JUDGMENT : Virender Singh, J. Petitioner-Ashutosh Thakur has filed the present criminal revision, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C’) against the judgment dated 27.11.2019, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (Camp at Bilaspur), (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellate Court’). 2. By way of judgment dated 27.11.2019, the learned Appellate Court has dismissed the appeal, filed by petitioner- Ashutosh Thakur, bearing Criminal Appeal No.43/10 of 2018, titled as Ashutosh Thakur versus Vikrant Sharma. The petitioner Ashutosh Thakur had preferred the said appeal against the judgment of conviction dated 18.08.2018 and order or sentence dated 27.08.2018, passed by the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’). 3. Vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as referred to above, the learned trial Court has convicted petitioner- Ashutosh Thakur for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act), and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a compensation of Rs.20,00,000/-. 4. For the sake of convenience, the parties to the present lis, are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present Criminal Revision, before this Court, may be summed up, as under:- 5.1. Complainant-Vikrant Sharma has filed a complaint, under Section 138 of N.I. Act, before the learned trial Court, on the ground that he and accused were running ready made garments shops at Bara-Da-Ghat and Dakri Chowk, respectively and having good friendly relations with each other. On 25.09.2013, as per the complainant,  the  accused  had  purchased  ready  made garments/articles for a sum of Rs.12,00,000/- and in this regard, agreement was executed between them. Later on, accused had paid a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- in the month of October, 2013. On 25.09.2013, as per the complainant,  the  accused  had  purchased  ready  made garments/articles for a sum of Rs.12,00,000/- and in this regard, agreement was executed between them. Later on, accused had paid a sum of Rs.6,00,000/- in the month of October, 2013. The complainant was interested to close his shop, as such, accused purchased articles lying in his shop, the value of which has been pleaded, as Rs.9,00,000/- and had agreed to make payment of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rs.6,00,000/-+Rs.9,00,000/-) within two-three months, whereas, he could not keep his words and on 21.03.2014, an agreement was executed between them, in presence of the witnesses, to make the payment to the complainant, within 45 days from 21.03.2014. For that purpose, he has also issued post dated cheque, bearing Cheque No.664076, which was issued for a sum of Rs.15,00,000/- drawn on the account maintained by the accused in Kangra Central Cooperative Bank, Branch Ladrour. 5.2. According to the complainant, the said cheque, was issued in discharge of his legally enforceable debt. Thereafter, the said cheque was presented for collection by the complainant with his banker i.e. Bank of Baroda, Branch Ghumwarin, however, the said cheque was returned back, vide memo dated 20.06.2014. The reason for dishonouring of the cheque has been mentioned as “funds insufficient”. Meaning thereby, according to the complainant, the cheque in question was issued by the accused without having sufficient funds in the account. Thereafter, the complainant had served the legal notice to the accused on 09.07.2014. Despite the said notice, the accused had not made the payment and after waiting for the statutory period, the complaint has been filed, before the learned trial Court. 5.3. On the basis of the evidence, so adduced, by the complainant, by way of preliminary evidence, the learned trial Court had taken the cognizance on 02.04.2016. 5.4. After securing the presence of the accused, the learned trial Court found a prima-facie case, punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, as such, Notice of Accusation was put to him, vide order dated 06.09.2016, to which, he has pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. As such, the complainant was directed to adduce his evidence. Consequently, in order to prove the Notice of Accusation, the complainant has examined, as many as, 6 witnesses. 5.5. Thereafter, the entire incriminating evidence was put to the accused, in his statement recorded, under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. on 03.10.2017. As such, the complainant was directed to adduce his evidence. Consequently, in order to prove the Notice of Accusation, the complainant has examined, as many as, 6 witnesses. 5.5. Thereafter, the entire incriminating evidence was put to the accused, in his statement recorded, under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. on 03.10.2017. When, the incriminating evidence was put to the accused, he has denied entire case of the complainant, however, the issuance of the cheque has been admitted. He has taken the plea that the cheque in question was given, as security cheque and according to him, the complainant has failed to supply the articles, for which, the cheque in question was given as security. In his defence, the accused has examined two defence witnesses. 5.6. After closure of the evidence, the learned trial Court, after hearing learned counsel appearing for the complainant, as well as, the accused, has convicted the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentence him, as referred to above. 5.7. Aggrieved from the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, as referred to above, the accused has unsuccessfully assailed the same before the learned Appellate Court. 5.8. After dismissal of the appeal, vide judgment dated 27.11.2019, the present Criminal Revision has been filed before this Court. 5.9. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court, as upheld by the learned Appellate Court have been assailed, before this Court, on the ground that both the Courts have miserably failed to appreciate the fact that the complainant could not establish on record that any sale of garment/item/material has been made by him, in favour of the accused. 5.10. It is the further case of the accused that the complainant could not produce any record and bills, qua the shop except one agreement, which, according to the accused, is under challenge before the appropriate Court. 5.11. The conclusions, which has been drawn by both the Courts are stated to be wrong, as according to the accused, no items have ever been supplied or sold out by the complainant to the accused. 