Judgment : Virender Singh, J. Applicant Kartar Singh has filed the present application, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), with a prayer to release him on bail, during pendency of the trial, arising out of FIR No. 112/2021, dated 30.05.2021, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FIR in question”), registered with Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’). 2. According to the applicant, he is innocent and has falsely been implicated, in this case. According to the applicant, he has no concern, whatsoever, with the offences, for which he has been arrested, in this case. 3. The applicant has further pleaded that he is permanent resident of Village & Post Office Chhiller, Tehsil and Police Station Ramshehar, District Solan, H.P., and as such, he will be available for the trial, in case, ordered to be released on bail. 4. According to the applicant, there is undue delay in the trial, as he is in judicial custody for about five years. According to him, the trial will take sufficient long time for its conclusion. As such, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the applicant in the judicial custody. 5. On the basis of above facts, Sh. Rajiv Chauhan, Legal Aid Counsel has pointed out that there are 28 witnesses and till date, only nine prosecution witnesses have been examined. 6. The applicant has given certain undertakings, for which, he is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be released on bail. 7. The applicant has also tried his luck by moving bail application, before learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nalagarh, District Solan, which was dismissed, on 09.09.2024. Thereafter, he has filed the present bail application. 8. On the basis of above facts, Mr. Rajiv Chauhan, Legal Aid Counsel has prayed that the bail application may kindly be allowed. 9. When, put to notice, the police filed the status report, disclosing therein that on 30.05.2021, at about 8:26 am, as per DD No. 22, Police Station Baddi, an information was received that a dead body is found lying on the road near Alpla company Indofarm Showroom. Upon which, the then SI/SHO Ramesh Kumar, I.O. along with other police officials, had reached at the spot. Upon which, the then SI/SHO Ramesh Kumar, I.O. along with other police officials, had reached at the spot. At the spot, a person was lying dead having the injuries marks over his mouth and head. On the spot, Harbans Lal, Subhash Singh and Raj Kumar etc. were present. On the spot, the eye witness Harbans Lal son of Falato Ram, has got recorded his statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C., disclosing therein, that he is resident of Village and Post Office Jambal, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. and working in Neptune company, village Thane, for the last 10-12 years, as security In-charge. 9.1 On 30.05.2021, when he was present in the company, then at about 7:00 am, there was change in the shift of the security, as during the night time Shiv Kumar was on security duty. At about 7:00 am, Kartar Singh son of Basant Vasi, resident of Village and Post Office Chhiller, Tehsil and Police Station Ramshehar, District Solan, H.P. came on duty under the influence of liquor, upon which, the complainant informed Security Manager Subhash Chand. When Shiv Kumar was returning back from his duty, at about 7:30 am, then Kartar Singh followed him, whereas complainant was present at the gate of the company. In his presence, Kartar Singh caught Shiv Kumar and started beating him and he had thrown him on the road and started giving kick blows. Kartar Singh also inflicted blows with stone on his neck and head and threw in the drain. When the complainant had tried to run towards the spot, meanwhile Innova Car bearing no. HP12N-3030, which was registered in the name of Raj Kumar, also came there, who has also witnessed the crime. 9.2 Thereafter, Kartar Singh, fled away from the spot. When the injured was taken to hospital for treatment, by the time he had died. On the basis of the above facts, he has prayed that action be taken against Kartar Singh. Upon which, police registered the case under Section 302 IPC. 9.3 Thereafter, the investigation was conducted by the police. After the completion of the investigation, police has filed the charge-sheet before the Court of learned ACJM, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. 9.4 As per the case of the police, seven witnesses have been examined and the case was listed for 12.09.2025 and 13.09.2025. 9.3 Thereafter, the investigation was conducted by the police. After the completion of the investigation, police has filed the charge-sheet before the Court of learned ACJM, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. 9.4 As per the case of the police, seven witnesses have been examined and the case was listed for 12.09.2025 and 13.09.2025. 9.5 On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to dismiss the application. 10. The applicant has approached this Court for bail, mainly on the ground of undue delay in the trial. In the present case, out of 28 witnesses, nine witnesses have only been examined. Meaning thereby, 19 witnesses are yet to be examined. The prosecution could only examine nine witnesses, in the span of five years. The manner, in which, the trial is being conducted, there is clear violation of the mandate of the law, under Section 309 Cr. P.C. 11. Right to speedy trial has been held to be fundamental right by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case titled as Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S. Nayak and Another, reported in (1992) 1 Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused has right to speedy trial, which flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment is reproduced, as under: “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re- trial. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re- trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words: ‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’ However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order — including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” (self-emphasis supplied) 12. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in another case, titled as Raj Deo Sharma versus State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme  Court  in  Abdul  Rehman  Antulay’s  case (supra), by issuing the additional directions. Relevant paragraph 17 of the judgment in Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra) is reproduced as under: “17. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed to supplement the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay case [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] with the following directions: (i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit. (iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit. (iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii). (v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence. The above directions will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in “Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India [ (1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] as modified by the same Bench through the order reported in “Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India [ (1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42]” 13. In case Dharmendra Kirthal versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, reported in (2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair trial to be an integral part of very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “30. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall presently proceed to deal with the stand and stance of both the sides. The first submission which pertains to the denial of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , the majority, speaking through Pandian, J., has expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras 85-86) “85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration,  to  minimise  anxiety  and  concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge. 86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 31. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40] , Hussainara Khatoon (6) v. State of Bihar [ (1980) 1 SCC 115 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [ (1983) 2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N. [ (1983) 2 SCC 68 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 342] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] . 32. The present provision is to be tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle. The provision clearly mandates that the trial under this Act of any offence by the Special Court shall have precedence and shall be concluded in preference to the trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose. The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. It is apt to note here that “any other case” against the accused in “any other court” does not include the Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not denial of it. The legislature has incorporated such a provision so that an accused does not face trial in two cases simultaneously and a case before the Special Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It is also worthy to note that the Special Court has been conferred jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the accused may, under any other law for the time being in force, have been charged and proceeded at the same trial. 33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) “33. Fair trial is the quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [ (2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33) “33. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in numerous rules and practices. It is a constant, ongoing development process continually adapted to new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of the situation—peculiar at times and related to the nature of crime, persons involved— directly or operating behind, social impact and societal needs and even so many powerful balancing factors which may come in the way of administration of criminal justice system.” (self-emphasis supplied) 14. Similar view has been taken by a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Hussain and another versus Union of India, reported in (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702. Relevant paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed under Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be denied even on the plea of non-availability of financial resources. The court is entitled to issue directions to augment and strengthen the investigating machinery, setting up of new courts, building new court houses, providing more staff and equipment to the courts, appointment of additional Judges and other measures as are necessary for speedy trial [Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98 , para 10 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40]. 10. Directions given by this Court in Hussainara Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to be implemented by the High Courts are as follows: (SCC p. 328, para 2) “2. Since this Court has already laid down the guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in different cases since then, we do not consider it necessary to restate the guidelines periodically because the enforcement of the guidelines by the subordinate courts functioning in different States should now be the responsibility of the different High Courts to which they are subordinate. General orders for release of undertrials without reference to specific fact situations in different cases may prove to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt that undertrial prisoners should not languish in jails on account of refusal to enlarge them on bail for want of their capacity to furnish bail with monetary obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt with on case- to-case basis keeping in mind the guidelines laid down by this Court in the orders passed in this writ petition and in subsequent cases from time to time. Sympathy for the undertrials who are in jail for long terms on account of the pendency of cases has to be balanced having regard to the impact of crime, more particularly, serious crime, on society and these considerations have to be weighed having regard to the fact situations in pending cases. While there can be no doubt that trials of those accused of crimes should be disposed of as early as possible, general orders in regard to Judge- strength of subordinate judiciary in each State must be attended to, and its functioning overseen, by the High Court of the State concerned. We share the sympathetic concern of the learned counsel for the petitioners that undertrials should not languish in jails for long spells merely on account of their inability to meet monetary obligations. We are, however, of the view that such monitoring can be done more effectively by the High Courts since it would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate the statistical information in that behalf, apply the broad guidelines already issued and deal with the situation as it emerges from the status reports presented to it. The role of the High Court is to ensure that the guidelines issued by this Court are implemented in letter and spirit. We think it would suffice if we request the Chief Justices of the High Courts to undertake a review of such cases in their States and give appropriate directions where needed to ensure proper and effective implementation of the guidelines. Instead of repeating the general directions already issued, it would be sufficient to remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases.” 11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. Instead of repeating the general directions already issued, it would be sufficient to remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious disposal of cases.” 11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal cannot be unduly long. This Court has held that while a person in custody for a grave offence may not be released if trial is delayed, trial has to be expedited or bail has to be granted in such cases [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 , para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39]. 12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights. Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence in the administration of justice. Directions of this Court in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202 , are as follows: (SCC p. 217, para 34) “34. … Therefore, we request the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases, to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can really be dealt with in an expeditious manner. Putting a step forward is a step towards the destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a committed collective endeavour would indubitably help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.” (self-emphasis supplied) 15. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A. Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases 713, has held that when a timely trial would not be possible and  the  accused  has  suffered  incarceration  for  a significant period of time, the Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail. Relevant paragraphs 11 and 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under: “11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622, para 10) “10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.” *** *** *** 15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India [Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731 , para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.” (self-emphasis supplied) 16. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.” (self-emphasis supplied) 16. Considering the facts of the case, in the light of the above legal proposition of law, this Court is of the view that the chances of conclusion of trial, against the applicant, in near future, are not so bright, as such, keeping the applicant in judicial custody, would be nothing, but, pre-trial punishment, which is prohibited under the law. Moreover, the applicant is presumed to be innocent till his guilt is proved by the prosecution, during the trial. 17. Even otherwise, no apprehensions have been expressed by the Police, in case, the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, during the pendency of the trial. 18. Similarly, the ground that at the time of alleged incident, the applicant has threatened the persons, present there, with dire consequences, in case, they will appear, against him, as witnesses, is too short to decline the relief of bail to the applicant. 19. Moreover, the applicant is local resident of District Solan, as such, it cannot be apprehended that in case, he is ordered to be released on bail, he may not be available for trial. The perusal of the status report shows that delay in trial cannot be attributed to the applicant. 20. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 21. The applicant is ordered to be released on bail in case FIR No. 112/2021, dated 30.05.2021, registered with Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., under Section 302 of the IPC on his furnishing personal bail bond, in the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, with one surety, of the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. 21. The applicant is ordered to be released on bail in case FIR No. 112/2021, dated 30.05.2021, registered with Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., under Section 302 of the IPC on his furnishing personal bail bond, in the sum of Rs. 50,000/-, with one surety, of the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. This order, however, shall be subject to the following conditions: a) He shall regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; b) He shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; c) He shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and d) He shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court. 22. Keeping in view the pace of trial, it is expected from the learned trial Court to adhere to the directions, issued by this Court, vide judgment dated 14.12.2023, passed in Cr. MP(M) No. 2628 of 2023, in letter and spirit. 23. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to the disposal of the present bail application. 24. It is made clear that the respondent-State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions, is found to be violated by the applicant. 25. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of Sub-Jail Nalagarh, H.P. through email, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e-prison software. 26. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Sub-Jail Nalagarh, H.P. is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Solan. 26. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Sub-Jail Nalagarh, H.P. is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Solan. The Superintendent of the Sub-Jail Nalagarh, H.P. is further directed that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as per the order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court.