JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. Heard. 2. All these appeals are being disposed of by common order as common questions of facts and law are involved. 3. The respondents herein in all the appeals filed two separate suits bearing Civil Suit Nos.28/1 of 2005 and 29/1 of 2005 against two separate sets of defendants. The predecessor- in-interest of the appellants in RSA No.448 of 2019 and 450 of 2019 was defendant in Civil Suit No.28/1 of 2005 and the appellants in RSA No.447 and 449 of 2019 were the defendants in Civil Suit No.29/1 of 2005. 4. The parties hereafter, for the sake of convenience, will be referred to by same status as they held before the original Court. 5. In both the above noted civil suits except for the defendants and description of suit land, other things were common. In Civil Suit No.28/1 of 2005 the suit land was comprised in Khasra No.300, measuring 1045 Sq. meters and in Civil Suit No.29/1 of 2005, the suit land was comprised in Khasra No.299, measuring 892.25 Sq meters. 6. Both the suits were filed on the premise that the suit lands were owned by the plaintiffs. They had family relation with one Shri Geeta Ram and hence, the said lands were given to Geeta Ram as licensee. Geeta Ram started cultivating the suit land comprised in Khasra No.299 through Arjun Singh, who was father of defendants in Civil Suit No.29/1 of 2005 and similarly, said Geeta Ram started cultivation of suit land comprised in Khasra No.300 through Sohan Singh the original defendant in Civil Suit No.28/1 of 2005. 7. Both the suits were contested by respective defendants by raising common pleas. The defendants had set up the plea of tenancy in their favour and were further claiming to have become owners by application of Section 104 of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972. Their further case was that the defendants had already initiated proceedings before the Land Reforms Officer seeking conferment of propitiatory rights in respect of the suit land. 8. Learned trial Court framed identical issues in both the suits as under: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of possession as prayed for? ...OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by law, as alleged? ...OPD 3. 8. Learned trial Court framed identical issues in both the suits as under: “1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the decree of possession as prayed for? ...OPP 2. Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is barred by law, as alleged? ...OPD 3. Whether present suit is not maintainable before this Court under the provisions of H.P. Tenancy of Land Reforms Act, as alleged? ...OPD 4. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case, as alleged? ...OPD 5. Whether suit of plaintiffs is not maintainable, as alleged? ...OPD 6. Relief.” 9. While answering issues No.2 to 5, learned trial Court held that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to try and decide the suit in view of law laid down by Full Bench of this Court in Chuhniya Devi vs. Jindu Ram, 1991(1) Shimla Law Cases 223. it was held that where the dispute inter se the parties qua their relationship as landlord and tenant had arisen during continuation of proceedings for conferment of propitiatory rights on the tenants, civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction in the matter. 10. However, while deciding issue No.1, learned trial Court held that the plaintiffs had a valid title over the suit lands. It was also held that the defendants had failed to prove the plea of tenancy. Hence, the defendants were held to be possessing the suit lands without any right, title or interest. Nonetheless, in view of findings on issues No.2 to 5, learned trial Court ordered the return of plaint to be presented before appropriate forum. 11. Separate judgments were passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.2, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. in both the suits on the same date i.e. 24.7.2012. 12. The plaintiffs challenged the judgment and decree dated 24.07.2012 by filing Civil Appeal No.3-N/13 of 2014/12 in Civil Suit No.28/1 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No.2-N/13 of 2014/12 in Civil Suit No.29/1 of 2005. Cross objections were also filed by the defendants. The first appellate Court partly allowed the appeals of the plaintiffs, the cross objections filed by the defendants were also allowed vide judgments dated 09.01.2014 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 3-N/13 of 2014/12 and 2-N/13 of 2014/12. Resultantly, the suits filed by the plaintiffs were dismissed. 13. The plaintiffs filed regular second appeal Nos.193 and 254 of 2014 before this Court. 3-N/13 of 2014/12 and 2-N/13 of 2014/12. Resultantly, the suits filed by the plaintiffs were dismissed. 13. The plaintiffs filed regular second appeal Nos.193 and 254 of 2014 before this Court. While deciding the said regular second appeals, this Court quashed and set aside the judgments and decree passed in both the appeals and remanded the matters back to first appellate Court to treat the appeals under Order 43 Rule 1(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. Thereafter, the appeal against the judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No.29/1 of 2005 was registered as CMA No.9-N/14 of 2015/12 and appeal against judgment and decree passed in Civil Suit No.28/1 of 2005 was registered as CMA No.21-N/14 of 2014/12. Learned first appellate Court again dismissed the appeals of the plaintiffs and allowed the cross objections. In result, the judgments and decrees passed by learned trial Court were affirmed. 