Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 62 of 2023, dated 28.04.2023, registered at Police Station Barmana, District Bilaspur, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS). It has been asserted that the police have filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court on 28.06.2023. The charges were framed on 04.12.2023. The prosecution has cited sixteen witnesses, and the statements of nine witnesses have been recorded so far. The petitioner has been behind the bars for the last two years and one month. There is an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on nakabandi duty on 28.04.2023. A bus bearing registration No. PB 65AT-1691 came from Salapar at 2.05 PM. The police checked the bus in the presence of the conductor. The petitioner was sleeping on seats No. 38, 39 and 40. He had kept a backpack on his lap. The police woke him up. He got frightened after seeing the police and tried to conceal the bag. He identified himself as Sujeet (the present petitioner). The police checked the backpack and found 1.144 kgs of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The charas was sent to SFSL Junga, and as per the report, it was confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. Only four witnesses are to be examined, who have been summoned for 28.07.2025. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Mr Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. 4. Mr Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has not completed the evidence, and the petitioners' right to a speedy trial is being violated; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. 4. Mr Rakesh Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The prosecution has not completed the evidence, and the petitioners' right to a speedy trial is being violated; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/ State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Only four witnesses are to be examined, and the trial is at its fag end. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: - (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elab- orating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be con- sidered while granting bail, which are extracted as un- der: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of jus- tice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in Eng- land” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of jus- tice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in Eng- land” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant inter- fering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the an- tecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious of- fences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discre- tion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record  of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrele- vance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted vari- ous aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having r egard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evi- dence in support thereof, the severity of the punish- ment which conviction will entail, the character, be- haviour, means and standing of the accused, circum- stances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses be- ing tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reason- ing, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter be- ing dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, can- not be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The na- ture of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that al- though it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-appli- cation of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, in- terfere with an order passed by the High Court grant- ing or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in com- pliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the fac- tors to be borne in mind while considering an applica- tion for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reason- able ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or flee- ing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis sup- plied) xx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exer- cise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclu- sion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due con- sideration must be given to facts suggestive of the na- ture of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would fol- low a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 8. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. It is undisputed that the petitioner was arrested on 28.04.2023. The photocopies of the order sheets show that the challan was incomplete on 26.07.2023. Hence, the learned Trial Court directed that the complete charge sheet be filed. The matter was listed for prosecution witnesses, but the witnesses did not appear before the Court. Witness Hari Singh was present before the Court on 30.04.2024, but the learned Public Prosecutor requested an adjournment, stating that other witnesses are to be examined. HC Ashu Verma was present before the Court on 28.07.2025, but the learned Public Prosecutor prayed for an adjournment on the ground that the witness of the spot, including the bearer of the rukka, was yet to be examined. Hence, the matter was adjourned for 08.10.2025. 10. The copies of the order sheets show that the prosecution had not produced the witnesses summoned by the Court, and when the witnesses appeared, the learned Public Prosecutor had sought an adjournment on the ground that the other witnesses were yet to be examined. This shows that the prosecution is interested in delaying the trial and not ensuring the completion of the trial at the earliest. This shows that the prosecution is interested in delaying the trial and not ensuring the completion of the trial at the earliest. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that when the State or any prosecuting agency has no wherewithal to provide the right to speedy trial of the accused, the bail should not be opposed on the ground that the crime committed is serious. It was observed at page 820: 17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. 18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however stringent the penal law may be. 19. We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 11. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 291 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127 that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused. It was observed on page 298: “13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, assures that: “12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 14. More recently, the European Convention on Human Rights in Article 6(1) promises that: “6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time….” And in its second sub-article, that: “6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” 15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)]. 16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp. 638-39, paras 86-87) “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5) ‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally, freed from the charge levelled against him on the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such a trial would constitute a violation of his fundamental right under Article 21?” 17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this right had been denied in the particular case before it.” 12. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot be kept behind bars when there is no prospect of trial being concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. It was observed at page 621: “8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation needs to be safeguarded, given the nature of the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.” 13. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be subjected to unending  detention pending trial. It was observed at page 335: “40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no accused can be subjected to unending detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 , paras 15 and 17] ).” 14. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: - “13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion (like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745: (2008) 17 SCR 369 ] (“the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the condition that the trial is concluded  expeditiously. The  Constitution  Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994) 2 SCR 375 ] made observations to this effect. In the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ] again, this Court expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123 ], SCC p. 624, para 17) “17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the community and the nation against terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in which society can be protected against harmful activities. This would also ensure that persons ultimately found innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.” 15. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178: “23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry's response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [ National Crime  Records  Bureau,  Prison  Statistics  in  India ]. Of these, 1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials. 24. The danger of unjust imprisonment is that inmates are at risk of “prisonisation”, a term described by the Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC OnLine Ker para 13) “13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.” 25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” [ Working Papers - Group on Prisons & Borstals - 1966 U.K.]  (also  see  Donald  Clemmer's  “The  Prison Community” published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer's Concept   of  Prisonisation”, available at: (accessed on  23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure that trials—especially in cases where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded speedily.” 16. It was held that the fetters provided in Section 37 of the NDPS Act will not prevent the Court from releasing the accused on bail if there is undue delay in concluding the trial. It was observed at page 178: 22. The standard to be considered therefore, is one, where the court would look at the material in a broad manner, and reasonably see whether the accused's guilt may be proved. The judgments of this Court have, there- fore, emphasised that the satisfaction which courts are expected to record i.e. that the accused may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials collected during investigation (as held in Union of In- dia v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 831] ). Grant of bail on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436-A, which is applica- ble to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Grant of bail on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436-A, which is applica- ble to offences under the NDPS Act too (ref. Satender Ku- mar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51 : (2023) 1 SCC (Cri) 1). Having regard to these factors, the Court is of the opin-ion that in the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be enlarged on bail. 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to the grant of bail. It was observed at page 817: - “10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para 5) “5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.” 11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again,  in  several  judgments,  such  as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84) “84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.” 18. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed: 7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines while being incarcerated: “I know not whether Laws be right, Or whether Laws be wrong; All that we know who be in jail Is that the wall is strong; And that each day is like a year, A year whose days are long.” 19. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail on the ground that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. 20. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing personal bonds in the sum of ?1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever; (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments; (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court; (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 21. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 22. The petition stands disposed of. 21. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 22. The petition stands disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (HP), and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 23. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.