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Gauhati High Court · body
2025 DAILYLAW 3647 (GAU)
Safina Khatun, W/o. Md. Yunush Ali @ Eunusur Rahman v. Moinur Ali, S/o. Lt. Fulsha Seikh
2025-04-23
Robin Phukan
body2025
JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. B.D. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. J. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. In this revision petition, under Section 115 of the CPC, the petitioners have challenged the correctness or otherwise of the order dated 06.06.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Kamrup(M), Guwahati, in Misc. Case No. 324/2019, arising out of Title Execution Case No. 2/2009, allowing an application filed by the respondents under Section 47, read with Section 151 of the CPC. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned order dated 06.06.2019, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Kamrup(M), Guwahati (‘executing Court’, for short) had held that the decree passed by the learned predecessor of that Court is not enforceable, being obtained by playing fraud upon the Court. 4. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are briefly stated as under: “The petitioners had filed one title suit, being Title Suit No. 324/2003, before the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Kamrup(M), Guwahati and the said suit was decreed, vide judgment and decree dated 18.09.2007. Thereafter, the respondents had filed an appeal, being First Appeal No. 24/2009 before this Court, which was dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 10.07.2018. Thereafter, the plaintiffs/petitioners herein filed Title Execution Case No. 02/2009, for execution of the decree and then, the respondents/judgment debtors challenged execution of the decree by filing an objection under Section 47 of the CPC on the ground that the decree had been obtained by playing fraud. But, in fact, the claim of the respondents/judgment debtors is only in respect of the land of a separate Dag i.e. Dag No. 238, while the claim of the plaintiffs/petitioners are in respect of a separate Dag No. 240, in which the respondents had not advanced any claim, and that as per jamabandi of the patta and the survey report obtained by the Court, a plot of land measuring 1 katha 4 lechas of Dag No. 240 still remained after sale by the plaintiffs/petitioners, which had been encroached upon and being illegally possessed by the defendants/respondents.
But, vide impugned order dated 06.06.2019, passed by the learned executing Court allowing the objection filed under Section 47 of the CPC, this land of 1 katha 4 lechas had been allowed to remain under illegal occupation of the respondents/judgment debtors.” 5. Being aggrieved, the petitioners herein has preferred this revision petition on the following grounds: (a) That, the learned executing Court passed the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, by exercising its jurisdiction, which is not vested upon it. (b) That, while passing the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, the learned executing Court had exercised its jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. (c) That, by holding the decree as not executable and reversing the decree passed by his predecessor, the learned executing Court went behind the decree. (d) That, by holding that the plaintiffs/decree holders obtained the decree by playing fraud upon the Court, the learned executing Court had failed to consider the legal definition of the term fraud and thus, arrived at a wrong finding. (e) That, the learned executing Court misread the jamabandi of the patta (Exhibit-4), the Survey Commissioner’s Report and miscalculated the areas of land sold by the plaintiffs, areas of land acquired by the Government, and the balance land of the plaintiffs, which remained under their ownership after sale and acquisition. (f) That, the findings of the learned executing Court regarding the acceptability of the Survey Commissioner’s Report is not based on any material on record and the same is unwarranted by law, particularly when the same has not been challenged by either of the parties, the same has been accepted by the learned trial Court and also by this Court as well, and by discarding the said report, the learned executing Court had committed gross miscarriage of justice. (g) That, the learned executing Court ought to have found that the plaintiffs appear to have given incorrect area of the total land of the patta, but have not suppressed any material fact particularly when the jamabandi of the patta (Exhibit- 4) and the Survey Commissioner's Report have clearly clarified the total area, the area under acquisition, the area under illegal occupation of the defendants and the area which remained under occupation of the purchasers after acquisition.
