( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 1 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No.3714 of 2025 ------ Jaya Sarkar, aged about 54 years, D/o Dhirendra Nath Sarkar, Permanent R/o Waxpol Road, near Shiv Mandir, Anand Vihar Colony, Booti More, P.O.-Booty, P.S.-Sadar, District-Ranchi, Present Add: Nagarmal Mor Seva Sada, Near Laxmi Narayan Mandir, Upper Bazar, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi. … Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand … Opposite Party ------ For the Petitioner : Mr. Sidhartha Roy, Advocate For the State : Mr. Manoj Kr. Mishra, Addl.P.P. ------ P R E S E N T HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY By the Court:- Heard the parties. 2. This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S., 2023 with the prayer to quash and set aside the FIR as well the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Ranchi Sadar P.S. Case No.525 of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(3), 351(2), 352 and 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023 and the said case is pending in the Court of learned JMFC-IV, Ranchi. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the investigation of the case is still going on and the charge sheet has not yet been submitted in this case. ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 2 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 4. The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner is the sister of the informant and the father of the informant purchased a house out of his self-acquired property, but this house was purchased in the name of the common mother of the petitioner and the informant. The mother of the informant sold the house to the petitioner. The father of the informant executed a will contending therein that the informant will be entitled to the whole of his property but the only rider was that the informant has to pay only Rs.10 lakhs each to the petitioner and their other sister. Keeping in view the relationship between the petitioner and the informant, the informant ensured that one plot is purchased in the name of the petitioner by paying Rs.22 lakhs out of 24.50 lakhs value of the plot and in consideration of the same, the petitioner put the informant in possession of the house which was sold by their mother in favour of the petitioner, but now the petitioner is not transferring the ownership of the said house of the father of the petitioner and the informant and is also claiming the ownership of the plot in respect of which the informant has already paid Rs.22 lakhs. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Anuj Kumar Triwedi @ Anuj Kumar & Others vs. The State of Jharkhand & Another dated 15.01.2024 in Cr.M.P. No.3478 of 2022 and submits that therein this Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207, paragraph nos.24 & 25 of which reads as under :- ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 3 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 “24. Now, we revert back to the allegations in the complaint against the appellant. The allegation is that the appellant with two or three other unknown persons, one of whom was holding a revolver, came to the complainant's house and abused him in filthy language and attempted to assault him and when some neighbours arrived there the appellant and the other persons accompanying him fled the spot. The above allegation taking on its face value does not satisfy the ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 as has been enumerated by this Court in the above two judgments. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The mere allegation that the appellant came and abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients as laid down in para 13 of the judgment of this Court in Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] . 25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following: “… The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.”(Emphasis supplied) A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.” and submits that neither the offence punishable under Section 351 of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code nor the offence punishable under Section 352 of the B.N.S., 2023 ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 4 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 which corresponds to Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that as admittedly petitioner is the owner of the house i.e. place of occurrence, so entering the said premises will not attract the offence punishable under Section 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in the absence of any allegation against the petitioner of playing deception since the beginning of the transaction between the parties, the offence punishable under Section 318 of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 418 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits that in the absence of any entrustment of any property to the petitioner, the offence punishable under Section 316(2) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that the allegation against the petitioner is false and the dispute between the parties is basically a civil dispute. It is next submitted that the criminal case has been instituted only for wreaking vengeance against the petitioner and to grab the property of the petitioner. It is next submitted that the petitioner has already lodged a Sanha on 08.10.2025 against the informant that they were pressurizing the petitioner by sending anti-social elements and goons to her home for transferring her share to the name of the ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 5 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 informant. It is lastly submitted that the prayer as prayed for, in this Cr.M.P., be allowed. 10. Learned Addl.P.P. appearing for the State on the other hand vehemently opposes the prayer of the petitioner made in the instant Cr.M.P and submits that the allegations made against the petitioner in this Cr.M.P. is sufficient to constitute each of the offences in respect of which the FIR has been registered. Therefore, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed. 11. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that it is a settled principle of law that mere inability of an accused person to return the loan amount would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika vs. State of Bihar & Another reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336 paragraph-6 of which reads as under:- 6. “Xxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has nowhere been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC.” (Emphasis supplied) ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 6 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 12. Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of playing deception since the beginning of the transaction between the parties. 13. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that even if the entire allegations against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still the offence punishable under Section 318(3) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 14. So far as the offence punishable under Section 316(2) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the essential ingredients to constitute the said offence is that there must be an entrustment and there must be misappropriation or conversion of any property to his own use or dishonestly used or dispose of the entrusted property in violation of any legal direction or of any legal contract as has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ram Narayan Popli vs. CBI reported in (2003) 3 SCC 641. 15. Now coming to facts of the case, there is absolutely no allegation against the petitioner of being entrusted with any property and in the absence of any dishonest misappropriation of any entrusted property, in the considered opinion of this Court; even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, still the ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 7 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 offence punishable under Section 316(2) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out. 16. So far as the offence punishable under Section 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023 which corresponds to Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is pertinent to mention here that the undisputedly the petitioner is the owner of the house in question; since it being the admitted case of the informant that the petitioner is the owner of the house concerned, so the petitioner entering the house owned by her, cannot constitute the offence of criminal trespass punishable under Section 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023. 17. So far as the offences punishable under Section 351(2) and 352 of the B.N.S., 2023 is concerned, they are non-cognizable offences. 18. In view of the discussions made above as it is crystal clear that no cognizable offence is made out against the petitioner, even if the entire allegations made against the petitioner are considered to be true in their entirety, this Court has no hesitation in holding that continuation of this criminal proceeding based on the First Information Report, will amount to abuse of process of law because basically a cloak of criminal case has been given by the informant to the civil dispute between the parties; obviously for the purpose of wreaking vengeance because of the acrimony between the parties. 19. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law and this is a fit case where the FIR ( 2025:JHHC:38699 ) 8 Cr. M.P. No.3714 of 2025 as well the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Ranchi Sadar P.S. Case No.525 of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(3), 351(2), 352 and 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023, be quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 20. Accordingly, the FIR as well the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Ranchi Sadar P.S. Case No.525 of 2025 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 316(2), 318(3), 351(2), 352 and 329(3) of the B.N.S., 2023, is quashed and set aside qua the petitioner only. 21. In the result, this Cr.M.P., stands allowed. (Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated the 22nd of December, 2025 AFR/ Abhiraj Uploaded on 03/01/2026