JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. P. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. J.C. Gaur, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. In this civil revision petition, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner has challenged the judgment and order dated 09.08.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No.1, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order dated 09.08.2024, the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Executing Court’) has dismissed the petition filed under Section 47 of the CPC. 3. The background facts leading to filing of the present revision petition is briefly stated as under:- “The respondent/decree holder had filed a summary suit against the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 herein, and against the Ambalal Properties & Investments (judgment debtor No.2) for recovery of a sum of Rs.54,98,800/-. The said suit is based on an agreement entered into by the respondent and the judgment debtor No.2. In the said summary suit, the learned Civil Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati, vide order dated 23.12.2005 had decreed the suit ex-parte, without taking any evidence. Thereafter, the respondent herein as decree holder, filed a Money Execution Case, No.1/2006, and thereby, put the decree dated 23.12.2005, in execution. Though, at first, the respondent sought the decree to be executed against the landed property of the judgment debtor No.2/defendant No.2, later on, the respondent got an order of attachment of Rs.1,45,54,237.98 belonging to the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1, on 18.05.2022, behind their back and only at that stage the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 company for the first time came to know about the decree/order dated 23.12.2005. And thereafter, they have filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 14.06.2022, upon which the learned Executing Court has registered the Misc.(J) Case No.492/2022, on the ground that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity and to be declared as null and void and non-executable being passed in contravention of the provision of Section 293(1)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 and also in violation of the provision of Section 7(d) of the Assam Money Lenders’ Act, 1934. Thereafter, vide impugned judgment and order dated 09.08.2024, the learned Executing Court had dismissed the petition, filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Thereafter, vide impugned judgment and order dated 09.08.2024, the learned Executing Court had dismissed the petition, filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 has approached this Court by filing the present petition, mainly on the following grounds amongst others:- (i) That, the respondent herein has fraudulently obtained the decree and the learned Executing Court misread and misinterpreted facts and the evidence on record and arrived at a perverse finding. (ii) That, the learned Executing Court has committed gross error in law in holding that the period for limitation for filing a petition under Section 47 CPC ought to be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, entailing a three years limitation period, whereas it provides for only starting point of limitation from the date from which right to apply accrues and that the cause of action for filing the objection under Section 47 of the CPC arose on 02.06.2022, when the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 for the first time came to know about the decree under execution and also about the order dated 18.05.2022. (iii) That, the bar of limitation and also the principle of res judicata would not come as the petitioner had taken the specific plea that the decree was obtained by fraud and it could be discovered only in the year 2022. (iv) That, though the learned Executing Court in the impugned judgment and order, held that against the decree dated 23.12.2005, one Assistant Manager Mr. Rana Das had applied for setting aside the ex-parte decree, yet, he was not the employee of the company and he was not authorized to make such an application. (v) That, the learned Executing Court has committed error in law in holding that the petition filed under Section 47 CPC is barred by constructive res judicata and not maintainable in view of the dismissal of the application under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. (v) That, the learned Executing Court has committed error in law in holding that the petition filed under Section 47 CPC is barred by constructive res judicata and not maintainable in view of the dismissal of the application under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. (vi) That, the learned Executing Court, while deciding the Issue Nos.4, 5, and 6, had failed to appreciate the fact that the order dated 23.12.2005, was based on two documents i.e. declaration dated 24.09.2003 and the agreement dated 24.09.2003 and though the name of petitioner was mentioned as sister concern of the respondent/judgment debtor No.2, the said fact is incorrect and that the respondent/judgment debtor No.2 itself is a non-existent company and merely mentioning of the name of the petitioner in the agreement, wherein the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 was not a party, the agreement was not binding on the third party i.e. petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 and no decree could have been passed against judgment debtor No.1. (vii) That, the learned Executing Court has also failed to consider that there is no legally enforceable debt against the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 and that the decree obtained on the basis of documents i.e. Exhibits-JD/3 and JD/4 are void ab initio and nullity and not binding upon the petitioner and that Exhibit-JD/4 was fraudulently executed by misrepresenting the fact and the agreement dated 24.09.2003, is not binding upon the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1. It is binding only upon the respondent/judgment debtor No.2 and that the learned Executing Court had failed to consider that the transaction/document were made in total violation of Section 293(1)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 and also Article 58, 65 and 67 of the Article of Association and that the decree so obtained is null and void and the learned Executing Court had committed gross illegality and that the execution petition is not maintainable in view of Section 7(d) of the Assam Money Lenders’ Act, 1934 as amended up to date. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent herein had obtained the decree fraudulently and there was no resolution of the company to obtain loan by the petitioner company and the decree was granted against the registered firm, which is not at all maintainable and that the learned Executing Court has misinterpreted Article 137 of the Limitation Act and held that the limitation period is three years, but the said Article provides that when the limitation starts. Mr. Khataniar also submits that when fraud is pleaded, no period of limitation will apply. Mr. Khataniar further submits that the decree sought to be executed not against the present petitioner and that the petitioner came to know about the two documents only in the year 2022. Mr. Khataniar further submits that there must be resolution of the Board of Directors to borrow money. Further, submission of Mr. Khataniar is that the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 cannot borrow money without approval of the Board of Directors and the Directors have no authority to take loan in view of Section 293(1)(d) of the Companies Act and also under Article 58, 65 and 67 of the Article of Association, and that the learned Executing Court has failed to consider this aspect and in support of his submission, Mr. Khataniar has referred following decisions in support of his submission:- (i) A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar & Ors.(Dr) v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. , reported in AIR 1963 SC 1185 ; and (ii) Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) Through LRS. vs. Jasjit Singh & Ors. , reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 (iii) Paramjit Kaur and Others vs. Teja Singh and Others reported in SCC OnLine Del 6516 6. Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitoiner also submits that the suit is barred by Section 7(d) of the Assam Money Lenders’ Act. Mr. Khataniar has also referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh & Ors. vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors. , reported in AIR 1954 SC 340. 7. Per contra, Mr. Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitoiner also submits that the suit is barred by Section 7(d) of the Assam Money Lenders’ Act. Mr. Khataniar has also referred to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh & Ors. vs. Chaman Paswan & Ors. , reported in AIR 1954 SC 340. 7. Per contra, Mr. Gaur, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the entire case of the respondent depends upon the Exhibit-3 and 4 i.e. the deed of declaration and agreement and that the petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 is a proprietorship firm and the judgment debtor No.2 was a guarantor and he is the managing partner of the aforementioned firm and there is also one criminal case under N.I. Act, being Complaint Case No. 65 C /2005 was filed before the Court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (Sadar) No. 1 at Guwahati for the cheques, for a sum of Rs.42,00,000/- being dishonored by the bank on presentation. Mr. Gaur, further submits that the petitioner herein has also approached this Court for quashing of the said proceeding but the same being Criminal Revision No. 615 of 2005 and Criminal Revision No. 710 of 2005 was dismissed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 24/05/2007. Further, Mr. Gaur submits that the petitioner also approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also rejected their petition and that they have filed one application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC, after the ex-parte decree being passed. But, the same was dismissed by the Court and that the decree was passed against both the defendants and the principle of res judicata will come into play in this case, as similar petition was earlier dismissed by the learned Executing Court and under such circumstances, Mr. Gaur contended to dismiss the petition. In support of his submission, Mr. Gaur has referred the following decisions:- (i) Manmath Kumar Kar v. Md. Sirat Ali , reported in 1990 (2) GLJ 236 ; and (ii) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By LRS. v. Jagannath (Dead) By LRS. , reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 8. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the impugned judgment and order, dated 09.08.2024, passed by the learned Executing Court. 9. v. Jagannath (Dead) By LRS. , reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 8. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also the impugned judgment and order, dated 09.08.2024, passed by the learned Executing Court. 