(h) That, the learned executing Court had committed gross miscarriage of justice by ignoring the survey report of the Assistant Settlement Officer/Survey Commissioner, which has remained unchallenged by either of the parties. (i) That, the learned executing Court ought to have found that the judgment debtors, not having advanced any claim of right over the land of the plaintiff/decree holders in Dag No. 240, are not entitled to file any objection against execution of decree concerning the said dag of land since they are not at all affected by the said decree sought to be executed in the said dag of land. (j) That, the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, is bad in law and it is unreasonable and without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. 6. The respondents herein had filed their objections and questioned about the maintainability of the petition. It is stated that it is well settled that executing court can go behind the decree if the same is obtained by fraud and nullity. It is also stated that after hearing both sides, the learned executing Court had passed the impugned order and the same suffers from no infirmity or illegality requiring any interference of this Court. 7. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners has reiterated the grounds mentioned in this revision petition. He submits that the learned executing Court had gone behind the decree and acted without jurisdiction. Mr. Deka also submits that the claim of the petitioners relates to a plot of land of Dag No. 240 and some of the portion of the aforesaid dag, was acquired by the Government also. 7.1. Mr. Deka has also submitted actual calculation sheet of the land in question as under:- ACTUAL CALCULATION:- 7.2. Mr. Deka also submits that the Survey Commissioner’ Report had not been challenged and also not been set aside by this Court in the appeal, being RFA No. 24/2009, and the learned executing Court had questioned the said report, which is not permissible and as such, the impugned order so passed by the learned executing Court is illegal and arbitrary and therefore, it is contended to allow this petition. 8. Per contra, Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order, so passed by the learned executing Court. Mr.
8. Per contra, Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order, so passed by the learned executing Court. Mr. Prakash submits that having found the mistake the petitioners had committed, they filed one amendment petition also, but the same was rejected by the Court. Mr. Prakash further submits that the learned executing Court can go behind the decree and as such, the impugned order, according to Mr. Prakash, suffers from no infirmity or illegality requiring any interference of this Court, and therefore, Mr. Prakash has contended to dismiss this petition. 8.1 In support of his submission, Mr. Prakash has referred to the following decisions: (i) S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 (ii) A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. vs. Govt. of A.P. and Ors., reported in (2007) 4 SCC 221 (iii) Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha vs. Ujagar Singh and Ors., reported in (2000) 7 SCC 543 (iv) Bajranglal Shivchandrai Ruia vs. Shashikant N. Ruia and Ors., reported in (2004) 5 SCC 272 (v) Sunder Dass vs. Ram Prakash, reported in 1977 AIR 1201. (vi) Gaon Sabha and Anr. vs. Nathi and Ors., reported in (2004) 12 SCC 555 (vii) Sarup Singh and Anr. vs. Union of India and Anr., reported in (2011) 11 SCC 198 (viii) Raju Ramsing Vasave vs. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar and Ors., reported in (2008) 12 SCR 992 (ix) Ram Chandra Singh vs. Savitri Devi and Ors., reported in (2003) 8 SCC 3193 (x) Jaipur Development Authority vs. Radhey Shyam and Ors., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 370 . (xi) Md. Ramiz Uddin Borbhuiya vs. the State of Assam and Ors., in CRP No. 451/2012 (xii) Sri Shivaji Balaram Haibatti vs. Sri Avinash Maruthi Pawar, in Civil Appeal No. 19421 of 2017 [ arising out of SLP (C) No. 22894/2014]. (xiii) Suraj Bhan and Ors. vs. Financial Commissioner and Ors., reported in (2007) 5 SCR 154. 9. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and perused the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, and the decisions referred by Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents. 10.
(xiii) Suraj Bhan and Ors. vs. Financial Commissioner and Ors., reported in (2007) 5 SCR 154. 9. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record, and perused the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, and the decisions referred by Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Before a discussion is directed to the issues raised in this petition, it would be in the interest of justice to understand the scope of Section 47 of C.P.C. The Section read as under:- Section 47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree. (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. * * * * * (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. Explanation I.– For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation II.– (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) All questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section. 11 . In the case of Pradeep Mehra v. Harijivan J. Jethwa (Since Deceased Thr. Lrs.) and Ors. Civil Appeal No. 6375 of 2023 (Arising out of SLP © No. 8943 of 2021) while dealing with the section Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that all questions between the parties can be decided by the executing court. But the important aspect to remember is that these questions are limited to the “execution of the decree”. The executing court can never go behind the decree.
