JUDGMENT : SUSHIL KUKREJA, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State under Section 378 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC) against the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 03.03.2015, passed by the learned Special Judge (II), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2011, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, the ‘NDPS Act’). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to present appeal as per the prosecution story, are that on 16.05.2011, a police party, headed by ASI Amar Nath, was on patrolling duty towards Pandoh side and when the said police party was present at place ahead Bindrabani towards Pandoh, at about 8:30 p.m., one woman was noticed coming on foot from Pandoh side towards Mandi road. On seeing police, she suddenly turned back and tried to run, but she was apprehended by the police about ten meters away. Having suspicion of some contraband, police inquired her name and whereabouts, who disclosed her name as Dimple (respondent-accused herein). Since it was a secluded place, no independent witness could be associated in the proceedings, therefore, HC Shiv Singh and LC Champa Devi were associated as witnesses. Thereafter, the accused was made aware about her legal right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and after that, the personal search of the accused was conducted by LC Champa Devi, During search, the accused was found wearing knee caps on her both legs, which were taken out. Inside the said knee caps, cannabis, wrapped in plastic packets, was found and on weighing, the same was found to be 1 kg. Thereafter, the cannabis was kept in the same polythene and the same was taken into possession. The knee caps and cannabis were sealed at the spot with nine seals of seal impression ‘S’. Police completed all the codal formalities, viz., recovered contraband was taken into possession, statements of the witnesses were recorded and the spot map was prepared. Rukka was sent to the police station, on the basis of which, the FIR in question was registered. 3. On the completion of the investigation and receipt of the SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the Trial Court. 4. Rukka was sent to the police station, on the basis of which, the FIR in question was registered. 3. On the completion of the investigation and receipt of the SFSL report, the charge-sheet was prepared and presented before the Trial Court. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 06.07.2012 framed charge against the accused under Section 20 of NDPS Act, to which she did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined as many as nine witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr.PC was recorded, wherein she denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against her, besides pleaded to be innocent and falsely implicated in the case. However, she did not examine any witness in her defence. 6. The learned trial Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 03.03.2015, acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of NDPS Act, hence, the instant appeal by the appellant-State. 7. The learned Deputy Advocate General contended that the Trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a very slip-shod and perfunctory manner. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has discarded the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses for untenable reasons in the absence of any proof of enmity. He also contended that the learned Trial Court has wrongly thrown-away the statements of official witnesses on the ground that no independent witnesses have been associated. In view of the above submissions, he prayed that the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 8. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondent-accused and also carefully examined the entire records. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 10. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 11. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of Karnatka, (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under:- “31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse: (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct justice; evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of: (a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 13. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the Appellate Court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). Relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 14. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 15. In the instant case, the accused has been tried for commission of the offence under Section 20 of NDPS Act on the allegation that on 16.05.2011, at about 8:30 p.m. at Bindrabani, she was found in possession of 1 Kg of charas. 16. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondent- accused and to bring home her guilt, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses. However, case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-2 HC Shiv Singh, PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal, PW-6 LC Champa Devi and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath (Investigating Officer), who have been examined primarily to prove the search, recovery and seizure of 1 Kg of charas in question from the exclusive and conscious possession of the accused. 17. All the aforesaid prosecution witnesses, i.,e. PW-2 HC Shiv Singh, PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal, PW-6 LC Champa Devi and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath, deposed in one voice that on 16.05.2011, while they were on patrolling duty towards Pandoh side, then at about 8:30 p.m. one woman was noticed coming on foot from Pandon side towards Mandi and on seeing police, she turned back towards Pandoh. On suspicion, LC Champa Devi nabbed her at a distance of ten meters and inquired from her name and address and disclosed her name as Dimple. ASI Amar Nath tried to associate independent witnesses from the moving vehicles on the spot, but nobody was ready to become witness in the case, therefore, HC Shiv Singh and LC Champa Devi were associated as witnesses. Thereafter, ASI Amar Nath apprised the accused about her legal rights to be searched either before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer, but she had given her consent to be searched by the lady police constable. After that, the police party gave their personal search to the accused and then search of the accused was conducted by LC Champa Devi. During search, the accused was wearing knee caps on her both legs, which were containing envelops of polythene, brown and white in colour and on checking both these envelops, they were containing a black substance. On the basis of experience and smelling, the substance was found to be charas and on weighing, it was found to be 1 Kg. The substance was weighed in one go with two weight measures of 500 grams each and thereafter the recovered contraband was repacked in the same manner and then sealed in a cloth parcel, which was sealed with nine seals of seal impression ‘S’. Sample seal was also taken in a piece of cloth. 18. It is well settled that the conviction can be based upon the testimony of the police officials, provided that such testimony is reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. In Pramod Kumar vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 6 SCC 588 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the Court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinizing the evidence, the Court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the Court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. Para-13 of the judgment reads as under:- “13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil Singh, State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar has laid down recently in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana that there is no absolute command of law that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and their testimony should always be treated with suspicion. Ordinarily, the public at large show their disinclination to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy, the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the evidence of the police officer as unreliable and untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust. This is also based on the principle that quality of the evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.” 