[2025:RJ-JP:44926] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 533/2024 Murlidhar Son of Shri Ramnarayan, Resident of Nalka, Tehsil- Baran, Currently Residing At A-67, New Nakoda Colony, Baran, Tehsil-Baran, District-Baran(Raj.). ----Appellant Versus 1. Harishankar Son of Shri Ramnarayan, Resident of Gram Nalka, Tehsil-Baran, District-Baran. 1/1. Suresh Kumar Sharma Son of Harishankar, Aged About 38 Years, Resident of Nalka Tehsil Baran District Baran (Raj.). 1/2. Priyanka D/o Harishankar W/o Nitesh Kumar, Aged About 30 Years, Resident of Mandola Ward, Baran, Tehsil And District-Baran (Raj.). 1/3. Minakshi Sharma D/o Harishankar W/o Tejasvi Gautam, Resident of Nalka, Presently Residing At Indira Market Sabji Mandi Tek Baran, District -Baran (Raj.). 2. Vishnu Prasad, Son of Shri Ramnarayan, Resident of Gram Nalka, Tehsil Baranm District-Baran At Present Residing At House of Suresh Ji Goyal, Chawani Ramchandrapura, in Front of Radhakrishan Mandir Gali, Chawani , Kota, District-Kota (Raj.). 3. Late Bhagwati Bai Widowed of Shri Ramnarayan, Resident of Gram Nalka, Tehsil-Baran, District-Baran (Raj.). 3/1. Chanda Bai Daughter of Shri Ramnarayan Wife of Shri Jamna Shankar, Resident of Jawahar Nagar, D-24, Near Shriji Marriage Hall, Kota, District-Kota. 3/2. Malti Daughter of Ramnarayan, Widowed of Shri Chandraprakash, Resident of Near Pani Ki Tanki, Civil Lines Colony Road, Nalka Road, Baran, Tehsil And District Baran. 3/3. Manju Daughter of Shri Ramnarayan, Wife of Shri Badrilal, Resident of Kunjed, Tehsil-Atru, District-Baran (Raj.). 4. Sangeeta Wife of Shri Dharmendra Kumar, Resident of Near Sanstha Dharmada Chauraha, Mangrol Road, Baran, Tehsil-Baran, District-Baran (Raj.). ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Ms. Firoz Akhtar for Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singhal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Arvind Gupta Mr. Lalit Kishore Joshi [2025:RJ-JP:44926] (2 of 6) [CSA-533/2024] HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 10/11/2025 1. Instant Civil Second Appeal under Section 100 has been directed against the judgment dated 19.10.2024, passed in Civil Appeal No. 36/2013 by the Additional District Judge No.1, Baran, District Baran, allowing the Civil First Appeal filed by the respondents-defendants and reversing the judgment and decree dated 28.09.2013, passed in Civil Suit No. 41/2012 by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Baran, District Baran whereby and whereunder appellant-plaintiff’s suit, seeking to cancel the registered relinquishment deed dated 23.05.2012 was decreed. 2. Heard Ms. Firoz Akhtar Ansari, counsel appearing on behalf of appellant-plaintiff, counsel for respondents and perused the material available on record. 3. Counsel for appellant-plaintiff contends that at the time of execution of relinquishment deed dated 23.05.2012, an interim stay on alienation of the agricultural land from the Revenue Court was in operation and further the relinquishment deed was executed keeping the executant in dark and by inducing her. Hence, her contention is that First Appellate Court has committed illegality, perversity and jurisdictional error in dismissing plaintiff’s suit, rather the relinquishment deed in question is liable to be canceled and suit deserves to be decreed as was done by the trial Court. 4. Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has repelled the aforesaid contention and submits that it is not in dispute that undivided 1/4th share of mother was relinquished by her through [2025:RJ-JP:44926] (3 of 6) [CSA-533/2024] registered relinquishment deed and the mother herself has appeared in the witness box as DW-1 and while deposing her statements, verified the execution of relinquishment deed to have been made on her own volition and free will, without any inducement or pressure in any manner. Thus, learned counsel submits that in view of statements of mother, as also the fact findings of Courts below, the present second appeal does not give rise to any substantial questions of law, hence, liable to be dismissed at threshold. 5. Having perused the pleadings of parties, impugned judgments and other material available on record, this Court finds that plaintiff has admitted in his plaint that his mother had 1/4th undivided share in the agricultural land, left by their predecessors. The case of plaintiff that the relinquishment deed was got executed by inducement or under misrepresentation of correct facts, has been disbelieved by both the Courts in absence of any cogent and convincing evidence from the side of plaintiff. As far as contention to execute the relinquishment deed during operation of interim stay order is concerned, it has been observed by the First Appellate court that the interim stay order was later on vacated and further the execution of relinquishment deed does not affect by the interim stay order, since it is not a transfer to any third person. 6. It appears that the trial Court decreed plaintiff’s suit under misconception of legal position that relinquishment of Khatedari rights are not permissible in law whereas such legal aspect has been made clear by the First Appellate Court that by virtue of a Government Circular, the Khatedari rights have been held [2025:RJ-JP:44926] (4 of 6) [CSA-533/2024] transferable through relinquishment deed as well. In this view, the First Appellate Court has assigned lawful and valid reasons to reverse the decree passed by the trial Court. 7. In the considered opinion of this Court, mother (respondent No.3 herein- now deceased and represented through her natural heirs) was competent enough to transfer her undivided Khatedari rights of 1/ 4th share by way of executing relinquishment deed. The relinquishment deed in question has been executed by her in favour of her two sons (respondent No.1 and 2 herein) who had their respective 1/4th – 1/4th share therein. The plaintiff being her third son, questioned the relinquishment deed during lifetime of mother, which itself, prima facie, appears to be malicious and unwarranted, more so mother herself appeared in the witness box and affirmed execution and registration of the relinquishment deed by her willfully and without any inducement, coercion or pressure. Thus, the trial Court erred in decreeing plaintiff’s suit and such error has rightly been corrected by the First Appellate Court within its jurisdiction and parameters of law. 8. For such reasons, impugned judgment dated 19.10.2024 passed by the First Appellate Court, reversing the judgment and decree of trial Court and dismissing plaintiff’s suit, does not elicit any substantial question of law for consideration by this Court. 9. The substantial question of law is sine qua non to entertain and consider the second appeal and in absence of the same, second appeal is bereft of merits. 10. The Court of First Appeal is final Court of facts and the scope of the High Court to grant indulgence in fact findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, is extremely limited and confined to the [2025:RJ-JP:44926] (5 of 6) [CSA-533/2024] existence of a substantial question of law, while exercising its power and jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. 11. In a series of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been categorically held as an established principle of law that the High Court is not required to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or to come to its own conclusion. 12. It has been observed and held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors., [(1999) 3 SCC 722], in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the First Appellate Court. 13. Further, in case of Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal [(2000) 1 SCC 434], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically observed and held that: "Under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so. There are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. The first one is when material or relevant evidence is not considered which, if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. The second situation in which interference with findings of fact is permissible is where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which if it was omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. In either of the above situations, a substantial question of law can arise." 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, on the issue of interference by the High Court in the fact findings of the first appellate Court, in case of Krishnan Vs. Backiam [(2007) 12 SCC 190] has held as under: “11. It may be mentioned that the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of [2025:RJ-JP:44926] (6 of 6) [CSA-533/2024] fact recorded by the First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect. In the present case no question was framed by the High Court as to whether the finding of the First Appellate Court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, is a finding based on no evidence or is perverse. Hence the findings of the First Appellate Court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, could not have been interfered with by the High Court. 12. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has practically acted as a First Appellate Court and has re-appreciated the findings of fact of the learned Subordinate Judge which it could not validly do in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case C. Doddanarayan Reddy v. C. Jayarama Reddy [(2020) 4 SCC 659], has observed that where two courts have reached a finding, which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against provisions of law and neither can it be said that any Judge acting judiciously and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then High Court is not required to interfere with such fact findings while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. 16. As a final result, instant Civil Second Appeal being devoid of substance and merits are hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 19.10.2024 is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs. 17. Records of both the Courts be sent back. 18. Stay application and other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (SUDESH BANSAL),J NITIN /69