A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that all questions between the parties can be decided by the executing court. But the important aspect to remember is that these questions are limited to the “execution of the decree”. The executing court can never go behind the decree. Under Section 47, CPC the executing court cannot examine the validity of the order of the court which had allowed the execution of the decree in 2013, unless the court’s order is itself without jurisdiction. More importantly this order (the order dated 12.02.2013), was never challenged by the tenants/judgment debtors before any forum. 11. The multiple stages a civil suit invariably has to go through before it reaches finality, is to ensure that any error in law is cured by the higher court. The appellate court, the second appellate court and the revisional court do not have the same powers, as the powers of the executing court, which are extremely limited. This was explained by this Court in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v . Jai Prakash University (2001) 6 SCC 534 , in para 24, it had stated thus: “ 24. ………. The exercise of powers under Section 47 of the Code is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. Thus, it is plain that executing court can allow objection under Section 47 of the Code to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab initio and a nullity, apart from the ground that the decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing.” 12. This Court noted further: “……… . The validity or otherwise of a decree may be challenged by filing a properly constituted suit or taking any other remedy available under law on the ground that the original defendant absented himself from the proceeding of the suit after appearance as he had no longer any interest in the subject of dispute or did not purposely take interest in the proceeding or colluded with the adversary or any other ground permissible under law. 13.
13. The reality is that pure civil matters take a long time to be decided, and regretfully it does not end with a decision, as execution of a decree is an entirely new phase in the long life of a civil litigation. The inordinate delay, which is universally caused throughout India in the execution of a decree, has been a cause of concern with this Court for several years. In Rahul S. Sha h v . Jinendra Kumar Gandhi (2021) 6 SCC 418 , this Court had observed that a remedy which is provided for preventing injustice (in the Civil Procedure Code) is in fact being misused to cause injustice by preventing timely implementation of orders and execution of decrees. Then, it had observed as under: “ 23. ……………. The execution proceedings which are supposed to be a handmaid of justice and sub-serve the cause of justice are, in effect, becoming tools which are being easily misused to obstruct justice.” 14. The above judgment is an important judgment in respect of Section 47 as well as Order XXI, CPC as the three Judge Bench decision of this Court not only condemned the abuse of process done in the garb of exercise of powers under Section 47 read with Order XXI, CPC, but also gave certain directions to be followed by all Civil Courts in their exercise of powers in the execution of a decree. It further directed all the High Courts to update and amend their Rules relating to the execution of decrees so that the decrees are executed in a timely manner. As far as Section 47 is concerned, this Court had stated as under: “ 24. In respect of execution of a decree, Section 47 CPC contemplates adjudication of limited nature of issues relating to execution i.e. discharge or satisfaction of the decree and is aligned with the consequential provisions of Order 21 CPC. Section 47 is intended to prevent multiplicity of suits. It simply lays down the procedure and the form whereby the court reaches a decision. For the applicability of the section, two essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the question must be the one arising between the parties and secondly, the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is to prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as expeditiously as possible.
For the applicability of the section, two essential requisites have to be kept in mind. Firstly, the question must be the one arising between the parties and secondly, the dispute relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. Thus, the objective of Section 47 is to prevent unwanted litigation and dispose of all objections as expeditiously as possible. 25. These provisions contemplate that for execution of decrees, executing court must not go beyond the decree. However, there is steady rise of proceedings akin to a retrial at the time of execution causing failure of realisation of fruits of decree and relief which the party seeks from the courts despite there being a decree in their favour. Experience has shown that various objections are filed before the executing court and the decree-holder is deprived of the fruits of the litigation and the judgment-debtor, in abuse of process of law, is allowed to benefit from the subject-matter which he is otherwise not entitled to. 26. The general practice prevailing in the subordinate courts is that invariably in all execution applications, the courts first issue show-cause notice asking the judgment-debtor as to why the decree should not be executed as is given under Order 21 Rule 22 for certain class of cases. However, this is often misconstrued as the beginning of a new trial. For example, the judgment- debtor sometimes misuses the provisions of Order 21 Rule 2 and Order 21 Rule 11 to set up an oral plea, which invariably leaves no option with the court but to record oral evidence which may be frivolous. This drags the execution proceedings indefinitely.” 15. This Court then gave certain directions, which were to be mandatorily followed by all Courts dealing with civil suits and execution proceedings. Two of its directions were as follows: “ 42……………. …………. …………. …………. 42.8. The court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant. ……… .. ………. 42.12.
