1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 100490 OF 2019 (PAR/POS) BETWEEN: 1 . SMT.RENUKA W/O SHIVALINGAPPA BEVINAMATTI AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS OCC: HOUSEWIFE AT POST: HONNAKATTI TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOT-587113. 2 . KUMAR DYAMANNA W/O SHIVALINGAPPA BEVINAMATTI AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS OCC: STUDENT AT POST: HONNAKATTI TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOT-587113. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. GANAPATI HEGDE, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI. A.C. CHAKALABBI, SRI. NANDOOR AND SRI. S.B. DODDAGOUDAR, ADVOCATES) AND: 1 . SMT.SAVANTREVVA W/O DYAMANNA BEVINAMATTI AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK R 2 AT POST: HONNAKATTI TQ AND DIST: BAGALKOT-587113. 2 . SHRI.UMESH S/O BHIMAPPA PUJAR URF WALIKAR AGED ABOUT: 54 YEARS OCC: AGRICULTURIST KILLA HONYAL, NER DESAIYAVAR HOUSE AT POST: BAGALKOT-587113. …RESPONDENTS (NOTICE TO R1 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O/D 21.01.2020; R2 IS SERVED AND UNPRESENTED) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC. 96 READ WITH ORDER 41 RULE 1 AND 2 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 28.08.2019 IN O.S.No. 101/2015 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND CJM, BAGALKOT, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND DECLARATION. THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 11.07.2025, THIS DAY JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA C.A.V. JUDGMENT (PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) This appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiffs who have questioned the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.101/2015 wherein the plaintiffs' suit seeking the relief 3 of partition in respect of item No.1 of suit schedule properties is dismissed in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Uttam .vs. Saubhag Singh and others1. 2. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. The family tree is as under: PAVADEPPA (PROPOSITUS) DIED DYAMANNA (DIED) SMT. SAVANTRAVVA (WIFE) (D2) SRI. SHIVALINGAPPA (SON) (D1) MT. RENUKA (WIFE) (Plf No.1) KUMAR. DYAMANNA (SON) (Plf No.2) 1 AIR 2016 SC 1169 4 4. The brief facts of the case are as under: Plaintiff No.2 is the son born from the wedlock of Defendant No.1 and Plaintiff No.1. The present suit is instituted by the wife and son, i.e., Plaintiffs No.1 and 2, challenging the alienation effected by Defendant No.1 (Shivalingappa) in respect of Schedule Item No.1 property - agricultural land bearing Survey No.502 measuring 16 acres and 38 guntas. The plaintiffs specifically contend that the property was originally purchased in the year 1943 by Pavadeppa, the propositus of the joint family. It is further asserted that upon Pavadeppa’s demise, the property devolved upon his only son Dyamanna, who in turn died leaving behind his widow Savanthrevva (Defendant No.2) and son Shivalingappa (Defendant No.1). On this basis, the plaintiffs claim that the suit schedule properties are ancestral joint family properties in which Plaintiff no. 2 has a right by birth and plaintiff no. 1 as wife has equal share as per Bombay school. 5 5. The plaintiffs further allege that Defendant No.3, though belonging to the same community, is a literate, politically influential person and a press reporter. It is alleged that Defendant No.3, by exploiting the illiteracy and innocence of Defendant No.1, obtained a sale deed in respect of Item No.1 of the suit schedule property for a meager sum of Rs.3 lakhs per acre, while the actual market value of the land was over Rs.20 lakhs per acre. Asserting that the sale transaction was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, the plaintiffs seek partition and separate possession of their share and further pray for a declaration that the sale deed executed in favour of Defendant No.3 is null and void and not binding on them. 6. Defendants No.1 and 2 did not contest the suit and were placed ex parte. 7. Defendant No.3, the purchaser, filed a detailed written statement denying the averments in the plaint. It is 6 contended that although the sale deed was executed by Defendants No.1 and 2, Plaintiff No.1, the wife of Defendant No.1, actively participated in the transaction. It is further asserted that the sale consideration was deposited in the joint account of Plaintiff No.1 and Defendant No.1 in Karnataka Bank. Defendant No.3 also raised the plea of limitation, contending that the suit is barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, as the sale deed dated 06.07.2011 was not challenged within three years. 