15. The plaintiffs then approached this Court by filing Civil Revision Nos.182 and 183 of 2015 to assail the judgments and decrees dated 31.07.2015 passed by the appellate Court in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Nos.9-N/14 of 2014/12 and 21-N/14 of 2014/12. A Coordinate Bench of this Court vide common judgment dated 24.09.2018 decided both Civil Revisions Nos.182 and 183 of 2015 in following terms: “29 After answering point No.1 in negative and point No.2 in affirmative, the appeal filed by the petitioners was ordered to be dismissed, whereas cross objections filed by the respondents were allowed as per operative portion of the judgment. 30 Evidently, the learned trial court did not pass the decree only on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. Now, that this Court has held the jurisdiction to be that of civil court to adjudicate and decide the instant lis, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned trial court is set aside and the suit of the petitioners is accordingly deemed to be decreed. Now, that this Court has held the jurisdiction to be that of civil court to adjudicate and decide the instant lis, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned trial court is set aside and the suit of the petitioners is accordingly deemed to be decreed. 31 Likewise, since the learned first appellate court has not gone into the merits of the case and has dismissed the suit filed by the petitioners solely on the ground of jurisdiction, the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate court is accordingly set aside and the matter is remanded to it with a direction to restore the civil miscellaneous appeal as also the cross objections to their original number(s) and thereafter decide the same in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible and in no event later than 31.3.2019. 32 The parties through their respective counsel to appear before the learned first appellate court on 10.10.2018. 33 Needless to say that if any of the parties want to amend/withdraw the grounds of the appeal/cross objections in light of this judgment, then at least one opportunity to do the needful shall be afforded to them. 34 This Court has deliberately avoided to render any findings on merits of the case lest it causes prejudice to any of the parties. Therefore, nothing here-in-above shall be considered to be an expression on merits of the case and the learned first appellate court shall decide the appeal and cross objections uninfluenced by what has been stated or observed above. 35 The petitions are accordingly allowed, in the aforesaid terms, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.” 16. The judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 24.09.2018 in Civil Revision No.182 and 183 of 2025 was assailed by the defendants before Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.29497-29498 of 2018. Hon’ble Supreme Court after granting the leave, affirmed the order assailed before it, vide judgment dated 03.12.2018. 17. Thus, the verdict rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Civil Revision Nos.182 and 183 of 2015, upholding the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the suits in question, attained finality. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court after granting the leave, affirmed the order assailed before it, vide judgment dated 03.12.2018. 17. Thus, the verdict rendered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Civil Revision Nos.182 and 183 of 2015, upholding the jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the suits in question, attained finality. 18. The Civil Appeals bearing Nos.9-N/14 of 2014/12 and 21-N/14 of 2014/12 were decided by learned Additional District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan along with cross objections filed by the defendants in both the appeals by the judgments and decrees dated 31.05.2019, which are the subject matter of the instant regular second appeals. 19. Learned appellate Court had allowed the appeals of the plaintiffs and the cross objections filed by the defendants have been dismissed. The findings returned on issued No.1 by learned trial Court in both the suits touching the merits of the case have been upheld. The plaintiffs have been held to be the owners of the suit land and the status of the defendants has not been held to be that of tenant. Accordingly, the decree of possession has been passed in respect of the suit lands in both the suits favouring the plaintiffs and against the defendants. 20. By way of instant appeals, what has been sought to be urged is that the Civil Court did have jurisdiction to try and decide the suits in light of law laid in Chuhniya Devi (supra) and the admission of appeals has been sought by framing substantial question on that aspect of the matter. 21. As noticed above, the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide common judgment dated 24.09.2018 passed in Civil Revision No.182 and 183 of 2015 had authoritatively held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the subject matter of Civil Suits Nos. 28/1 of 2005 and 29/1 of 2005. The judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench has been affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court. That being so, the appellants/defendants cannot be allowed to re-agitate the matter and for such reason no substantial question of law arises on the jurisdictional aspect of Civil Court in the given facts and circumstances of the cases at hand. 22. It is settled proposition that the principle of merger applies in cases where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after granting leave to appeal, renders its adjudication. 