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2025 DAILYLAW 3719 (KER)

MANURAJ v. STATE OF KERALA

WP(C)/6911/2025 · 2025-04-08

Jobin Sebastian, P B Suresh Kumar

Writ Petition (Civil)body2025

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2025:KER:30290 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN TUESDAY, THE 8TH DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 18TH CHAITHRA, 1947 WP(C) NO. 6911 OF 2025 PETITIONER: MANURAJ, AGED 24 YEARS, S/O SURESH, NEEROKKIL MUTHAPPANTHARA, KALYAN ROAD, BELLA VILLAGE, HOSDURG TALUK, KASARGOD DISTRICT., PIN - 671315 BY ADVS. M.H.HANIS T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR NANCY MOL P. ANANDHU P.C. NEETHU.G.NADH RIA ELIZABETH T.J. SAHAD M. HANIS RESPONDENTS: 1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME AND VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001 2 DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, RANGE OFFICE, KANNUR,KANNUR DIST, PIN - 670002 3 THE CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD, VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA,ERNAKULAM - 682026 BY ADV.SRI.K.A. ANAS, GOVERNMENT PLEADER THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN COME UP FOR HEARING ON 03.04.2025, THE COURT ON 08.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 2 2025:KER:3029 JUDGMENT Jobin Sebastian, J. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. 2. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of Kasaragode Revenue District for six months from the date of the receipt of the order. However, after considering the representation submitted by the externee, the Advisory Board modified the said order, and the period of externment was reduced to five months from the date of the service of the impugned order and it is further directed that after the expiry of the period of five months of externment, the petitioner shall report before the Station House Officer, Hosdurg Police Station, for the remaining period of five months on every Sunday between 10 a.m. and 12 noon. However, it is apparent that the direction of the Advisory Board to appear before the SHO for five months is only a typing error as it is mentioned that it is for the “remaining period of five months”, the petitioner shall appear before the SHO particularly when the remaining period is only WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 3 2025:KER:3029 one month. Therefore, the direction to appear before the SHO has to be treated as a direction to appear for one month instead of five months. 3. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities, the District Police Chief, Kasaragode submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been classified as a “known rowdy” as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007. 4. The authority considered 8 cases in which the petitioner was involved before passing the order of externment. The last case considered by the authorised officer for passing the impugned order of externment is crime No.584/2024 of Hosdurg Police Station registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 118(2), 110, 296(b) r/w 190 BNS. 5. Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 4 2025:KER:3029 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of externment, and hence the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment order is snapped. The learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity on stringent conditions, the said fact is not adverted to, in the impugned order and the sufficiency of bail conditions was also not considered by the jurisdictional authority. Moreover, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order was passed in a casual manner without arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction and hence warrants interference. 7. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and after entering on the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order and hence the petitioner could not be heard to say WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 5 2025:KER:3029 that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment was snapped. It was further submitted that all the procedural safeguards were complied with while passing the order of externment against the petitioner and hence, no interference is warranted. 8. On perusal of the records, it is gatherable that the last prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority to pass Ext.P1 order of externment is crime No.584/2024 of Hosdurg Police Station, registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 191(2), 191(3), 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 118(2), 110, 296(b) r/w 190 BNS. The petitioner is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case. The last prejudicial activity was committed on 03.07.2024 and in the said case the petitioner was arrested on 28.07.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner was released on bail in the said case. It was thereafter, on 18.11.2024 the District Police Chief, Kasaragode, forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P)Act against the petitioner. Thereafter, the jurisdictional authority passed the order of externment on 24.12.2024, whereby the petitioner was restrained from entering the limits of Kasaragode Revenue District for a period WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 6 2025:KER:3029 of six months from the date of receipt of the order. 9. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order. Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act is having a significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay occurred in this case is only justifiable and it could not be said that the livelink between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is snapped. Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing as the consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. We are cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person concerned with an intrusion to his personal liberty within the limit of Article 21 especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 7 2025:KER:3029 under Section 3 is compared with an order of externment passed under Section 15(1) of KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the nature of proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852]. Moreover, an order under Section 15 can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the delay of 4 months and 13 days in mooting the proposal and the delay of 5 months and 21 days in passing the externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity has no serious impact at all and the same is only liable to be discarded. 10. One of the main contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority while passing the order did not take notice of the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the last case registered against him. According to the counsel, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time when he was granted bail. While considering the contention WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 8 2025:KER:3029 of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law which precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of externment against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of externment is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the externee from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Furthermore, in the impugned order it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the petitioner at the time of granting bail to him, are not sufficient to restrain him from involving in criminal activities recurrently. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will certainly fail. In short, a perusal of Ext. P1 order indicates that the Deputy Inspector General of Police had passed the said order after proper evaluation of the materials and arriving at the requisite objective as WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 9 2025:KER:3029 well as subjective satisfaction. All the procedural safeguards envisaged under KAA(P) Act are seen scrupulously complied with before passing the order. Therefore, we are of the considered view that Ext.P1 order warrants no interference. In the result, this petition stands dismissed. Sd/- P.B. SURESH KUMAR JUDGE Sd/- JOBIN SEBASTIAN JUDGE ncd WP(C) NO. 6911/2025 10 2025:KER:3029 APPENDIX OF WP(C) 6911/2025 PETITIONER EXHIBITS Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. A3-21522/2024/KR DATED 24.12.2024 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT Exhibit P3 . A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 13.02.2025 IN O.P.NO.18/2025 OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT