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2025 DAILYLAW 3751 (HP)

Kunal Juneja v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-10-29

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 40 of 2022, dated 16.02.2022, registered at Police Station Shimla (West), District Shimla (HP), for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451 and 504 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police that he is running a workshop in the name of Rishikesh Car Care at Chakkar Shimla, which is engaged in servicing, dry cleaning, polishing, painting, and other mechanical works. The petitioner, Kunal Singh Juneja, purporting to be the owner of the vehicle bearing registration number PB-03AP-3880, got the vehicle serviced as per his choice. The total cost of the work was Rs.72,530, out of which the petitioner paid Rs.40,000 and promised to pay the remaining amount of Rs.32,530 within a day or two. The informant delivered the possession of the vehicle to the petitioner on 14th January 2022, along with the original bills of spare parts, labour, and other items. The petitioner failed to pay the amount within the stipulated time, and the informant requested him to pay the remaining amount, but in vain. The petitioner and two other persons came to the informant’s garage on 17th January 2022 in the vehicle bearing registration number PB-03AP-3880, armed with sticks. They abused and beat the informant. The informant was saved by the employees of the workshop and other persons present on the spot. The petitioner threatened to kill the informant on the next occasion. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police found after the investigation that the petitioner had delivered the car for repair to the informant’s workshop. The petitioner visited the workshop to take delivery of the vehicle and paid Rs.40,000 out of Rs.72,530. The petitioner did not find the work satisfactory, and he returned with his friends, Ashutosh Shandilya and Shubham Singh, to the informant’s workshop on 17th January 2022. All of them gave beatings to the informant. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. The petitioner did not find the work satisfactory, and he returned with his friends, Ashutosh Shandilya and Shubham Singh, to the informant’s workshop on 17th January 2022. All of them gave beatings to the informant. The police filed the charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. It has been asserted that the petitioner approached the informant for the repair of his car. The informant quoted an estimate of Rs.40,000/- to 50,000/-. The petitioner agreed and left his car with the informant for repairs. The petitioner visited the informant’s garage and requested the delivery of the vehicle; however, the informant demanded Rs.73,000 without providing the details of the expenses. This led to the exchange of hot words. The informant made a false complaint against the petitioner. The informant was not medically examined, which shows the falsity of the informant’s complaint. The ingredients of Sections 451 and 504 of IPC are not satisfied. The petitioner had visited the garage to take delivery of his vehicle. A civil dispute is being converted into a criminal case. There was a delay of one month in reporting the matter to the Police. The continuation of the FIR is an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent No. 1 by filing a reply, making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the FIR and the details of the investigation work were reproduced. It was asserted that the police investigated the matter and found the allegations to be correct. Three persons were involved in the commission of the offence, and quashing the FIR against the petitioner would result in inconsistency. The allegations against the petitioner are serious and have far-reaching effects on society. The petitioner cannot escape the consequences of his acts. The delay was properly explained. A charge sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of the investigations. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested with it. The petitioner cannot escape the consequences of his acts. The delay was properly explained. A charge sheet was filed before the Court after the completion of the investigations. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested with it. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. No reply was filed by respondent No. 2, and the reply filed by respondent No. 1 was adopted. 6. I have heard M/s Vasu Jal and Sambhav Bhasin, learned counsel, for the petitioner, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No. 1 /State and Mr Bhairav Gupta, learned counsel, for respondent No. 2. 7. Mr Vasu Jal, learned counsel, for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made by the informant are false. The ingredients of Sections 451 and 504 of IPC are not satisfied. The informant converted civil proceedings into criminal proceedings, which is impermissible. There was a delay in reporting the matter to the police. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Sonu Choudhary vs State of NCT Delhi 2024 INSC 864 , and Ram Avtar Gupta vs State of Haryana and another 2024 (1) RCR (Cr) 152 in support of his submission. 8. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No. 1 /State, submitted that the learned Trial Court has framed the charge and the matter is pending for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. The petitioner has not challenged the order framing the charges, and the present petition is not maintainable. The allegations made by the informant are corroborated by independent witnesses. The truthfulness or otherwise of all the allegations is not to be seen at this stage. The delay was properly explained. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Bhairav Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, adopted the submissions of Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No. 1/ State and submitted that the petitioner abused the informant in the name of the caste because he had demanded his wages for the work done by him. The abuse hurled by the petitioner is covered under the SC & ST Act. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent No. 1/ State and submitted that the petitioner abused the informant in the name of the caste because he had demanded his wages for the work done by him. The abuse hurled by the petitioner is covered under the SC & ST Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 INSC 1249 as under: - 66. The power to quash criminal proceedings is guided by the principle of preventing the abuse of the process of law or miscarriage of justice, and of securing the ends of justice. It can be done by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or by exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the B.N.S.S.”)) and even by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, if the circumstances so require. 67. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. stipulates that nothing in the Cr.P.C. limits or affects the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders to give effect to any order under the Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The powers vested can even be exercised suo motu to secure the ends of justice. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) 335, this Court made it abundantly clear that the High Courts in exercise of their extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., should act with a view to prevent abuse of process of any court or secure the ends of justice…” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335). 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. It has been specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioner, Ashutosh Shandilya and Shubham Singh entered the informant’s garage armed with sticks and they abused and beat the informant. These allegations prima facie show the commission of cognizable offences. 15. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 16. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not. 17. It was submitted that there is a civil dispute between the parties. The informant was to recover money from the petitioner, and criminal proceedings are being used for ulterior purposes. This submission will not help the petitioner. The enmity is a double-edged weapon; while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of a crime. In the present case, the FIR specifically mentions that the petitioner abused and beat the informant over the dispute about the repair expenses. Thus, as per the FIR, the civil dispute was the motive for the commission of the crime and not false implication. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. Thus, as per the FIR, the civil dispute was the motive for the commission of the crime and not false implication. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 19. It was submitted that the garage was a public place and the ingredients of section 451 of IPC are not satisfied. This submission is not acceptable. It is undisputed that the garage is used for the custody of the cars. Therefore, the garage is a building used for the custody of the property, and the petitioner’s entry into it armed with the sticks to beat the informant will satisfy the requirements of section 451 of the IPC. 20. It was laid down by the Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. Richard, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 45: 2008 Cri LJ 2200: ILR 2008 Kar 1352 that entry into a police station which is used for the custody of the property will attract Section 451 of IPC. It was observed at page 1366: “23. As far as the offence punishable under Section 452 of the IPC is concerned, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the said section is not attracted because, a plain reading of Section 452 would make it clear that it is applicable only in cases of trespass into the house property and as the accused No. 4 did not enter house, but entered the police station, the question of house trespass does not arise and the ingredient of Section 452 are not attracted. 24. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for State argued that a look at the meaning assigned to the expression “house trespass” in Section 452 of IPC will make it clear that the criminal trespass in question need not be only in respect of a building used as a human dwelling, but it also covers in building used as a place for custody of property and as the police station is a place where there will also be custody of property, Section 442 is satisfied in the instant case and consequently, as A4 did commit criminal trespass by entering the police station and assaulted PW2, Section 452 also comes into application. 25. Therefore, the important question to be answered at this juncture is, whether the prosecution has also made out a case against A4 in respect of the offence punishable under Section 452 of the IPC? 26. 25. Therefore, the important question to be answered at this juncture is, whether the prosecution has also made out a case against A4 in respect of the offence punishable under Section 452 of the IPC? 26. Section 452 of the IPC reads as follows: “452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.- Whoever commits house- trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrong- fully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 27. The expression house trespass has been explained in Section 442 of the IPC as follows: “442. House-trespass.- Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of property, is said to commit “house-tres- pass”. 28. Therefore, from a combine reading of these two Sections and in particular, having regard to use of the expression in building used as a place for “custody of property”, I am of the view that A4, having entered the police station and having assaulted PW2, Section 452 gets attracted. A police station is necessarily housed in a building, and it is also a place for the custody of property. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the respondents that Section 452 of the IPC is applicable only in respect of any building used as a human dwelling. In this regard, it is also pertinent to refer to a decision reported in 1991 (2) Orissa LR 295, which decision has been referred to in AIR Manual 5th Edition Volume 38 at page 868, where it is commented thus: “Where the evidence on record proved that the accused went inside the office room of the Sub-Divisional Veterinary Assistant Surgeon with a stone in hand and threatened to assault him, an offence under Section 448 is made out against the accused.” 29. In the instant case, not only A4 committed criminal trespass by entering the police station, but he further assaulted PW2 by ditching his head against the face of PW2 and thereby caused injuries to PW2, which also included the loss of one tooth. Under the above circumstances, I am of the view that the prosecution has made out a case by conviction of A4 even in respect of the offence punish- able under Section 452 of the IPC.” 21. In Sonu Chodary (supra), the entry was inside a restaurant which was not used for custody of property as per para 10 of the judgment, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 22. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, and the FIR should be quashed because of the delay. This submission is not acceptable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Punit Beriwala (supra) that the delay cannot be used for quashing the FIR. It was observed: “DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR QUASHING THE PRESENT FIR 36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that ‘there had been a delay in registration of the FIR and because of such delay, the allegations made by the Appellant are unbelievable’ and the submissions of learned senior counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should be entertained ‘at this distance of time’, would mean in effect in accepting the argument that delay is a sufficient ground for quashing of the present FIR/complaint. 37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the com- plaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…” 23. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…” 23. It was submitted that the medical examination of the informant was not conducted, and the FIR is to be quashed because of this infirmity. This submission will not help the petitioner. The medical evidence can be used to corroborate the informant’s statement, and the Trial Court is to weigh the informant’s statement after the conclusion of the Trial. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.” 24. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 25. It was submitted that the informant stated in his statement before the police that he had mentioned the sticks in a state of anger, which casts a doubt on the informant’s statement. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 958 that the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus does not apply to India. It was observed: “36. It is, though trite and much overstated, but the maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”(false in one thing, false in everything) is not applicable to our criminal justice system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on record.” 26. Hence, the informant’s statement cannot be discarded due to some falsehood in it. 27. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had framed the charges, and the petitioner has not assailed the orders framing the charges. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on record.” 26. Hence, the informant’s statement cannot be discarded due to some falsehood in it. 27. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court had framed the charges, and the petitioner has not assailed the orders framing the charges. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in rare cases. It was observed on page 145:- “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases, the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 28. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances were shown to justify the quashing of the FIR. 29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. 29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 32. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.