APHC010627562009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: Between: 1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD. 1. GOLLA CHANDRASEKHAR, S/o G.Ramachandrappa, R/o Santhe Kondapuram, Bramhasamudram Mandal, Ananthapur Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this memorandum of Crl.A., against the Judgment in S.C.No.838/2004 on the file of the Addl. Asst. Sessions Judge, Ananthapur, dated 21.08.07 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set-aside the Order of acquittal and convict the accused/respondents for the offences with which he was charged. IA NO:1 OF 2009 (CRLAMP 2312 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of (596) days in presenting this Crl.A., against the Order of acquittal of the accused/respondent in S.C.No.838/2 Addl. Asst. Sessions Judge, Ananthapur, dated 21.08.07. Counsel for the Appellant: 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1872/2009 THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ...APELLANT AND GOLLA CHANDRASEKHAR, S/o G.Ramachandrappa, R/o Santhe Kondapuram, Bramhasamudram Mandal, Ananthapur Dist. ...RESPODENT Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this memorandum of Crl.A., against the Judgment in S.C.No.838/2004 on the file of the Addl. Asst. Sessions Judge, d 21.08.07 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased aside the Order of acquittal and convict the accused/respondents for the offences with which he was charged. (CRLAMP 2312 OF 2009) Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of (596) days in presenting this Crl.A., against the Order of acquittal of the accused/respondent in S.C.No.838/2004 on the file of the Addl. Asst. Sessions Judge, Ananthapur, dated 21.08.07. ellant: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH [3369] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, ...APELLANT GOLLA CHANDRASEKHAR, S/o G.Ramachandrappa, R/o Santhe ...RESPODENT Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to present this memorandum of Crl.A., against the Judgment in S.C.No.838/2004 on the file of the Addl. Asst. Sessions Judge, d 21.08.07 and prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased aside the Order of acquittal and convict the accused/respondents for the praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of (596) days in presenting this Crl.A., against the Order of 004 on the file of the 2 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respondent: 1. The Court made the following JUDGMENT: 1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.838 of 2004 on the file of Additional Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur (for short, ‘the Sessions Court’) by its judgment dated 21.08.2007, acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under section 354, 326 and 307 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’). 2. Heard learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the Appellant / State. None appeared on behalf of the respondent / accused. 3. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 9 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.21 and contradictory statements i.e., Exs.D.1 to D.6 which were elicited during the cross- examination of PW.1 and MOs.1 to 5 were also marked. 4. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as under: On 25.06.2004 at around 7:00 PM, the de facto complainant (LW.1), while returning to Mamudur village after selling vegetables, was accosted near the fields of Santhe Kondapuram village. The accused emerged from the kanuga bushes, gestured to her using sign language, and demanded sexual favours. Upon her refusal and reprimand, he held her hand forcibly. Enraged by her refusal, the accused forcibly held her hand. Though she managed to free herself, he chased and caught her again, and assaulted her with a sickle, causing bleeding injuries to her head and right eyebrow. The accused also bit the defacto complainant on her lips and cheek, and assaulted 3 her abdomen, inflicting multiple simple and grievous injuries with the intent to kill. He further outraged her modesty. As a result, she fell unconscious on the ground. In the meantime, the accused fled the scene. LWs.2 and 3 witnessed the incident and informed LWs.4 to 8. Subsequently, the injured de facto complainant was shifted to the Government Hospital in Kalyanadurg, where she lodged a report with the Kalyanadurg Police. The report was registered as Crime No. 32 of 2004 under Sections 354 and 307 of the IPC, and the investigation was taken up. During investigation, it was revealed that the accused had committed offences punishable under Sections 354, 324, 326, and 307 IPC. Meanwhile, the accused surrendered before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kalyanadurg. A requisition was filed by the Investigating Officer seeking police custody, which was granted. Upon interrogation, the accused confessed, leading to the recovery of the weapon used in the assault. After the investigation was completed, a charge sheet was filed against the accused for prosecution in accordance with the law. 5. After laying the charge sheet by Investigating Officer, the committal court passed an order under Section 209(a) of Cr.P.C., by following provisions of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. The case is committed to the Court of Sessions. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.838 of 2004 has been numbered. After hearing the charges presented by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the trial court framed charges against the accused, punishable under Sections 326, 307, and 354 of the IPC. The accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. 6. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. But the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 4 7. After considering the necessary material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused not guilty and acquitted him. 8. I have examined the oral and documentary evidence produced on the record by the prosecution before the learned Sessions Court. 9. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State contends that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen that the ingredients to constitute offences punishable under sections 354, 326 and 307 of IPC are made out by the prosecution against the accused; the learned sessions judge erred in disbelieving the evidence of prosecution witnesses, which is cogent and reliable; the learned judge erred in disbelieving the evidence ofPWs.2 and 3 who are eye witnesses to the incident; the learned sessions judge has not considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses in its correct prospective; the other reasons assigned by the learned judge in acquitting the accused are unsustainable. 10. Point for determination is: Whether the Sessions Court was justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 11. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 5 court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 12. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under: “16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 13. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate court to reappreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the order of acquittal, this court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above decisions and further held that: “42.....The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 3 (2007) 4 SCC 415 6 (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 14. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted. However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are 7 "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. 15. With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 16. In order to duly consider the submissions made on behalf of the appellant/State, I have carefully examined the material placed on record. To establish its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 3. According to the prosecution, PW.1, Lakshmakka, is the de facto complainant, who alleged that she was assaulted and that the accused attempted to outrage her modesty. The prosecution examined PW.2 (G.Narayanappa) and PW.3 (B.Narasimhappa) as eyewitnesses to the incident. However, the record reveals that both witnesses turned hostile. 17. The prosecution examined PW.9 (M. Ganganna), the investigating officer, who conducted the investigation, visited the scene of the offence, and recovered material objects from the spot, including blood-stained clothes belonging to PW.1. To corroborate the recovery, the prosecution examined PW.5 (Sadananda), who was allegedly present during the scene visit and seizure of property. PW.5 confirmed his presence by identifying his signature on the seizure report, which has been marked as Ex.P3. Similarly, PW.6 (Tirupal Reddy) identified his signature in Mahazarnama, which has been marked as Ex.P4. The prosecution also examined PW.7, Dr.N.Anitha (Medical Officer), whose evidence indicates that she conducted an X-ray examination of the injuries. Ex.P6, the wound certificate, was relied upon to establish the nature of injuries sustained by PW.1. 18. Based on the evidence as mentioned above, the prosecution contends that it has successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, a perusal of PW.1’s evidence reveals that contradictions marked as Exs.D1 to D6 were brought on record. The prosecution argues that 8 these contradictions are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the case. It is further contended that such discrepancies arose due to the illiteracy of the witnesses. 19. The defence contends that, although the prosecution has cited PWs.2 and 3 as eyewitnesses to the incident, the initial report makes no mention of their presence at the scene of the offence. In light of this omission, the defence argues that their evidence given during the examination-in-chief lacks credibility and cannot be relied upon. 20. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the defence/accused, PW.1's evidence is quite inconsistent with the case projected in the report marked as Ex.P1. However, it is significant to note that in Ex.P1, PW.1 did not allege sexual harassment or rape. In contrast, during her testimony, she went to the extent of alleging that the accused committed rape. This apparent inconsistency casts serious doubt on the credibility of PW.1's account and suggests an attempt to implicate the accused falsely. In light of these facts, the Sessions Court rightly considered whether the solitary testimony of PW.1 could be accepted in its entirety, notably as PWs.2 and 3 did not support the prosecution’s case. 21. In Jagdish Prasad V. State of M.P.4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "8. As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated provided the testimony of that single witness is found out entirely reliable. In that case, there will be no legal impediment for recording a conviction. But if the evidence is open to doubt or suspicion, the court will require sufficient corroboration. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras wherein this court has classified the testimony of a witness into three categories viz. (1) wholly reliable (2) wholly unreliable and (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable and observed that although in the first two categories of classification, there may not be any difficulty in coming to a conclusion either accepting or rejecting the testimony, it is in the third category of cases that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for 4 1995 SCC (Cri) 160 9 corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony either direct or circumstantial." 