecution case, we are of the opinion that the defence story set up by the appellant cannot be said to be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it is not the case where the burden of proof was on the accused in terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has not been proved, Section 20 will also have no application. (Union of India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576: (2005) 8 Scale 246 ] and T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [ (2006) 1 SCC 401 : (2006) 1 Scale 116 ])’ (emphasis supplied)” 26. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence of the demand, and no advantage can be derived from the provisions of Section 20 of the PC Act. 27. In the present case, the Investigating Officer did not verify the demand for a bribe and associated Nardeep as a shadow witness who is related to the informant. In the present case, there is no satisfactory evidence of the demand, and no advantage can be derived from the provisions of Section 20 of the PC Act. 27. In the present case, the Investigating Officer did not verify the demand for a bribe and associated Nardeep as a shadow witness who is related to the informant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., (2024) 10 SCC 489 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 86: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1689 that where the Investigating Officer did not verify the demand of bribe before laying the trap and associated a close friend of the informant, the prosecution case is suspect. It was observed at page 503: “32. It is the settled convention in such cases that the Trap Laying Officer makes efforts to verify the factum of the demand of a bribe by the public servant before initiating the trap proceedings. The factum of the demand of a bribe can also be verified by recording the telephonic conversation between the decoy and the suspect public servant. Often, a recording device is secretly placed on the person of the decoy to record the conversation which would transpire during the course of acceptance of a bribe by the public servant. However, no such steps were taken by the DSP (PW 10), who straight away organised the trap without making any effort whatsoever to verify the factum of demand attributed to the appellant (AO-1) and AO-2. 33. It is relevant to mention here that PW 2 was the only witness associated by the DSP/TLO (PW 10) to accompany the complainant (PW 1) for witnessing the transaction of demand and acceptance of bribe. Evidently thus, PW 2 was kept as a shadow witness in the case. During the course of trial, the complainant (PW 1) and PW 2 both admitted that they were close friends. The complainant (PW 1) and PW 2 being close friends, it can safely be assumed that PW 2 was an interested witness. Hence, it is also manifested that TLO/DSP (PW 10) did not make any effort whatsoever to associate an independent person to act as a shadow witness in the trap proceedings. It is recorded in the memorandum of the pre-trap proceedings (Ext. Hence, it is also manifested that TLO/DSP (PW 10) did not make any effort whatsoever to associate an independent person to act as a shadow witness in the trap proceedings. It is recorded in the memorandum of the pre-trap proceedings (Ext. P-4) that it was the DSP (PW 10) who summoned PW 2 and asked him to act as a shadow witness to oversee and overhear the transaction of acceptance of illegal gratification. However, this fact is totally contradicted by the version as set out in the evidence of the complainant (PW 1) and PW 2. Both categorically stated that it was the complainant (PW 1) who asked PW 2 to accompany him during the trap proceedings scheduled to take place on the morning of 23-1-2003. 34. In normal course, before proceeding to the stage of trap, it was incumbent upon the DSP (PW 10) to get an independent verification done of the alleged demand which fact assumes prominence considering the circumstance that the accompanying shadow witness, Ramesh Naidu (PW 2) is a close friend of the complainant (PW 1) who himself bore a grudge against the appellant (AO-1) on account of the fine of Rs 50,000 imposed on the sawmill.” 28. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 29. No other point was urged. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 31. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondent/ accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 32. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. 33. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.