1 2025:CGHC:32783 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 7597 of 2023 1 - Jalim Singh Rajhans S/o Late Purushottam Lal Aged About 48 Years Resident Of Village Odkakan, Post Pandripali, Tahsil Bilaigarh, District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Director Directorate of Panchayat, Vikas Bhawan, Sector- 19, North Block, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Collector District- Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) 4 - Chief Executive Officer District Panchayat, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) 5 - Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat, Bilaigarh, Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.) ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Advocate. For State-Respondents : Mr. Suyash Dhar Badgaiya, Deputy Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Order on Board 14-07-2025 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging his transfer order dated 27-11-2014, and claimed for his posting in the home district and prayed for the following reliefs:- Digitally signed by MOHAMMAD AADIL KHAN 2 “10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/cancel the transfer order dated 27-11-2014 (Annexure P-1) and may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities for posting of petitioner in the Home District i.e. District Sarangarh-Bilaigarh (C.G.). 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief, as it may deem-fit and appropriate.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a Panchayat Secretary, and was posted at Gram Panchayat Dhourabhata (Dho.), Janpad Panchayat Bilaigarh. By the impugned transfer order dated 27-11-2014, he has been transferred from Dhourabhata to Gram Panchayat Potiya, Janpad Panchayat Gariyaband. Immediately after his transfer order dated 27-11-2014, he suffered from paralysis and could not perform his duties. After recovering from his ailment, on 10-04-2023, he moved his representation before Respondent No. 3 for his posting in his home district, i.e. Sarangarh-Bilaigarh. On his representation, the Respondent No. 3 seeks direction from the Respondent No. 2 vide memo dated 02-05-2023. Till date, his representation has not been considered by the concerned authorities. He would further submit that the State Government has issued the notification on 16-09-2009 that the transfer of the Panchayat Secretaries should be within the districts, yet he has been transferred from Bilaigarh to Gariyaband. Therefore, the impugned transfer order is liable to be quashed, and the authorities may be directed to give posting in the home district of the petitioner. 3. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent/State would submit that the matter is to be properly replied by the Jila Panchayat, Raipur; however, he would oppose the prayer of the petitioner and submit that the transfer order dated 27-11-2014 is challenged by the petitioner after about 9 years, which itself is not bona fide. The petitioner explained the delay that he was suffering from paralysis, but except for a single-page medical certificate, there is no document of his treatment or ailment. The medical certificate submitted by 3 the petitioner itself is suspicious, as the said certificate is issued on 30-11- 2014, whereas in the said certificate, the petitioner is suffering from paralysis since 30-11-2014 to 11-01-2023. One cannot certify the treatment of a future date; thus, the medical certificate is a fabricated document. He would also submit that from the pleading, it appears that he is not on duty and remains absent from his duty, directly claiming to be posted at his home district to cover his absence by any observation of the order passed by this court. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 5. Undisputedly, the transfer order of the petitioner dated 27-11-2014 is challenged by him in the present petition after about 9 years. From the memo dated 02-05-2023 (Annexure P-9), it transpires that the petitioner was relieved on 09-12-2014 from Gram Panchayat Dhourabhata (Dho.) in compliance with his transfer order dated 27-11-2014. From the pleading and document annexed with the petition, admittedly the petitioner is not on duty. The petitioner could not demonstrate that he is on medical leave. Though he tried to convince this court that he informed the Respondent No. 5 about his ailment on 16-12-2014 (Annexure P-5) but that itself is not sufficient to hold that medical leave was sanctioned to the petitioner. There is no medical treatment documents filed by the petitioner except a one-page medical certificate issued by the doctor, in which he made one one-line note for every year. The medical certificate issued by the doctor annexed at page No. 18 of the petition is also suspicious because the doctor has certified the treatment from 30-11-2014 to 11-01-2023 on 30-11-2014 itself. 6. The petitioner cleverly claimed the relief that he may be posted in his home district. The petitioner, first to make his service joined, if the authorities would permit after such a long period, and only thereafter, he can claim about place 4 of his posting. He tried to take advantage of the observation of the order passed by this court, if any, to join his duty and to cover up the lapses. 7. In the matter of “Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation,”, 2022 SCC Online SC 641, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed (in Nav Rattanmal Vs. state of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1704). The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely, (a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence (State of Kerala Vs. V.R. Kalliyanikutty, (1999) 3 SCC 657 relying on Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605; Halsbury’s Laws of England , Vol. 68 (2021) para 1005. Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression.(see Popat and Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association (2005) 7 SCC 510).Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (See N. Blarkrishnan Vs. M. 5 Krishnamurthy, (1998)7 SCC 123. Referring to the principle of delay and laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mils Ltd Vs. M.R. Mehar, President, Industrial Court, Bombay AIR 1967 SC 1450, had referred to the view expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company and Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (L.R.) 5 P.C.221 in the following words: “ Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine, Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by this conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case,if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” 8. Further, in the matter of “Bichitrananda Behera v. State of Orissa and others”, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 883, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ 6 petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25:” 9. The court must scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any sufficient explanation or not. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons; such delay does not deserve any indulgence, and on the said ground alone, this court deems it appropriate to dismiss the petition. The doctrine of delay and latches, or for that matter, statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of 7 peace. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. 10. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the delay caused by the petitioner in approaching this court, I am not inclined to interfere in the present matter. Consequently, the instant writ petition is hereby dismissed. 11. No order as to cost(s). Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge Aadil