19. Similarly, in Baldev Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 554, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “10. There is no legal proposition that evidence of police officials unless supported by independent evidence is unworthy of acceptance. Evidence of police witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground that they belong to police force and interested in the investigation and their desire to see the success of the case. Prudence however requires that the evidence of police officials who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case needs to be carefully scrutinised and independently appreciated. Mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness.” 20. In Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. In Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. Para-16 of judgment reads as under:- “16. In State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Sunil it was held as under: (SCC p.655) “It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust on the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a presumption of law, the presumption should be the other way round. The official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.” 21. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the testimony of police witnesses cannot be rejected on the ground of non- corroboration by independent witnesses, however such testimony needs to be carefully scrutinized. The same must inspire confidence and should be consistent with the case set up by the prosecution. In case there are material contradictions, which goes to the root of the case and make the prosecution case highly doubtful, then this Court would obviously be circumspect while placing reliance on such testimony. 22. Now reverting back to the facts of the case on hand. In the instant case, we have carefully scrutinized the entice evidence of the prosecution on record and have found that there are material contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses and various other infirmities, which go to the root of the case as rightly noticed by the learned Trial Court and the same render the prosecution case highly suspicious. PW-2 HC Shiv Singh, PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal, PW-6 LC Champa Devi and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath are the witnesses of the spot and all these witnesses had gone to the spot together on 16.05.2011. PW-2 HC Shiv stated that he had gone to the spot on foot, whereas PW-6 LC Champa Devi deposed that she had taken the lift in small private vehicle and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath stated that he had gone in a vehicle up to place Bhuili and on on foot to the spot. PW-2 HC Shiv stated that he had gone to the spot on foot, whereas PW-6 LC Champa Devi deposed that she had taken the lift in small private vehicle and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath stated that he had gone in a vehicle up to place Bhuili and on on foot to the spot. Admittedly, there was darkness at the spot. The consent memo Ext. PW2/A was prepared at the spot by the Investigating Officer. PW-2 HC Shiv Singh as well as PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal stated that the consent memo Ext. PW2/A was prepared in a torch light, however, PW-6 LC Champa Devi stated that the consent memo was prepared in street light. If street light was there, the question about writ- ing of consent memo as well as other documents in torch light does not arise, which creates a serious doubt about the story of the prosecution. Further, PW-2 HC Shiv Singh stated that no vehicle was checked by the police on the way from the police station to the spot, however, PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal stated that the vehicles were checked on the way. It also creates a serious doubt about the presence of these witnesses at the spot. 23. As per case of the prosecution, the case property was sealed at the spot with nine seals of seal impression ‘S’. PW-9 Surinder Pal, the then SHO, deposed that on the intervening night of 16/17.05.2011, at 12:20 a.m., ASI produced sealed parcel sealed with seal ‘S’ at nine places, which he had resealed with seal ‘T’ at six places and prepared the reseal memo Ext. PW8/B. However, perusal of reseal memo Ext. PW8/B shows that the case property was sealed with nine seals of seal impression ‘S’ and resealed with three seals of seal impression ‘C’, whereas, SFSL report Ext. PX also shows that case property, which was received at SFSL, was bearing nine seals of seal impression ‘S’ and three seals of seal impression ‘C’. Therefore, there is a discrepancy in the prosecution case regarding resealing of the case property as the case property was resealed by the SHO with seal impression ‘T’ at six places, whereas, in the Malkhana Register Ext. PW8/A as well as SFSL report Ext. Therefore, there is a discrepancy in the prosecution case regarding resealing of the case property as the case property was resealed by the SHO with seal impression ‘T’ at six places, whereas, in the Malkhana Register Ext. PW8/A as well as SFSL report Ext. PX, the case property is stated to have been sealed nine seals of seal impression ‘S’ and three seals of seal impression ‘C’ and there is no reference of seal impression ‘T’ at all in these documents. Hence, it cannot be said that the same case property was sent to FSL for chemical examination, which was allegedly recovered from the accused and there is every possibility of tampering of the case property, benefit of which goes in favour of the accused. 24. It has also come in the evidence of prosecution that the independent witnesses, though available, were not associated in the investigation. PW-3 HHC Krishan Lal as well as PW-6 LC Champa Devi, during their cross-examinations, admitted that there was Forest Check Post at Bindrabani and PW-7 ASI Amar Nath also admitted the suggestion that there was Forest Check post at the spot and the area was having residential houses and shops. However, no witness from Bindrabani was associated in the investigating by the police. PW-2 HC Shiv Singh, in his cross-examination, stated that the Investigating Officer did not try to call any witness from the village. Therefore, since there were residential houses, shops and check post on the spot and even then, the Investigating Officer did not try to associate independent any witness, as such, non-joining of independent witnesses, despite their availability, is fatal to the prosecution case. Hence, we are of the opinion that non-joining of independent witnesses by prosecution at the time of preparation of search and seizure memo despite the availability of independent witnesses has caused miscarriage of justice to the accused. 25. Therefore, after the close scrutiny of the above police/official witnesses, we are left with no other option, but to disbelieve their testimonies, as there are contradictions in their testimonies, which creates a doubt qua the veracity of the prosecution story. 25. Therefore, after the close scrutiny of the above police/official witnesses, we are left with no other option, but to disbelieve their testimonies, as there are contradictions in their testimonies, which creates a doubt qua the veracity of the prosecution story. Hence, we are of the opinion that it is not expedient in the ends of justice to convict the accused solely on testimonies of police officials due to various contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies in their statements and also due to non association of any independent witnesses despite their availability which has caused miscarriage of justice to accused and has also created serious doubt in the mind of Court about the impartial investigation of present case. 26. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under:- “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that `may be proved and `will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between `may be and `must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between `may be true and `must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between `may be true and `must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 27. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the learned Trial Court while acquitting the accused under Section 20 of NDPS Act is a reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 03.03.2015, rendered by the learned Special Judge (II), Mandi, District Mandi, HP, in Sessions Trial No.35 of 2011, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. 28. In view of the provisions of Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within a period of four weeks with the stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.