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2025 DAILYLAW 3687 (HP)

State of H. P v. Puran Chand

2025-09-24

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.02.2012, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge- II, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra (HP) (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.08.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jawali, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 341, 342 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’). It was asserted that the informant, Swaroop Singh (PW1), is running a milk dairy at his home. He supplies milk to various people, including the accused (Puran Chand). Puran Chand complained to the informant about the quality of the milk 3-4 days before the incident. The informant replied that he did not have any other milk, and if the accused was unhappy with the quality, he should get the milk from someone else. The informant went to supply milk on 24.02.2006 on his scooter bearing registration no. HP54-7657 at about 08.30 AM. He parked his scooter outside Dev Raj’s house. Puran Chand came to the spot with his wife Satya Devi and sons Sanjeev @ Suresh Kumar and Hans Raj. They beat the informant, dragged him towards their house and tied him with ropes to a mango tree. They beat the informant with a stick (Ex. P3) and a shovel (Ex. P2). They dragged him inside the room and bolted the door from the outside. Puran Chand threatened to kill the informant. The incident was witnessed by many people, but nobody rescued the informant. The informant remained inside the room for about two hours. Jeewan Lal (Pradhan)(PW2), Suresh Kumar (Ward Member) (PW4), Ishwar Dass (Up-Pradhan) (PW3), and Dilawar Singh (Zila Parishad) rescued the informant. Manorma Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bharmad also came to the spot and asked the informant to settle the matter. The informant’s utensils, containers and plastic bottles remained on the spot. The money kept by the informant in his pocket was also missing. Manorma Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bharmad also came to the spot and asked the informant to settle the matter. The informant’s utensils, containers and plastic bottles remained on the spot. The money kept by the informant in his pocket was also missing. The matter was reported to the police, and FIR (Ex.PW1/A) was registered. HC Vinod Kumar (PW6) filed an application (Ex.PW6/A) for the informant’s medical examination. Dr Aman Dua (PW8) conducted the informant’s medical examination and found multiple injuries on his body. He advised an X-ray. Dr Raman Sharma (PW9) went through the X-ray and found that the informant had suffered a fracture of the 1/3rd upper fibula. He issued the reports (Ex.PW9/A and Ex.PW9/B). Dr Aman Dua (PW8) issued the final report (Ex.PW8/A) stating that the nature of injuries was grievous and their probable duration was three hours. ASI Desh Raj (PW7) conducted further investigation. He went to the spot and prepared a site plan (Ex.PW7/A). He seized the rope (Ex. P1), shovel (Ex. P2), and stick (Ex. P3) vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). He also recovered the container having ten litres of milk vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). The lock (Ex. P4) and key (Ex. P5) were seized vide memo (Ex.PW2/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their versions, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 341, 342, and 506, read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Swaroop Singh (PW1) is the informant. Jeewan Lal (PW2), Ishwar Dass (PW3), Suresh Kumar (PW4), and HHG Kewal Krishan (PW5) are the eyewitnesses. HC Vinod Kumar (PW6) recorded the FIR. ASI Desh Raj (PW7) conducted the investigation. Dr Aman Dua (PW8) examined the injury. Dr Raman Sharma (PW9) went through the X-rays. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case. They stated that the witnesses were inimical to them. Accused Suresh Kumar stated that he was not present on the spot. Statement of Manorma Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bharmad (DW1) was recorded in defence. 6. Dr Raman Sharma (PW9) went through the X-rays. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case. They stated that the witnesses were inimical to them. Accused Suresh Kumar stated that he was not present on the spot. Statement of Manorma Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bharmad (DW1) was recorded in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by the statements of eyewitnesses. Minor contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to discard them. HHG Kewal Krishan (PW5) corroborated the informant’s statement in material particulars, and his testimony could not be discarded because he was a chance witness. Statement of Manorma Devi, Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Bharmad (DW1) was not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. She stated that the accused had made a complaint to her, but her conduct does not justify her version. The minor injuries sustained by the accused were not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. Therefore, the accused were convicted and sentenced as follows: Under Section 341 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. Under Section 342 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. Under Section 323 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. Under Section 325 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of  Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for a period of three months. Under Section 506 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of  Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal. Learned Appellate Court held that the presence of HHG Kewal Krishan (PW5) on the spot was highly doubtful. The informant stated that 200 people had gathered on the spot, but no such witnesses were examined before the Court. It was highly improbable that the accused would have given beatings to the informant in the presence of so many people, and none would have rescued the informant from the accused. The informant stated that 200 people had gathered on the spot, but no such witnesses were examined before the Court. It was highly improbable that the accused would have given beatings to the informant in the presence of so many people, and none would have rescued the informant from the accused. Non-explanation of the injury to the person of the accused made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Hence, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. The informant’s testimony was corroborated by Jeewan Lal (PW2), Ishwar Dass (PW4) and HHC Kewal Krishan (PW5). Learned Appellate Court erred in rejecting the prosecution’s case. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel, for the respondents /accused. 10. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the testimonies of the informant and the eyewitnesses proved the prosecution’s case. The learned Trial Court gave valid reasons for convicting and sentencing the accused. Learned Appellate Court reversed the judgment without dispelling the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Rajesh Mandhotra, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the witnesses admitted the presence of 200 persons in their cross-examination. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that it was highly unlikely that no person had rescued the informant from the accused. The informant claimed that he was beaten with a stick and shovel; however, he did not sustain any corresponding injury. Learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached or is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in   the   following   words:   (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant claimed that the accused gave him beatings for about two hours. He was tied to a mango tree with a rope and was beaten with a stick and a shovel. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The informant claimed that the accused gave him beatings for about two hours. He was tied to a mango tree with a rope and was beaten with a stick and a shovel. Dr Aman Dua (PW8) found injuries on the right lower leg, sub coastal region of chest, right hand dorsum, left hand and left knee joint. The Medical Officer stated that the injuries could have been caused by means of a stick (Ex.P3); however, the injuries noticed by him could have only been caused by the blunt side of the shovel. It is nobody’s case that the accused had given beatings to the informant with the blunt side of the shovel. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hallu vs. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 300 , that in the case of a sharp-edged weapon, the presumption is that its sharp side was used. If the prosecution wants the Court to believe that the blunt side was used, the burden is upon it to say so. It was observed: - 11. The post-mortem report prepared by Dr N. Jain shows that on the body of Jagdeo were found three bruises and a haematoma. On the body of Padum were found four lacerated wounds and two bruises. According to the eyewitnesses, the two men were attacked with lathis, spears and axes, but that clearly stands falsified by the medical evidence. Not one of the injuries found on the person of Jagdeo and Padum could be caused by a spear or an axe. The High Court, however, refused to attach any importance to this aspect of the matter by saying that the witnesses had not stated that “the miscreants dealt axe blows from the sharp side or used the spear as a piercing weapon”. According to the High Court, axes and spears may have been used from the blunt side, and therefore, the evidence of the eyewitnesses could safely be accepted. We should have thought that normally, when the witness says that an axe or a spear is used, there is no warrant for supposing that what the witness means is that the blunt side of the weapon was used. We should have thought that normally, when the witness says that an axe or a spear is used, there is no warrant for supposing that what the witness means is that the blunt side of the weapon was used. If that be the implication, it is the duty of the prosecution to obtain a clarification from the witness as to whether a sharp-edged or a piercing instrument was used as a blunt weapon.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. In the present case, no witness has testified that the blunt side of the shovel was used to cause an injury; hence, such an inference cannot be drawn, and the medical evidence would make the prosecution’s case doubtful. 18. FIR (Ex.PW1/A) does not mention the name of Kewal Krishan. The FIR was lodged on the same day at 10.30 AM. No reason has been assigned for the omission to mention the name of Kewal Krishan. He claimed that he was serving in the Police Station Jawalaji, but did not take any steps to inform the police about the incident, even though he admitted in his cross- examination that he was duty-bound to do so. His statement was not recorded on the same day but on 24.02.2006. He has not provided any explanation for not narrating the incident to the police on the same day. All these circumstances made his presence on the spot doubtful. 19. Jeewan Lal (PW2) admitted in his cross-examination that 200 people were present on the spot. It is not shown that any person had intervened to rescue the informant from the accused. It is difficult to believe that the accused would have been beaten and locked inside the room in the presence of so many people. This aspect was not clarified during the examination of the witnesses. Therefore, the benefit of the same would go to the accused. 