8. Defendant No.3 also questioned the plaintiffs’ locus standi to challenge the alienation. Referring to the plaintiffs’ own pleading that the property was purchased by Pavadeppa in 1943, it is contended that upon the death of Pavadeppa, the property devolved upon Dyamanna, and after his death, upon his widow (Defendant No.2) and son (Defendant No.1). It is therefore argued that the said property became the absolute property of Defendant No.1, and the alienation was made in exercise of his full 7 ownership rights. Consequently, no permission from any Court was necessary for the said sale. 9. Based on rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed appropriate issues. The plaintiffs examined themselves as PWs 1 and 2 and marked documents as Exhibits P1 to P8. Defendant No.3 examined himself as DW1 and another witness as DW2 and marked Exhibits D1 to D8. 10. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court answered Issues No.1 and 2 partly in the affirmative, holding that Plaintiffs and Defendants No.1 and 2 constituted a Hindu joint family and that Item No.1 of the suit schedule properties was indeed an ancestral joint family property. However, Issues No.3 and 4 were answered in the negative, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the sale deed dated 06.07.2011 was obtained by fraud, coercion, or undue influence and therefore, it was binding on them. Issue No.5 was answered 8 in the affirmative, holding that the sale was effected by Defendants No.1 and 2 in respect of Item No.2 of the schedule properties, in their capacity as absolute owners. 11. The Trial Court, while answering Issue No.6 in the affirmative, held that Defendant No.3 had established that the sale of Item No.1 of the suit property was for legal necessity. Consequently, the Trial Court decreed the suit partly by granting the plaintiffs 1/4th share in Item No.2 of the suit schedule properties and dismissed the claim for partition in respect of Item No.1. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. 12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs submitted that the Trial Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff No.2 is not entitled to share by birth is perverse and contrary to law. He contended that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme 9 Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and others2, the earlier view taken in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh and others stands impliedly overruled. 13. It is submitted that since the property was originally acquired prior to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and since the co-parcenary is traced through the male line up to four degrees from Pavadeppa, Plaintiff No.2, being the great-grandson of Pavadeppa, acquires a right by birth. In light of principles laid down in Vineeta Sharma's case, it is further contended that daughters are also co-parceners by birth, and hence, the alienation made by Defendant No.1 (father) without the consent of the other co-parceners, including Plaintiff No.2, is not binding. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the Trial Court erred in holding that the property in the hands of Defendant No.1 was not co- parcenary in nature and wrongly denied the plaintiff’s right to partition in Item No.1 of the suit schedule properties. 2 [(2020) 9 SCC 1] 10 14. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: • Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors., (2020) 9 SCC 1; • M. Yogendra & Ors. v. Leelamma N. & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 184; • Sheela Devi & Ors. v. Lalchand & Anr., (2006) 8 SCC 581; • Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Miragu Agalawe & Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 126; • Smt. Sitabai & Anr. v. Ramchandra, (1969) 2 SCC 544; • Romesh Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar & Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 11162; • Surendra Kumar v. Dhani Ram & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 333; • Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567; • Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2014) 16 SCC 623; • Uttam v. Saubhag Singh & Ors., AIR 2016 SC 1169. 11 15. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. Notice to Respondent No.1 is dispensed with. The remaining respondents, including Defendant No.3, have not chosen to contest the appeal. 16. The following points would arise for consideration: " (i) Whether the finding of the trial Court that defendant No.3 has succeeded in proving that item No.1 was sold for legal necessity is perverse and warrants interference ? (ii) Whether the finding of the trial Court that plaintiff No.2 being the grand son of one Dyamanna and great grandson of one Pavadeppa who acquired the property in 1943, is not entitled for share on the ground that Dyamanna died intestate and therefore, plaintiff No.2's father Shivalingappa (defendant No.1) and Savantrevva succeeded as tenants in common under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and therefore, partition suit filed by son and wife of 12 defendant No.1 is not maintainable, suffers from perversity and warrants interference ?" FINDING ON POINT No.(i) 17. Defendant No.3 claims to be a bonafide purchaser. Defendant No.3 has contended that defendants 1 and 2 were compelled to sell suit item No.1 property for legal necessity. This Court deems it fit to cull out the entire sale deed, which reads as under: "ಾಗಲೋಟ ೆ ಾಗಲೋಟ ಾಲೂಾ ೈ ರೂರ ಾಮದ RÄ¶Ì ೆಂಪ ಜೕನ ಖೕ ಪತ ಖೕ .ರೂ. 50,00,000/- ಬ#ಾರ $ಾವ .ರೂ. 50,00,000/- ೕಯುತ : ಉ)ೕಶ ತಂ+ೆ ,ೕಮಪ- ಪ.#ಾ ಉಫ0 1ಾ2ಾರ ವ3ಾ : 46 4ಂದು ಉ+ೊ5ೕಗ : 6ೇwÌ 7ಾ : ಾ 8ೊ9ಾ5ಳ +ೇ7ಾ;ಯವರ ಮ9ೆ ಹ=>ರ, ಾಗಲೋಟ ಾ: : ಾಗಲೋಟ EªÀjUÉ, ¥ÉÆ£À £ÀA : 9845534001 ¥Á£ï PÁqÀð : AAWPU6867F ಖೕ ಪತ ೇ¹ä :- 9ಾವ (1) ವ2ಂಗಪ- ತಂ+ೆ +ಾ5ಮಣ@ ೇAನಮBC (2) 6ಾವಂ ೆವD - ಗಂಡ +ಾ5ಮಣ@ 13 ೇAನಮBC ವ3ಾ : ಕಮ1ಾG 42, 72 4ಂದು ಉ+ೊ5ೕಗ : 6ೇwÌ ವ ಮ9ೆೆಲಸ 7ಾ : 8ೊ9ಾIಕBC ಾ : : ಾಗಲೋಟ 3ಾವತ>ರೂ ಕೂJ ಬKೆದುೊಡುವ ಜೕನ ಖೕ ಪತ ಏ9ೆಂದKೆ, ಖೕ ೆ ೊಟC ಜೕನದ Aವರ :- ಾಗಲೋಟ ೆ ಾಗಲೋಟ ಾಲೂಾ ೈ ರೂರ ಾಮದ2ರುವ ನಮM ಸDಂತ Nಾ2O ಕಾP ವ41ಾBಯ2ರುವ RÄ¶Ì ೆಂಪ ಜೕನು ಇದರ Aವರ: .ಸ.ನಂ. J - UÀÄA ಆಾರ gÀÆ. 502 16 - 38 5-39 EzÀÄ ¥ÀÆgÁ. EzÀÄ DPÁgÀ §AzÀPÉÌ ºÀ.gÀ. PÉëÃvÀæPÉÌ ºÉÆAzÁtÂPÉ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. EzÀgÀ ZÀPÀ§A¢ :- ¥ÀƪÀðPÉÌ : ²ªÁf ¸ÀÆAiÀÄðªÀA² EªÀgÀ j¸À£ÀA 501 ¥À²ÑªÀÄPÉÌ : Sೕರಪ-ಜT ರಗುಂU ಇವರ ಜೕನು GvÀÛgÀPÉÌ : ಸರಾ ಗುಡV zÀQëtPÉÌ : ರ7ೆ> ಈ ಚಕಬಂ ನಡುAನ ಜೕನು ಪ.Kಾ, ನಮೆ ನಂ 19ೇ ದವರ ಮಗನ ಾಲನ Yೕಷ[ೆ ವ A\ಾ5$ಾ5ಸದ ಸಲು1ಾG 8ಾಗೂ ನಂ 29ೇದವರ ಉಪ ೕವನದ ಸಲು1ಾG ಮತು> ನಂ 19ೇದವರ ಉಪ ೕವನದ ಸಲು1ಾG ರಕನ ಅವಶ5ಕ ೆ ಇದು^ದಂದ )ೕೆ 8ೇ_ದ `ೆಕಬಂ ಮಧ5ದ ಜೕನನುI 9ಾವ NಾKಾಟೆO ೆೆಯಲು bೕವ ಎಲರOಂತ 8ೆdeನ ರಕೆ ಖೕ ೆ ೇJದ^ಂದ bಮೆ ನಮM bಮM ಒU-ೆ ವ 14 ಈGನ ಬ#ಾರ $ಾವದ ಪಾರ bಮೆ bO ೊ ಾ>ದ ರಕಮು 50,00,000/-(ಐವತು> ಲh) ರೂ.ಗ_ೆ ಖುi;ಂದ ದಕO ಖೕ ೆ ೊಟುC ಇವ ೆ>ೕ bಮೆ ಇದರ Nಾ°Ìà ಕ¨ÁÓ ಪತ5h1ಾG ೊBCರು ೆ>ೕ1ೆ. ಸದರ ಜೕನದ )ೕೆ ಇನುI ಮುಂ+ೆ ನಮM ವ ನಮM ಇjೆCೕಟ 1ಾರಸು+ಾರರ Nಾ°Ìà ಹಕುO ಸ ಾ> ಏನೂ ಇರುವ ಲ. ಇದರ ಸಂಪ.ಣ0 Nಾ°Ìà ಇವ=>bಂದ bಮM+ೇ ಆGದು^, ಇನುI ಮುಂ+ೆ bೕವ ಸದ ಜೕನವನುI bಮM ಮ 0 ಪಾರ ೇಾದ ೕ= bರಂತರ Nಾ2O;ಂದ ವ41ಾಟ ಉಪkೕಗ Nಾಡುlತ 8ೋಗೇಕು. Nಾ2O ಹOನ ಾಗ 2ಾಡ ಏನೂ ಇರುವ ಲ. Sm ೋ#ಾ ಂದ ಖೕ ೆ ೊBCರು ೆ>ೕ1ೆ ಕ+ಾdl Nಾ°Ìà ಹOನ ವ ೋ`ಾದ ಬೆn ತಂoೆ ತಕKಾರು ಬಂದ2 9ಾವ ನಮM ಸDಂತ ಖd0bಂದ ದೂರ NಾJೊಡು ೆ>ೕ1ೆ. bಮೆ 8ಾb NಾJ ೊಡುವ ಲ. $ಾರ=ೕಯ 9ೋಂದp ಾq^ 1908 ಕಲಂ 22 ಎ ಇವಗ_ೆ ಈ ವ5ವ8ಾರವ ವ5=ಕ>1ಾGರುವ ಲ ಖೕ ರಕಮು 50,00,000/-(ಐವತು> ಲh) ರೂ.ಗಳನುI 7ೆCೕಟ ಾ5ಂಕ ಆr 8ೈದಾs 6ಾtೆ, ಾಗಲೋಟ ಇವರ ೇ ಆಡ0ರ ನಂಬರ 293482 ೊBCದು^ ಖೕ ರಕಮು ಪ.Kಾ ನಮೆ ಮುBCದು^ ಬರತಕO ಖೕ ರಕಮು ಏನೂ ಉ_ ರುವ ಲ. ಇದರ2 ರೂ. 30,00,000/- (ಮೂವತು> ಲh) ಗಳನುI ನಂ 19ೇದವgÀ ಅಲ-ವ; ಮಗ +ಾ5ಮಣ@ ತಂ+ೆ ವ2ಂಗಪ- ೇAನಮBC ಇವನ 8ೆಸೆ uೇವp NಾJದು^ ಇರುತ>+ೆ. 15 ಅಂ ಾ ಸಂ ೋಷ ಂದ ವ ಅಕOಲು ಹುjಾ;ಂದ ಬKೆದುೊಟC ದಕO ಖೕ ಪತ ಸ4 vÁjÃRÄ: 06-07-2011 " (emphasis supplied) A perusal of the recitals contained in the sale deed marked as Ex.P 1 brings to light two significant and decisive aspects that have a direct bearing on the issue of legal necessity. Firstly, the sale deed categorically records that Item No.1 of the suit schedule properties is a dry land, not under active cultivation. This fact, coupled with the prevailing financial circumstances of the family, forms the foundational basis for the alienation. The recitals expressly state that Defendants No.1 and 2 had to meet essential family obligations, including providing for basic amenities and educational expenses of Plaintiff No.2, who was a minor at the time of the transaction. Additionally, the sale proceeds were also intended to cater to the maintenance and well- being of Defendant No.2/Savantrevva, the widow of Dyamanna and the grandmother of Plaintiff No.2. These 16 details clearly establish the existence of pressing family needs, justifying the sale. 18. The second and more compelling aspect emerging from the recitals is that the sale was consciously structured to safeguard the interest of the minor, Plaintiff No.2. This is unequivocally demonstrated by the fact that out of the total sale consideration of Rs.50 lakhs, a substantial sum of Rs.30 lakhs was earmarked and deposited directly in the name of Plaintiff No.2 with the State Bank of Hyderabad, Bagalkot Branch, under Pay Order No. 293482. This payment mode ensures transparency and clearly reflects the intention of Defendants No.1 and 2 to protect and preserve the financial interest of the minor beneficiary. Defendant no. 3/purchaser has placed on record Fixed deposit receipts to substantiate his claim that significant portion of the sale consideration received from the transaction in question has been duly set aside and invested in the name of plaintiff no. 17 1, Defendant No. 1 and 2 jointly. FD receipts have been produced and marked at Ex. R-1 and R-2. The act of creating fixed deposit in the name of plaintiff no. 1, Defendant No. 1 and 2 jointly lends credence to the good faith and intention to safeguard their financial interest. These FD deposits receipts reflect both quantum of funds deposited and also reveal the beneficiaries. It is relevant to note that this significant step of securing over 60% of the total consideration in a fixed deposit in the minor's name goes well beyond the basic threshold of legal necessity which constitutes an act of prudence and foresight. 19. Moreover, Plaintiff No.1, the mother of Plaintiff No.2 and the wife of Defendant No.1, was fully aware of the alienation and did not raise any objection to the transaction at the relevant time. It is only in the year 2015, several years after the sale deed was executed in 2011, that the plaintiffs chose to challenge the sale. This delay in raising a 18 grievance further supports the inference that the transaction was neither clandestine nor detrimental to the minor’s interest. Rather, it was a conscious, bona fide, and family-oriented transaction intended to serve the best interest of the minor and ensure financial stability in the household. 20. In addition, the plaintiffs themselves have produced the RTC extracts pertaining to Item No.1 of the suit schedule properties, which reveal that the land is indeed dry and uncultivable, with no crops grown even at the time of filing the suit. This evidentiary material corroborates the plea of legal necessity, demonstrating that the land was non-productive and not yielding any agricultural income. In such circumstances, the decision to alienate an unproductive asset and convert it into a liquid financial instrument for the minor’s benefit is not only reasonable and necessary, but also legally permissible under Hindu law governing joint family property. 19 21. The trial Court, after meticulous examination of the recitals in Ex.P1, oral evidence, and accompanying documentary material, rightly concluded that the alienation was necessitated by genuine family obligations, including educational and maintenance needs of the minor. The trial Court’s finding that the alienation satisfies the test of legal necessity is well-reasoned and firmly rooted in the evidentiary records. Since the transaction demonstrably protected the interests of the minor and was executed in furtherance of his welfare, no interference with the finding recorded by the trial Court is warranted. Accordingly point no.i is answered in the Negative. FINDING ON POINT No.(ii) 22. Under the traditional Mitakshara school of Hindu law, as it prevailed prior to the codification of Hindu succession laws through the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the nature and character of property held by a Hindu male 20 were governed by distinct principles of joint family and coparcenary law. One of the cardinal principles of Mitakshara law was that a Hindu joint family, consisting of male members, descended lineally from a common ancestor, held property in coparcenary, which is a narrower body within the larger joint family. In such a structure, ancestral property was always held jointly by the coparceners, who acquired a birthright in the property by virtue of their being born into the family. 23. However, when it came to property acquired by a Hindu male through his own efforts termed self-acquired property, the law drew a sharp distinction. Under Mitakshara law, if a Hindu male, while being a member of a joint Hindu family, acquired property by his own skill, learning, effort, or from his separate income, such property was considered his separate and exclusive property during his lifetime. Neither his sons nor any other lineal male descendants could claim a vested interest in such self- 21 acquired property so long as the acquirer was alive. The father retained full autonomy to dispose of or deal with such property as he pleased, including through gift, sale, or will. 24. However, this position altered upon the death of the Hindu male intestate that is, without leaving a will. If, at the time of his death, his son was alive and the grandson (son’s son) had also been born, the property, which was originally self-acquired, would assume the character of ancestral property in the hands of the son. In such circumstances, the grandson would acquire by birth a right in the property as a coparcener under the Mitakshara law. This transformation of the property into ancestral property posthumously was grounded in the doctrine that once property devolved from the paternal ancestor without being alienated, it would be held jointly by the male descendants and treated as ancestral in their hands. 22 25. Thus, prior to the statutory reforms introduced by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the character of property in a Hindu joint family was heavily dependent on the source of acquisition and the status of lineal male descendants. The Mitakshara law drew a critical line between self-acquired and ancestral property, with the rights of sons and grandsons being contingent upon both the source of acquisition and the timing of birth in relation to the life of the acquirer. 26. The enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 brought about a significant departure from the traditional Mitakshara principles governing inheritance and succession. Prior to codification, the doctrine of survivorship governed the devolution of property in a Mitakshara joint family. Under this doctrine, co-parcenary property would devolve upon the surviving male co-parceners by survivorship, and not by inheritance. However, the codified law ushered in a new regime, particularly through the 23 introduction of Section 8, which fundamentally altered the landscape of intestate succession for Hindu males dying after 1956. 27. Section 8 of the Act lays down that when a Hindu male dies intestate that is, without executing a valid will, his property does not devolve by the traditional rule of survivorship but by succession to his legal heirs enumerated in Class I of the Schedule. These Class I heirs include: • The widow of the deceased, • His sons and daughters (including married daughters), and • His mother. 28. This statutory scheme marks a radical break from the Mitakshara principle of birthright and survivorship. The property that devolves under Section 8 if it is self-acquired of the deceased from his own father or 24 other ancestors after 1956, is treated as the absolute property of the Class I heirs. Importantly, such property does not retain the character of co-parcenary property in the hands of these heirs. There is no automatic vesting of co-parcenary rights in the male lineal descendants, and no birthright accrues to the son, grandson, or great-grandson in the property inherited under Section 8. 29. Thus, where a Hindu male acquires property either by his own efforts after 1956, such property, upon his intestate death, is distributed equally among his legal heirs under Section 8. The heirs take the property as tenants-in-common, not as co-parceners. Each heir receives a distinct and identifiable share, which can be alienated, bequeathed, or otherwise dealt with as her or his absolute property. 30. In effect, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, particularly Section 8, curtails the operation of 25 survivorship and the concept of a unified joint family estate, thereby recognizing the modern notion of individual rights and equal inheritance. This shift not only erodes the doctrine of unobstructed heritage but also expands the scope of inheritance by including female heirs such as daughters and widows on par with male heirs, thereby achieving a more equitable distribution of property. 31. At the outset, it must be emphasized that neither in the plaint nor in the appeal memo have the plaintiffs specifically pleaded that Pavadeppa died prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and that consequently, Dyamanna succeeded to the suit schedule properties by survivorship, thereby preserving the character of the property as ancestral or co-parcenary in nature. The entire foundation of a claim based on co- parcenary rights by birth hinges on the crucial factual assertion that the property devolved before codification, 26 which would invoke the operation of the old Mitakshara law of survivorship. 32. Even if the plaintiff's contention is accepted at face value that Pavadeppa died prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act 1956, this Court is of the considered view that such an assumption does not automatically vest co-parcenary rights in the hands of Dyamanna, Pavadeppa’s son, during Pavadeppa’s lifetime, in respect of his self-acquired property. Under the traditional Mitakshara law, a son acquires a birthright only in ancestral property, not in the self-acquired property of his father. The father retains full ownership and dispositive power over his self-acquired property during his lifetime. Therefore, even under pre-codification law, Dyamanna could not have claimed any vested interest or co-parcenary right in Pavadeppa’s self-acquired property during Pavadeppa’s lifetime. 27 33. Upon the death of Pavadeppa, Dyamanna would inherit the self-acquired property as a legal heir, and it would vest in him as separate property, unless it was thrown into the common hotchpotch of joint family property or otherwise blended. Whether such inherited property subsequently assumes the character of ancestral property depends on whether Dyamanna had a son born to him prior to his inheriting the property, thereby giving rise to a Mitakshara co-parcenary and creating a joint family nucleus. 34. In the present case, the plaintiff has failed to plead or produce any material evidence showing when Pavadeppa died or when the plaintiff’s father, Shivalingappa, was born. This omission is critical. The timing of Shivalingappa’s birth determines whether or not a co-parcenary came into existence between Dyamanna and Shivalingappa. Under the Mitakshara doctrine, if Shivalingappa was born before the death of Pavadeppa, and 28 property in the hands of Dyamanna would have been ancestral, Shivalingappa could have acquired a co- parcenary right by birth. 35. If Shivalingappa was born after the Act came into force of 1956 Act, the property inherited by Dyamanna from Pavadeppa would devolve by succession and not survivorship. Consequently, any property held by Dyamanna, whether inherited or otherwise, would be held by him in his individual capacity, and no co-parcenary right would accrue to Shivalingappa by birth. 36. A careful reading of the plaint reveals that Shivalingappa’s age is shown as 46 years as on the year 2015. This indicates that he was born around 1969, which is well after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956. Thus, on the face of the pleadings, it is evident that Shivalingappa was born post-codification, and therefore, he could not have acquired co-parcenary rights in 29 any property held by Dyamanna. The inheritance by Dyamanna from his father Pavadeppa would devolve upon Shivalingappa, if at all, under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, in his individual capacity as a Class I heir, and not by virtue of any survivorship or birthright under the Mitakshara law. Defendant No. 2/Widow of Dyamanna inherited Item no. 1 property to an extent of ½ share as per Bombay school. 37. In summary, the distinction between pre- codification Mitakshara law and the post-codification statutory regime under Section 8 is decisive in this case. Mitakshara law recognizes birthright in ancestral property, and co-parcenary arises only when male descendants are born during the continuance of joint family property. In contrast, Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act does away with the doctrine of survivorship for intestate succession, and introduces equal succession among Class I 30 heirs, severing the automatic accrual of co-parcenary rights unless the property is clearly joint family property. 38. Therefore, in the absence of material pleadings or proof to establish that Shivalingappa was born before codification or that the property was ancestral in nature, the plaintiff’s claim of co-parcenary right cannot be sustained. The legal presumption arising from the pleadings is that Shivalingappa was born after the Hindu Succession Act came into force and that he inherited the property, if at all, as an individual heir under Section 8, and not as a co- parcener with birthright under the Mitakshara framework. 39. However, in the absence of any such pleading, this fundamental issue never arose for consideration before the trial Court. The trial Court, accordingly, did not frame any issue on the nature of devolution from Pavadeppa to Dyamanna, as the plaintiffs themselves failed to raise this 31 contention either directly or by seeking an amendment of the plaint at any stage. 40. It is well-settled that in civil litigation, pleadings form the backbone of the case, and a party cannot be permitted to raise a new factual foundation for the first time during appeal, particularly when such a foundation has serious consequences on the legal character of the property in dispute. The doctrine of co-parcenary and survivorship cannot be presumed in the absence of specific facts showing that the succession occurred prior to 1956. Any such determination requires clear and affirmative evidence of the date of death of the propositus, which is completely lacking in the present case. 41. In this background, the reliance placed by the appellants on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (supra) is misplaced and inapplicable to the facts of the 32 present case. The Vineeta Sharma case was concerned with the constitutional validity and retrospective operation of the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, which conferred equal co-parcenary rights on daughters by birth, at par with sons. The central issue in Vineeta Sharma pertained to whether the amendment to Section 6 introduced in 2005 operated retrospectively and conferred birthright on daughters even when the father had died before the amendment came into effect, and not on the issue of whether property devolved by survivorship or succession in a male lineage in the absence of such statutory amendments. The decision in Vineeta Sharma was rendered in the context of gender equality in co-parcenary rights, and the legal interpretation of amended Section 6, which is not relevant to the facts at hand where the basic fact of ancestral character of the property has not been pleaded or proved. 33 42. Similarly, the appellant contention that principles laid Uttam v. Saubhag Singh (supra) is no more good law is misconcieved. In Uttam Singh, the Supreme Court clarified that upon the death of a male Hindu after 1956, his self acquired property would not retain co-parcenary character, but would instead devolve by succession under Section 8. The principle in Uttam Singh actually supports the respondent’s position that upon Pavadeppa's death, whether it occurred prior to codification of Hindu Law or after 1956, the property would devolve through statutory succession under Section 8, and not by survivorship. Since there are no pleadings or evidence to prove that Pavadeppa died prior to codification and Shivalingappa (plaintiff no2 ‘s father) was born prior to 1956, Section 8 would apply, and the property in the hands of Dyamanna would be his individual property. 43. Therefore, both Vineeta Sharma and Uttam Singh were rendered in distinct factual and legal contexts. 34 The former relates to the right of daughters in co-parcenary property under the amended Section 6, and the latter clarifies the applicability of Section 8 where devolution occurs after 1956. In the present case, neither principle can be invoked unless it is first established that the succession occurred before codification, and that a co-parcenary existed at the time of birth of Plaintiff No.2. In the absence of pleadings, issues, and supporting evidence on this critical point, the appellants’ attempt to invoke these landmark rulings is legally untenable. 44. The decisions in Uttam Singh v. Saubhag Singh, and Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, represent two significant pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the field of Hindu succession law. Though both deal with aspects of devolution and rights in Hindu joint family property, they operate in different statutory and doctrinal spheres and address distinct legal questions. 35 45. Uttam Singh v. Saubhag Singh, In Uttam Singh, the Supreme Court dealt with the legal consequences flowing from the death of a Hindu male intestate after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The central issue in the case was whether self acquired property held by a Hindu male, a self acquired property would retain its character as co-parcenary property upon his death, or whether such property would devolve upon his heirs by succession under Section 8 of the Act. The Court held that with the advent of codification in 1956, the traditional rule of survivorship stood curtailed, and where a Hindu male dies intestate, even his property would devolve by succession to his legal heirs under Section 8, rather than by survivorship. 46. It must be emphasized that Uttam Singh does not deal with the issue of co-parcenary rights of daughters or the interpretation of Section 6 of the Act. Its ratio is confined to the statutory mode of devolution under Section 36 8 and the implications for properties held by a Hindu male dying intestate after 1956. 47. B. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma In contrast, the Full Bench decision in Vineeta Sharma dealt with an entirely different legal question concerning the status of daughters in a Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara law. The issue before the Court was the correct interpretation of the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act (as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005), which conferred co- parcenary rights upon daughters by birth. The Court unequivocally held that a daughter, like a son, becomes a co-parcener by birth, and such right is not contingent upon the father being alive on the date of the amendment, i.e., 09.09.2005. 48. The Court emphasized that the conferral of co- parcenary status is by operation of law and flows from the 37 daughter's birth into a joint Hindu family. The amendment being declaratory in nature, applies retrospectively, and daughters are entitled to seek partition of co-parcenary property just as sons are. The judgment reinforces the principle of substantive equality and seeks to correct the historic exclusion of daughters from the Mitakshara co- parcenary. 49. It is important to note that Vineeta Sharma is concerned with the character of co-parcenary property and the recognition of daughters as co-parceners therein. It does not examine or overrule the principles laid down in Uttam Singh concerning the devolution of property by succession under Section 8. 50. Whether Vineeta Sharma Overrules Uttam Singh? (i) A careful doctrinal analysis makes it evident that Vineeta Sharma does not overrule or invalidate the reasoning in Uttam Singh. The two decisions operate in entirely 38 different factual and statutory contexts, and their respective holdings address distinct questions of law. (ii) Accordingly, the reliance placed on Vineeta Sharma is misplaced, and cannot sustain the plaintiffs’ claim for partition in the suit item No.1 based on co-parcenary rights. Accordingly point No.(ii) is answered in the Negative. Conclusion: I. Even if it is assumed that Pavadeppa died prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, his son Dyamanna would not acquire any vested co-parcenary interest in Pavadeppa’s self-acquired property during his lifetime. Under Mitakshara law, co-parcenary rights arise only in ancestral property, not in property acquired independently by the father. II. Upon Pavadeppa’s death, the self-acquired property would devolve upon Dyamanna as his separate property, unless it was blended with joint family assets. It would become ancestral in Dyamanna’s hands only if a son was born to 39 him before he inherited it, thereby triggering co-parcenary rights under Mitakshara doctrine. III. The plaintiff has not pleaded or produced any evidence regarding the dates of Pavadeppa’s death or Shivalingappa’s birth. This omission is crucial, as the timing determines the legal character of the property and the applicability of either the pre-codification Mitakshara principles or the post-codification statutory succession regime. In the present case, Shivalingappa was born in 1969 and his age is shown as 46 years and the suit is filed in the year 2015, therefore Shivalingappa/ Defendant No.1 does not acquire birth right on account of death of his grandfather, Pavadeppa. Hypothetically, if Shivalingappa was born before the codification, on the demise of his grandfather, Pavadeppa, Item No.1 would have been ancestral property in the hands of Dyamanna and Shivalingappa would have gotten birth right in Item No.1 property. IV. From a perusal of the plaint, it is evident that Shivalingappa, was born in the year 1969, which is well 40 after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is a matter of record that the present suit has been instituted in the year 2015, and Shivalingappa's age is stated to be 46 years, which corroborates the fact that he was born subsequent to the 1956 codification of Hindu succession law. Since Shivalingappa was born after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, and