22. It is settled proposition that the principle of merger applies in cases where the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after granting leave to appeal, renders its adjudication. Reference in this regard can be made to following extract from the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Atul Kumar Dwivedi and others, (2022) 11 SCC 578 : “31. At the outset, we must consider the effect of dismissal of Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.39931 of 2019. It was a summary dismissal at the admission stage and the order does not disclose any reasons why the challenge was negated. The challenge was also not at the instance of the State. 32. In P. Singaravelan and others vs. District Collector, Tiruppur and DT and others, it was observed by this Court:- “6. It is evident that all the above orders were non-speaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At this juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well- settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger. The following discussion on this proposition in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, is relevant in this regard: (SCC pp. 383-84, para 44) “(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law. (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. The first stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal. (iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of (2020)3 SCC 133 (2000)6 SCC 359 petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter. (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non- speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed. (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. (vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation. (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.” (emphasis supplied) This view has also been adopted in a plethora of decisions of this Court, including the recent decision in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 376 7. Applying these observations to the present case, it is clear that there has been no pronouncement by this Court constituting the law of the land as to the interpretation of GOMs No.162. In such a situation, it is open for us to proceed to decide the instant appeals uninfluenced by the prior orders of this Court dismissing SLPs against the grant of relief to drivers placed similarly as the appellants herein.” 33. To similar effect are the observations in C.G. Govindan v. State of Gujarat and others, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through its Chairman v. Omaditya Verma and others and State of Orissa and another v. Dhirendra Sundar Das and others. We, therefore, reject the submission. 23. Similarly in Vipin Kumar vs. Jaydeep and others, (2025) 6 SCC 465 , the principle has been reiterated as under: “36. In this regard, learned senior counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry vs. Govt. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 , by contending that when there has been a fraud played by the first respondent herein, the same would have to be considered by the High Court by recalling the earlier orders passed by it and by rehearing the parties and rendering a judgment in accordance with law. of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC 221 , by contending that when there has been a fraud played by the first respondent herein, the same would have to be considered by the High Court by recalling the earlier orders passed by it and by rehearing the parties and rendering a judgment in accordance with law. The relevant observations from the aforesaid judgments are paraphrased as under: “Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even the most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. A judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non-est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first court or by the final court- has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It cannot be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. The matter could be looked at from a different angle as well If this Court grants leave and thereafter decides to dismiss the appeal, such an order can be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution would apply and the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order. … However, where a special leave petition is simply dismissed, the doctrine of merger would not apply. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non-est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practicing or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non-est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of any absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.” 29. Further having regard to the judgment of this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 , an order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking or speaking order. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was no inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow an appeal being filed. In the circumstances, the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.41568/2019 as well as the Review Petition (Diary) No. 56394/2024 by this Court would not come in the way of the reconsideration of the second appeal by the High Court.” 24. As regards the status of parties and the rights respectively claimed by them in Civil Suit Nos.28/1 of 2005 and 29/1 of 2005 both the Courts have concurrently held that the plaintiffs are the owners and the defendants are not the tenants. The concurrent findings of fact returned by learned courts below need no interference as learned senior counsel representing the appellants has not been able to point out any illegality or perversity. I have also not found any material on the record to draw such an inference. 25. In result, the appeals are dismissed. All pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 26. Decree Sheets be prepared accordingly. 27. Records be sent back forthwith.