IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.154/2023 Date of Decision: 17th December, 2025. Sher Singh and Ors. .....Appellants Versus Ganga Ram and Ors. …..Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellants: Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate, vice Mr. Narender Kumar Reddy, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr. Vivek Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Amrit, Advocate, vice Mr. Rahul Gathania, Advocate, for respondents No.2 to 6. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The appellants, by filing this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), has assailed the judgment and decree dated 20.01.2023, passed by the learned District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, HP in Civil Appeal No.1/2023/2021, modifying the judgment and decree dated 25.11.2021, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Thunag, District Mandi, HP, in Civil Suit No.73/2021/2015. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter in this judgment, the parties shall be referred in the same manner in which they were referred before learned trial Court. 3. The facts giving rise to the present second appeal are that the plaintiff instituted a civil suit seeking a declaration that the land comprised in specific Khata Khatauni numbers situated 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 in Tehsil Thunag, District Mandi, H.P., was the ancestral and coparcenary property of the plaintiff and defendant no. 1, and that sale deed no. 25 dated 28.01.2015 executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 regarding part of the suit land was illegal, null and void. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction was also sought. The plaintiff pleaded that the suit land was joint Hindu family ancestral property, recorded in the name of defendant no. 1 as the Karta, and that the sale by defendant no. 1 was without legal necessity and affected the plaintiff's rights. Defendants no. 2 to 4 contested the suit, denying that the land was coparcenary property and asserting that defendant no. 1 had sold a specific share for valid consideration, making defendant no. 2 a bona fide purchaser. Defendants no. 5 to 8 supported the plaintiff's case. Defendant no. 1 was proceeded ex-parte. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial court on 05.07.2016:- 1. Whether the suit land is ancestral and coparcenary joint Hindu property, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the sale deed no. 25 dated 28.01.2015 is null and void, as alleged? OPP 3. If issues no. 1 and 2 are proved in affirmative, then whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed for?OPP 4. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable, as alleged? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff has no enforceable cause of action, as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands, as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction, as alleged?OPD 3 9. Whether defendants no. 2 to 4 are the bonafide purchaser for consideration, as alleged? OPD 2 to 4 10. Relief. 5. Upon evidence, the learned trial Court held that the suit land, except the portion sold, was ancestral and coparcenary property. It concluded that defendant no. 1 had sold land within his notional share, the sale was for repaying a bank loan, and there was no proof of illegal or immoral activity by the Karta. Consequently, the trial Court answered issue no. 1 partly in the affirmative, issues no. 4 to 6 and 9 in the affirmative, and issues no. 2, 3, 7 and 8 in the negative, decreeing the suit partly. 6. Aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the first appeal contending that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence which established the entire suit land as ancestral. It was urged that defendant no. 1 sold more than his share and there was no satisfactory evidence of legal necessity for the sale. An application for leading additional evidence to further prove the ancestral nature of the sold land was also filed. The respondents supported the trial Court's judgment and opposed the additional evidence. 7. The first appellate Court, after hearing the parties, allowed the appeal in part. It modified the trial Court's decree, declaring the entire suit land to be the ancestral property of the plaintiff, defendant no. 1, and defendants no. 5 to 8, and further declared sale deed no. 25 dated 28.01.2015 executed by 4 defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 to be void. Aggrieved by the same original defendants 2,3 & 4 have preferred the present second appeal. 8. Heard Counsels for the parties, perused the impugned judgements. 9. The suit property is established to be ancestral and coparcenary in nature. The finding of the learned trial Court that the sold land was not ancestral is incorrect and has been set right by The First Appellate Court. The documentary evidence, notably mutation no. 30 and the relevant jamabandis, proves that the land was inherited by Sagar, the predecessor-in- interest of defendant no. 1, from his father before the Hindu Succession Act came into force. The existence of a joint family nucleus being proven, and no contrary evidence having been adduced by defendant no. 1, the legal presumption that the property is joint family property stands unrebutted. This is further corroborated by the admission of defendant no. 2. Consequently, the entire property, including the portion alienated, constitutes joint Hindu family coparcenary property. 10. The concept of "notional partition" invoked by the plaintiff and the trial court is inapplicable here. This statutory fiction under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, as explained in Anar Devi v. Parmeshwari Devi (2006) 8 SCC 656, is limited to the purpose of determining a deceased 5 coparcener's share for succession and does not effect an actual partition or disrupt the joint status of the surviving coparceners. 11. In a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, the Karta's power to alienate coparcenary property is not absolute but is qualified and limited. Defendant no. 1, as the Karta, had no independent right to alienate the property except for legal necessity, for the benefit of the estate, or to discharge an antecedent debt not tainted with immorality. This fundamental limitation on managerial power is a settled principle of Hindu law. 12. The right of a Karta to sell joint family property with regard to existence of legal necessity, the way in which such necessity can be fulfilled and that the onus to prove that a sale made by the Karta on behalf of other coparceners of HUF for legal necessity lies on the alienee/purchaser is well settle and has been discussed in detail by the Apex Court in case titled as Dastagirsab Appellant(s) Versus Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa Police Patil (D) by LRs. & Ors. Respondent(s)., 2025 INSC 1120, relevant portions of which are being reproduced hereinunder. “11. Right of a Karta to sell joint family property is well settled. Karta enjoys wide discretion with regard to existence of legal necessity and in what way such necessity can be fulfilled. Whether legal necessity existed justifying the sale would depend on facts of each case. In Beereddy Dasaratharami Reddy vs. V. Manjunath & Anr. (2021) 19 SCC 263, this Court succinctly elucidated: 6 “6. Right of the Karta to execute agreement to sell or sale deed of a joint Hindu family property is settled and is beyond cavil vide several judgments of this Court including Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar (1996) 8 SCC 54] , wherein it has been held that a joint Hindu family is capable of acting through its Karta or adult member of the family in management of the joint Hindu family property. A coparcener who has right to claim a share in the joint Hindu family estate cannot seek injunction against the Karta restraining him from dealing with or entering into a transaction from sale of the joint Hindu family property, albeit post alienation has a right to challenge the alienation if the same is not for legal necessity or for betterment of the estate. Where a Karta has alienated a joint Hindu family property for value either for legal necessity or benefit of the estate it would bind the interest of all undivided members of the family even when they are minors or widows. There are no specific grounds that establish the existence of legal necessity and the existence of legal necessity depends upon facts of each case. The Karta enjoys wide discretion in his decision over existence of legal necessity and as to in what way such necessity can be fulfilled. The exercise of powers given the rights of the Karta on fulfilling the requirement of legal necessity or betterment of the estate is valid and binding on other coparceners. 7. Elucidating the position in Hindu law, this Court in Kehar Singh v. Nachittar Kaur (2018) 14 SCC 445 has referred to Mulla on Hindu Law and the concept of legal necessity to observe thus: (SCC pp. 449-51, paras 20-21 & 26) “20. Mulla in his classic work Hindu Law while dealing with the right of a father to alienate any ancestral property said in Article 254, which reads as under: ‘Article 254 254. Alienation by father.—A Hindu father as such has special powers of alienating 7 coparcenary property, which no other coparcener has. In the exercise of these powers he may: (1) make a gift of ancestral movable property to the extent mentioned in Article 223, and even of ancestral immovable property to the extent mentioned in Article 224; (2) sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable or immovable, including the interest of his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons therein, for the payment of his own debt, provided the debt was an antecedent debt, and was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes (Article 294).’ 21. What is legal necessity was also succinctly said by Mulla in Article 241, which reads as under: ‘Article 241 241. What is legal necessity.—The following have been held to be family necessities within the meaning of Article 240: (a) payment of government revenue and of debts which are payable out of the family property; (b) maintenance of coparceners and of the members of their families; (c) marriage expenses of male coparceners, and of the daughters of coparceners; (d) performance of the necessary funeral or family ceremonies; (e) costs of necessary litigation in recovering or preserving the estate; (f) costs of defending the head of the joint family or any other member against a serious criminal charge; (g) payment of debts incurred for family business or other necessary purpose. In the case of a manager other than a father, it is not enough to show merely that the debt is a preexisting debt; The above are not the only indices for concluding as to whether the alienation was indeed for legal necessity, nor can the enumeration of criterion for establishing legal necessity be copious or even predictable. It must therefore depend on the facts of each case. When, therefore, property is sold in order to fulfil tax obligations incurred by a family business, such alienation can be classified as 8 constituting legal necessity.’ (See Hindu Law by Mulla “22nd Edition”.) *** 26. Once the factum of existence of legal necessity stood proved, then, in our view, no co-coparcener (son) has a right to challenge the sale made by the karta of his family. The plaintiff being a son was one of the co-coparceners along with his father Pritam Singh. He had no right to challenge such sale in the light of findings of legal necessity being recorded against him. It was more so when the plaintiff failed to prove by any evidence that there was no legal necessity for sale of the suit land or that the evidence adduced by the defendants to prove the factum of existence of legal necessity was either insufficient or irrelevant or no evidence at all.” 13. Moreover, in Rani & Anr vs Santa Bala Debnath & Ors 1970 SCC (3) 722, It was held that: (ii) Legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion : it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and confide enquiries about the existence of the necessities and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. 14. In view of the legal principles settled above, it is clear that the burden to justify the impugned alienation rested on the alienee, defendant no. 2. He was required to prove either the existence of legal necessity/benefit or that he made bona fide and reasonable inquiries to satisfy himself of such necessity. The plea that the sale was for repaying a bank loan fails. The sale deed contains no recital to this effect, referring only to 9 domestic needs. The documentary evidence regarding the mortgage is inconsistent, and defendant no. 2 admitted he did not verify the documents concerning the alleged financial pressure. Therefore, the alienation by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 was made without legal necessity or benefit to the estate. 15. Since the alienation of the coparcenary property was without legal necessity, it is not binding on the coparcenary. The plaintiff, as a coparcener, is entitled to a declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant no. 1 in favour of defendant no. 2 is void and does not bind the coparcenary interest in the suit property. 16. Given this legal framework, the plaintiff's suit for a permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain defendant no. 1 from alienating the suit land was not maintainable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. Ram Parkash 1988(2) SCC77, as relied upon by the First Appellate Court has categorically held that a coparcener cannot, by way of an injunction, obstruct the Karta's potential exercise of this managerial power. Such a remedy would paralyze the Karta's ability to act for the family's benefit even in cases of genuine necessity. The proper recourse for a coparcener aggrieved by an alienation is to challenge the specific transaction after it has occurred. The learned trial Court was therefore correct in declining the relief of injunction, both against the alienation and 10 against alleged interference with possession, as the latter remedy also flows from the Karta's right to manage the property. The plaintiff's appropriate remedy, if he seeks exclusive rights, is a suit for partition. 17. In view of the aforesaid the judgement of The First Appellate Court partly modifying the judgement of The Trial Court is upheld. 18. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, there arises no question of law, much-less a substantial question of law for consideration of the Court, therefore, the appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 17th December, 2025 (Gaurav Rawat/TB)