JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 11.07.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Solan, Camp at Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P.(learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction dated 26.02.2011 and order of sentence dated 01.03.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P., (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly, stated the facts leading to the present revision are that the police filed a challan against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337, and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ( IPC ), and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act). It was stated that informant Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) was going to Bagbania on 13.05.2005. He reached Patwarkhana at 12:45 p.m. when a tipper came at high speed from Baddi. The tipper crushed a dog and collided with a motorcycle. The tipper stopped after approximately 70-80 feet, and the driver fled from the scene. The motorcyclist’s right leg was crushed, and he sustained multiple injuries. The motorcycle bore registration No. PB11Y-7296, and the tipper bore registration No. HR68-4470. The accident was caused by the tipper’s excessive speed and the driver’s negligence. The injured person was taken to the hospital, and an intimation (Ext.PW-7/A) was given to the police Station. HC Neelam Kumar (PW-7) and HC Roop Singh were sent to the hospital, while Constable Narender Kumar was sent to the place of the incident. HC Neelam Kumar (PW-7) submitted an application (Ext.PW-7/B) seeking the Medical Officer’s opinion on the injured’s fitness to make the statement. The Medical Officer certified that the patient was gasping and unfit to make the statement (Ext.PW-4/A). HC Neelam Kumar (PW-7) recorded the statement of Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) which was sent to the police station, where the FIR (Ext.PW-7/C) was registered. HC Neelam Kumar also took photographs (Ext.P1 to P11), whose negatives are Ext.P12 to P22, and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-7/D). He seized the tipper bearing registration No. HR68-4470 vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A), and the motorcycle vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Rajinder Singh (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the tipper and motorcycle. He found no defects in them that could have caused the accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW-5/A). He seized the tipper bearing registration No. HR68-4470 vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A), and the motorcycle vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Rajinder Singh (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the tipper and motorcycle. He found no defects in them that could have caused the accident. He issued a report (Ext.PW-5/A). The injured succumbed to his injuries. An inquest (Ext.PW-7/F) was conducted, and an application (Ext.PW-7/E) was made for the post-mortem. Dr Yuvraj Shauri (PW-10) performed the post-mortem examination. He found multiple fractures, profuse blood loss, hypovolemic shock, cardio-respiratory arrest, leading to death. He issued the report (Ext.PW10/A). The tipper's documents were seized vide memo (Ext.PW7/G). The motorcycle was handed over to Sabar Ali, brother of the deceased, through a memo (Ext.PW-6/A). Statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their accounts, and after completing the investigation, the challan was prepared and submitted before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304-A of the IPC and Section 187 of the M.V.Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses to prove its case. Prem Chand (PW-1), Ashok Kumar (PW-2), Constable Ram Pyara (PW-6) and Jagdish Chand (PW-9) witnessed various recoveries. Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) is the informant. Rajinder Singh (PW-5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles. HC Neelam Kumar (PW-7) investigated the matter. Dr Sunita Sood (PW-8) issued a certificate that the patient was unfit to make the statement. Dr Yuvraj Shauri (PW-10) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Mangat Ram (PW-11) proved the entry in the daily diary. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He specifically denied that he was driving the tipper. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case, but that was not sufficient to discard it. Informant Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) identified the accused and specifically stated that the accused was driving the tipper. There was nothing to doubt his testimony. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case, but that was not sufficient to discard it. Informant Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) identified the accused and specifically stated that the accused was driving the tipper. There was nothing to doubt his testimony. He did not know the accused before the date of the incident, but had given a detailed description of the clothes worn by the accused at the time of the accident. The accident occurred during broad daylight, and it was possible for the informant to see the accused. The failure to examine the owner was not material. The statements of witnesses proved that the accused was driving the tipper at a high speed, which had hit the motorcycle and crushed it. The principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply to the present case, and the accused failed to explain the accident. Therefore, the accused was convicted and sentenced as under:- Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. 304-A of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for fifteen days. 187 of M.V.Act The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Appellate Court. Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) had witnessed the accident. The road was wide and straight. Thus, a driver was in a position to see the road condition. He hit the motorcycle from the rear and failed to maintain an adequate distance between his vehicle and the motorcycle. The identity of the driver was duly established. The motorcyclist died in the accident. There was no mechanical defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. He hit the motorcycle from the rear and failed to maintain an adequate distance between his vehicle and the motorcycle. The identity of the driver was duly established. The motorcyclist died in the accident. There was no mechanical defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. Therefore, the accused was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. No interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the material placed on record. The ingredients of Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC were not satisfied. The statement of Nachhatar Singh (PW4) was not credible. Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case. The benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act was not granted to the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Ms Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms Srishti Negi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kultehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 10. Ms Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the identity of the accused. No Test Identification Parade was conducted, and there is nothing on record to show as to how the accused was connected to the commission of the crime. Use of the term high speed by itself is insufficient to infer the rashness or negligence. Learned Courts below erred in holding that the identity of the accused was proved and the prosecution had succeeded in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, she prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment of the learned Courts below be set aside. She relied upon the following judgments in support of her submission: - Tukesh Singh & others vs. State of Chattisgarh 2025 SCC Online SC1110; - Sher Singh vs. State of H.P. , 2017 : 6503 - State of H.P. vs. Mohidner Kumar 2010 , : 1860 - Deep Raj vs. State of H.P. 2025 : : 19449 11. She relied upon the following judgments in support of her submission: - Tukesh Singh & others vs. State of Chattisgarh 2025 SCC Online SC1110; - Sher Singh vs. State of H.P. , 2017 : 6503 - State of H.P. vs. Mohidner Kumar 2010 , : 1860 - Deep Raj vs. State of H.P. 2025 : : 19449 11. Mr Lokender Kutlehira, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the tipper had hit the motorcycle from the rear. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the driver of the tipper had failed to maintain a sufficient distance to avoid collision, which was gross negligence on his part. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) had duly identified the accused. The learned Courts below had rightly held that the accident had occurred in broad daylight, giving ample chance to the witness to identify the driver. He had also given the description of the clothes worn by the driver, which shows that he was in a position to have a careful look at the driver. Learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was driving the vehicle, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10.Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14.The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986, where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12.This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13.Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. ThisCourt held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16.It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “27.It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See:Bir Singh(supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. 28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court. 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. The F.I.R. is silent regarding the name of the driver or any feature which could have led to the identification of the driver. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan , (2002) 1 SCC 702 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 256 : 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that when the identity of the accused is not known, the Investigating Officer needs to prove how he picked up the accused. It was observed at page 713: “26.Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a cognizable crime having been committed is known, but neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any indication available of the witnesses who would be able to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence, finding out the path which leads to the culprit. The ends, which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy, persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value.” 20. HC Neelam Kumar (PW-7) conducted the investigation; however, he did not specify in his examination- in-chief how he determined the identity of the driver. During cross-examination, he stated that the driver had left the spot, and his name was disclosed by Nachhatar Singh (PW-4). This assertion is factually inaccurate because Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) did not mention in his statement (Ext.PW-1/A) that the accused, Raghubir Singh, was driving the tipper. During cross-examination, Nachhatar Singh (PW4) stated that the driver had fled from the scene after stopping the tipper. He was not aware of the whereabouts of the owner or driver after the accident. Consequently, the testimony of Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) did not provide the name of the accused to the police. There is no evidence on record to indicate how the police ascertained that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 21. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) identified the accused in the Court. Learned Courts below held that the identification of the accused in the Court was sufficient because the incident occurred in broad daylight and Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) had sufficient opportunity to identify the driver. This finding cannot be sustained. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) stated in his examination-in-chief that the tipper was stopped after 10 Karams, and the driver ran away from the spot. He stated in his cross-examination that the accused ran away in his presence after stopping the tipper. He did not know the driver before the incident. The driver was wearing khaki pants and a blue check shirt. He had tied a cloth (PARNA) on his head, having black and red checks. 22. He stated in his cross-examination that the accused ran away in his presence after stopping the tipper. He did not know the driver before the incident. The driver was wearing khaki pants and a blue check shirt. He had tied a cloth (PARNA) on his head, having black and red checks. 22. It is apparent from the statement of Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) that the tipper was stopped at a distance of 10 Karams ( as per statement on oath) and 70-80 meters feet as per statement (Ext.PW-1/A). Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) also stated that he was standing near Patwarkhana, which is shown to be towards the left side of the road in the site plan (Ext.PW-7/D) for a vehicle coming from Baddi towards Nalagarh. The driver was sitting towards the right side. The vehicle was travelling at a high speed as per Nachhatar Singh (PW-4). Therefore, it is highly doubtful that Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) would have had an opportunity to see the driver carefully after the accident had occurred and the tipper had stopped at a distance. 23. Learned Trial Court was impressed by the fact that Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) had described the clothes worn by the driver, and held that his testimony could be relied upon to establish the identity of the accused. This conclusion overlooks the fact that the correctness of the description given by Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) was never verified. No witness stated that when the accused was apprehended, he was wearing a Parana having black and red checks, a shirt having blue checks and khaki pants. Had the accused been found wearing these clothes, the testimony of Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) would have been reliable, but without any evidence that the accused was wearing those clothes, the mere description of clothes does not fix the identity. 24. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) admitted in his cross- examination that he did not know the accused before the incident; therefore, it was essential to conduct a Test Identification Parade. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. 24. Nachhatar Singh (PW-4) admitted in his cross- examination that he did not know the accused before the incident; therefore, it was essential to conduct a Test Identification Parade. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed: "It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain. People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light." 25. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper, and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363: “It is undesirable that a witness should be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.” 26. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N. , (2024) 8 SCC 600 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed at page 605: “17.The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”! xxx 21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismisses the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant i.e. Accused 2 was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper. xxxx 23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406]). xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. xxx 27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases ofJayanv.State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402 : (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404. 28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 ], this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 ], SCC p. 44, para 18) “18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.” 27. This Court already held in Sher Singh (supra) and Mohinder Kumar (supra) that where the accused was not known to the witnesses, it was essential to conduct a Test Identification Parade, and in the absence of a Test Identification Parade, no reliance can be placed on the identification made before the Court for the first time 28. The record shows that the police had recorded the statement of Mohan Lal, the owner of the tipper, but did not cite him as a witness. He was the best person to name the person employed by him as a driver; hence, an adverse inference is to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding him. 29. Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his statement. 29. Jagdish (PW-3) did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined, and he denied that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.Therefore, no advantage can be derived from his statement. 29. There is no other evidence to establish that he accused was driving the tipper at the time of the accident. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused was driving the tipper at the time of the accident. Learned Courts below failed to notice the significance of the test identification parade, and the judgments and order passed by them cannot be sustained. 30. No other point was urged. 31. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside, and the accused is ordered to be acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304-A of IPC and Section 187 of M.V. Act. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused, shall be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 33. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 34. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.