Page No.# 1/13 GAHC030004652025 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : I.A.(Civil)/115/2025 Smt. Romawii Hnamte (Deceased) R/b her legal representative Vanlalhmachhuana S/o Romawii Hnamte, R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang, Aizawl, Mizoram VERSUS Smt. E. Lalremruati and 6 Ors. W/o Saingura Sailo, R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang, Aizawl, Mizoram 2:Sh. Saingura Sailo 3:Sh. K. Lalthazuala 4:Sh. Lalthuamliana Sailo 5:The Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram 6:The Director 7:The Asst. Settlement Officer- Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga Advocate for the Respondent : Addl. AG/GA, Mizoram for R5-R7 Linked Case : RFA/28/2025 Page No.# 2/13 Smt. Romawii Hnamte (Deceased) R/b her legal representative Vanlalhmachhuana S/o Romawii Hnamte R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang Aizawl Mizoram VERSUS Smt. E. Lalremruati and 6 Ors. W/o Saingura Sailo R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang Aizawl Mizoram 2:Sh. Saingura Sailo S/o Lalnguaua Sailo (L) R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang Aizawl Mizoram 3:Sh. K. Lalthazuala S/o K. Lalbuana (L) R/o Bethlehem Vengthlang Aizawl Mizoram 4:Sh. Lalthuamluaia Sailo S/o Ngurliana Sailo (L) R/o H.No. ZB 111/1 Zotlang Aizawl Mizoram 5:The Secretary to the Govt. of Mizoram Land Revenue and Settlement Department Government of Mizoram Aizawl 6:The Director Land Revenue and Settlement Department Government of Mizoram Aizawl 7:The Asst. Settlement Officer-I Land Revenue and Settlement Department Government of Mizoram Aizawl Page No.# 3/13 Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga Advocate for the Respondent : Addl. AG/GA Mizoram for R5-R7 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA ORDER 20.08.2026 Heard Mr. Jonathan Lalrintluanga, learned counsel assisted by Mr. R. Murmu, learned counsel for the applicant. Also heard Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, learned Senior Advocate for the opposite party. 2] This interlocutory application has been filed by the appellant in RFA No.28/2025 as applicant seeking condonation of delay of 102 days in filing the accompanying appeal. 3] Notice in the matter was issue on 29.07.2025. The opposite parties have filed their objections opposing the claims made by the applicant. 4] The learned counsel for the applicant submits that the delay has been sufficiently explained, it was beyond the control of the applicant and which cannot be attributed to the applicant and therefore, the delay of 102 days be condoned and the appeal be admitted. 5] Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing to the respondents strongly objects to the submissions made. It is submitted that the condonation Page No.# 4/13 of delay in a given facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may take a liberal view. However, that would be dependent on the sufficient causes that may be shown by the applicant. Referring to the present Interlocutory Application, the learned counsel submits that no proper or satisfactory explanation has been furnished for the delay occasioned in filing the application, much less has any “sufficient cause’’ been shown to warrant condonation of the said delay. 6] The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has referred to the judgments in support of his contentions. By referring to the judgments the learned Senior Counsel submits that where the explanation is not sufficient then the prayer for condonation of delay in filing an appeal should be rejected. 7] From the pleadings available before the Court, it is submitted that the application/appellant was not diligent and his bona fides are not clear on the explanation furnished by him in support of his contentions that the delay be condoned. 8] The learned counsel for the parties have been heard and the pleadings available before the Court have been carefully perused. 9] The grounds which are urged in support of the prayer for condonation of delay are enumerated in paragraph No.3 of the interlocutory application which are extracted below for convenience: “3. That the limitation period for filing the connected appeal is 90 days. However, there has been a delay of 102 days in filing the connected Appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation. However, the said delay may be condoned for the Page No.# 5/13 reasons enumerated herein below: i. That although the judgment was pronounced on 22.11.2024, the final decree was only drawn on 13.01.2025. The Applicant only came into physical possession after a few days from the issuance of the impugned decree sometime around the 16.1.2025, and thereafter required time to understand its contents and consequences. After understanding the adverse impact of the judgment, the Applicant took steps to approach legal counsel for further action. The Applicant faced logistical challenges in coordinating with his relatives as Smt. Romawii Hamte had passed away during the pendency of/the suit in the trial court. After internal consultations and understanding the implications of the judgments, the Applicant approached several legal counsels from 17.02.25 in order to find a suitable counsel. He also contacted his counsel from the trial court, but since they were not practicing the High Court, he had to approach other counsels. ii. That the applicant got in touch with his present counsel sometime towards the end of February. However, the counsel for the Applicant was preoccupied with personal arrangements in connection with his marriage, which took place on 6th March 2025. As