IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.263/2025 Date of Decision: 02nd December, 2025. Dharam Chand .....Appellant Versus Tikkam Ram and Ors. …..Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant: Mr. Atul Jhingan, Advocate. For the Respondents: Nemo. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral). The appellant, by filing this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, CPC), has assailed the judgment and decree dated 02.08.2025, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, HP in Civil Miscellaneous Application No.487/2024, affirming the judgment and decree dated 31.05.2023, passed by the learned Civil Judge Manali, District Kullu, HP in Counter Claim No.135/2023/2013. 2. For the sake of convenience, hereinafter in this judgment, the parties shall be referred in the same manner in which they were referred before learned trial Court. The facts material and relevant for the disposal of the present appeal are that the respondent No. 1/plaintiff, Tikam Ram, filed a suit for declaration that settlement deeds bearing Nos. 394, 401, 402, and 403 executed by the original defendant No. 1, Kamli @ Kamla (since deceased), in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3 were illegal, null, and void, and that defendant No. 1 had no 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? YES 2 right to deprive the plaintiff and proforma defendants No. 4 and 5 from inheriting the suit land. 3. In the suit, the applicant, Dharam Chand, was arrayed as proforma defendant No. 4. Defendants No. 1 to 3 filed a counterclaim, registered as CIS No. 135/2023/2013, pleading that the settlement deeds were executed out of free will and that the plaintiff was a stranger to the property. The applicant filed a separate written statement in the main suit supporting the prayer for declaring the settlement deeds null and void, but he did not file any written statement in the counterclaim as no claim was made against him. The learned trial Court, vide common judgment dated 31.05.2023, dismissed the main suit and decreed the counter claim. 4. Against this judgment, the respondent/plaintiff preferred First Appeal No. 17/2023 before the Additional District Judge. The applicant was a party to this appeal as respondent No. 4. According to the applicant, he was under the impression that the plaintiff's appeal challenged the decree in both the main suit and the counter claim. Therefore, believing his interests in the suit property were being contested by the plaintiff's appeal, the applicant did not file separate appeals or cross-objections against the judgment. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 30.11.2023. 5. Subsequently, the respondent/plaintiff filed a Regular Second Appeal, RSA No. 95/2024, before the Hon'ble High 3 Court of Himachal Pradesh against the First Appellate Court's decree. The applicant was arrayed as respondent No. 3 in this RSA. The applicant, under the same impression that the RSA encompassed the entire dispute including the counter claim decree, inadvertently did not put in an appearance before the Hon'ble High Court. The Hon'ble High Court dismissed the RSA vide judgment dated 24.06.2024. 6. The applicant, aggrieved by the decrees which he claims adversely affect his inheritance rights in the suit land, subsequently filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge. Alongside the appeal, he filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing. In the application, he argued that the delay was not intentional but was due to a bona fide mistake and misapprehension. He contended that he believed the earlier appeals filed by the plaintiff contested the entire judgment, including the parts affecting him, which led him to not file a separate appeal in time. He stated he only later realized the need for an independent challenge. He pleaded that he had a prima facie good case on the merits concerning his rights in the suit property and that a valuable right of inheritance should not be forfeited due to a technical lapse. 7. The contesting respondents opposed the condonation application. They argued that the applicant had no locus standi to challenge the decree as he was merely a proforma defendant 4 who had filed no counterclaim. They asserted that the applicant was duly represented by counsel throughout the trial and the first appeal, and was fully aware of the proceedings. They contended that the plea of a bona fide mistake was an afterthought, and the applicant had not approached the court with clean hands. They emphasized that the judgment had attained finality up to the Hon'ble High Court, and the applicant's inaction for such a long period showed a lack of diligence. They argued no sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay was shown. 8. The learned First Appellate Court, after hearing the parties, dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Being aggrieved by this order dismissing his application for condonation of delay, the applicant has filed the present Regular Second Appeal. 9. Heard counsel for the appellants, perused the impugned order. 10. It is a matter of record that the present appellant was proforma defendant No. 4 before the learned trial Court in the original suit, as is evident from the memo of parties of the judgment dated 31.05.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge, and he was duly represented by counsel throughout those proceedings. The judgment and decree of the learned trial Court dismissed the suit and decreed the counter claim filed by the original defendants No. 1 to 3, and it is noted that the appellant 5 was not made a party to the said counter claim. Upon the plaintiff's first appeal, the appellant was arrayed as respondent No. 4 before the learned First Appellate Court and was again duly represented by counsel. The appellant's averment that he inadvertently did not appear before the Hon'ble High Court in the subsequent regular second appeal is contradicted by his own admission of having due knowledge of that proceeding. The first appeal was dismissed on 30.11.2023, the regular second appeal was dismissed on 24.06.2024, and the present application for condonation of delay was filed only on 17.09.2024. While the law leans towards adjudication on merits, a party seeking condonation must demonstrate a sufficient cause that prevented timely action. 11. The record unequivocally establishes that the appellant, represented by legal counsel, had full knowledge of the proceedings at every stage, from the trial court through to the Hon'ble High Court. His failure to avail of the statutory remedy within the prescribed period of limitation, despite this knowledge and professional representation, demonstrates a lack of due diligence. Furthermore, a significant legal impediment exists: the appellant, having been a proforma defendant and not a party to the counter claim, lacks the requisite locus standi to challenge the decree passed thereon. 12. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in SLP (C) 6 No.17575 of 2023 title Thirunagalingam vs. Lingeswaran & Anr. decided on 13.05.2025, relevant extract whereof is being reproduced here-in-below:- “Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasized in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet.” 13. Other than the aforesaid in the case of Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81 while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in as follows:- 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means 7 “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. 8 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. For these reasons, the appellant has failed to make out any sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeal before the First Appellate Court, and consequently, the Learned First Appellate Court committed no error of law or perversity in appreciating the facts and evidence. 15. In the aforesaid facts and attending circumstances, there arises no question of law, much-less a substantial question of law for consideration of the Court, therefore, the 9 appeal is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 02nd December, 2025 (Gaurav Rawat/TB)