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2025 DAILYLAW 37248 (PNJ)

KAWAL SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA

CRM-M/15955/2025 · 2025-03-24

Harpreet Singh Brar

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Judgment text

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CRM-M-15955-2025 -1- 139 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CRM-M-15955-2025 Date of decision: 24.03.2025 Kawal Singh ....Petitioner Versus State of Haryana ...Respondent CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR Present: Mr. Sandeep Kotla, Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. Geeta Sharma, DAG, Haryana. HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL) 1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing of complaint/DD No.12 of 2020 dated 18.02.2020 titled as ‘State of Haryana Vs. Pardeep and another’ in case bearing FIR No.100 dated 27.07.2017 under Sections 279/337/506/182 of IPC registered at Police Station Bapoli, District Panipat (Annexure P-1) and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 2. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 27.07.2017, the petitioner lodged an FIR alleging that on 24.07.2017, while he was on an evening walk with his wife, Pradeep Singh hit him with his Scorpio car with the intent to cause injuries. Subsequently, on 30.10.2017, a cancellation report for the same was submitted. However, after a period of three years, on 18.02.2020, complaint(supra) was filed by the prosecution agency. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that the FIR (supra), on the basis of complaint made by the petitioner, was registered on 27.07.2017 for which cancellation report was submitted. The impugned Neha 2025.03.25 18:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-15955-2025 -2- kalandra for the same was filed under the provisions of Section 182 of IPC in which six months is the maximum punishment. As such, kalandra could have been initiated within a period of one year after filling of the complaint, as barred by provisions contained under Section 468 of Cr.P.C, whereas the same has been initiated on 18.02.2020. Learned counsel further contends that out of five witnesses cited in the complaint, one witness is the accused himself and other four are official witnesses. Addition to above, learned counsel contends that Pradeep Singh is facing proceedings in regards to forgery, preparing forged papers, etc. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and after perusing the record of the case with their able assistance, it transpires that the alleged incident occurred on 24.07.2017 and the FIR(supra) was lodged on 27.07.2017. Subsequently, upon the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry, the cancellation report was submitted on 30.10.2017 whereas the impugned kalandra was filed on 18.02.2020. With regard to the invocation of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner are accepted. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Disease and Others 2014(14) RCR Criminal 10, has categorically held that for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. the relevant date would be the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance or the date of issuance of process by the Court. Since the prosecution was instituted on 27.07.2017 i.e. upon the registration of the FIR(supra), Section 468 of Cr.P.C. comes to the aid of the petitioner. Neha 2025.03.25 18:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-15955-2025 -3- 5. Gainful reference in this regard can also be made on the judgment rendered by a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amritlal vs. Shantilal Soni and Others, (2022) 13 SCC 128, wherein, speaking through Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, the following was opined: “9. In Sarah Mathew, the Constitution Bench of this Court examined two questions thus: - 3. No specific questions have been referred to us. But, in our opinion, the following questions arise for our consideration: 3.1. (i) Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of the prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence? 3.2. (ii) Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121] or Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559] (which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394]), lays down the correct law? 10. The Constitution Bench answered the aforesaid questions as follows: - 51. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale [Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., (2003) 8 SCC 559] which is followed in Japani Sahoo [Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, (2007) 7 SCC 394] lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai [Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp SCC 121 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 646] will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC. (emphasis supplied) 11. Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of law by the Constitution Bench do not admit of any doubt that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The High Court has made a fundamental error in assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e., 04.12.2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by the appellant on 10.07.2012, well within the period of limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of commission of offence i.e., 04.10.2009. xxx xxx xxx xxx Neha 2025.03.25 18:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CRM-M-15955-2025 -4- 13. A decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court cannot be ques- tioned on certain suggestions about different interpretation of the provi- sions under consideration. It remains trite that the binding effect of a de- cision of this Court does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the ar- gument is advanced, was actually decided therein [ Somawanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab & Ors.: AIR 1963 SC 151 (para 22)]. This is apart from the fact that a bare reading of the decision in Sarah Mathew (supra) would make it clear that every relevant aspect concerning Chapter XXXVI CrPC has been dilated upon by the Constitution Bench in neces- sary details. As a necessary corollary, the submissions made with refer- ence to other decision of this Court, which proceeded on its own facts, are of no avail to the respondents. Thus, the submissions made on behalf of the contesting respondents stand rejected in absolute terms.” 6. In view of the above discussion, the present petition is allowed and impugned kalandra stands quashed. 7. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE 24.03.2025 Neha Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No Neha 2025.03.25 18:37 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document