JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 02.04.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rampur Bushahar, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the accused (respondent before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 IPC . It was asserted that the informant Partap Thakur (PW-1) was going towards Rampur Bushahar in an Auto bearing registration No. HP50-0540. The Auto reached near Bushahar Regency at 1:20 p.m. A Car bearing registration No. HP38A-6550 came from the Rampur side at a high speed and hit the Auto on the wrong side of the road. The Auto was damaged. The driver of the auto, Bashir Ahmad (PW-4), the passengers of Auto Kishore Parmar (PW-2), Ramesh Chauhan (PW-3), and informant Partap Singh (PW-1) sustained injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the car. The injured were taken to the hospital. An intimation was given to the police. An entry No.19 was recorded in the Police Station. HC Shashi Bhushan (PW-10) and Constable Devi Singh (P-7) were sent to verify the correctness of the information. The informant made a statement (Ext. PW-1/A), which was sent to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-7/A) was registered. HC Sashi Bhushan filed an application (Ext.PW-10/A) for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr Rajeswari Azad (PW-8) medically examined Partap Thakur (PW-1), Kishore Parmar (PW-2), Ramesh Chauhan (PW-3), and Bashir Ahmad (PW-4) and found that they had sustained simple injuries, which could have been caused within six hours of examination in a roadside accident. He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-8/A, Ext.PW-8/B, Ext.PW- 8/C, and Ext.PW-8D). HC Shashi Bhushan (PW-10) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-10/B). He seized the car bearing registration no. HP38A-6550 vide memo (Ext.PW- 5/A). He also seized the Auto bearing registration No. HP-50- 0540 along with its documents vide Memo (Ex.PW-4/A). He issued MLCs (Ext.PW-8/A, Ext.PW-8/B, Ext.PW- 8/C, and Ext.PW-8D). HC Shashi Bhushan (PW-10) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-10/B). He seized the car bearing registration no. HP38A-6550 vide memo (Ext.PW- 5/A). He also seized the Auto bearing registration No. HP-50- 0540 along with its documents vide Memo (Ex.PW-4/A). Trilok Chand (PW-9) examined the vehicles and found that there was no mechanical defect in them, which could have led accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW-9/A and Ext.PW9/B). The Auto was handed over on Sapurdari vide memo (Ext.PW-5/B). The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC , to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Pratap Singh (PW-1) is the informant. Kishore Parmar (PW-2), Ramesh Chauhan (PW-3), and Bashir Ahmad (PW-4) are the injured. Mohamad Ali (PW-5) and Vijay Kumar (PW-6) witnessed the recoveries. Constable Devi Singh (PW-7) carried the rukka to the Police Station. Dr Rajeshwari Azad (PW-8) medically examined the injured. Trilok Chand (PW-9) mechanically examined both the vehicles. HC Shashi Bhushan (PW-10) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the car was seized. He denied the rest of the prosecution's case. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that there were major contradictions in the statements of witnesses, which made the prosecution’s case doubtful. HC Shashi Bhushan (PW-10) proved that Bashir Ahmad (PW-1) was driving the auto without a valid driving license. The site plan did not depict the correct spot position. The prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC . 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the instant appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without assigning any reason. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the instant appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without assigning any reason. The injured categorically stated that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. There was no reason to disbelieve their testimonies. Mechanic Trilok Chand (PW-9) proved that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicles, which could have led to the accident. The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is contrary to the material placed on record. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the appellant, and Ms Reeta Hingmang, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The witnesses consistently stated that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused. These statements were discarded without assigning any reason. The accused drove the vehicle towards the right side of the road and violated the Rules of the Road Regulations. Learned Trial Court had not considered this aspect. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Ms Reeta Hingmang, learned counsel for the accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence, and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “11. It was observed at page 440: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38.First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29.After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappav. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 :(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction, or condition on the exercise of such power, and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8..…8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. HC Sashi Bhushan (PW-10) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/B mentioning Kinnaur and Nogli as two ends of the road. He did not mention Dakolad or Rampur in the site plan. He did not explain in his statement on oath which vehicle was towards the left side of the road and which vehicle was towards the right side. As per the prosecution, the auto was going from Dakolad towards Rampur, whereas the car was coming from Rampur. Note-C reads that the parapet was shown on Nogli-Rampur National Highway. Point D was a National Highway from Shimla to Kinnaur. A vehicle going to Rampur should have been eastern side, whereas the vehicle coming from Rampur should have been towards the western side, as the vehicles are required to be driven towards the left side of the road. The site plan depicts both vehicles towards the western side of the road. Thus, the car was on its correct side, whereas the Auto was on its wrong side. 15. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State , AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. 15. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State , AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 16. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar 2008 H.L.J. 399, that where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 17. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 18. The photographs (Ext.C-1 to C-3) show the position of the vehicles after the accident. HC Shashi Bhsuhan (PW-10) admitted in his cross-examination that the photographs (Ext.C-1 to Ext.C-3) depicted the position of the vehicles after the accident. Therefore, these photographs do not depict the position of the vehicles at the time of the accident, and they are not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. 19. Pratap Singh (PW-1) stated that the accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the accused. Kishore Parmar (PW-2) stated that the accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the accused. Ramesh Chauhan (PW-3) stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver and the high speed of the car. Bashir Ahmad (PW- 4) stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. 20. No person had deposed about the facts which could lead to an inference of the negligence of the accused. The statements made by the witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused are not sufficient to convict him. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The statements made by the witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused are not sufficient to convict him. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 21. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), wherein it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 22. Therefore, the prosecution cannot derive any advantage from the statement of the witnesses deposing about the negligence of the accused. 23. The witnesses also stated that the accident occurred due to high speed. None of the witnesses has explained what is meant by the term of high speed. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus, and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 24. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 25. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 25. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 26. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 27. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable merely because the witnesses have stated that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed. 28. No other negligence was attributed to the accused. 29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the negligence of the accused, and this Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed.Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 31. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed.Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 31. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 32. A copy of the judgment, along with record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.