J UDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. M.H. Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. P.K. Roy, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Ms. A. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.03.2012, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Karimganj, in Title Appeal No. 30/2008. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree dated 17.03.2012, the learned Civil Judge, Karimganj (‘first appellate Court’, for short) had reversed the judgment and decree dated 12.05.2008, passed by the learned Munsiff No. 2, Karimganj (‘trial Court’, for short), in Title Suit No. 201/1997, whereby the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. 4. For the sake of convenience, and to avoid confusion, the parties herein are referred to in the same status, as they appeared in the suit. 5. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are briefly stated as under: “The appellants herein, namely, Md. Main Uddin, Md. Armin Ali and Md. Makisur Rahman, as plaintiffs instituted a title suit, being Title Suit No. 201/1997, for declaration of right, title and interest over Schedule-1 and 2 land and for confirmation of their possession over the same, and also for declaration of khatian prepared in the names of principal defendant Nos. 1 to 5 as fraudulent and illegal document, and for temporary and permanent injunction to restrain the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 from selling the suit land and also from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs in the said land. The case of the plaintiffs is that they became owners of the suit land from their father, Late Suraj Ali, who inherited the same by way of inheritance and also through purchase from the co-sharers and they had been maintaining their right, title, interest and possession thereon, since time immemorial, generation after generation. Late Suraj Ali had jote right, over the suit land, under Ashalata Paul and Najib Ali, who had proprietary right over the suit land. Late Suraj Ali had jote right, over the suit land, under Ashalata Paul and Najib Ali, who had proprietary right over the suit land. The defendant No. 1 was a Zamindar and a very strong and powerful man and since long, he was trying to grab the suit land and impleaded the father of the plaintiffs, in many criminal cases, and with a view to grab the suit land, the defendant No. 1 got a case filed by his son, the defendant No. 2, in the learned Court of Sub- Divisional Executive Magistrate, Karimganj, vide Case No. 538(m)/1997, under Section 145 Cr.P.C. against the plaintiffs, and after going through the settlement record, the plaintiffs came to know that the principal defendant No.1 had created some false and fabricated documents in respect of the suit land in collusion with the settlement staff, and on the strength of said illegal preparation of settlement record, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were trying to sell the suit land to the defendant No. 6. Being left with no other choice, the plaintiffs instituted the aforementioned title suit praying for the relief as aforesaid. The defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 6 had contested the suit by filing their written statements jointly. The suit against the defendant Nos. 3 and 12 proceeded ex-parte and against defendant Nos. 10 and 11, proceeded without written statement as they failed to submit their written statement within the stipulated time. During the pendency of the suit, the name of defendant Nos. 4 and 5 were struck off from the record. The case of the contesting defendant was of denial and they stated that the suit had no cause of action, suit was not maintainable, suit was barred by law of limitation, suit was defect of parties etc. The defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 6 had also taken a stand that the defendant No. 1 got Mouraushi right over the suit property and that he acquired absolute right and title over the said property by way of inheritance from his father, by way of gift from his mother and by way of purchase from heirs of his brother and enjoying the same by paying regular revenue to the Government and record of right was also prepared in the name of defendant No. 1. They had also stated that defendant No. 1 had executed a registered bainanama on 02.09.1997, in favour of the defendant No. 6, in respect of land measuring an area of 2 kedar, 1 powa and 6 jasties, pertaining to survey Dag No. 457, under Khatian No. 452, but the plaintiffs, with mala fide intention, had instituted the suit. Upon the aforementioned pleadings, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues: 1. Whether there is any cause of action for the suit? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? 3. Whether the suit is bad for defect of parties? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get decree as prayed for? 5. What other relief or relief plaintiff is entitled to? Thereafter, recording evidence and also hearing learned Advocates of both the parties, the learned trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Then being aggrieved, the defendant had preferred an appeal, being Title Appeal No. 30/2008, wherein, after hearing learned Advocates of both the parties, and considering the evidence so recorded by the learned trial Court, the learned first appellate Court was pleased to set aside the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial Court. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs have approached this Court by filing the present appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: i) Whether the learned appellate court below committed an error of law in not considering the judgment passed in T.A. No. 57 of 1958 by the learned Sub Judge, Cachar, Silchar and by this Hon'ble Court in S.A. 200 of 1961, wherein the plaintiffs' tenancy right over the suit land had been established? ii) Whether the judgment of the learned appellate court below suffered from infirmity of non- consideration of the evidence of the plaintiffs in respect of the rights over the suit land in its proper perspective?” 6. Mr. Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court had rightly decreed the suit declaring the landholders right over the suit land and cancellation for the settlement record of the defendant No. 1 along with other reliefs. Mr. Mr. Rajbarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned trial Court had rightly decreed the suit declaring the landholders right over the suit land and cancellation for the settlement record of the defendant No. 1 along with other reliefs. Mr. Rajbarbhuiyan also submits that the learned trial Court considering the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and also considering the documents Ext.-2 and Ext.-7, had rightly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, and the land is in the possession of the plaintiffs. Mr. Rajbarbhuiyan also submits that the learned first appellate Court, without considering the aforementioned aspect, had set aside the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial Court, and that the impugned judgment and decree, is illegal and arbitrary, and therefore, it is contended to set it aside. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Roy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, submits that the learned trial Court had decreed the suit only on the basis of two documents i.e. Ext.-2 and Ext.-7, and the said documents are not public documents, rather the same were issued by Zamindar, and as such, the learned first appellate Court had rightly interfered with the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court. Mr. Roy also submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court warrants no interference of this Court. 7.1. Mr. Roy further submits that though two substantial questions of law are formulated herein this appeal, the first substantial question of law is not at all involved as the respondent herein are not the parties in the aforesaid two appeals being T.A. No. 57 of 1958 disposed of by the learned Sub Judge, Cachar, Silchar and in Second Appeal No. 200 of 1961, disposed of by this Court and that being so the judgment and decree so passed in the said two appeals are not binding upon them. Mr. Roy also submits that the second substantial question of law is in fact not a substantial question of law. Under such circumstances, Mr. Roy has contended to dismiss this appeal. 7.2. Mr. Roy has also referred to the following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Gangamma and Ors. vs. Shivalingaiah , reported in (2005) 9 SCC 359 (ii) Lakhi Baruah and Ors. vs. Padma Kanta Kalita and Ors. Under such circumstances, Mr. Roy has contended to dismiss this appeal. 7.2. Mr. Roy has also referred to the following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) Gangamma and Ors. vs. Shivalingaiah , reported in (2005) 9 SCC 359 (ii) Lakhi Baruah and Ors. vs. Padma Kanta Kalita and Ors. , reported in (1996) 8 SCC 357 (iii) Mattulal vs. Radhe Lal , reported in (1974) 2 SCC 365 . 8. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both the parties, I have carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the grounds mentioned therein, and also perused the judgment and decree dated 12.05.2008, passed by the learned trial Court, in Title Suit No. 201/1997, and the impugned judgment and decree dated 17.03.2012, passed by the learned first appellate Court, in Title Appeal No. 30/2008. 9. It appears that that while directing a discussion to the issue No. 4 as to whether the plaintiffs/appellants herein are entitled to get a decree as prayed for, the learned trial Court had observed that the plaintiffs had filed the suit for declaration of land holder right over the suit land and cancellation of the name of defendant No. 1 from the settlement record, which had been wrongly entered by the settlement authority, and thereafter, arrived at the finding that the P.W.1, Md. Makisur Rahman, who deposed that the suit land was under their possession since generation after generation, had exhibited Ext.-2 which is the farogs/rent receipt issued by Ashalata Paul through her husband Sri Nibaran Paul, in favour of Suraj Ali, the father of the plaintiffs, and Ext.