Further, the court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant. ……… .. ………. 42.12. The executing court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay. 42.13. ……..” 12. Thus, the proposition of law, that can be crystallised from the aforesaid discussion is that powers of the executing Court, under Section 47 of the Code, is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. The questions that can be raised under this Section are limited to the “execution of the decree”. The executing Court can never go behind the decree. 13. Now adverting to the facts herein this case, I find that the impugned order dated 06.06.2019, passed by the learned executing Court, in Misc. Case No. 324/2019, arising out of Title Execution Case No. 2/2009, in connection with Title Suit No. 324/2003, and the said Misc. case was registered on the basis of one petition filed by the respondents/judgment debtors raising objection against the execution of the judgment and decree dated 18.09.2007, passed in Title Suit No. 324/2003, invoking the provision of Section 47, read with Section 151 of the CPC on the following grounds: (i) Liability of judgment debtor discharged in terms of the total land as claimed in the plaint; and/or otherwise. (ii) To hold that the decree is not executable for being nullity for the reasons:- (a) decree fetched by fraud/ misrepresentation /concealment of material fact from the Court; (b) also in breach of the principles of natural justice and (c) without jurisdiction and therefore not enforceable. 13.1. Thereafter, the learned executing Court had framed the following two issues for determination: (i) Whether the judgment and decree dated 18.09.2007, passed in T.S. No. 324/2003 is obtained by playing fraud upon the Court? (ii) Whether the judgment and decree dated 18.09.2007, passed in T.S. No. 324/2003 is non executable? 13.2. Thereafter, going through the record and also taking note of the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, the learned executing Court decided both point Nos. (i) and (ii) in affirmative and accordingly, allowed the petition. 13.3.
(ii) Whether the judgment and decree dated 18.09.2007, passed in T.S. No. 324/2003 is non executable? 13.2. Thereafter, going through the record and also taking note of the submissions of learned Advocates of both sides, the learned executing Court decided both point Nos. (i) and (ii) in affirmative and accordingly, allowed the petition. 13.3. Further, it appears that the learned executing Court had taken note of the judgment of his predecessor, which reads as under: "The land of 238 and 240 have been surveyed by the Commissioner /A.S.O and submitted the report and sketch map. The Commission has stated in his report that the defendants are in possession of 1 Bigha 1 Katha 6 Lechas of their land in dag No. 238, Patta No.9 and in addition to that area, the defendants have been found in occupation of land measuring 1 Katha and 4 Lechas of the dag No.240. The defendants are found in possession in total land measuring 1 Bigha, 3 Katha 8 Lechas. The land of dag No. 240 which is under occupation of the defendant has been shown in red colour in the map as "Kha" measuring 1 Katha 4 Lechas. In view of above discussions of evidence on record and facts and circumstances appeared in the suit I have arrived at the decision that the defendants have been occupying the plaintiff's suit land. Neither party filed objection against the report of the Commissioner land hence the report is taken into consideration." 13.4. Thereafter, the learned executing Court had observed as under: “ From the aforesaid para of impugned judgment, passed by my predecessor Learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div), what transpire is that the then learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div) had totally relied upon the survey commission report to arrive at his finding to effect that, the excess land measuring 1 K 4 L found in the possession of defendants belongs to the plaintiff. So, let us take the aforesaid survey commission report to find out as to what does it contains, which compelled my learned Predecessor to rely upon that report.” 13.5.
So, let us take the aforesaid survey commission report to find out as to what does it contains, which compelled my learned Predecessor to rely upon that report.” 13.5. Thereafter, the learned executing Court went on to discuss the report as under: "The survey and inspection of land of Dag No. 240 reveals that as per official record, the land of Dag No. 240 covered by Patta No.5, contains total land measuring 4 K 16 L, out of which 2 K 7 L land is utilized as PWD road (as shown in trace map in yellow colour); 1 K 4 L land is in possession of defendant (as shown in trace map in orange colour); and remaining 1 K 5 L is in possession of the purchaser. The report also states that during the survey of Dag No. 238 of Patta No.16, the defendants in addition to their land measuring 1 K 1B 8L are enjoying excess land measuring 1 K 4 L land of plaintiff and excess land measuring 16 L land of government." 13.6. Thereafter, the learned executing Court had observed as under: “ Now, from the aforesaid survey report, what is noticeable is that the report do not specify the name and numbers of the purchaser who are occupying 1 K 5 L land only in the suit land, which is very vital in my considered opinion, as because, if we peruse the Jamabandi copy, relied upon by the plaintiff as well as my learned predecessor, we will find that plaintiffs in the year of 1985 had sold their land measuring 2 K to two different sets of person, i.e. The land measuring 1 K 6 L land is sold to the Bhawarilal Jain and 14 L land is sold to Champa Lal Khate and Naba Khate from the Dag No. 240 of Patta No.5. Now, if that be so then, the report of survey commissioner become clouded with suspicion. Because, both, the report of survey commission and the certified copy of Jamabandi, relates to the same date l.e. 01.08.2007.
Now, if that be so then, the report of survey commissioner become clouded with suspicion. Because, both, the report of survey commission and the certified copy of Jamabandi, relates to the same date l.e. 01.08.2007. And if we believe that survey commission report wherein it is stated that it was prepared on the basis of revenue record, then the land of purchaser cannot be 1 K 5 L, as stated in survey report, Rather it should be 2 K. That apart, if we peruse the case record particularly order dated 26.07.07, the suspicion over survey report become more stronger. Because, the aforesaid order reveals that the survey commissioner was given writ only to inspect and take measurement of land of Dag No. 240, belonging to the plaintiffs and not to conduct survey of land of Dag No. 238, belonging to the defendants. The conduct of survey Commissioner raise serious question as to what prompted the survey commissioner to deviate from the direction given by the court and take the measurement of land of Dag No. 238 belonging to the defendants when there is specific prohibition from the Court. But, interestingly there is no explanation in this regard in the evidence of plaintiff. Further, if we again peruse the survey commissioner report meticulously what we will find is that it also speaks about the possession of excess land measuring 16 L belonging to Govt. by the defendant, but, interestingly it is again silent as to which dag the govt. land relates and towards which side it is situated. The trace map appended with the survey commissioner report speaks 3 more dags, beside, the land of disputed Dag No. 240, and all those dags are shown adjacent to the land of defendant, and those dags are Dag No. 229, 237 and 241 but nowhere in trace map there is any mention that above dags are of govt. land. So, the report of survey commissioner under aforesaid circumstances, appears to be ambiguous and vague. Further, it also do not speak about the procedure as to how the survey and inspection was done. Nor survey report was supported by field book, which is mandatory to look into, when survey commissioner is not examined upon his report, more particularly, to know about the procedure/ method applied by him to arrive at his findings.
