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2025 DAILYLAW 3743 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Rajesh Kumar

2025-10-09

Rakesh Kainthla

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JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.05.2012 passed by learned Special Judge, Sirmour District at Nahan (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a charge-sheet against the accused before learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354 and 323 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(x) and 3(xi) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 (SC & ST Act). It was asserted that the victim is residing away from the village in a lonely place. The land of the accused is located at some distance from the victim’s house. The accused used to talk indecently after seeing the victim. He used to say that people of the ‘koli’ castes were made for him and he could use them in a manner he liked. She told this fact to her husband, who counselled the accused, but the accused persisted with his behaviour. The victim was alone in her home on 19.02.2010 at about 2:00 P.M.- 2:30 P.M. The accused came to her home and acted indecently with her. She shouted for help, and the accused ran away. The matter was reported to the police by means of an application (Ex. PW1/A). F.I.R. (Ex.PW3/A)  was registered  in the police station. Dy. S.P.Bhagat Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. He filed an application (Ex. PW8/A) for the medical examination of the victim’s husband. Dr Purnima Thakur (PW4) conducted the medical examination of the victim’s husband and found simple injuries which could have been caused by beatings. She issued MLC (Ex. PW4/A). Bhagat Singh (PW8) visited the spot on 22.02.2010 and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW8/A1). He also prepared a site plan of the place where the accused had earlier misbehaved with the victim (Ex. PW8/B). He visited the place where the accused had beaten the victim’s husband and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW8/C). He recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses as per their version. Nishchint Singh Negi (PW6) conducted further investigation. He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. Mohd. PW8/B). He visited the place where the accused had beaten the victim’s husband and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW8/C). He recorded the statements of prosecution witnesses as per their version. Nishchint Singh Negi (PW6) conducted further investigation. He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. Mohd. Salim Khan (PW5) issued the caste certificate of the victim and the accused. As per the official record, the victim belonged to the ‘Koli’ caste, whereas the accused belonged to the ‘Rajput’ caste, which is not a scheduled caste. He issued the certificates (Ext.PW3/C and Ext.PW3/D). He also issued the caste certificates of Shashi Pal and Narender Kumar (Ext.PW5/A and Ext.PW5/B). It was found out after the investigation that the accused, Rajesh Kumar, had molested the victim. Rajesh Kumar and Shashi Pal alias Manju had beaten the victim’s husband when he had asked accused Rajesh  about  the  molestation. After  completion  of  the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, learned Trial Court charged the accused Rajesh Kumar with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354 and 323 read with Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3(x) and 3(xi) of SC & ST Act and accused Shashi Pal with the commission of offences punishable under Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 3(x) of SC & ST Act, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case. Victim (PW1) narrated the incident. Her husband (PW2) was told about the harassment by the victim. Rajinder Singh (PW3) signed the F.I.R. and applied for the caste certificates of the victim and the accused. Dr Purnima (PW4) conducted the medical examination of the victim’s husband. Mohammad Salim Khan issued the caste certificates. Nischint Singh Negi (PW6) conducted the investigation. Constable Vishal Dhawan (PW7) entered the F.I.R. in the computer. Bhagat Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. They did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that there were discrepancies in the statements of the victim and her husband. The incident occurred on 19.02.2010. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They claimed that they were innocent and were falsely implicated. They did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that there were discrepancies in the statements of the victim and her husband. The incident occurred on 19.02.2010. The victim and her husband visited the Police Station, Rajgarh, on 20.02.2010. Witnesses made contradictory statements regarding the place where this application was written. There was a delay in sending the F.I.R. to the Court. The victim stated that the accused gave beatings to her husband on 18.02.2010, whereas her husband stated that the accused had beaten him on 19.02.2010. The Medical Officer conducted the medical examination on 20.02.2010 and opined that the injury could have been caused between 6 to 48 hours. The prosecution’s case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offences. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. The statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other, and the learned Trial Court erred in ignoring them on irrelevant consideration. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr C.S. Thakur, learned counsel for the respondents. 9. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the victim and her husband supported the prosecution’s case. It was duly proved by their testimonies that the accused, Rajesh, had outraged the victim's modesty, and both the accused had beaten her husband. The Medical Officer also found multiple injuries on the body of the victim's husband. This corroborated the statement of the victim’s husband. The incident had occurred at a lonely place, and there could be no corroboration of the victim’s testimony. Learned Trial Court rejected the statements of   prosecution   witnesses   on   irrelevant   consideration. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. The incident had occurred at a lonely place, and there could be no corroboration of the victim’s testimony. Learned Trial Court rejected the statements of   prosecution   witnesses   on   irrelevant   consideration. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. C.S. Thakur, learned Counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. There is no explanation as to why F.I.R. was not recorded in the police station and why the victim was asked to write an application to the police. The Medical Officer admitted in his cross- examination that the injury could have been caused by way of a fall, and there was no corroboration to the testimony of the victim's husband by medical evidence. There was a delay in sending the F.I.R. to the police. All these circumstances made the prosecution’s case doubtful, and the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding the prosecution’s case. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 . 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The victim had not mentioned in the complaint (Ex.PW1/A) that the accused Rajesh Kumar and Shashi Pal had given beatings to her husband. This version was introduced during the investigation. 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The victim had not mentioned in the complaint (Ex.PW1/A) that the accused Rajesh Kumar and Shashi Pal had given beatings to her husband. This version was introduced during the investigation. An application for medical examination of the victim's husband (Ex.PW8/A) was filed, in which it was mentioned that the victim made a complaint to the police on 20.02.2010 that she and her husband were beaten by Rajesh, etc., on which an F.I.R. was registered in the police station. Therefore, the medical examination of the victim's husband was necessary. 16. This application is contrary to the FIR because the FIR nowhere mentions the beatings. This application was filed on 22.02.2010. The medical examination of the victim's husband was also conducted on 22.02.2010 at 6:00 P.M. by Dr Purnima. This shows that the police have suppressed the initial version from the Court, and this would make the prosecution’s case suspect. 17. Dr. Purnima found a single linear laceration over the left parietal region of the scalp and a minor abrasion over the left forehead. She admitted in her cross-examination that injury No.1 could not be caused by beatings by hand, but could be caused by a fall. Injuries No. 2 and 3 could also have been caused by way of fall. Her statement that injury No.1 cannot be caused by beatings makes the prosecution’s case suspect that the accused had beaten the victim's husband. 18. The victim (PW1) stated that she was working outside her house on 19.02.2010 at about 2:00 P.M.- 2:30 P.M. The accused, Rajesh, approached her and started acting indecently with her. He caught hold of her arm and tried to lay her on the ground. She shouted for help, and the accused ran away from the spot. She filed an application (Ex.PW1/A) with the police. She stated in her cross-examination that the application was written by the Deputy Superintendent of Police when he had visited her village. She and her husband had gone to the Police Station, Rajgarh, on 20.02.2010, but no report was lodged. The application was written after the police had arrived on the spot. She was going to collect the vegetables from the field of the accused Rajesh Kumar when he misbehaved with her. The accused had not beaten her husband in her presence. 19. The application was written after the police had arrived on the spot. She was going to collect the vegetables from the field of the accused Rajesh Kumar when he misbehaved with her. The accused had not beaten her husband in her presence. 19. Her testimony makes the prosecution’s case doubtful. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the police had no reason for not registering the F.I.R. when she and her husband had gone to the Rajgarh police station. Further, she admitted in her cross-examination that the accused had misbehaved with her when she was going to collect vegetables from the field of the accused. This is contrary to the initial version recorded in the complaint (Ex.PW1/A) that the incident occurred in the victim's house. Thus, she has shifted her version in the Court, and this makes her testimony suspect. 20. Her husband (PW2) stated that on 19.02.2010, he had gone to the residence of Amar Singh. When he returned, his wife complained about the acts of the accused Rajesh. He advised Rajesh to desist from his activities. He had gone to the 'jungle' to collect fodder when the accused Rajesh caught him, and Shashi Pal started beating him. He and the victim went to the police station and filed an application (Ex.PW1/A). He was given kicks and fist blows, and he sustained minor injuries. He stated in his cross-examination that he was beaten by the accused on 19.02.2010 at 11:00 A.M. The victim had told him that Rajesh had visited her house and acted indecently with her on 18.02.2010, so he inquired from the accused Rajesh on 19.02.2010 as to why he had done so. 21. The testimony of this witness is also not as per the prosecution’s case. He stated that the accused had acted indecently with his wife on 18.02.2010, and he had made inquiries from the accused on 19.02.2010. The victim claimed that the accused had acted indecently with her on 19.02.2010, and she had reported the matter to the police on the next date. Thus, the victim and her husband had given different dates of the incident. 22. The victim's husband stated that the accused had given him beatings with kicks and fist blows. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries noticed by her could not have been caused by kicks and fist blows. Thus, the victim and her husband had given different dates of the incident. 22. The victim's husband stated that the accused had given him beatings with kicks and fist blows. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries noticed by her could not have been caused by kicks and fist blows. Therefore, the medical evidence makes the testimony of the victim’s husband doubtful. 23. The victim's husband stated that the incident had taken place in the victim's house, whereas the victim stated that the incident occurred when she was going to the field of the accused to pick up vegetables. The discrepancy regarding the place of the incident also casts a doubt on the prosecution’s case. 24. The prosecution has not examined any other witness to corroborate the victim’s testimony. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimonies of the victim and her husband were doubtful and failed to prove the incident beyond a reasonable doubt. This was a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 27. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.