-7 is the rent receipt issued also in favour of Suraj Ali by Najib Ali connecting the suit land, and both the documents were 30 years old. The learned trial Court also observed that Ext.1 is the deed of exchange No. 5725, dated 13.07.1951, between Aminul Haq Choudhury on one part and Suresh Ch. Paul, Harendra Ch. Paul and Ashalata Paul on other part by which Aminul Haq Choudhury exchanged his property and left for erstwhile East Pakistan and thereafter, Suresh Ch. Paul, Harendra Ch. Paul and Ashalata Paul amicably partitioned their property and Suraj Ali became a jote tenant under Ashalata Paul, which was amply proved from Ext.2. 9.1. Paul, Harendra Ch. Paul and Ashalata Paul on other part by which Aminul Haq Choudhury exchanged his property and left for erstwhile East Pakistan and thereafter, Suresh Ch. Paul, Harendra Ch. Paul and Ashalata Paul amicably partitioned their property and Suraj Ali became a jote tenant under Ashalata Paul, which was amply proved from Ext.2. 9.1. The learned trial Court also observed that the question of jote tenancy of the plaintiffs was proved by Ext.2 and Ext.7, since these documents were thirty years old documents, and that the question arose as to whether these documents were in connection with the suit land. Thereafter, considering the evidence of D.W.1, the learned trial Court arrived at the finding that the defendant No. 1 had no possession over the suit land and thus, the entry in jamabandi was not made on actual factual description and the settlement authority had entirely ignored the possession of the plaintiffs and prevented their entry in the jamabandi, and that mere entry of name of the defendant No. 1 in record could not pass any title, in the absence of establishment of relationship to the suit property, and thereafter, decreed the suit. 9.2. However, while dealing with the aforesaid issue, the learned first appellate Court in issue No. 1, held that Ext.-10 is the certified copy of final Khatian No. 447, which stands in the names of Jyotish Das, Jyotirmoy Das, Janaki Nath Das and others, and the same relates to Schedule-1 and 2 of the plaint, and that description of taluk of first schedule land in the plaint, regarding taluk did not tally with taluk of Ext.-10, and Ext.-11 being final Khatian No. 452, covering Dag No. 457, which relates to second schedule land, stood recorded in the name of Jyotish Chandra Das, Jyotirmoy Das and five others. 9.3. The learned first appellate Court also held that Ext.-10 and Ext.-11 were prepared, recorded and published as per provision of Sylhet Tenancy Act, 1936, and that final khatian was a prima facie document of title and possession of the concerned person in whose name the same was recorded and the final khatian was presumed to be genuinely and correctly prepared and published, unless rebutted by stronger evidence. 9.4. 9.4. The learned first appellate Court also observed that the plaintiffs’ side, in order to show that the tenancy of Suraj Ali, who was the predecessor of the plaintiffs, in respect of the suit land, exhibited two farogs i.e. Ext.2 and Ext.7, and both are not public document and no touzi number is mentioned therein, and that those two documents in order to be admitted in evidence, must be proved as per law, and the said documents having not been proved by the plaintiffs, cannot be admitted in evidence. 9.5. The learned first appellate Court further observed that in the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court had wrongly held that Ext.2 and Ext.7 being more than thirty years old, were self proved documents, but failed to comprehend the spirit of Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that Ext.2 and Ext.7 not being public documents nor registered, cannot be admitted to be self exhibited document under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act. 9.6. Thereafter, the learned first appellate Court observed that P.W.1/plaintiff No. 3 deposed that Aminul Haque Choudhury and others who were the mirasder of the suit land, exchanged the property with Suresh Ch. Paul, Harendra Ch. Paul and Ashalata Paul, vide registered deed of exchange No. 5725, dated 13.07.1957, and the plaintiffs’ side exhibited certified copy of the said document as Ext.1, and that the P.W.1 deposed that on amicable partition, Ashalata Paul got the first schedule and his father Suraj Ali became jote tenant under Ashalata Paul, and as such, the plaintiffs’ suit land was tenanted land under mirasder. The learned first appellate Court further observed that Ext.10 spoke that first schedule land was khas land of mirasder, whose name was recorded as Dakhaldar, and that Ext.10 and Ext.11 prima facie show that land is miras land which were under their direct possession, without any tenancy and that being so, the plaintiffs’ side had failed to establish that their predecessors were tenant in respect of the suit land. 9.7. The learned first appellate Court also found that Ext.-3 and Ext.-4 did not show that the same were related to the present suit land. Moreover, these documents are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. 9.7. The learned first appellate Court also found that Ext.-3 and Ext.-4 did not show that the same were related to the present suit land. Moreover, these documents are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. It appears that defendant No.1 or predecessor of the defendants were not the party to the relevant suit. Thereafter, the learned first appellate Court considering the evidence adduced by the defendants, arrived at the finding that the suit land is not under any tenant or jote dag as claimed by the plaintiffs’ side and thereafter, decided the issue in negative. 9.8. It appears that while decreeing the suit, the learned trial Court had relied upon Ext.2 and Ext.7, and though said documents were 30 years old, yet the same were issued by Zamindar, and as such, cannot be regarded as public documents. Moreover, the same have to be proved in accordance with law. That being so, Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act would not come into their assistance, and the said documents have to be proved in other manner i.e. by examining the issuing authority, but the plaintiffs have failed to examine the issuing authority and to prove the same in accordance with law. 9.9. And in view of the foregoing discussion and finding, I find the second substantial question of law does not flow out of the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court. It appears that the learned first appellate Court had considered the evidence of the plaintiffs in proper perspective and arrived at a reasoned finding. 10. Moving forward to the first substantial question law, I find that before the learned trial Court, the judgment passed in T.A. No. 57 of 1958, by the learned Sub-Judge, Cachar, Silchar was exhibited as Exhibit-3 and the judgment passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 200 of 1961, was exhibited as Exhibit-4. It appears that the learned first appellate Court had considered the same in the impugned judgment and arrived at a finding that Ext.-3 and Ext.-4, did not show that the same were related to the present suit land. Moreover, these documents are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. It appears that defendant No.1 or predecessor of the defendants were not the party to the relevant suit. 10.1. Moreover, these documents are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. It appears that defendant No.1 or predecessor of the defendants were not the party to the relevant suit. 10.1. Thereafter, the learned first appellate Court, considering the evidence adduced by the defendants, arrived at the finding that the suit land is not under any tenant or jote dag as claimed by the plaintiffs’ side and thereafter, decided the issue in negative. 10.2. Thus, having examined the materials placed on record, and considering the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, and also the evidence so adduced and the documents so exhibited, I find that the learned first appellate Court had considered the judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 57 of 1958, by the learned Sub- Judge, Cachar, Silchar and the judgment of this Court in Second Appeal No. 200 of 1961, being Exhibit-3 and 4. 10.3. It is to be noted here that in Exhibit-3, the learned first appellate Court had declared the title of the plaintiff and also declared that defendant No.1 was his bhagidar and dismissed the prayer of khas possession. The appeal was directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Karimganj in Title Suit No. 88 of 1956, which was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent namely, Harendra Chandra Paul and 2 others, wherein the learned Munsiff had decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent for recovery of khas possession of the suit land on declaration of his title and also on declaration that defendant No.1-4 had no tenancy right over the land. And the learned appellate Court in Title Appeal No. 57/1958 had declared the plaintiff’s title over the suit land and also declared defendant No.1 as his bhagidar, but dismissed the prayer for khas possession and partly allowed the appeal. And this Court, in Second Appeal No. 200 of 1961, Exhibit-4, had affirmed the said finding of the first appellate Court. 10.4. But, as held by the learned first appellate Court, Ext.-3 and Ext.-4 did not show that the same were related to the present suit land. Further, defendant No.1 or his predecessors were not the party to the relevant suit and further Ext.-3 and 4 are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. Mr. Further, defendant No.1 or his predecessors were not the party to the relevant suit and further Ext.-3 and 4 are not binding upon the defendants because a declaratory suit operating in personam and not in rem. Mr. Roy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, has rightly pointed this out during argument. And there appears to be force in his submission. 10.5. Thus, I find that the first substantial question of law does not flows out of the impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and even if it flows out, the same has to be answered in negative, in view of the aforesaid discussion and finding. 11. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal, and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. 12. Send down the records of the learned Courts below, along with a copy of this judgment and order.