5.12. It is the further case of the accused that both the Courts have miserably failed to take into consideration the defence, which has been setup by the accused, by leading the cogent and convincing evidence. 5.13. 5.12. It is the further case of the accused that both the Courts have miserably failed to take into consideration the defence, which has been setup by the accused, by leading the cogent and convincing evidence. 5.13. It is the further case of the accused that the cheque in question, was misused by the complainant. The accused has also relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, titled as M/s Kumar Exports versus M/s Sharma Carpets, reported as AIR 2009 Supreme Court 1518. 5.14. Highly relying upon the evidence of DW-1, the capacity of the complainant has also been challenged to supply the goods of worth Rs.9,00,000-, which were allegedly lying in his shop. 5.15. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as upheld by the learned Appellate Court has also been assailed, on the ground that it has been proved that the complainant is a chronic litigant, as, he has also filed two other complaints against Surender Kumar and Arun Chauhan. 5.16. On the basis of the above facts, Mr. Varun Chandel, learned counsel appearing for the complainant, has prayed that the Criminal Revision may kindly be accepted, by setting aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, passed by the learned trial Court, as upheld by the learned Appellate Court. 5.17. Per contra, Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has supported the judgment of conviction and order of sentence and argued that the well reasoned judgment, passed by the learned trial Court is not liable to be interfered, by this Court, that too, in the revisional jurisdisction, where the scope of interference is limited. 5.18. According to learned counsel appearing for the respondent, from no stretch of imagination, the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, as upheld by the learned First Appellate Court, fall within the definition of perverse findings. 6. The parties are before this Court in criminal revision. Before proceeding further, it is incumbent upon this Court to discuss the scope of interference, in the concurrent findings, that too, in the revisional jurisdiction. 7. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Bir Singh versus Mukesh Kumar, reported in AIR 2019 Supreme Court 2446. Relevant paragraphs 19 & 20 are reproduced as under:- “19. 7. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as Bir Singh versus Mukesh Kumar, reported in AIR 2019 Supreme Court 2446. Relevant paragraphs 19 & 20 are reproduced as under:- “19. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sectopm 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.” “20. As held by this Court in Southern Sales and Services and Others vs. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH MANU/SC/4488/2008: (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is therefore, in the negative.” 8. Almost a similar view has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case titled as Malkeet Singh Gill versus The State of Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2022 Supreme Court 3283. Relevant paragraphs 9 and 10 are reproduced as under:- 9. This Court in the case of ‘Manju Ram Kalita vs. State of Assam Manu/SC/0911/2009 (2009) 13 SCC 330 , while dealing with the scope of re-appreciation of evidence by higher Court in criminal revision, observed in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment as under- “9. So far as Issue 1 is concerned i.e. as to whether the appellant got married with Smt Ranju Sarma, is a pure question of fact. All the three courts below have given concurrent finding regarding the factum of marriage and its validity. It has been held to be a valid marriage. It is a settled legal proposition that if the courts below have recorded the finding of fact, the question of re-appreciation of evidence by the third court does not arise unless it is found to be totally perverse. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. “10. The higher court does not sit as a regular court of appeal. Its function is to ensure that law is being properly administered. Such a court cannot embark upon fruitless task of determining the issues by re-appreciating the evidence. “10. This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings on pure questions of fact and review the evidence again unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying the departure from the normal practice.” “8. ….The position may undoubtedly be different if the inference is one of law from [the] facts admitted and proved or where the finding of fact is materially affected by violation of any rule of law or procedure.” “11. Thus, it is evident from the above that this Court being the fourth court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the courts below as the said courts have exercised their discretion in good faith giving due weight to relevant material and without being swayed by any irrelevant material. Even if two views are possible on the question of fact, we, being the fourth court, should not interfere even though we may exercise discretion differently had the case come before us initially. In view of the above, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact so far as the issue of bigamy is concerned nor the quantum of punishment on this count is required to be interfered with.” 10. As per the settled legal position and after conviction by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court on filing the revision the High Court maintained the conviction upholding the findings of the two courts. The High Court found the finding recorded by the two Courts to serve the sentence consecutively by the appellant and the other co- accused were not correct, hence set aside and directed to run such sentence concurrently. In our considered opinion, the finding of fact as recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court has rightly not been interfered while maintaining the conviction against the appellant. On the issue of sentence also the direction as issued by the High Court is in consonance with the provisions of Section 31 of Cr.P.C which confer full discretion to the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences.” 9. On the issue of sentence also the direction as issued by the High Court is in consonance with the provisions of Section 31 of Cr.P.C which confer full discretion to the Trial Court as well as Appellate Court to order the sentences to run concurrently in case of conviction for two or more offences.” 