JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the summoning order dated 12.08.2021 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.3, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) in Complaint bearing Registration No. 212 of 2018 titled Sun Pack India vs. M/s Himalayan Hygienic Food & Drinks Pvt. Ltd. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the petitioner and other accused, asserting that the complainant is a registered firm manufacturing corrugated boxes. Accused No.1 is a Company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Accused No.2 is a Director, and accused No. 3 is In charge of the Company. The accused had business dealings with the complainant. They used to purchase different types of corrugated boxes from the complainant on credit. The complainant issued invoices against the goods supplied to the accused, which were accepted by the accused without any protest. The accused made payment to the complainant till 10.11.2017. An amount of Rs.3,73,638/- was due from the accused to the complainant. The complainant made repeated requests for the repayment of the amount due. The accused promised to repay the amount by transferring it through NEFT up to 25th March, 2018. The accused also issued a signed security cheque drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Naya Nangal, Branch Ajoli, Naya Nangal, District Rupnagar (PB). Accused No. 3 filled in the trade name on the cheque. He also requested to present the cheque on 25.03.2018 in case payment was not made through NEFT. The accused failed to repay the amount as promised. Hence, the complainant presented the cheque on 26.03.2018; however, the cheque was returned unpaid with an endorsement ‘exceeds arrangements’. A notice was served upon the accused, but the accused failed to repay the amount. Hence, the complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court ordered the summoning of the accused vide order dated 06.10.2018. When the petitioner did not appear, the Court ordered the issuance of bailable warrants against him on 11.04.2019 and 12.08.2021. 4. Hence, the complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court ordered the summoning of the accused vide order dated 06.10.2018. When the petitioner did not appear, the Court ordered the issuance of bailable warrants against him on 11.04.2019 and 12.08.2021. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition asserting that the cheque was issued by accused No.2, Rashpal Singh. The petitioner/accused No.3 is the son of accused No.2. He has no concern with the business affairs, and he was pursuing his studies in business management. Vague allegations are made against him. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that no offence was committed. Accused No.1 is a firm, and only the person who was responsible for conducting its business could be arrayed as accused. There was no justification to issue a summons against the petitioner/accused. Learned Trial Court failed to consider this aspect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the summoning order be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for respondent No.1/complainant. 6. Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner/accused are vague and the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance and issuing the process against him. The petitioner never remained the Director of accused No.1, and the order summoning him is bad. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the summoning order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2016 (6) SC 62 and Akansha Arora vs. Tanay Maben, 2024 INSC 96 in support of his submission. 7. Mr. Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for respondent No.1/complainant, submitted that the revision is barred by limitation. The summoning order was passed on 06.10.2018, and the present revision was filed on 24.09.2021, much beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the law. An order of summoning an accused is an interlocutory order, and no revision lies against the same. The present revision has been filed by the petitioner through his mother and is not properly instituted. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. An order of summoning an accused is an interlocutory order, and no revision lies against the same. The present revision has been filed by the petitioner through his mother and is not properly instituted. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was submitted that the present petition is not maintainable because it was filed by the petitioner through his mother. This submission is technically correct. The petitioner is a major person and capable of suing and being sued. The petition is silent regarding the inability of the petitioner to sue himself. Therefore, he could not have sued through his mother, and the petition filed by him in the present form is not maintainable. However, Section 397 of Cr.P.C. reads that the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceedings before any inferior Criminal Court situated within his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court. The jurisdiction has been conferred upon the High Court or the Sessions Court to call for the record. This jurisdiction can be exercised at the instance of a person or suo moto. This is apparent from the fact that the legislature has used the words ‘by itself’. Further, Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no party has a right to be heard either personally or by a pleader before any Court exercising the power of revision, but the Court may, if it thinks fit, hear any party personally or through a pleader. This also shows that the legislature intended that the jurisdiction is to be exercised by the Revisional Court after perusing the record, and a party at whose instance the record has been requisitioned does not have a right to address the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1001, that the third party has a right to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. It was observed: 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Honnaiah T.