20. Ishwar Dass (PW3) stated that he had gone to the temple on 24.02.2006. Jeewan Lal (PW2) (Pradhan) and Member Suresh took Swaroop out of the room, but he had not seen the informant being taken out of the room. He saw the informant sitting in the veranda. The statement of this witness shows that the informant was not rescued in his presence, and his testimony does not establish that the accused had confined the informant in the room. 21. He saw the informant sitting in the veranda. The statement of this witness shows that the informant was not rescued in his presence, and his testimony does not establish that the accused had confined the informant in the room. 21. Manorma Devi (DW1) stated that accused Puran came to her house and complained about the beatings given by the informant. She saw that Puran Chand had sustained a bleeding injury. She went to the spot, but there was no one. She accompanied the accused to the police station. She denied in her cross-examination that Puran Chand had told her about the confinement of the informant. She admitted that she had visited the spot. She denied that Jeewan Lal (PW2), Dilawar Singh, Ishwar Dass (PW3) and Suresh Kumar (PW4) were present at the spot. She denied that the lock was put on the door, which was opened by Jeewan Lal (pradhan). 22. Her name was mentioned in the FIR, and her presence cannot be doubted. She is the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat Bharmad, where the incident had occurred. It is not shown that she is having any enmity with the informant or any affiliation with the accused. Her statement that there was no one on her arrival on the spot has remained unrebutted. Therefore, her testimony will make the prosecution’s case suspect. 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Adambhai Sulemanbhai Ajmeri v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 7 SCC 716 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 312: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 465 that equal weightage must be given to the defence witnesses. It was observed at page 829: “219. It has been held by this Court in a catena of cases that while examining the witnesses on record, equal weightage shall be given to the defence witnesses as that of the prosecution witnesses. In Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar [ (2002) 1 SCC 351 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 175], this Court held as under: (SCC p. 356, para 3) “3. … Before drawing the curtain on this score, how- ever, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the wit- nesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. … Before drawing the curtain on this score, how- ever, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the wit- nesses being examined by the defence. The defence witnesses are entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution — a lapse on the part of the defence witnesses cannot be differentiated and be treated differently from that of the prosecutors' witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 220. Further, it has been held in State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [ (2002) 2 SCC 426 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 350] as under: (SCC p. 439, para 19) “19. … Incidentally, be it noted that the evidence tendered by defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one — the defence wit- nesses are entitled to equal treatment and equal respect as that of the prosecution. The issue of credibility and trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses on a par with that of the prosecution. Rejection of the defence case on the basis of the evidence tendered by the defence witness has been effected rather casually by the High Court. Suggestion was there to the prosecution witnesses, in particular PW 10 Dholu Ram that his father Manphool was missing for about 2/3 days prior to the day of the occurrence itself—what more is expected of the defence case: a doubt or a certainty—jurisprudentially a doubt would be enough: when such a suggestion has been made the prosecution has to bring on record the availability of the deceased during those 2/3 days with some independent evidence. Rejection of the defence case only by reason thereof is far too strict and rigid a requirement for the defence to meet — it is the prosecutor's duty to prove beyond all reasonable doubts and not the defence to prove its innocence — this it- self is a circumstance, which cannot but be termed to be suspicious in nature.” 221. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram [ (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 845], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21-23) “21. Also, in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram [ (2000) 4 SCC 515 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 845], this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 524-25, paras 21-23) “21. Shri N.P. Midha, learned counsel for the re- spondent, submitted written submissions over and above the oral arguments addressed by him. One of the contentions adverted to by the learned counsel is pertaining to the evidence of the de- fence witness (DW 1 Moharam Ali). The counsel contended that if the evidence of DW 1 Moharam Ali can be believed, it is sufficient to shake the basic structure of the prosecution’s evidence. Shri N.P. Midha invited our attention to the fol- lowing observations contained in the decision of this Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. [ (1981) 2 SCC 166 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 379] : (SCC p. 173, para 19) ‘19. … Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, in- stinctive disbelief in defence witnesses.’ 22. We may quote the succeeding sentence also from the said decision for the sake of completion of the observations of Their Lordships on that score. It is this: ‘Quite often they tell lies, but so do the prosecution witnesses.’ 23. Depositions of witnesses, whether they are examined on the prosecution side or defence side or as court witnesses, are oral evidence in the case, and hence the scrutiny thereof shall be without any predilection or bias. No witness is entitled to get better treatment merely because he was examined as a prosecution witness or even as a court witness. It is judicial scrutiny which is warranted in respect of the depositions of all witnesses for which different yardsticks cannot be prescribed as for those different categories of witnesses.” (emphasis supplied) 24. It was submitted that Jeewan Lal (PW2) and Suresh Kumar (PW4) had no reason to depose against the informant. Both these persons are residents of Sidhpurghad, where the informant is residing. The incident occurred at Bharmad, where the Police Station is located and the Pradhan is residing. No reason has been assigned as to why the Pradhan and a Member of a different Panchayats were called to the spot. Further, Ishwar Dass (PW3) has not supported their version that the informant was taken out of the room in his presence. The incident occurred at Bharmad, where the Police Station is located and the Pradhan is residing. No reason has been assigned as to why the Pradhan and a Member of a different Panchayats were called to the spot. Further, Ishwar Dass (PW3) has not supported their version that the informant was taken out of the room in his presence. No reason was assigned as to why he should be deposing against the prosecution and in favour of the accused. Learned Appellate Court was entitled to accept one set of witnesses out of two sets, and when two versions are competing against each other, the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. Thus, the learned Appellate Court cannot be faulted for accepting the statement of Manorma Devi and rejecting the testimonies of Jeewan Lal (PW2) and Suresh Kumar (PW4) 25. Dr Aman Dua (PW8) stated that he had also examined Puran Chand and found simple injuries on his person. The prosecution has not provided any explanation for the injuries sustained by the accused. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that failure of the prosecution to explain the injuries will make its case doubtful. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parshuram v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1416, that failure to explain the injuries sustained by the accused is an important circumstance. It was observed: - “31. We do not find the said observation of the trial court correct. The injuries sustained by Ramrup @ Roopa are by a sharp weapon. It was observed: - “31. We do not find the said observation of the trial court correct. The injuries sustained by Ramrup @ Roopa are by a sharp weapon. It will be trite to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394 : “12    It seems to us that in a murder case, the non- explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of the altercation is a very important circumstance from which the court can draw the following inferences: “(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on the most material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case.” The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one. In the instant case, when it is held, as it must be, that the appellant Dasrath Singh received serious injuries which have not been explained by the prosecution, then it will be difficult for the court to rely on the evidence of PWs 1 to 4 and 6, more particularly, when some of these witnesses have lied by stating that they did not see any injuries on the person of the accused. Thus, neither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court appears to have given due consideration to this important lacuna or infirmity appearing in the prosecution’s case. We must hasten to add that, as held by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (1975) 2 SCC 7 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 384, there may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution’s case. We must hasten to add that, as held by this Court in State of Gujarat v. Bai Fatima (1975) 2 SCC 7 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 384, there may be cases where the non-explanation of the injuries by the prosecution may not affect the prosecution’s case. This principle would obviously apply to cases where the injuries sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence is so clear and cogent, so independent and disinterested, so probable, consistent and creditworthy, that it far outweighs the effect of the omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries. The present, however, is certainly not such a case, and the High Court was, therefore, in error in brushing aside this serious infirmity in the prosecution case on unconvincing premises.” 32. A similar view with regard to non-explanation of injuries has been taken by this Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. Madho  1991  Supp  (2)  SCC  396, State of M.P. v. Mishrilal (Dead) (2003) 9 SCC 426 , Nagarathinam v. State  Represented  by  Inspector  of Police (2006) 9 SCC 57 and recently in the case of Nand Lal v. State of Chhattisgarh 2023 SCC OnLine SC 262 33. Undisputedly, in the present case also, the witnesses are interested. The injuries sustained by the three accused persons are not at all explained. The trial court and the High Court have not considered this aspect of the matter. 34. Non-explanation of injuries on the persons of the accused would create doubt as to whether the prosecution has brought on record the real genesis of the incident or not. Undisputedly, as observed hereinabove, a cross-case was also registered against the complainant party for the injuries sustained by the accused persons.” 26. It is an admitted version that the relationship between the parties was strained, which would put the Court on guard, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in evaluating the prosecution’s version carefully. The view arrived at by the learned Appellate Court based on the evidence was reasonable, and even if another view is possible, this Court cannot substitute the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. 27. No other point was urged. 28 In view of the above, the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is sustainable. 27. No other point was urged. 28 In view of the above, the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court is sustainable. Hence, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 29. Record of learned Courts below be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment.