1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2025 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM WRIT PETITION NO.33812 OF 2024 (KLR-RES) BETWEEN: 1. SRI. LINGAPPA K. SUVARNA S/O KOOSAPPA SUVARNA AGED 55 YEARS 2. MR. LAKSHMAN K. SUVARNA S/O KOOSAPPA SUVARNA AGED 52 YEARS BOTH ARE R/AT RAMPRASAD HOUSE KARAMBAR VILLAGE BAJPE POST MANGALURU-574 142. ...PETITIONERS (BY SRI. I.THARANATH POOJARY, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SMT. VEENA T.N., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE M.S. BUILDING BENGALURU - 560 001. 2 2. THE THASILDAR TALUK OFFICE MANGALURU DAKSHINA KANNADA - 575 001. 3. JAGADEESH S/O LATE SESU MOILY AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS KARAMBAR MALAVOOR VILLAGE POST BAJPE MANGALURU - 574 412. (R-3 IMPLEADED V/O/DTD: 10.01.2025) …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI MANJUNATH K., HCGP FOR R1 & R2; SRI K. CHANDRANATH ARIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 05.12.2024 PASSED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT MADE IN NO.T.T.RCT 255/2020-21(B3) VIDE ANNEXURE-A. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 17.01.2025, THIS DAY ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM 3 CAV ORDER In the captioned petition, petitioner has challenged the fresh eviction notice issued by the respondent No.2/Tahsildar against the petitioner herein in respect of Poramboku land which is classified as a marginal road. 2. Learned Senior Counsel reiterating the grounds urged in the petition has submitted that petitioners family is in possession and occupation of 6 cents of land in Sy.No.21/1B1B of Malavoor Village for the last 55 years and are running a grocery shop with licence and the shop is assessed for regular tax by the local authorities. Citing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Olga Tellis and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others1, he would vehemently argue and contend that the right to live would be infringed if petitioners are evicted without following due process of law and without providing an opportunity of being heard. He 1 (1985) 3 SCC 545 4 would also point out that there are similarly encroached individuals and no action is contemplated and the action is contemplated against the petitioners selectively and this amounts to hostile discrimination. He would further point out that this action is contemplated only at the instance of respondent No.2 who has filed a suit against the petitioner and the same is pending consideration. 3. To buttress his arguments, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1) Olga Tellis & Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Others - (1985) 3 SCC 545; 2) State of Uttar Pradesh & Others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Others - (2024) SCC Online SC 3291; 3) C.Hanumanthappa vs. Bellary City Municipality - 1972 SCC Online Kar 97; 4) Muthammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu - (2006) 3 MLJ 216; 5 5) Malaprabha Co-operative Society vs. State of Karnataka - ILR 1990 Kar 1730. 4. Reiterating the principles in the judgment cited supra, he would contend that Poramboku land vest with municipalities and therefore, respondent No.2/Tahsildar has no jurisdiction. He would further point out that the application tendered by petitioners father seeking regularization is pending and that after their father's demise, even petitioners have tendered their application seeking regularization. 5. Per contra, learned HCGP would contend that petitioners are blowing hot and cold. The fact that petitioners are seeking regularization acknowledges the jurisdiction of Tahsildar to take precipitative action against the encroachers over marginal road. She would further point out that petitioners application is rejected and therefore, no further indulgence is warranted. 6 6. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 arguing in the same vein would also point out that unfortunately petitioners are permitted to squat over encroached portion as Poramboku Road (marginal road). Citing the Division Bench judgment at unnumbered paragraph 4, he would point out that petitioners right are rightly declined by the Division Bench. Citing the above said paragraph, he would point out that the petitioners assertion that their family is entitled for regularization is also given a quietus by the Division Bench. 7. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, learned HCGP appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3. 8. Before this Court delves into the matter to examine whether due process of law is followed by respondent No.2/Tahsildar while issuing eviction notice, this Court deems it fit to extract the relevant findings recorded 7 by the Division Bench while dismissing the writ appeal filed by petitioners father namely Koosappa Suvarna in W.A.No.5517/1997. The relevant paragraph is extracted and the same reads as under: "It is seen from the orders passed by the authorities, viz., the Tahsildar, the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, that they have concurrently held that the land in question is a Government road poramboke, i.e., reserved for road, and any encroachment on the same is objectionable. It is also noticed that as per the rules for regularization of unauthorized occupation, such reserved land cannot be granted or the unauthorized occupation of such land cannot be regularized, as the same would affect the public at large for whose benefit the land has been reserved. Merely because the appellant has filed an application, there is no justification to quash the well considered concurrent orders passed by the 3 authorities below. In view of the same, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, is justified in rejecting the writ petition." 8 9. Upon careful examination of the findings recorded by the Division Bench in W.A.No.5517/1997, it is abundantly clear that the facts of the case are not in dispute. The records unequivocally reveal that the petitioners father has been in unauthorized occupation of the subject land since 1982. This land, identified as a Government road, has been designated for public use. Despite being served with an eviction order by the then Tahsildar, the petitioners father challenged this order before the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.33721/1995. The petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 01.09.1997, a decision that was subsequently affirmed by the Division Bench in the writ appeal. In its judgment, the Division Bench made it clear that the petitioners father was found to be an unlawful occupant of Government land, which had been specifically reserved for public road use, and as such, any encroachment on this land was both objectionable and 9 illegal. This finding was conclusive, and it categorically affirmed that the unauthorized occupation of such land could not be regularized, given the public nature of the land. The Division Bench further emphasized that the filing of an application by the appellant (petitioners father) did not justify the quashing of the orders passed by the authorities, all of which were well-considered and based on sound reasoning. In light of these facts, the learned Single Judge was fully justified in rejecting the writ petition. 10. In light of the findings of the Division Bench, it is evident that there is no dispute regarding the facts of the case. The records confirm that the petitioners father has been in unauthorized occupation of the land for more than four decades, since 1982. This occupation was initially challenged by the petitioners father, but the eviction order issued by the Tahsildar was upheld through the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge in 1997, with the Division Bench subsequently affirming this decision. The 10 Division Bench’s ruling categorically declared that the petitioners father was a trespasser, and the land in question was a marginal road, thereby rendering any attempt to regularize the occupation legally untenable. The judgment of the Division Bench, having attained finality, stands as an irrefutable declaration of the status of the land and the ineligibility of the petitioners father for regularization. 11. Despite the eviction order having been affirmed by the Division Bench, it is regrettable that the authorities have failed to enforce the order for an extended period. However, it must be noted that the fresh eviction notice issued in 2024 by the authorities aims to rectify this lapse and ensure that the eviction order, which has remained unexecuted for so long, is now enforced. The petitioner's contention that the issuance of a fresh eviction notice necessitates the initiation of a new inquiry and a compliance with procedural requirements is not one this Court is inclined to accept. The judgment rendered by the Division 11 Bench has attained finality, and its findings conclusively determined the status of the petitioners father as a trespasser on public land. These findings also definitively affirmed the ineligibility of the petitioners father for regularization of the occupation, given that the land in question is a reserved public road. Once these findings were made and upheld by the Courts, there was no requirement for the authorities to initiate a fresh inquiry or provide further notices to the petitioners. 12. The principle of natural justice cannot be invoked repetitively in order to prolong an unauthorized occupation of land, particularly in the case of land designated as a marginal road, which is intended for public use. The authorities’ action to issue an eviction notice was first contemplated in 1982, when a notice was issued to the petitioners father. Since then, the petitioners family has continued to occupy this marginal road without legal justification. Now, in 2025, the occupation remains 12 unaddressed, and it is clear that no indulgence can be granted at this juncture. The petitioners family has been occupying public land for more than four decades, flagrantly disregarding the law and the judgments passed by this Court. The issuance of the fresh eviction notice in 2024 is nothing more than a procedural step aimed at enforcing the eviction order that has been upheld for many years. 13. It is essential to recognize that public land, especially land designated as a marginal road, serves an important public purpose. The continued encroachment on such land undermines the larger public interest, as it interferes with the intended use of the land and compromises the safety and functionality of the road. Allowing such encroachment to continue indefinitely is not only unjust to the public but also detrimental to the proper utilization of public resources. The petitioner's continued occupation of the land, in defiance of the law and in violation of the Court's orders, has had long-lasting adverse 13 effects on the community that relies on the land for public access and road safety. 14. While this Court had initially considered granting some indulgence to the petitioners and offering them a limited period of time to vacate the premises, it has become apparent that the petitioners are determined to persist in their unauthorized occupation. Despite the clear and final judgments against them, the petitioners continue to resist the enforcement of the eviction order. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners attempted to persuade the Court to quash the eviction notice and return the matter to the Tahsildar for further procedural steps. However, this Court finds that there is no merit in such a request, as the judgment of the Division Bench, which has attained finality, does not warrant any further delay or procedural extensions. 14 15. For the reasons outlined above, this Court concludes that the petition lacks merit and cannot be sustained. The competent authorities are directed to take immediate and necessary steps to enforce the eviction order in strict accordance with the law, without further delay. Although this case could warrant the imposition of exemplary costs, the Court has decided to refrain from imposing any costs, adopting a more lenient approach given the long-standing nature of the matter. The authorities must now proceed expeditiously to implement the eviction order and ensure the land is vacated in the public interest. 16. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. The pending interlocutory application, if any, does not survive for consideration and stands dismissed. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA