JUDGMENT : SUSHIL KUKREJA, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State under Section 378 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) against the judgment of acquittal, dated 15.03.2014, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 59-ST/7 of 2013 2012, whereby the accused persons (respondents herein) were acquitted of the charge for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 452 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) and Section 25 of the Arms Act. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to instant appeal, as per the prosecution story, are that complainant-Shri Surinder Kumar, alongwith his wife Smt. Jyoti and their children, used to live in a rented accommodation at village Jattanwali, Kala Amb and on 03.09.2011 the complainant visited the clinic of accused Amit Kumar for some medicines. Accused Amit, after giving medicines to the complainant, asked him to return his mobile, but he (complainant) told him that he was not having his mobile. It has further come in the prosecution story that on 12.09.2011, around 10 a.m., when the complainant was going to Kala Amb for bringing kerosene oil, accused Aditya alongwith 3-4 boys met him near Ruchira Paper Mill and accused Aditya quarreled with him for lifting the mobile of Amit. On the same day, around 04:15 p.m., when the accused alongwith his wife and children, was in his accommodation, accused persons came and attacked his wife and when the complainant tried to rescue her, accused Aditya fired a shot from behind with country made revolver which struck on the right side of his head. Subsequently, the accused persons fled away from the spot and also bolted the door from outside. Later on, someone opened the door from outside and the complainant reported the matter to the police. The medical examination of the complainant was got conducted at Sneh Hospital, Kala Amb and upon his statement FIR was registered. During the course of the investigation, police completed all the codal formalities, viz., prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of the witnesses, effected relevant recoveries, clicked the photographs and collected scientific samples. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial Court. 3. During the course of the investigation, police completed all the codal formalities, viz., prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of the witnesses, effected relevant recoveries, clicked the photographs and collected scientific samples. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 19.11.2012 framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 452 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act, 1959, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 15 witnesses. Thereafter, statements of the accused persons under Section 313, Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein they denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against them, besides pleaded to be innocent and being falsely implicated. However, the accused persons did not examine any witness in their defence. 5. Vide impugned judgment dated 15.03.2014, the learned trial Court, acquitted the accused persons for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 307, 323, 452 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 25 of the Arms Act, hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant-State. 6. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General contended that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a slip- shod and perfunctory manner and discarded the well reasoned and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He further contended that the learned trial Court has gravely erred in disbelieving the versions of the prosecution witnesses on minor discrepancies and contradictions not affecting the core of the prosecution case, as such, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 7. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondents/accused persons contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondent and also carefully examined the entire records. 9. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondent and also carefully examined the entire records. 9. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 10. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnatka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under:- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh [2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under:- “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice: (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 12. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 14. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. 15. In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. 15. In the instant case, the accused persons have been tried for commission of the offences under Sections 452 and 307 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act, 1959, on the allegation that on or about 12th September, 2011, at about 04:15 p.m. at Jatawali, Kala Amb, they in furtherance of common intention committed house trespass by entering into residential quarter of the complainant, after having made preparation to cause and had caused hurt on his person and wrongfully confined him and his wife and also fired upon the complainant with fire arm, i.e., Desi Katta, with such intention and under such circumstances that if by that act the accused persons had caused the death of the complainant accused persons would have been guilty of murder and had caused hurt on his person. The accused persons were also in furtherance of common intention had acquired and unauthorizedly used and were found in possession of country made pistol, i.e., Desi Katta, i.e., firearm without licence. 16. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondent- accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. However, the case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-9 Shri Surender Singh @ Dipak (complainant/injured), PW-11 Smt. Jyoti (wife of the complainant), PW-4 Dr. M.L. Gupta and PW-5 Dr. C.L. Sharma. 17. Shri Surender Kumar (complainant/injured) appeared in the witness-box as PW-9 and deposed that he was driver and for the last 10-12 years living in a rented house at Jattanwali Kala Amb alongwith his wife-Jyoti (PW-11) and two children. He further deposed that he had visited the clinic of accused Amit Kumar at Jattanwali for getting medicines and after taking the same, accused Amit asked him to give his mobile phone and said that his mobile phone was not traceable. On this he disclosed to accused Amit that he was not having any mobile and left. He further deposed that he had visited the clinic of accused Amit Kumar at Jattanwali for getting medicines and after taking the same, accused Amit asked him to give his mobile phone and said that his mobile phone was not traceable. On this he disclosed to accused Amit that he was not having any mobile and left. He also deposed that on 12.09.2011, around 10 a.m., when he was going to Kala Amb for bringing Kerosene oil and reached near Ruchira Paper mill, accused persons Amit, Aditya and 3-4 boys, whose names were not known to him met him there. This witness further deposed that accused Aditya quarreled with him for lifting the phone of accused Amit. On the same day, around 04:15 p.m., when he alongwith his children, was present in his quarter, accused persons Aditya, Suresh, Pankaj came and attacked his wife (PW-11) and when he tried to intervene, accused Aditya fired a shot from behind on his head and the accused persons bolted the door from outside and ran away. He deposed that the bullet hit on his right side of head. Accused Amit had visited the adjoining room for giving medicines and he came there later on, on hearing the noise of the fire shot and he (PW-9) thought that accused Amit came there alongwith other accused persons, but subsequently he came to know that he had no role in the incident. As per this witness, later on someone opened the door and he visited Sneh Hospital, where his statement, Ex. PW-9/A, was recorded by the police. Police took him to RH Nahan whereby his blood sample and hair sample were taken and police visited the spot for spot inspection. He also deposed that on 13.09.2011 he produced a t-shirt, one blood stained vest to the police, which were taken into possession, vide memo Ex. PW-9/B, in presence of his brother Narender and wife Jyoti. 18. Smt. Jyoti, wife of the complainant, appeared in the witness-box as PW-11 and deposed that during the year 2011 he alongwith his husband (PW-9) and children used to live in a rented accommodation at village Jattanwala. She further deposed that on 12.09.2011, around 3 or 03:30 p.m., when she alongwith her husband and children, was in the room, accused persons Aditya, Pankaj and Suresh entered their room. She further deposed that on 12.09.2011, around 3 or 03:30 p.m., when she alongwith her husband and children, was in the room, accused persons Aditya, Pankaj and Suresh entered their room. As per this witness, accused Amit came to give medicine to her child and accused Pankaj picked her hair and slapped her and accused Suresh gave danda blow on her head. In the interregnum, her husband (PW-9) intervened to save her, but accused persons caught hold of her and she became unconscious, thereafter, accused Aditya fired a gun shot at her husband, due to which he suffered injury on his left side of head. Subsequently, the accused persons fled away from the spot after bolting the door from outside. She stated that her husband sustained bullet injury and his hair were also uprooted. 19. Dr. M.L. Gupta, who initially examined the complainant/injured (PW-9), appeared in the witness-box as PW-4 and deposed that he used to run a private hospital at Kala Amb in the name of Sneh Hospital. As per this witness, on 12.09.2011, application, Ex. PW-4/A, was moved by the police for the medical examination of Surender Kumar. He further deposed that Surender Kumar was admitted in his hospital and he was fit to give statement. He administered first aid treatment to him and referred him to RH Nahan. The injured was allegedly hit by some fire arm and on examination, his general condition was fair, as he was conscious and well oriented to time and space. He deposed that the patient was bleeding from right side of the scalp, but detailed examination was deferred, as the patient was not willing for treatment in a private hospital. After administering first aid, the patient was referred to RH Nahan. The case summary, Ex. PW-4/B, bears his signatures. This witness, in his cross-examination, deposed that he did not observe injuries sustained by the patient and he simply noticed the bleeding. He also did not observe injuries, as the patient had refused to get treatment from him. This witness admitted that in case the fire arm had been used from close range, there should be charring around the wound of entry. 20. Dr. C.L. Sharma, the then General Surgeon, RH Nahan, appeared in the witness-box as PW-5. He deposed that on 12.09.2011, around 11 p.m., the patient (complainant/injured) was admitted in male surgical ward by Dr. This witness admitted that in case the fire arm had been used from close range, there should be charring around the wound of entry. 20. Dr. C.L. Sharma, the then General Surgeon, RH Nahan, appeared in the witness-box as PW-5. He deposed that on 12.09.2011, around 11 p.m., the patient (complainant/injured) was admitted in male surgical ward by Dr. Pankaj Sharma, as it was a case of fire arm injury and he was called to stitch the wound. As per this witness, stitching of the wound and dressing was done in the operation theater on 13.09.2011. He further deposed that the patient remained admitted w.e.f. 12.09.2011 to 13.09.2011 and he was discharged on 13.09.2011. He also deposed that the injury, which he treated, could be caused with a fire arm cartridge of Dessi Katta. This witness, in his cross- examination, deposed that the injuries sustained by the patient could have been caused even by fall and there was no charring near the wound and it was a simple lacerated wound. 21. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the close scrutiny of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 22. The close scrutiny of the testimonies of PW-9 (complainant/injured) and PW-11 Smt. Jyoti (wife of the complainant) unearths that both these witnesses have deposed that accused Amit had no role in the incident, but as per the story of the prosecution, accused persons had quarrel with the complainant over missing of mobile of accused Amit, who was suspecting that the complainant had lifted the same. When PW-9 and PW-11 did not support the prosecution story against accused Amit, who, as per the story of the prosecution, was the main kingpin, their depositions against other accused persons Suresh, Pankaj and Aditya, who had no prior enmity with them, had no perceptible motive to attack them (PW-9 and PW-11). In fact, the testimonies of PW-9 and 11 create a doubt about the prosecution story. PW-11 specifically deposed that she was caught hold by accused Pankaj by her hair and accused Suresh inflicted danda blows on her head, due to which she became unconscious, but this statement was not fortified by any medical evidence. In fact, the testimonies of PW-9 and 11 create a doubt about the prosecution story. PW-11 specifically deposed that she was caught hold by accused Pankaj by her hair and accused Suresh inflicted danda blows on her head, due to which she became unconscious, but this statement was not fortified by any medical evidence. PW-9 (complainant/injured) deposed that accused Aditya fired a shot from behind from a distance of one feet, but the cartridge, Ex.P5, which was recovered from the place of occurrence, shows that it had complete assembly, i.e., primer, propellant and projectile, thus it is unlikely that the complainant was stuck was this bullet. The above version of PW-9 also becomes highly improbable by the nature of injury suffered by him. Had the complainant suffered gunshot injury from point blank range, then there should have been charring/blackening around the entry wound. The absence of any charring/blackening around the entry wound on the scalp of the complainant, renders the testimony of the complainant highly doubtful, especially when the available medical evidence does not rule out the possibility of sustaining injury by the complainant due to fall. 23. The prosecution did not bother to produce any witness from the neighbourhood, although, as per the prosecution story, number of people used to reside in the neighbourhood of the complainant. PW-9 tried to explain that due to gun fire no one visited the spot at the time of the occurrence. On the one hand complainant deposed that due to gun fire shot no one visited the spot, however, on the other hand the police recovered an intact cartridge (Ex. P5) with all its three parts, i.e. primer, propellant and projectile. Now, if the cartridge recovered by the police was intact, then there is no question of hearing gun fire by the people living in the vicinity, which could have deterred them to assemble at the place of occurrence. The prosecution has failed to prove that the alleged country made pistol, Ex. P-11, was a fire arm and the same was in working condition. The recovered fire arm, i.e., pistol, Ex. P11, which was allegedly used by the accused to fire gun shot at the complainant, was examined by the Scientific Officer, Physics and Ballistics Division, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga, and in this regard report is Ex. P-11, was a fire arm and the same was in working condition. The recovered fire arm, i.e., pistol, Ex. P11, which was allegedly used by the accused to fire gun shot at the complainant, was examined by the Scientific Officer, Physics and Ballistics Division, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Junga, and in this regard report is Ex. PW-13/M. However, surprisingly the said Scientific Officer had neither been cited as a witness nor examined by the prosecution to prove that the Ex.P11 was in working condition. Thus, report, Ex. PW- 13/M, cannot be read in evidence for want of formal proof. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that Ex.P11 was a fire arm in working condition and bullet Ex.P5 was fired from this gun. 24. The prosecution story stands further vitiated by the depositions of PW-9 and PW11, as both these witnesses uniformly deposed that accused Aditya fired at PW-9, but the alleged fire arm, Ex. P-11, was neither recovered from accused Aditya nor at his instance. In fact, the recovery of alleged firm arm was made from the possession of accused Pankaj and the prosecution has failed to explain as to how the fire arm came in possession of accused Pankaj from where it was recovered. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to connect accused Aditya with pistol, Ex. P11. It seems that the prosecution had booked the accused persons only on the basis of suspicion. 25. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under: “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be proved and `will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be true and `must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be true and `must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 26. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused persons is a reasonable view based on the evidence on the record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 15.03.2014, rendered by learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 59-ST/7 of 2013 2012, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.