9. Being guided by the above decisions, now this Court would proceed further determining the fact whether the findings, so recorded, by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, fall within the definition of perverse findings or not. 10. The learned trial Court, in the present case, has discussed the evidence so adduced by the parties and thereafter, concluded that the defence of the accused is neither clear nor confidence inspiring as in this case, the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheque by taking the defence that the same was issued as security cheque. Those findings have also been upheld by the learned Appellate Court. The learned Appellate Court has categorically held that the accused has failed to rebut the presumption of Section 118 of the NI Act, which is in favour of the complainant. In this case, the accused has taken the plea that the cheque in question was issued as security cheque. 11. In this case, complainant has examined, as many as, 6 witnesses, whereas, the accused has not bothered to put appearance in the witness box to depose about his defence. The accused is held to be a competent witness and his non- appearance in the witness box gives an occasion for this Court to draw an adverse inference against him. 12. From the statement of DW-1 Shami Kant, Clerk from the office of Excise and Taxation Department, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act, is in favour of the complainant, which could not be rebutted either from the evidence of DWs or from the cross examination of the complainant witnesses. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as Triyambak S. Hegde versus Sripad, reported in (2022) 1 Supreme Court Cases 742 has elaborately discussed the provisions of Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. Relevant paragraphs 13 to 15, of the judgment, are reproduced as under:- 13. 13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as Triyambak S. Hegde versus Sripad, reported in (2022) 1 Supreme Court Cases 742 has elaborately discussed the provisions of Sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. Relevant paragraphs 13 to 15, of the judgment, are reproduced as under:- 13. Insofar as the payment of the amount by the appellant in the context of the cheque having been signed by the respondent, the presumption for passing of the consideration would arise as provided under Section 118(a) of N.I. Act which reads as hereunder: “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments – Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made: (a) of consideration – that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration.” 14. The above noted provisions are explicit to the effect that such presumption would remain, until the contrary is proved. The learned counsel for the appellant in that regard has relied on the decision of this court in K Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & Anr, wherein it is held as hereunder: “9. As the signature in the cheque is admitted to be that of the accused, the presumption envisaged in Section 118 of the Act can legally be inferred that the cheque was made or drawn for consideration on the date which the cheque bears. Section 139 of the Act enjoins on the Court to presume that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any debt or liability. The burden was on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The Trial Court was not persuaded to rely on the interested testimony of DW1 to rebut the presumption. The said finding was upheld by the High Court. It is not now open to the accused to contend differently on that aspect. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has however referred to the decision of this Court in Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 wherein it is held as hereunder:- “25. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner: 25.1. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in the above cases on Sections 118 (a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner: 25.1. Once the execution of cheque is admitted Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. 25.2. The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 25.3. To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or the accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. 25.4. That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, Section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. 25.5. It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence. 26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that signature on the cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of PW1, when the specific question was put that cheque was issued in relation to loan of Rs.25,000 taken by the accused, PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received monetary benefit of Rs.8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. It was also brought in the evidence in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000 to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs.4,50,000 being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs.50,000 with regard to which Complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ext. D2, there was burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the year 2010- 2011, as per own case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs.18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts.” 14. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could not satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as how the non production of books of account, stock register, acknowledgment of delivery of goods, bills etc, are required to be produced by the complainant, when the issuance of the cheque has not been disputed by the accused. 15. It is the specific stand taken by the accused, in this case, that the cheque in question was issued as security cheque, as the accused in his statement, under Section 313 has specifically taken a stand that the false case has been filed by misusing the security cheque. The cheque in question was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient funds. 16. Considering the above facts, there is no occasion for this Court to differ with the findings of the learned trial Court, as upheld by the learned First Appellate Court. 17. Consequently the present criminal revision is dismissed so also, the pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.