9. It appears that while dealing with the petition under Section 47 CPC filed by the petitioner, the learned Executing Court has framed the following issues:- (i) Whether there is any cause of action for filing application under Section 47 of CPC by the petitioner? (ii) Whether the petition filed under Section 47 of CPC is barred by law of limitation? (iii) Whether the petition filed under Section 47 of CPC is maintainable in view of dismissal of application filed in the year 2006 by the petitioner? (iv) Whether the judgment and decree passed in Summary Suit No.196/2005 is null and void? (v) Whether the judgment and decree passed in Summary Suit No.196/2005 was obtained by playing fraud? (vi) Whether the judgment and decree passed in Summary Suit No.196/2005 by the Court without jurisdiction? (vii) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get any reliefs as prayed for? 9.1. And thereafter, considering the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the documents so exhibited, the learned Executing Court had decided the Issue No.1 in favour of the petitioner, Issue No.2 in favour of the respondent, Issue No.3, 4, 5, 6 and Issue No.7 against the petitioner. The learned Executing Court, while deciding issues No. 4, 5, 6 had held that the burden to prove that the judgment and decree was obtained by playing fraud is upon the petitioner and the petitioner had failed to discharge the said burden, and on the other hand, it was argued by the respondent that Judgment Debtor No.2 representing Judgment Debtor No.1 had entered into the agreement and executed a deed of declaration on 24 th September 2003, acknowledging the loan amount and issuing cheque, totaling 42 lacs and that the respondent had not made any false representation to the court in obtaining the judgment and decree in the Money Suit No. 196/2005. The learned Executing Court had arrived at a conclusion that the suit was properly filed and that the loan was legally recoverable. The learned Executing Court had arrived at a conclusion that the suit was properly filed and that the loan was legally recoverable. It had also found that Exhibit-3 is the copy of declaration dated 24.09.2003 and Exhibit-4 is a copy of agreement, dated 24.09.2003, and Exhibit 3 and 4 reveals that Hashmukh R. Patel as the Managing Director of Judgment Debtor No.1, acquired a loan of Rs.40,00,000/ from the decree holder and issued five number of cheques and Exhibit-4 reveals that an agreement was signed between Hashmukh R. Patel representing Ambalal Properties and Investment with the decree holder at the time of mortgaging the property in favour of decree holder. And at the time of preparing Exhibit-3 and 4 Hasmukh Patel was the Director of Daloo Tea Estate and the evidence so adduced reveals that he possess the capacity to secure the loan given the role as a Director. 10. Having carefully examined the finding, so recorded by the learned Executing Court, in the impugned judgment and order dated 09.08.2024, in the light of the facts and circumstances on the record, this Court finds that the petitioner herein fails to establish that the decree in Summary Suit No.196/2005, was passed by a Court having no jurisdiction. It was passed by the Court of Civil Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), who had both the pecuniary jurisdiction as well as territorial jurisdiction, to try the suit summarily. In that view of the matter, the judgment and decree cannot be branded as nullity and non-est in the eye of law. And as such, the decision referred by Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner in Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (Deceased) Through LRS (supra) would not advance his argument. Further, I find that nothing is placed on record to show that the decree was obtained by fraud. 11. Though Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Annexure-3 and 4 are obtained by fraud, yet, the submission of Mr. Khataniar left this Court unimpressed. It is the deed of declaration (Exhibit-JD/3) dated 24.09.2003 and the agreement (Exhibit-JD/4) dated 24.09.2003 between the parties and the same had duly been exhibited and proved and also the same were part of the Summary Suit, No.196/2005 and that being so, it cannot be said that the judgment and decree in the summary suit, is null and void. 12. It is the deed of declaration (Exhibit-JD/3) dated 24.09.2003 and the agreement (Exhibit-JD/4) dated 24.09.2003 between the parties and the same had duly been exhibited and proved and also the same were part of the Summary Suit, No.196/2005 and that being so, it cannot be said that the judgment and decree in the summary suit, is null and void. 12. Further, it appears that in the year 2006, the petitioner has filed one petition, under Order 37 Rule 4, read with Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC, to set aside the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2005, in Summary (Money) Suit No.196/2005, upon which Misc. Case No.52/2006 was registered and in the said petition, it is clearly stated that the Assistant Manager of petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 visited the Revenue Department of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, Silchar, regarding land acquisition matter on 23.05.2006 and came to know about the ex-parte judgment and decree and that being so, the claim of the petitioner that he came to know about the judgment and decree only in the year 2022, itself indicates that he has not been telling the truth and approached the court with clean hand. And on this count alone the case of the petitioner can be thrown out, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MCD v. State of Delhi, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 605 , wherein it has been held that a person whose case is based on falsehood can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. It has also been held that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. In the instant case, suppression of aforesaid fact that the Assistant Manager of petitioner/judgment debtor No.1 visited the Revenue Department of the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, Silchar, regarding land acquisition matter on 23.05.2006 and came to know about the ex-parte judgment and decree, tantamount to playing fraud on the Court. A litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. A litigant who approaches the court is bound to produce all documents which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party. And by reason of such conduct, the petitioner disentitled himself from getting any relief or assistance from this Court. 13. A nd further, the petition under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC being filed, the subsequent petition, under Section 47 CPC appears to be barred by the principle of constructive res-judicata. Besides, filing of the petition under Section 47 CPC, in view of Article 137 of the Limitation Act is three years from the date when right to sue accrues. For the reason aforesaid, this Court is unable to record concurrence to the contention of the petitioner that it was unaware of the judgment and decree until 2022. I have gone through the decision of Delhi High Court in Paramjit Kaur (supra) referred by Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard, wherein it has been held that if the document is void then in fact there is no issue of limitation for filing of a suit to challenge the void document. But, for the reason discussed above this decision would not advance the argument of Mr. Khataniar. 14. Notably, the order of the learned Trial Court in respect of Misc. Case No.52/2006, under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, had already attained finality having not been challenged before any of the Court of law. Under such circumstances, this Court finds that there is no merit in this petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 15. Though a contention is being made by Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the suit is barred by Section 7 (d) of the Assam Money Lender’s Act, 1934 yet, registration under the said section is required only when the lender carry on business of lending. Mr. Gaur, the learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed this out during the course of hearing and the decision so referred by him in Manmath Kumar Kar(supra) also strengthened his submission. Mr. Gaur, the learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed this out during the course of hearing and the decision so referred by him in Manmath Kumar Kar(supra) also strengthened his submission. A money lender is not required to register if he does not carry on business of money lending. It is not the case of the present petitioner that the respondent carries on business of money lending. That being so, the argument so advanced, appears to be a misplaced one. 16. That, as regard the contention of the petitioner that the judgment and decree is to be declared as null and void and non-executable for being passed in contravention of the provision of Section 293(1)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956 it appears that said section stipulates that the Board of Directors of a public company, or of a private company which is a subsidiary of a public company, shall not, except with the consent of such public company or subsidiary in general meeting, borrow moneys after the commencement of this Act, where the moneys to be borrowed, together with the moneys already borrowed by the company (apart from temporary loans obtained from the company's bankers in the ordinary course of business), will exceed the aggregate of the paid-up capital of the company and its free reserves, that is to say, reserves not set apart for any specific purpose; or that the Board of Directors could not borrow money exceeding the Company’s paid up capital and free revenue without the consent of the Company in a general meeting. 17. But, perusal of the Exhibit-3 it appears that at the relevant time Hasmukh Patel was the Managing Director of the Doloo Tea Company (India) Ltd. and he was authorized by a resolution of the Board of Directors to receive a sum of Rs.40,00,000/ being the loan amount, from Manish Tea Company, the respondent herein, though however, the date of resolution was kept blank there. Exhibit -3 also indicates that five numbers of cheques were issued for a sum of Rs.42,00,000/ lacs by Doloo Tea Company (India) Ltd. towards repayment of the loan amount. Further it appears that the cheques were presented to the bank for encashment but all were dishonored. Exhibit -3 also indicates that five numbers of cheques were issued for a sum of Rs.42,00,000/ lacs by Doloo Tea Company (India) Ltd. towards repayment of the loan amount. Further it appears that the cheques were presented to the bank for encashment but all were dishonored. Then a complaint case, being Complaint Case No. 65 C /2005 was filed before the Court of learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate (Sadar) No. 1 at Guwahati where in summons were issued after taking cognizance of the offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. And the said proceeding was unsuccessfully challenged in Criminal Revision No. 615 of 2005 and Criminal Revision No. 710 of 2005 before this Court and this Court vide judgment dated 24/05/2007, was pleased to dismiss the same. In the given factual background, this Court unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the judgment and decree so passed was nullity for being obtained fraudulently. 18. I have also carefully gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Khataniar, learned counsel for the petitioner. There is no quarrel at the Bar about the proposition laid down in the aforementioned cases. But, in the given facts and circumstances, the said proposition would not be applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Therefore, detail discussion is found to be not necessary to decide the issue in present petition. 19. In the result, I find no merit in this petition and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The learned Executing Court has taken note of all the issues in detail and thereafter, arrived at a finding, which are based on the materials placed on record. 20. In terms of above, this civil revision petition stands disposed of. The parties have to bear their own cost.