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2025 DAILYLAW 3659 (HP)

Bali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-11-14

Rakesh Kainthla

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail, in FIR No. 131 of 2024, dated 17.11.2024, registered at Police Station Palampur, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 , 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). 2. It has been asserted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner. The petitioner has remained in custody for over 8 months without the effective commencement of trial. His custody amounts to illegal pre-trial detention, which is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned Trial Court denied the bail because the commercial quantity was involved without considering the fundamental constitutional violation underlying the arrest itself. The learned Trial Court erred in conflating the arrest memos with the grounds of arrest. The mere existence of an arrest memo is not sufficient, and the grounds of arrest are to be communicated. The petitioner has a constitutional right to get grounds of arrest, and the statutory bar contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the provisions of the Constitution. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the present petition. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that police had set up a naka at Chadiyar Chowk on 18.09.2025. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-66A-4741 came to the spot, and the driver identified himself as Bali Ram. The person sitting beside the driver identified himself as Chet Ram. The police demanded the papers of the vehicle, and the driver got frightened. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of Vinay Kapoor and Rohit. They recovered one plastic bag containing some articles and a packet wrapped with Khakhi Tape. The police opened the packet and found 1.466 kgs of charas in it. The police arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga and as per the result of analysis, it was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a crime in case of his release on bail. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 19.03.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a crime in case of his release on bail. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 19.03.2025. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard M/s Rahul Kumar and Rajat Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Kumar Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that this Court had mentioned in the order dated 09.10.2025 that the petitioner was caught red-handed with the contraband. This finding cannot be given at this stage and is to be given at the time of conclusion of the trial. The police are supposed to comply with the requirements of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, and they cannot claim a substantial compliance or the lack of prejudice. The State had relied upon the judgment of Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC 292 , but the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are in the nature of obiter and not binding upon this Court. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Delhi vs. Ram Avtar @ Rama AIR 2011, SCC 2699, 2011 (12) SCC 207 , Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024] 6 S.C.R. 666: 2024 INSC 414 and Vihaan Kumar vs. The State of Haryana 2025 INSC 162 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was caught red-handed with the commercial quantity of charas. Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case, and the petitioner was unable to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under of the NDPS Act. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P. , (2025) 7 SCC 314 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 10. A perusal of the status report shows that the police had intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP66A-4741 which was being driven by the petitioner. The police searched the vehicle in the presence of two independent witnesses and recovered 1.466 kgs of charas from the vehicle. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner was found in possession of 1.466 kgs of charas, which is a commercial quantity and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. 11. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as follows: “37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 12. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 12. This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738 , and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed: “7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are: (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) offences involving a commercial quantity. 8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence; (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 13. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh , AIR 2020 SC 721 , wherein it was held: “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under: - "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under: - "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95 ) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and a deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37 , namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by , which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless the two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 14. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan , (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan , (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. Under Section 37 (1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27- A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37 (1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 ], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 ] ] *** 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, which depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 ] 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”(emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.” 15. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.” 15. It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: 4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application; and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail. 15. For the sake of convenience Section 37 (1) is reproduced hereinbelow:— “37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for 2[offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no person accused of an offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 16. 16. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was observed: “5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37 (1)(b) (ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:— “37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts themselves read thus:— “An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.” In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549 , the three-judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37 (1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37 (1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above. 7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122 , after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering an application for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the limitation placed by (1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would operate. 8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37 (1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.” 17. In the present case, the prosecution has collected sufficient material to, prima facie, connect the petitioner with the commission of the crime. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner would not indulge in the commission of an offence if released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 18. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner would not indulge in the commission of an offence if released on bail. Hence, he has not satisfied the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner was not informed about the grounds of arrest, and his arrest is illegal. Reliance was placed upon the information of arrest in support of this plea, which mentions that HC Sudesh Kumar No. 79, Investigating Officer, Police Station Palampur, arrested Chet Ram on 17.11.2024, at 12:30 pm at Chadhiar Chowk. He would be detained in police custody in the Police Station, Palampur. He should inform the name of the person who should be apprised of his arrest. The State did not file any document to show that the grounds of arrest were communicated to the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. The status report shows that the police has recovered 1.466 kgs of charas from the vehicle being driven by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner was aware of the nature of the crime committed by him. It was laid down by three Judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC 292 : 1968 SCC OnLine SC 374, that if the accused is arrested red- handed, there is no need to explain the grounds of arrest: it was observed at Page 298: “Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. “There is no need to explain the reasons for arrest if the arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven.” 19. It was held in Balbir Kaur v. State of Punjab , (2009) 15 SCC 795 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 997 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1258, that where the accused knew that she was being searched for the contraband, the plea taken by her regarding non-communication of the reason of arrest is technical in nature. It was observed at page 802: “20. It was observed at page 802: “20. In view of the concurrent findings of the trial court and as also the High Court holding that the appellant was in conscious possession of the said contraband goods, the allegation of non-disclosure of the purpose of the search and the grounds of arrest to her is of a technical nature and without there being any material force in them. The appellant herself knew that she was being searched for possession of contraband goods, and therefore, she had also sought protection as provided under Sections 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act. 21. The appellant was being searched and arrested on account of possession of contraband goods. The violation of the provisions of the NDPS Act was clearly known to her. The allegation that she herself asked for such protection instead of prosecution, giving her the option to be searched before a gazetted officer, as required under the law, would not in any manner adversely affect her conviction and order of sentence passed by both the courts below. No prejudice could be shown by the appellant against the DSP, who was a gazetted officer and the lady officer present at the time of the search.” 20. The arrest memo filed by the petitioner mentions the offence committed by him. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narayanaswamy Ravishankar v. Asstt. Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (2002) 8 SCC 7 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1865 : 2002 SCC Online SC 948, that when the arrest memo mentions the offence committed by the accused, the plea taken by him regarding non-communication of arrest is not acceptable. It was observed at page 9: “6. It was also contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the ground on which the appellant was arrested was not communicated to him. We find no merit in this because the arrest memo clearly indicates the offence stated to have been committed by the appellant under the NDPS Act. Further, the record also shows that a copy of the arrest memo Ext. P-20 was received by the appellant.” 21. Therefore, the plea that the petitioner’s arrest is illegal cannot be accepted. 22. It was submitted that the cited para in the judgment of Madhu Limaye (supra) is obiter dicta and this Court is not bound by the same. This submission is only stated to be rejected. P-20 was received by the appellant.” 21. Therefore, the plea that the petitioner’s arrest is illegal cannot be accepted. 22. It was submitted that the cited para in the judgment of Madhu Limaye (supra) is obiter dicta and this Court is not bound by the same. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Committee v. Hazara Singh , (1975) 1 SCC 794 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 354 : 1975 SCC OnLine SC 106 that an obiter dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding. It was observed at page 795: “4…Certainly, the revisional power of the High Court is reserved for setting right miscarriage of justice, not for being invoked by private persecutors. Such was the ratio, but, in the course of the judgment, Hidayatullah, J., to drive home the point that the case itself was so marginal, referred to the microscopic difference from the set standard. To distort that passage, tear it out of context and devise a new defence out of it in respect of food adulteration cases, is to be grossly unjust to the judgment. Indeed, the Kerala case cited before us by counsel, viz. State of Kerala v. Vasudevan Nair [ Cr.A. No. 89 of 1973, decided by the Kerala High Court on July 18, 1974 — All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Cases Reporter, 1975 Part I, p. 8] itself shows that such a distortion of the passage in the judgment did not and could not pass muster. When pressed with such misuse of this ruling, the High Court repelled it. The law of food adulteration, as also the right approach to decisions of this Court, has been set out correctly there: “Judicial propriety, dignity and decorum demand that, being the highest judicial tribunal in the country, even an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court should be accepted as binding. The declaration of law by that Court, even if it be only by the way, has to be respected. But all that does not mean that every statement contained in a judgment of that Court would be attracted by Article 141. Statements on matters other than law have no binding force. The declaration of law by that Court, even if it be only by the way, has to be respected. But all that does not mean that every statement contained in a judgment of that Court would be attracted by Article 141. Statements on matters other than law have no binding force. Several decisions of the Supreme Court are on facts and that Court itself has pointed out in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [1972 FAC 549] and Prakash Chandra Pathak v. State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1960 SC 195 : 1960 Cri LJ 283] that as on facts no two cases could be similar, its own decisions which were essentially on questions of fact could not be relied upon as precedents for decision of other cases.” 23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Director of Settlements v. M.R. Apparao , (2002) 4 SCC 638: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 375 that an obiter dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considerable weight and the Courts are bound to follow it. They cannot brush aside the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court by saying that it is an obiter dictum. It was observed at page 650: “7…An “obiter dictum”, as distinguished from a ratio decidendi, is an observation by the Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a binding effect as a precedent, it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a given case. So far as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of the Court not to make any pronouncement on points not directly raised for its decision…” 24. Thus, the submission that the judgment of Madhu Limaye cannot be followed is rejected. 25. It was submitted that the provision of Article 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be ignored by claiming that there was substantial compliance and no prejudice was caused to the accused. This submission is also not acceptable. Thus, the submission that the judgment of Madhu Limaye cannot be followed is rejected. 25. It was submitted that the provision of Article 22 of the Constitution of India cannot be ignored by claiming that there was substantial compliance and no prejudice was caused to the accused. This submission is also not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 that where the arrest memos and remand record showed that the accused was aware of the reasons of their arrest, they were represented by their counsel and had applied for their bail, no prejudice was caused to them and the irregularity in not communicating the grounds of arrest is not sufficient to grant bail. It was observed: 20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for the grant of bail. 20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents - accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr. P.C. (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is devoid of merit. 20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that “no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice”. Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr. P.C. requires that “every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest. 20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown. 20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 456, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown. 20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana 2025 SCC OnLine SC 456, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2025 INSC 768 , it was observed that when an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post-Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an inflexible requirement in all circumstances. 20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr. P.C. is mandatory; the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend. 20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024)7 SCC 576 and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail. 20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.” 26. In any case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. In Ram Avtar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with the compliance of Section 50 of the ND&PS Act and was not concerned with the grant of bail because of non- furnishing of grounds of arrest. Therefore, the cited judgment will not help the petitioner. 28. The petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Vihaan Kumar (supra) and Prabir (supra). However, both these judgments have been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri Darshan (supra), and it is not necessary to discuss them all over again. 29. It was further submitted that the earlier finding recorded by the Court that the petitioner was caught red-handed caused serious prejudice to the petitioner because nothing remained to be tried by the learned Trial Court. 29. It was further submitted that the earlier finding recorded by the Court that the petitioner was caught red-handed caused serious prejudice to the petitioner because nothing remained to be tried by the learned Trial Court. This submission overlooks the fact that the observations made by this Court while deciding the bail are confined to the disposal of the bail petition and are based upon the prima facie consideration of the material placed before the Court. Therefore, any observations made in the bail petition will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. The learned Trial Court is always free to adjudicate the matter as per the evidence brought before it, tested by the cross- examination; therefore, the grievance of the petitioner is that no finding can be given in the bail petition has no substance. The petitioner himself invited the finding based on the material placed before the Court by claiming that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him, and he cannot raise any grievance once the findings have been recorded. 30. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 31. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.