[2025:JHHC:35340] 1 Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 Sunil Yadav, aged about 35 years, son of Devnarayan Yadav, resident of Ward No. 03, Village Sigsiga Kala, P.O Barwadih, P.S. Chintiya, District-Garhwa ...... Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. Ram Lakhan Yadav, Son of late Jogi Prasad Yadav, resident of village Kattotiya, Barwadih, P.O. Barwadih, P.S. Chinia, District-Garhwa, Jharkhand, presently residing at village Kalyanpur, P.O.-Kalyanpur, P.S. Garhwa, District-Garhwa, Jharkhand ….. Opposite Parties For the Petitioner : Mr. Parambir Singh Bajaj, Adv. For the State : Mr. Achinto Sen, Addl. PP For the O.P.No. 2 : Mr. Avnish Kr. Pathak, Adv. Mr. Madhav Prasad, Adv. Mr. Krishna Prajapati, Adv. P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY By the Court:- Heard the parties. 2. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 with the prayer for quashing and setting aside the entire criminal proceeding as well as the summoning order dated 10.04.2024 in connection with Complaint Case no. 1474 of 2022 passed by learned JMFC, Garhwa whereby and whereunder, the learned Magistrate has found prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 506 of the IPC against the petitioner. 3. The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner took a friendly loan of Rs. 15,86,000/- and returned Rs. 3,32,500/- but did not return rest of the money and gave a cheque for Rs. 5,40,000/- but the same upon being presented in the bank for encashment, returned with the report that the account has been closed by the complainant. On the basis of the complaint, the [2025:JHHC:35340] 2 Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 statement of the complainant on Solemn Affirmation, the statement of the inquiry witnesses, learned Magistrate found prima facie case for the said offences. 4. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunil Sharma vs. M/s Hero Fincorp Limited and Another reported in 2025 INSC 1001, para 11 of which reads as under :- “11.The underlying idea which we find in Section 405, IPC is undoubtedly this, that the property, which is entrusted, or in respect of which dominion is passed over, to another person does not even become such person's property, even temporarily, for him to use as he wishes. Thus, the section would not normally cover the case of a loan where the lender advances money to the borrower who intends to use or utilise the money, for the time being, till he is in possession of it, although he may have to return an equivalent amount later on to the lender with or without interest or compensation for the use thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that therein it has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that Section 406 of IPC would not normally cover the case of loan where the lender advances money to the borrower who intends to use or utilize the money, for the time being, till he is in possession of it, although he may have to return an equivalent amount later on to the lender with or without interest or compensation for the use thereof. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207, paragraph nos. 25 of which reads as under :- 25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, [2025:JHHC:35340] 3 Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.” (emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.” and submits that therein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has dealt with the essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC. 6. It is next submitted that the allegation against the petitioner is false and even though the entire allegations against the petitioner are considered to be true in its entirety still neither the offence punishable under Section 406 of IPC nor the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC is made out against the petitioner. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as made in this criminal miscellaneous petition be allowed. 7. Learned Addl. PP and learned counsel for the Opp. Party no. 2 on the other hand vehemently oppose the prayer of the petitioner and submits that the materials in the record are sufficient to constitute both the offences punishable under Section 406 of IPC and 506 of IPC. Hence, it is submitted that this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition being without any merit, be dismissed. 8. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is a settled principle of law as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Satish Chandra Ratan Lal Shah vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. reported in (2019) 9 SCC 148, paragraph 13 of which reads as under:- “13. Now coming to the charge under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 IPC. In the context of contracts, the distinction between mere breach of contract and cheating would depend upon the fraudulent inducement and mens rea. (See Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] .) In the case before us, admittedly the appellant was trapped in economic crisis and therefore, he had approached Respondent 2 to ameliorate the situation of crisis. Further, in order to recover the aforesaid amount, Respondent 2 had instituted a summary civil suit seeking recovery of the loan amount which is still pending adjudication. The mere inability of the appellant to return the loan amount cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, as it is this [2025:JHHC:35340] 4 Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 mens rea which is the crux of the offence. Even if all the facts in the complaint and material are taken on their face value, no such dishonest representation or inducement could be found or inferred.” wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held that merely the inability of the accused persons to return the loan amount cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. 9. Now coming to the facts of the case and as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sunil Sharma vs. M/s Hero Fincorp Limited and Another (supra), the money allegedly taken by the petitioner being a loan, the same cannot be stated to be the entrustment of property as envisaged under Section 405 of the IPC. Hence in the absence of any entrustment, the dishonest misappropriation of the entrusted property of using the entrusted property to his own use etc. does not arise and in the absence of the same, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations are considered to be true against the petitioner, the offence punishable under section 406 of IPC is not made out. 10. So far as the offence punishable under section 506 of IPC is considered, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner which will constitute the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (supra). Hence, this Court has no hesitation in holding that even if the entire allegations against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety still the offence punishable under section 506 of IPC is not made out. Hence, continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law. Therefore, this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceeding as well as the summoning order dated 10.04.2024 in connection with Complaint Case no. 1474 of 2022 be quashed and set aside against the petitioner. [2025:JHHC:35340] 5 Cr.M.P. No. 172 of 2025 11. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding as well as the summoning order dated 10.04.2024 in connection with Complaint Case no. 1474 of 2022, is quashed and set aside against the petitioner. 12. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is allowed. (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated, the 20th November, 2025 Smita /AFR Uploaded on 09/12/ 2025