Further, it also do not speak about the procedure as to how the survey and inspection was done. Nor survey report was supported by field book, which is mandatory to look into, when survey commissioner is not examined upon his report, more particularly, to know about the procedure/ method applied by him to arrive at his findings. But, unfortunately, the Case record reveals that the field book was withheld and my learned predecessor got mislead by the Survey Commission report.” 13.7. Thereafter, the learned executing Court further went on to observe that: “ The survey commissioner report appears to be have been prepared to fit the case of the plaintiff so as to corroborate and substantiate their claim of land measuring 1 K 4 L from defendants. Further, it is also pertinent to mention that as per materials available on record, like the copy of Jamabandi vis-a-vis the survey commissioner report, the plaintiff is shown to have total land measuring 4 K 16 L and out of that 4 K 16 L they had admittedly sold 2 K to two different sets of persons in 1985 and 2 K 7L. land is subsequently disclosed to be acquired by PWD for PWD road. And if that be a position, then under aforesaid admitted position of the fact as per record, the plaintiff's cannot have more than 9 L of land in their Dag No.240 of Patta No.5. Not to speak of their claim for 1 K 16 L from the defendants. So, claim of the plaintiff appears to be false and misleading.” 13.8. Thereafter, the learned executing Court arrived at a finding that the conduct of the plaintiffs appears not to be fair and in accordance with law and thereafter, decided the issue No. (i) in affirmative. Subsequently, the learned executing Court also decided the issue No. (ii) in affirmative. 14. It is to be noted here that indisputably, the Survey Commissioner’s Report was not challenged by any of the parties and the finding of the learned trial Court in respect Dag No. 240, was not interfered with by this Court in the first appeal. Further, it appears that the Commissioner’s report, having not been challenged, by any of the parties, the same had already attained finality. 15.
Further, it appears that the Commissioner’s report, having not been challenged, by any of the parties, the same had already attained finality. 15. It is worth mentioning in this context that the respondent herein had preferred an appeal being RFA No. 24/2009 and in the said appeal, this Court was pleased to formulate one point for determination on the Commissioner’s Report being issue No.(a) as under:- (a) Whether the learned trial court erred on facts and in law in relying on the Commissioner’s Report submitted pursuant to his appointment under order XXVI Rule 9 CPC ? 15.1. Then after detailed discussion answered the point in negative by holding that the learned trial Court is not found to have erred either on facts or in law in relying on the Commissioner’s Report submitted pursuant to his appointment under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC. The finding so recorded by this Court had not been challenged by any of the parties. And as such, the finding so recorded by the learned trial Court as well as by this Court has already attained finality. 15.2. That being so, the learned executing Court ought not to have gone into the question of the reliability and acceptability of the Survey Commissioner’s Report. Further, the learned executing Court ought not to have observed that the Survey Commissioner’s Report is ambiguous and vague and that the Survey Commissioner’s Report appears to be have been prepared to fit the case of the plaintiffs so as to corroborate and substantiate their claim of land measuring 1 K 4 L from defendants. And thereby the learned executing Court appears to have gone behind the decree which is not at all permissible in law. 16. Though, Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the learned executing Court can go behind the decree, yet the submission of Mr. Prakash left his Court unimpressed. In that view of the matter, the impugned order so passed by the learned executing Court appears to be arbitrary and illegal and without any jurisdiction, and on such count the same requires interference of this Court. 17. I have also carefully gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents and it appears that the aforementioned decisions proceed on its own facts and are not applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
17. I have also carefully gone through the decisions referred by Mr. Prakash, learned counsel for the respondents and it appears that the aforementioned decisions proceed on its own facts and are not applicable in all force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. And to decide the issue, raised in the present petition, reference to those decisions, is found to be not necessary herein this case and therefore, detailed discussion is not required to be made in this judgment and order. 18. In the result, I find sufficient merit in this petition and accordingly the same stands allowed. The impugned order dated 06.06.2019, stands set aside and quashed. 19. Consequent upon, the learned executing Court shall, forthwith, restore the Title Execution Case No. 02/2009, to its file and thereafter, proceed to dispose of the same in accordance with law, keeping in mind the directions issued by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of :- (i) Rahul S. Shah vs. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi & Ors, reported in (2021) 6 SCC 418 ; (ii) Bhoj Raj Garg vs. Goyal Education and Welfare Society & Ors., in Special Leave to Appeal(C) No(s) 19654/2022; (iii) Periyamal (Dead) Through LRS & Others vs. Rajamani & Anr. Etc. in Civil Appeal No. 3640-3642 of 2020. 20. Send down the record of the learned executing Court with a copy of this Judgment and Order. 21. The parties have to bear their own cost.[ 2025 DAILYLAW 3647 (GAU) · dailylaw.ai ]