22. In Lallu Manjhi V. State of Jharkhand5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the judgment in Vadivelu Thevar V. State of Madras6 and held as under: "10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly' unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras)" 23. Concerning the evidence of PW.1, she stated that while she was returning to her village, Mamudur, from Santhe Kondapuram, she was accosted on the way near a cluster of Kanuga bushes, the accused came and caught hold of her hand with the intent to outrage her modesty and also demanded her to fulfill his lust, for which she refused and since the accused is dumb, he made gestures and signs demanding sexual intercourse and then attempted to drag her into the bushes. In the meantime, she struggled to free herself and raised cries for help. In response, the accused assaulted her with a sickle, causing injuries to her head, above her right eyebrow, and other parts of her body, and also bit her on the cheeks. Her statement is recorded as Ex.P19, along with the FIR. 24. The Sessions Court noted that, according to the statement marked as Ex.P9, no eyewitnesses were present at the scene of the occurrence. It appears that PW.1 remained lying at the location throughout the night. The following morning, she called out to a passerby named Golla Narayana, son of Thimmappa, and informed him of the incident and requested him to notify her 5 (2003) 2 SCC 401 6 AIR 1957 SC 614 10 kith and kin. Subsequently, her kith and kin arrived at the scene in a jeep and shifted her to the Government Hospital, where the police recorded her statement. 25. Regarding PW.1's testimony, she stated that approximately three years ago, while returning to her village after selling vegetables in Santhe Kondapuram, she encountered babul trees obstructing the road, approximately a quarter of a kilometre from Santhe Kondapuram. As she attempted to lift the babul tree stems to clear the way, the accused dragged her toward a small canal beside the road. She immediately freed herself from his grasp and proceeded towards the village. However, the accused suddenly attacked her with a sickle, causing a bleeding injury on the left side of her head. The accused also struck her face with a stone and beat her on the chest. The accused sexually assaulted her during that night. Later, he went away. 26. As rightly observed in the preceding paragraphs regarding the allegation of rape, the Sessions Court noted that such an accusation does not appear in the earliest version recorded by the police at the hospital in Kalyanadurgam, marked as Ex.P19. The Sessions Court further observed that during the examination-in-chief, there was no mention of the complainant noticing a passerby named Golla Narayana and informing him of the incident. Additionally, the Sessions Court highlighted several material inconsistencies in the evidence of PW.1. Notably, during cross-examination, PW.1 stated that the police first recorded her statement at 8:00 AM at the scene of the offence. In contrast, Ex.P19 indicates that the statement was recorded at the hospital. 27. The Sessions Court has taken note of the fact that there is not a single iota of corroborative evidence, either oral or documentary, to support the conclusion that the rape was committed against PW.1 as alleged. Concerning the accusation of an attempt to outrage PW.1's modesty, the Sessions Court thoroughly examined PW.1's evidence. As rightly observed, Ex.P19, which 11 constitutes the earliest version, states that following the alleged incident, PW.1 fell to the ground, lost consciousness, and only regained awareness the next day, when she saw a person named Golla Narayana, to whom she reported the incident. Golla Narayana was examined as PW.2. According to his testimony, approximately three years ago, he noticed Lakshmakka with injuries on a road leading from their village to Mamudur and informed her mother. However, as PW.2 did not fully support the prosecution’s case, he was declared a hostile witness. Similarly, PW.3 also did not support the prosecution. 28. PW.2’s evidence partially supported the prosecution by confirming that he observed Lakshmamma with injuries on the road. The prosecution also alleged that the accused snatched money and gold ornaments from PW.1’s possession. However, there is no mention of these allegations in the earliest statement (Ex.P19). During cross-examination, PW.1 stated that she had Rs.2,400/- in her possession, which was lost at the scene, along with her gold talibottu and ear studs. She further testified that the accused and her mother came to the scene the next morning and snatched her gold talibottu, ear studs, and cash. This version, however, does not appear in Ex.P19. By relying on these facts, the Sessions Court rightly found that the contradictory portions, marked as Exs.D1 to D6 in PW.1’s evidence, severely undermine the prosecution’s case. These contradictions cast serious doubt on the credibility of PW.1’s testimony and raise suspicion regarding the overall veracity of the prosecution’s case. 29. The record indicates that the sole testimony of PW.1 remains uncorroborated by any independent witness. The evidence of PW.4 is of no assistance to the prosecution’s case, as it amounts merely to hearsay. In these circumstances, it is rightly observed that the testimony of PW.4 alone cannot serve as a basis to conclude that the accused committed the offence alleged under Section 354 of the IPC. 12 30. As per the record, a charge under Section 326 of the IPC was framed against the accused, requiring the prosecution to establish the nature of injuries sustained by PW.1. In this regard, the prosecution examined PW.7, Dr. Anitha, the Medical Officer, who issued the wound certificate (Ex.P.6). She opined that Injury No.2 was grievous in nature and could have been caused by a blunt object. To further support the case, the prosecution examined PW.8, Dr. P. Ranganath, Radiologist. His testimony indicates that he took X-rays of a female patient named Lakshmakka from Mamudur village on 26.06.2004, as well as on 03.06.2004 and 03.07.2004, during her treatment. However, their evidence does not conclusively establish that the injuries were caused by the accused. 31. The Trial Court pointed out that PW.7 did not state that the victim disclosed the name of the person who caused the injuries. Furthermore, the wound certificate (Ex.P.6) does not mention the name of the accused. The evidence of the Investigating Officer reveals that, based on the confession statement of the accused, a sickle (M.O.5) was recovered through a seizure mahazar. To prove this, the prosecution examined PW.6, Tirupal Reddy. According to PW.6, the Sub-Inspector of Police showed him the sickle, stating that it was handed over by the accused. PW.6 merely identified his signature on the mahazar (Ex.P.4), but denied witnessing the actual recovery of the sickle. He further stated that he saw the sickle already placed on the table at the police station. As PW.6 did not support the prosecution's version, he was declared hostile to the prosecution. 32. Taking the above evidence into consideration, the Sessions Court observed that the alleged confession statement dated 16.07.2004, purported to have been recorded by the police, was not duly established. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Sessions Court found that the sole testimony of PW.1, attributing the injuries to the accused, could not be relied upon in the absence of any corroborative evidence. 13 33. The Sessions Court noted that in the statement marked as Ex.P.19, there were overwritings concerning the date, which was altered from 26.06.2004 to 25.06.2004. The Sessions Court also observed an unexplained delay of one and a half days in forwarding the FIR to the Magistrate, both of which remained unexplained. Upon a detailed analysis of the evidence on record, the Sessions Court concluded that the testimony of PW.1 regarding the alleged attack by the accused was not substantiated. In light of these factors, the Sessions Court held that the sole testimony of PW.1 could not be relied upon. 34. In State of Rajasthan V. Daud Kahn7, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: “The interpretation of Section-157 of the CrPC is no longer res integra. A detailed discussion on the subject is to be found in Brahm Swaroop V. State of U.P., which considered a large number of cases on the subject. The purpose of the forthwith communication of a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is to check the possibility of its manipulation. Therefore, a delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate is linked to the lodging of the FIR. If there is no delay in lodging an FIR, then any delay in communicating the special report to the Magistrate would really be of little consequence, since manipulation of the FIR would then get ruled out. Nevertheless, the prosecution should explain the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate. However, if no question is put to the investigating officer concerning the delay, the prosecution is under no obligation to give an explanation. There is no universal rule that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becomes unreliable. In other words, the facts and circumstances of a case are important for a decision in this regard.” 35. The entire prosecution case is encircled around to a substantial extent of PW.1’s evidence. It appears that the learned Sessions judge rightly has not placed much reliance despite insistence by prosecution. A well propounded proposition on the issue of sole witness indicates that evidence of such witness needs to be considered with caution and after testing it against other 7 (2016) 2 SCC 607 14 material whereas such evidence also inspire confidence and ought to be beyond suspicion. 36. It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt about the accused's complicity. 37. For this, the prosecution case has to be in the category of "must be true" and not "may be true". In Rajiv Singh V. State of Bihar and another8 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that : “It is the well-entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that a charge can be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence to warrant legal conviction and that no person can be held guilty on pure moral conviction. Howsoever grave the alleged offence may be, otherwise stirring the conscience of any court, suspicion alone cannot take the place of legal proof. The well-established cannon of criminal justice is "fouler the crime, higher the proof". In unmistakable terms, it is the mandate of law that the prosecution, in order to succeed in a criminal trial, has to prove the charge(s) beyond all reasonable doubt”. 38. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal, if another view is possible, then also the appellate court cannot substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into conviction unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 39. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka9, the hon'ble Apex Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under: “Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution 8 (2015) 16 SCC 369 9 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 15 becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses. 40. In State of Gujarat V. Thanabhai Ganeshbhai Rajput10, it is held that as per the settled legal position when two views are possible, the judgment and order of the acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for special reasons. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Rajasthan V. Ram Niwas11 can be relied on in this regard. 41. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal12, it is laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to 10 2022 Latest Caselaw 3827 Guj 11 (2010) 15 SCC 463 12 (2017) CriLJ 169 16 interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after: "10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal. 11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 42. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondent. 43. It is a settled principle of law that if the trial court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the trial court is a plausible one. Therefore, taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, this court is not inclined to reverse the trial court's finding. 44. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the trial court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Judge. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed. Accordingly, the point is answered. 17 45. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1872 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Anantapur, in Sessions Case No. 838 of 2004, dated 21.08.2007, stands confirmed. Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. ________________________ T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J Date: 23.07.2025 SAK 18 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1872/2009 Date: 23.07.2025 SAK