the concept of survivorship ceased to apply to the devolution of separate property of a Hindu male post-1956, it necessarily follows that Shivalingappa did not acquire any right in the property by virtue of birth. He could not have acquired any coparcenary interest in the said property as there existed no coparcenary to begin with, the same having been extinguished or rendered inapplicable by virtue of the statutory scheme introduced under Section 8 of the Act. Therefore, the foundational premise of the suit, if predicated on the existence of a notional coparcenary or a right by birth in the estate of propositus Pavadappa (Great grand father of plaintiff no.2), is fundamentally flawed. In light of the above legal position, it must be concluded that 41 Plaintiff No.2 cannot claim any coparcenary right in the suit schedule property, as such a coparcenary was never created after the 1956 codification, and the property vested absolutely in the legal heirs of Dyamanna through succession as per the Act. V. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is respectfully submitted that the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh and Others, squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In the said decision, the Apex Court authoritatively held that where a Hindu male dies intestate after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, his property devolves upon his Class I legal heirs as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, and consequently, no coparcenary exists after such devolution. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment, upon the demise of Dyamanna, the suit schedule Item No.1 devolved upon Defendant Nos.1 and 2, his son and widow as Class I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The property vested in them absolutely as tenants-in-common in their individual 42 capacities. As there was no subsisting coparcenary after the death of Dyamanna, who inherited item No. 1 property from Pavadeppa, Defendant no. 1/Shivalingappa who was born in 1969, well after the 1956 codification did not acquire any birthright or coparcenary interest in the property but inherited ½ share and Defendant no. 2/ widow of Dyamanna inherited ½ share as per section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and also under Bombay school of law. VI. Accordingly, the sale deed executed jointly by Defendant No.1 and Defendant No.2 in favour of Defendant No.3 is a valid and lawful transaction, effected by persons having full right, title and interest in the property. The plaintiffs, having no legal right or share in Item No.1, have no locus standi to challenge the said alienation. Further, Plaintiff No.1, being the wife of Defendant No.1, cannot assert any independent right in the property during the lifetime of her husband, as per settled principles of Hindu law. VII. Therefore, the suit for partition in respect of Item No.1 is wholly misconceived, not maintainable in law, and 43 deserves to be dismissed in light of the binding ratio laid down in Uttam Singh (supra). VIII. The distinction between Uttam Singh v. Saubhag Singh and Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma supports this conclusion. While Uttam Singh clarifies that property devolving under Section 8 loses its co-parcenary character, Vineeta Sharma affirms the co-parcenary rights of daughters by birth in existing ancestral property. The two decisions operate in separate legal domains and are not in conflict. IX. Doctrinally, there is no conflict between the two decisions. Rather, they are harmonious in their operation. Uttam Singh deals with how and to whom property devolves upon the intestate death of a Hindu male under Section 8, while Vineeta Sharma is concerned with who qualifies as a co-parcener in joint family property under the amended Section 6 and when such a right accrues. The Full Bench in Vineeta Sharma makes no reference to Uttam Singh nor does it seek to overrule it, reinforcing the view that both judgments occupy separate legal terrains. 44 X. In sum, the judgments in Uttam Singh and Vineeta Sharma reflect the evolution of Hindu succession law in two distinct yet complementary directions. Uttam Singh explains the implications of statutory succession under Section 8 for intestate property and confirms the extinction of co-parcenary rights in sef acquired property. Vineeta Sharma, on the other hand, affirms the birthright-based co-parcenary status of daughters in ancestral property and ensures gender equality in the devolution of joint family estates. There is no doctrinal inconsistency between the two; rather, they reflect a coherent and progressive interpretation of different provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 51. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court declining partition 45 insofar as item No.1 of the suit schedule properties does not warrant interference at the hands of this Court. 52. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER The appeal is dismissed. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE Sd/- (G BASAVARAJA) JUDGE ALB