2025:HHC:41888 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MPM No. 2701 of 2025 Reserved on: 27.11.2025 Date of Decision: 04.12.2025 Priyanka .... Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate. For the Respondent- State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No.17/25, dated 31.01.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act) at Police Station Haroli, Distt. Una, H.P. 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, _________________________ Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:41888 the police intercepted an HRTC Bus bearing Registration No. HP-72-A-6039 on 31.01.2025. Two passengers, namely, Priyanka and Rahul, were searched, leading to the recovery of 8.53 grams of Heroin (Chitta) from the petitioner and co- accused. These allegations are false. Petitioner was falsely implicated. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail application before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP (M) No.1282 of 2025, and was dismissed on 21.06.2025. The police have filed the charge-sheet, and the matter is listed for recording the statement of prosecution witnesses on 15.01.2026. The trial is unlikely to be concluded soon. Detaining the petitioner in custody would serve no fruitful purpose. The petitioner has a minor child. Her husband is also in custody, and there is no one to care for the minor child. The grounds for arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner's custody is illegal. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 31.01.2025. They received a secret information at about 2:40 pm that petitioner Priyanka and her relative were transporting heroin in the bus bearing registration No. HP-72A-6039. The 3 2025:HHC:41888 police reduced the information to writing and sent it to the SDPO Una. Police intercepted the bus and found the petitioner occupying Seat No.22 and her relative occupying Seat No.20. The petitioner identified herself as Priyanka, and her relative identified himself as Rahul. The police searched Rahul and Priyanka in the presence of the driver and conductor. One polythene was recovered from the petitioner’s purse. The police checked the contents of the polythene and found 8.53 grams of heroin in it. The police arrested the petitioner and her relative and seized the heroin. The heroin was sent to FSL, and as per the result, it was confirmed to be a sample of Diacetylmorphine (heroin). FIR No. 287 of 2024 has been registered against the petitioner, which is listed for consideration of the charge. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses and would indulge in the commission of similar offences in case of her release on bail. The police completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet on 28.03.2025. The statements of four witnesses have been recorded. The matter is listed for prosecution evidence on 15.01.2026. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned 4 2025:HHC:41888 counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent State. 5. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that she was falsely implicated. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to her. The petitioner has been in custody since January 2025. The police have filed the charge-sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and that the petitioner be released on bail. 6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of an offence earlier; she would commit similar offence in case of her release on bail. Her previous bail petition was dismissed by this Court, and there is no change in the circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No.1282 of 5 2025:HHC:41888 2025, and was dismissed on 21.06.2025. It was held in State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and 6 2025:HHC:41888 then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.” 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: “30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a 7 2025:HHC:41888 view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.” 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The 8 2025:HHC:41888 satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the earlier order passed by this Court. 14. It was submitted that a charge sheet has been filed, and this is a change in circumstance. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a charge sheet does not amount to a change in circumstances. It was observed: “12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the fac- tum that when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner lessen the al- legations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, fil- ing of the charge sheet establishes that after due inves- tigation, the investigating agency, having found materi- als, has placed the charge sheet for the trial of the ac- cused persons.” 15. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bail on the ground that the charge sheet has been filed. 9 2025:HHC:41888 16. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner, and her arrest is illegal. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356, that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. Therefore, the non-supply of grounds of arrest will not make any difference. 18. The status report shows that the police intercepted the bus and found the petitioner occupying seat No.22. She had a purse with her from which heroin was recovered. These allegations, prima facie, show that the petitioner was in possession of the heroin, and the plea taken by the petitioner 10 2025:HHC:41888 that the heroin was not recovered from her possession and she was merely travelling in the bus cannot be accepted. 