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1001, that the third party has a right to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. It was observed: 16. The challenge to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the appellant impugning an order passed during the pendency of the trial must also be rejected. The revisional jurisdiction of a High Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC is a discretionary jurisdiction that can be exercised by the revisional court suo motu so as to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order recorded or passed by the trial court or the inferior court. As the power of revision can be exercised by the High Court even suo moto, there can be no bar on a third party invoking the revisional jurisdiction and inviting the attention of the High Court that an occasion to exercise the power has arisen. Holding a revision petition instituted by a complainant maintainable, Justice Santosh Hegde writing for this Court in K Pandurangan v. SSR Velusamy (2003) 8 SCC 625 observed: “6. So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the court has a suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will not affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn).” 10. Therefore, the revision cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is filed by a third party. 11. It was submitted that the order of summoning the accused is interlocutory and no revision lies against the same. This submission is also not acceptable. Therefore, the revision cannot be dismissed on the ground that it is filed by a third party. 11. It was submitted that the order of summoning the accused is interlocutory and no revision lies against the same. This submission is also not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 that the accused has a right to approach the High Court for quashing the order summoning him. It was observed:- "17. Before we conclude we may point out an obvious, almost insurmountable, difficulty in the way of applying literally the test laid down in the Kuppuswami Rao case and in holding that an order of the kind under consideration being not a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one. If a complaint is dismissed under Section 203 or Section 204(4), or the Court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise, it will make Section 398 of the new Code otiose. Does it stand to reason, then, that an accused will have no remedy to move the High Court in revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated upon a complaint or otherwise and which is fit to be quashed on the face of it? The Legislature left the power to order further inquiry intact in Section 398. Is it not then, in consonance with the sense of justice to leave intact the remedy of the accused to move the High Court for setting aside the order adversely made against him in similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding? The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above." (Emphasis supplied) 12. It was held in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134 that an order directing the issuance of a process cannot be termed as an interlocutory order as it adversly affects the rights of the parties adversely. It was observed:- "4. It was held in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134 that an order directing the issuance of a process cannot be termed as an interlocutory order as it adversly affects the rights of the parties adversely. It was observed:- "4. In view of the rival submissions at the bar, the first question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Magistrate, directing the issuance of process can be said to be such an interlocutory order which is not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, in view of the bar in sub-section (2) thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 reads thus: "397. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub- section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceeding." 5. The very object of conferring revisional jurisdiction upon the superior criminal courts is to correct a miscarriage of justice arising from the misconception of law or irregularity of procedure. 6. Discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction should, therefore, be exercised within the four corners of Section 397, whenever there has been a miscarriage of justice in whatever manner. Under sub-section (2) of Section 397, there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. But the expression "interlocutory order" has not been defined in the Code. In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana [ (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585 : (1978) 1 SCR 222 ] this Court has held that the expression "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in a broad or artistic sense and merely denotes orders of purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties and any order which substantially affects the right of the parties cannot be said to be an "interlocutory order". In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 :1978 SCC (Cri) 10: (1978) 1 SCR 749 ] a three-judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 :1978 SCC (Cri) 10: (1978) 1 SCR 749 ] a three-judge Bench of this Court has held an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, cannot be held to be an interlocutory order. In V.C. Shukla v. State [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] this Court has held that the term "interlocutory order" used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial and the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi- final. This being the position of law, it would not be appropriate to hold that an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 would apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi-final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order in view of the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Code. 13. It was held in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 that the order of issuance of the summons is not interlocutory, a revision and a petition under Section 482 of CrPC can be filed against such an order. It was observed: - "6. Indisputably issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. This Court in a large number of decisions beginning from R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1960 SC 866 ] to Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 910] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code. of Karnataka [ (2008) 3 SCC 574 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 910] has laid down the criterion for entertaining an application under Section 482. Only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not constitute a bar for entertaining an application under Section 482 of the Code. Even where a revision application is barred, as for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court has held that the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [ (2003) 6 SCC 675 ] .) Even in cases where a second revision before the High Court after the dismissal of the first one by the Court of Session is barred under Section 397(2) [Ed. : The intended provision seems to be Section 397(3). In this regard See (1) Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 544; (2) Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124; (3) Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn., (2005) 2 SCC 571 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 538.] of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been held to be available. 14. This judgment was followed in Om Kumar Dhankar Vs. State of Haryana, 2011 (12) SCC 52, wherein it was held:- 9. Insofar as the first question is concerned, it is concluded by a later decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam [ (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393]. In Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande case [ (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393] this Court considered earlier decisions of this Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10], V.C. Shukla v. State [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695], Amar Nath v. State of Haryana [ (1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 585] and K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala [ (1992) 1 SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 88] and it was held as under: (Rajendra Kumar case [ (1999) 3 SCC 134 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 393], SCC p. 137, para 6) "6. ... ... This being the position of law, it would not be appropriate to hold that an order directing issuance of process is purely interlocutory and, therefore, the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 397 would apply. On the other hand, it must be held to be intermediate or quasi-final and, therefore, the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 could be exercised against the same." 10. In view of the above legal position, we hold, as it must be, that revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC was available to Respondent 2 in challenging the order of the Magistrate directing the issuance of summons. The first question is answered against the appellant accordingly." 15. Bombay High Court also held in V.K. Jain v. Pratap V. Padode, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 684 : (2005) 3 Mah LJ 778 : (2005) 2 Bom CR (Cri) 738 that an order summoning the accused is not interlocutory. It was observed at page 786: “31. From various decisions of the Supreme Court discussed above, it is quite clear that an order issuing process is not an interlocutory order and hence a revision can be preferred against such an order. In these decisions, the said issue was specifically considered and the said issue was decided, giving detailed reasoning. Thus, it is clear that there is a specific provision in the Code in section 397 for redressal of the grievance of the accused against whom process has been issued.” 16. The Patna High Court also took a similar view in Md. Rafique Ahmad v. State of Bihar, 2006 SCC OnLine Pat 249 : (2006) 3 PLJR 139 , wherein it was observed at page 146: “25. Accordingly, my answer to the question posed at the outset is that an order taking cognizance and directing for issuance of process is not an interlocutory order and is subject to the revisional jurisdiction and bar put under Section 397(2) of the Code does not come into way. Resultantly, any judgment taking a contrary view shall be deemed to have been overruled and not lay down the correct law.” 17. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Madamanchi Veera Raghavaiah and Ors. vs. Thalakola Chinnamma and Ors. (28.10.2022-APHC): MANU/AP/2119/2022 and held as under: “12. Resultantly, any judgment taking a contrary view shall be deemed to have been overruled and not lay down the correct law.” 17. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Madamanchi Veera Raghavaiah and Ors. vs. Thalakola Chinnamma and Ors. (28.10.2022-APHC): MANU/AP/2119/2022 and held as under: “12. From the above, it is evident that order taking cognizance is an intermediate order, since if it is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against the accused. Thus, revision is maintainable. As such, the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/de facto complainant and the learned Special Assistant Public Prosecutor in this regard are not tenable.” 18. Therefore, the submission that the present revision is not maintainable cannot be accepted. 19. The learned Trial Court took cognisance and issued the process vide order dated 07.10.2018. Article 131 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 90 days to file a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure,1898, and the limitation starts running from the date of the order sought to be revised. Hence, the limitation for challenging the order dated 06.10.2018 had expired in January 2019, and the present petition filed on 24.09.2021 is hopelessly barred by limitation. 20. It was submitted that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12.08.2021, and the revision is within the limitation from the date of passing the order. This submission is not acceptable. Order dated 12.08.2021 merely issued bailable warrants to secure the presence of the petitioner and is not a summoning order. This order has been passed consequent upon the order dated 06.10.2018, and cannot be set aside without challenging the order dated 06.10.2018. Even if this Court sets aside the order for issuing the bailable warrants, the petitioner will have to appear before the learned Trial Court because the order dated 06.10.2018 obliges him to do so. Hence, the submissions that the revision is against the order dated 12.08.2021 and not against the order dated 06.10.2018 cannot be accepted. 21. The judgment in Standard Chartered Bank (supra) deals with the liability of drawer and is not relevant. The judgment in Akanksha Arora (supra) deals with inherent jurisdiction of the Court and does not apply. Hence, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgments. Consequently, the submission that the petition is barred by limitation has to be upheld. 22. 21. The judgment in Standard Chartered Bank (supra) deals with the liability of drawer and is not relevant. The judgment in Akanksha Arora (supra) deals with inherent jurisdiction of the Court and does not apply. Hence, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgments. Consequently, the submission that the petition is barred by limitation has to be upheld. 22. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed as barred by limitation. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 23. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing. Whatsoever, on the merits of the case.