such, the preparation of the appeal was inadvertently delayed due to counsel's limited availability in the lead-up to and aftermath of the wedding. iii. That again in April 2025, the Applicant's counsel was out of station on professional duties, and soon after, the Court remained closed for Good Friday and Easter holidays, further hampering the process of filing the appeal. Furthermore, the counsel faced personal and medical problems during the month of April and May. Hence, no effective steps could be taken during this period. iv. That the Applicant obtained copies of the judgment, decree, evidence, plaint, etc. towards the end of May, 2025. Since there were several documents, the case required extensive research. He had to meet up with the Applicant on several occasions to discuss the case as well. Thereafter, after completion of research and consultation, it was realized that certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree had not been applied for. The counsel then applied for certified true copies of the Judgment and Order and decree on 23.06.2025 and the same were issued on 04.07.2025, reflecting administrative delay in the court registry, which is not within the control of the Applicant. v. That court vacations also started from 7.7.2025. In the meantime, the counsel for the Applicant had gone on vacation from 3.7.2025 and returned on 11.7.2025. After resumption of court on 14.7.2025, the counsel immediately started preparing and drafting the appeal, which was finally completed on 21.7.2025. However, some last minute alterations had to be made in the appeal as well as this instant application. Moreover, since there are several parties involved, obtaining the voluminous photocopies of the requisite documents also took time. Thereafter, the appeal has Page No.# 6/13 been filed after a delay of 102 days. vi. That the Applicant has acted in good faith throughout the process and has been diligently pursuing his legal remedies, and the short delay is not due to negligence or lack of diligence on his part, but due to reasons beyond his control.” 10] Having perused the grounds urged as also the objection filed it is necessary to refer to section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.” 11] Upon a careful reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is evident that the Appellate Court is vested with discretionary power to condone the delay in filing an appeal where the appeal could not be preferred within the prescribed period of limitation, provided that the appellant satisfies the Court that there was “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period. However, the prayer for condonation has to be made on the explanation which the Court will have considered to be a sufficient ground for explaining the delay in support of such prayer made. 12] Upon perusal of the grounds urged, it is seen that the first ground undertaken by the applicant is that the judgment was pronounced on 22.11.2024 whereas the final decree was drawn on 13.01.2025. Although no clear averments were made, from the perusal of the grounds urged it appears that the applicant has sought to project a case that the limitation would not start from the date of delivery of the judgment as the final decree was drawn Page No.# 7/13 only on 13.01.2025. In this context, a reference is required to be made to the provisions of order XX Rule 6A(2) of CPC. The statute itself provides for filing an appeal from the date of delivery of the judgment and not from the date of drawing up of the decree. This view of the Court is fortified by a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Court rendered in Pradip Kumar Kalita Vs. Hiran Prova Kalita reported in (2002) 2 GLR 164. The relevant paragraphs of the judgments are extracted below: “11. It will be seen from Order XX Rule 6A(1) that the last paragraph of the judgment shall state in precise terms the relief which has been granted by such judgment. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 6A of Order XX farther provides that an endeavour is to be made by the court to ensure that the decree is drawn up as expeditiously as possible and in any case within fifteen days from the date on which the judgment is pronounced. The Court under sub-rule (2) can be requested that the decree has not been drawn up under Order XX Rule. 6A(2)(a) and the appeal may be preferred against the decree without filing a copy of the decree and in such case the last paragraph of the judgment shall, for the purpose of Rule 1 Order XLI would be treated as decree and till the decree is not drawn last paragraph of the judgment would be treated as decree. From this it is also indicative that the starting point for computing limitation for filing an appeal is the date of the judgment and not the date of decree. 12. In view of our aforesaid discussion, our answer to the question posed in the opening paragraph of this judgment is that the limitation for filing an appeal would start running from the date of the judgment and not the date of the decree. The date of the decree would be deemed to be the date of the judgment. However, if an application is made for obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree within the period of limitation, the period spent in drawing up the decree as well as the time spent in obtaining a copy of the decree would be excluded.” 13] Further the benefits of exclusion of the period of limitation as per provision of under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, the date of judgment and order and the date of drawing up of the degree, would not be available, if the application for certified copy of the judgment was not made prior to the expiry of limitation period. This is the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Udayan Page No.# 8/13 Chinubhai vs R. C. Bali reported in (1977) 4 SCC 309. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “25. The Law Commission, in its wisdom, went to the extent of even suggesting the phraseology of the Explanation at p.76 of the Report. Parliament having taken note of the recommendations of the Law Commission made it clear in the Objects and Reasons while introducing the Bill that it was brought to implement the recommendation of the Law Commission. When the Explanation was added to Section 12, Parliament sought to put a quietus to the long-standing judicial controversy with regard to “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” by clearly explaining that when time is excluded, as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 12, the time that has elapsed from pronouncement of the judgment to the point of time prior to application for a copy of the decree shall not be excluded in computation of the time requisite for obtaining the copy. This is in accord with reason and sound commonsense since a person does nothing in court for obtaining a copy prior to his making an application for a copy when there is nothing, in his way, not to. This was the reason underlying the Explanation which prompted the legislature not to permit exclusion of such idle time of the applicant while computing the “time requisite for obtaining a copy” for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. We have to give effect to this Explanation with its avowed intent. 31. The view we have taken does not require us to mentally substitute the words in the statute for those used by the legislature. Besides, even under the new Act there having already arisen a conflict of decisions in several High Courts the sooner the controversy is set at rest the better. We are happy that in arriving at this decision we are effectuating a very useful recommendation of the Law Commission whose anxiety in the Report was clearly manifest to put an end to an ancient judicial conflict. The Court will do its duty not to recommence another series of litigation.” 14] Considering the findings of the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court in the judgments, it is clear that the statute itself provides for filing of an appeal from the date of the judgment is rendered even if the decree may not have been drawn up or available immediately thereafter. Therefore, the first ground urged by the applicant that the judgment was pronounced on 22.11.2024 and the decree was drawn up on 13.01.2025 will have no relevance and will not lend any support to the contentions sought to be raised by the applicant that the appeal could not have been filed without the decree being Page No.# 9/13 drawn up. There is no explanation seen in the interlocutory application which shows that immediately after the delivery of the judgment the applicant had taken steps to pursue the appeal. 15] Further, the applicant will not be entitled to the benefit under Section 12(2) of the Limitations Act, 1963, if no application for certified copy of the judgment is made within the period of limitation. 16] During the course of the arguments on a pointed query made by the Court to the counsel for the applicant as to the date of knowledge of the delivery of the judgment by the applicant, it was stated that the applicant is one of the legal heirs substituted for the original defendant No. 3. It is also admitted that the defendant No.3, the mother of the applicant expired during the pendency of the trial. Therefore, it is clearly admitted or at least not disputed that the applicant was aware of the process of substitution in place of the original defendant No. 3 who was his mother and also regarding the date of delivery of the judgment on 22.11.2024. The explanation sought to be made reveals that although some dates are mentioned in para 3 of the applications but specific explanations are seen as to how the delay had occurred pursuant to the delivery of the judgment by the trial Court. For instance, in paragraph No. 3(i) it is stated that after delivery of the judgment the applicant required some time to understand the contents and consequences of the judgment. However, no dates are specified as to how much time was required by the applicant. Again, it is stated that the applicant took steps to approach the legal counsel for further action. However, no specific dates are referred as to when the applicant approached the counsel to take steps or to obtain legal opinion as to whether Page No.# 10/13 and how appeal is required to be preferred. In the said paragraph, it is also stated that the applicant had approached several legal counsels from 17.02.2025 to find a suitable counsel. But none of the counsel he had contacted were practicing in the High Court. However, from the date of delivery of the judgment i.e. 22.11.2024 or from the date of drawing up of the decree i.e. 13.01.2025 till 17.02.2025, there is no proper explanation by the applicant as to the steps taken by him/her. 17] At paragraph No. 3(i)i it was stated that the applicant got in touch with the present counsel sometime in the end of February. Thereafter, the counsel was preoccupied with his marriage which took place on 6th of March, 2025 and therefore, the appeal was inadvertently delayed due to the counsel's limited availability and after math of the wedding of the counsel. There is no supporting documents enclosed to this application, which lend credence to the contentions of the applicant. 18] Again, in paragraph No. 3(iii) it is stated that in April 2025, the counsel was out of station for professional duties and thereafter, the Court was enclosed for “Good Friday” and “Easter holidays”. It is also stated that the counsel faced personal and medical problems in the month of April and May and therefore, no effective steps could be taken during that period However, no specific dates are mentioned. It is only towards the end of May, 2025 the applicant obtained the copies of the judgment, decree, evidence, plaint, etc and thereafter, true certified copies were obtained on 23.06.2025 which came to be issued on 04.07.2025. It is stated in paragraph No. 3(v) that the Court was in vacation w.e.f. 07.07.2025 and the counsel for the applicant had remained on vacation Page No.# 11/13 from 03.07.2025 and had returned on 11.07.2025. Thereafter, on 14.07.2025 upon resumption of the Court the preparation of the appeal had started which was finally completed on 21.07.2025. There is no averment as to when the appeal was filed. However, from the endorsements by the filing section, it is seen that the interlocutory application was filed on 24.07.2025. 19] Further, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court have also held that mere explanation without any supporting documents may not be sufficient to indulge the discretion of the Court for seeking condonation of the delay. Explanation offered has to be minimally substantiated as the nature of explanation would admit. A reference can be made in this regard of the judgment of Nizamuddin Ahmed vs. Akram Hussain reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 32. 20] While it is not in dispute that the Court has to take a liberal view. However, in matters relating to civil disputes, once a judgment and a decree is delivered by the trial Court after examination of proper evidence adduced, the rights qua the parties have been settled by the Court, more particularly, in a matter which is decided intra-party not ex-parte. Where there is a responsibility of the State or an agency of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India for undertaking their duties prescribed under a statute, there are instances where Courts have taken a liberal view in where some explanation may have furnished by the litigant, which are considered to be sufficient for the condonation of the delay. However, in respect of civil disputes and where personal rights are being decided by the trial Courts, what must be seen is the bona fides of the applicant, whether the applicant was diligent in pursuing the matter and whether the causes on a plain reading, which are placed before the Page No.# 12/13 Court reveal the causes which are completely beyond the control of the applicant and thereby the appeal against the said judgment, order and decree could not be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. 21] In the facts of the present case, it is a question of a dispute between the applicant and the opposite party which was decided by the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl. In respect of the claim of land covered by LSC No.104302/01/458 of 2008 and the Civil Judge had clearly held that the opposite party is a legal and bona fide owner of the land covered by LSC No.104302/01/458 of 2008. While it is open to the applicant to agitate the matter before the appellate forum as prescribed under the statute on the grounds and reasons undertaken in the Appeal Memo, the fact remains that the appeal cannot be entertained unless the delay as specified under the Limitation Act is condoned. 22] The discussions aforementioned would clearly reveal that while a liberal view is required to be taken ordinarily, however, there is a bounden duty on the applicant to diligently explain and urge before the Court the “sufficient cause” which would invite the Court's discretion for condonation of the delay as prayed. The law laid down by the Apex Court clearly enumerates the principles as to what would be considered to be a “sufficient cause” as specified under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the Court to allow the prayer for condonation of the delay. 23] Although the applicant states that after judgment he spent some time trying to understand the implication and also consulted lawyers. However it’s Page No.# 13/13 only at a much later that that he claims to have procured copies of the pleadings although certified copy of the judgment and order was applied for and obtained at a much later date. This doesn’t sufficiently explain how the applicant proceeded to seek legal advice without copies of the relevant pleadings. Therefore, it is clear that the applicant didn’t diligently pursue the matter more particularly, when the petitioner was duly substituted as a defendant well prior to delivery of the judgment and order terefore, no sufficient cause. 24] Considering the facts urged before the Court and the explanation sought to be put up by the applicant it is the considered view of the Court that the explanation put up by the applicant may be “good cause” for a delay but certainly not “sufficient cause”. Considering all of the above, this Court is of the view that the applicant has failed to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for delay, which had occurred and which were beyond the control of the applicant, the prayer made in the interlocutory application therefore, stands rejected. Accordingly, this interlocutory application stands dismissed. Consequently, the accompanying appeal is also dismissed. No order as to cause. JUDGE Comparing Assistant