19. It was submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of an intermediate quantity of heroin, and she is entitled to bail as a matter of right. This submission cannot be accepted. This Court laid down in Dilbar Khan v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 2441, that a person found in possession of an intermediate quantity of drugs is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. It was observed: - “9. No doubt the quantity of contraband in the case is intermediate, and therefore the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act will not be applicable. Merely because the quantity of contraband recovered is less than the commercial quantity may not, by itself, be sufficient to grant bail. 10. The menace of drug abuse is not unknown in society in modern times. The victims are innocent adolescents, among others. Drug abuse more often than not leads to drug addiction, which ruins the lives of a substantial number of such persons. The question arises as to how young adolescents, who by and large remain in the custody of their guardians, are able to procure the prohibited drug. Definitely, the drug is made available through a supply chain managed in an organised manner.” 20. It was laid down by this Court in Khushi Ram Gupta v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 3779, that the menace of drug addiction has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, and the release of an accused on bail in NDPS 11 2025:HHC:41888 Act cases will send a negative signal to society. It was observed: “8. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril. 9. It is not a case where the investigating agency is clueless in respect of evidence against the petitioner. Though allegations against the petitioner are yet to be proved in accordance with the law, it cannot be taken singly as a factor to grant bail to the petitioner. Nothing has been placed on record on behalf of the petitioner to divulge as to how and in what manner he came in contact with the persons who were residents of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, there is sufficient prima facie material to infer the implication of the petitioner in the crime. In such circumstances, the release of the petitioner on bail will send a negative signal in society, which will definitely be detrimental to its interests. 10. The prima facie involvement of the petitioner in the dangerous trade of contraband cannot be ignored merely on account of the fact that he has no past criminal history. It cannot be guaranteed that there will be re-indulgence by the petitioner in similar activities, in case he is released on bail.” 21. Similarly, it was held in Bunty Yadav v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 4996 that even where the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Each case has to be adjudged on its own facts. It was observed: “6. The quantity involved in the case is 89.89 grams of heroin and 3.90 grams of MDMA. Such quantity may not technically fall under the category of commercial quantity; nevertheless, such quantity cannot be termed 12 2025:HHC:41888 to be less by any stretch of the imagination. The evident nature of commercial transactions and dealing with the contraband aggravates the situation for the petitioner. In a case where Section 37 of the NDPS Act is not applicable, the bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The fate depends on the facts of each and every case. 7. The menace of drug addiction, especially in adolescents and students, has seriously eroded into the fabric of society, putting the future generation as well as the prospects of future nation-building into serious peril.” 22. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that Narcotics are adversely affecting the young generation and their possession cannot be viewed lightly. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to bail on this consideration. 23. It was submitted that the petitioner has a minor child, and there is no one to look after her. This submission will not help the petitioner. The status report shows that FIR No.287/2024 has been registered against the petitioner. It means that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. This Court exhaustively dealt with the relevance of criminal antecedents in Aminodin vs State of H.P. 2024: HHC: 6091 and held, after referring to various judgments, that a Judge must consider the criminal antecedents of the accused, the nature of such offences and his general conduct while considering the bail petition. The bail should not be generally granted to an 13 2025:HHC:41888 accused having criminal antecedents when there is a likelihood of the commission of the crime. 24. It was held in V. Senthil Balaji v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626, that where the petitioner can become a threat to society because of her criminal antecedents, she should not be released on bail. It was observed: “27…..An exception will also be in a case where, considering the antecedents of the accused, there is every possibility of the accused becoming a real threat to society if enlarged on bail. The jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs is always discretionary.” 25. Similarly, it was held in Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019, that where the persons were involved in the commission of an offence, similar offences, they should not be released on bail. It was observed: “20. … So far as the respondents in the instant appeals are concerned, they are in custody for hardly one and a half years, apart from the fact that all the respondents are shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8 to 9 previous cases shown in the chargesheet against the respondents, except accused Nos. 1, 4 and 6, who are shown to have been involved in two cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal antecedents, in our opinion High Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UAPA. 14 2025:HHC:41888 26. In the present case, the registration of the FIR against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under the NDPS Act shows that the possibility of the petitioner committing the crime while on bail cannot be ruled out. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to bail because of her criminal antecedents. 27. No other point was urged. 28. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 29. The observations made heretofore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 04th December, 2025 (Meera)