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2025:CGHC:39514 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 262 of 2014 Shyamlal Mehar, S/o Late Shri Shambhuram Mehar, aged about – 60 years, R/o Palace Road, Kosta para, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Raigarh, Civil and Revenue District – Raigarh (C.G.) ... Appellant versus State of Chhattisgarh Through : Officer In-charge of the P.S. AJAK, Raigarh, Tahsil and District Raigarh (C.G.) ... Respondent For Appellant : Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Ms. Nand Kumari Kashyap, P.L. Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J
Judgment on Board 07.08.2025
1. The appellant in this appeal under Section 374(2) of CrPC has challenged the legality, validity and propriety of the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
2 / 18 07.03.2014 passed by the Special Judge (constituted under SC/ST Atrocities) Act, 1989, Raigarh (C.G.), in Special Case No. 21/2005, whereby the appellant stands convicted under Section 294 of IPC, however, considering the provision of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short ‘the Act’), he is convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 3 (1) (x) of S.C./S.T. Act, R.I. for 03 years with fine of Rs.6,000/-, in default of payment of fine amount to undergo additional R.I. for 06 months
2. Prosecution story, in brief, is that complainant Chandel Singh Manhar, who is a member of Scheduled Caste was working as Educational Coordinator in Bhupdev Sankul Kendra. On 18.03.2005 at around 12.30 PM, he was preparing the list of Supervisor for 5th and 8th Board Examination in the Sankul Kendra. Along with him Vidyadhar Thethwar, Incharge, Sankul was also present. At the relevant time, appellant Shyamlal Mehar came there on the pretext of giving monthly statement and started hurling filthy abuses. The complainant objected the act of the appellant then he told him to take monthly statement saying
3 / 18 that who made this Chamar as Educational Coordinator and started scuffling with Vidyadhar Thetwar, Sankul In-charge and tore the list of Supervisors which caused obstruction in work of examination. The said incident was witnessed by Ramlal Nishad, Assistant Teacher, Primary School, Sambhalpuri, Dhaniram Bareth, Peon, Sankul Kendra Bhupdev Primary School, Vidyadhar Thetwar, Bhupdev Primary School and one teacher Sant Michael. Further prosecution story is that on scuffling with Thetwar, In-charge Sankul, the complainant tried to intervene the matter but he started abusing the complainant by repeatedly saying ‘move aside chamar’ and threatened to teach him lesson. Thereafter, the complainant lodged written report (Ex.P-6) in Police Station against the appellant. On the basis of said written report (Ex.P-6), an FIR (Ex.P-9) was registered for the offence punishable under Section 294 of IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989. During investigation, statement of the complainant and witnesses were recorded. The case certificate (Ex.P-8) of the applicant was seized vide Ex.P-7. After completing usual investigation, charge sheet for the offence punishable under Sections 294 of IPC and 3 (1)(x) of the Act, 1989 was filed before the jurisdictional Court.
Thereafter, learned trial Court framed
4 / 18 charge under Sections 294 of IPC and 3(1) (x) of the Act, 1989, to which he abjured his guilt and prayed for trial. 3. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. Statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 4. Learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, by the impugned judgment convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. 5.
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the finding of the learned trial Court is erroneous and contrary to the settled principle of law and also against the rule of prudence. The three eye-witnesses were examined by the Prosecution but PW-2 Dhaniram Bareth turned hostile, PW- 3 Ramlal Nishad and PW-8 Vidyadhar Thathwar both have categorically admitted that the main basis of incident was with regard to the payment of monthly fee only and except that there was no such reason for altercation, which shows that the caste of the complainant was nowhere reason for the quarrel. Learned counsel further submits that according to the eye-witnesses PW-2, PW-3 and PW-8, the incident
5 / 18 took place in a room of the school which was not within the public domain, therefore, Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989 is not attracted against the appellant. Learned counsel also submits that except PW-2, PW-3 and PW-8, other witnessed like Puniram PW-1, Deepak Patel PW-4 and Benudhar Pandhi PW-9, who were also material witnesses of the case, turned hostile and there is contradiction in their statements to that of the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also submits that defence witness namely G.S. Sidar (A.S.I.) (D.W.-1) was also examined by the, who has categorically stated that the first report (Ex.D-5) was lodged by the appellant against the complainant and when the complainant came to know about this report, he lodged the instant report just to implicate the appellant in Atrocities Act. The learned trial Court ought to have appreciated the statement of defence witness while passing the impugned judgment. Learned counsel also submits that there are numbers of material contradictions and omission amongst the prosecution witness and, therefore, the benefit of doubt, of course, has to go to the appellant. Learned counsel also submits that the caste certificate was issued by the Tahsildar which was valid for six months and the same was issued after the occurrence of
6 / 18 the incident, therefore, also no case is made out against the appellant. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karuppudayar Vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Ors. reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133 and Rabindra Kumar Chhatoi Vs. State of Odisha & Anr. reported in 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 975.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State strongly opposed the prayer of the appellant and submits that the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant and no interference is called for by this Court. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the learned trial Court. 8. It is apparent from the record of the trial Court that the learned trial Court framed charge against the appellant under Sections 294 of IPC and 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989, and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court considering the provision of Act, 1989, convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in para of of this judgment. 9. As regards the conviction of the appellant under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, 1989, it transpires from the record of the
7 / 18 learned trial Court that the prosecution has produced caste certificate (Ex.P/8), perusal of which goes to show that it was issued by Nayab Tahsildar, Raigarh on 23.06.205 and valid for only 6 months. The FIR (Ex.P-9) was lodged by the complainant on 25.05.2005. Thus, it is clear that this caste certificate was issued by the Nayab Tahsildar after the occurrence of the incident and after lodging of FIR. Neelam Toppo (PW-3), Tahsildar, has stated that on 23.06.2005, he issued caste certificate (Ex.P-8) to Chandel Singh Manhar, S/o Late Rajaram, R/o Rajeev Nagar, Raigarh of Scheduled Caste Satnami. This witness in her cross-examination has admitted that the case certificate (Ex.P-8) is temporary, which is valid for only 06 months and thereafter permanent caste certificate is being issued. He has also submitted that he had issued the caste certificate on the basis of documents and affidavit. 10. The question which arises for consideration before this Court whether the conviction of the accused/appellant under the provision of SC/ST Act is sustainable or not when there is temporary caste certificate available on record. 11.
While dealing with the issue where the case certificate was issued after the occurrence of incident, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh observed in the matter of Babulal Patel Vs. The state of M. P. order dated 15.05.2024, passed in
8 / 18 Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2004, held in paras 6,7 & 8 as under:-
6. The learned trial court has convicted the accused for the offence of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and for this, reliance has been placed upon the provisional caste certificate of complainant, marked as Ex.P-2. It was issued by Tahsildar on 18.12.2002 and contents thereof reveal that it was issued temporarily while the incident of the present case occurred on 8.12.2002, therefore, it is clear that this provisional caste certificate was obtained from Tahsildar after the date of incident. 7. The circular issued by General Administration Department of Madhya Pradesh Government dated 30.6.2001 with No.F.7-32/2000/s very relevant here because it came into existence prior to the issuance of provisional certificate of Ex. P-2 in this case. This circular makes it clear that the practice of issuing provisional caste certificate is being stopped henceforth and only in exceptional circumstances, the provisional caste certificate would be issued. Those exceptional circumstances have also been discussed in the circular itself and they are: (1) for seeking admission in an education institute. (2) for applying for a Government job. (3) for appearing in an interview. (4) for applying in a Government scheme. Under only these four exceptional conditions and
9 / 18 that too when the caste certificate is required immediately, the provisional caste certificate was supposed to be issued; for it an application is duly supported with the affidavit and the reason of urgency was to be made.
The circular further clarifies that the validity period of this caste certificate would be maximum six months and all such cases in which provisional caste certificate is issued shall be enquired into within the prescribed time frame and if the applicant is not found to be entitled to the certificate, his provisional caste certificate would be cancelled. 8. The above discussed circular was in enforcement when the provisional caste certificate of complainant, marked as Ex.P-2, was issued by Tahsildar. This caste certificate was issued to prove the caste of complainant in a criminal case. Obviously, the purpose of issuing this provisional caste certificate was not covered under the circular of 30.6.2001. Thus, the learned trial court was in error in relying upon the caste certificate of Ex.P-2 which was issued in flagrant violation of the existing circular of Madhya Pradesh Government dated 30.6.2001. In the light of this observation, it is held that the caste of complainant was not duly proved in the case by any credible document. 12. Further, this Court in the matter of Meghnath Vs. State of Chhattisgarh [ Cr.A. No.822/2002 dated 24.06.2024], referring the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of
10 / 18 Kumari Madhuri Patil Vs. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development reported in AIR 1995 SC 94, held in paras 11 and 12 as under :-
13. “11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ku. Madhuri Patil (supra) which has been followed by this court in the case of Pilla Bai (supra). Supreme Court in Ku. Madhuri Patil (supra) has specifically observed that the application for grant of social status certificate shall be made to the Revenue Sub-Divisional Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued by such officer rather that officer at Taluk or Mandal Level. 14. 12. Considering the overall material and evidence available on record, in the light of the matter of Ku.
Madhuri Patil (supra), it is found that the Caste Certificate vide (Ex.P-3) of the complainant was issued by the Village-Sarpanch (PW-6) who is not a competent authority to issue caste certificate. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities Act) is not found proved beyond reasonable doubt and the same is liable to be set aside.”
15. Thus, from the aforesaid judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh and this Court, when looked into the present case, the caste certificate was issued after the occurrence of
11 / 18 incident and it was valid for only six months. The present is not an exceptional case. In the light of above judgment Babulal and Meghnath (supra), in the instant case, it is clear that caste certificate (Ex. P/8) was issued by Nayab Tahsildar after the date of incident on the basis of documents and affidavit of complainant, but learned Trial Court relied on temporary/provisional caste certificate, which was issued by Nayab Tahsildar, Raigarh, though it was only valid for six months and wrongly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC & ST Act. Thus, conviction of the accused/appellant under Section 3 (1)(x) of SC/ST Act is not sustainable, as such, findings recorded by learned Trial Court in this regard are set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 3 (1)(x) of SC/ ST Act. 16. The question which arise for consideration whether the learned trial Court was fully justified in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 294 of the IPC. 17. Punai Ram (PW-1) and Dhaniram Bareth (PW-2) are the Peon, who at the time of incident were posted in Bhupdev Primary School, have not supported the prosecution case and turned hostile. The prosecution cross-examined these witnesses and they only admitted this suggestion that some
12 / 18 quarrel took place between the complainant and the appellant.
They have specifically denied this fact that the appellant uttered caste remark against the complainant PW-
5. 18. Complainant Chandel Singh Manhar (PW-5) has stated that at the time of the incident in the year 2005, he was posted in Primary School Rampur and was doing the assigned task of Educational Coordinator in the office of Bhupdev Boys Primary School. On 18.3.2005, he and School Incharge Shri Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8), Ramlal Nishad (PW-3) - Teacher, Dhaniram (PW-2) and one teacher Shri Ajay Barwa of Saint Michael School were also present and were preparing the list of Supervisors for 10-12th Board Examination. At the same time, at around 12:30 PM, the peon of the appellant, whose name he does not know, came to them to give monthly details. Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) said that the monthly details of all the schools have been collected & submitted and they are doing some other work and said him to bring the monthly details later, thereafter, the peon of the appellant went back from there. He has also stated that after some time, the appellant came to their office with monthly details and asked Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) that why were they not taking monthly details, then he (PW-8) said that he has sent the monthly details and
13 / 18 currently doing the exam related work. Meanwhile, the appellant slapped Vidyadhar (PW-8) saying that why don't he take monthly details and tore the list that they were preparing. He has also stated that thereafter the appellant took Vidyadhar (PW-8) outside and started beating him. When he (this witness) tried to intervene, the accused called me a bastard Chamaar who are you to save me and I will deal with him first and then I will deal with you, saying this the appellant called him a bastard Chamaar, and abused him with filthy language and uttered caste remark. Even then he was trying to intervene between the appellant and Vidyadhar (PW-8). He has also stated that he separated them, even then the appellant was abusing him and Vidyadhar.
Thereafter, he lodged a written report of the incident in Harijan police station Raigarh vide Ex.P-6. The police had seized his caste certificate (Ex.P-8) vide seizure memo Ex.P-7 and has admitted his signature thereon. The police had also seized the broken glasses and documents vide Ex.P-4 and he admitted his signature thereon on ‘B to B’ part. In cross-examination, he has admitted that the appellant was Principal of Primary School and there was no cordial relation between the appellant and Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) and there used to be quarrel between them. This witness, in para 11, has also admitted this fact
14 / 18 that in written report (Ex.P-6) he did not write that the appellant uttered caste remark when he tried to intervene the dispute, and there is no reason for not writing the same in his written report (Ex.P-6). 19. Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) has stated that when the appellant was quarreling with him, complainant Chandel Singh Manhar (PW-5) came there to intervene the dispute and then the appellant started uttering caste remark. In para 12 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that he had not filed any report about the said incident in the office. He has no knowledge that on 18.03.2005 whether the appellant, in the capacity of Principal, had lodged any report against him in police station or not. This witness has denied this suggestion that on the date of incident, he threatened the appellant that he will get a report lodged against him in Harijan Police Station by complainant Chandel Singh Manhar (PW-5) and will implicate him under the Harijan Act, because he had filed a report against them yesterday. 20. It is clear from the statements of complainant (PW-5) and other prosecution witnesses that the incident took place in the room of the school in which the alleged overt act was attributed to the appellant. 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rabindra (supra) held in para 13 and 14 as under :-
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“13……...The place of occurrence of the alleged offence was at the backyard of the appellant’s house. Backyard of a private house cannot be within the public view.
The persons who accompanied the second respondent were also the employees or the labour force she had engaged for the purpose of carrying out repairs to her house which is adjacent to the appellant’s house. They cannot also be termed as public in general. 14. In the circumstances, we do not think that the alleged utterance of the appellant herein was
“in any place within public view”. Therefore, the allegation against the appellant herein, was not made out as such.”
22. While addressing the essentials to constitute Section 294 IPC, it is relevant to extract Section 294 of IPC as under :
“294. Obscene acts and songs. - Whoever, to the annoyance of others - (a) does any obscene act in any public place, or (b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both. 23. On order to secure a conviction, the provision of Section 294 IPC requires two particulars to be proved by the prosecution, i.e (i) the offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has sung, recited or uttered any obscene
16 / 18 songs or words in or near any public place; and (ii) has so caused annoyance to others. If the act complained of is not obscene, or is not done in any public place, or the song recited or uttered is not obscene, or is not sung, recited or uttered in or near any public place, or that it causes no annoyance to others, the offence is not committed. The courts should be sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of Section 294 IPC on today's society and its standards and its changing views of obscenity. The expression 'public place' is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Penal Code.
In Queen v. Wellard [(1884) 14 QBD 63, Grose, J. laid down that a public place "is a place where the public go, no matter whether they have a right to go or not", and this definition has been accepted by subsequent judicial decisions both in India and in England. A place in order to be public, must, therefore, be open to the public i.e. a place to which the public have access by right, permission, usage or otherwise. 24. It is apparent from the evidence of aforesaid prosecution witnesses that the alleged incident took place in school office and the independent witnesses PW1 and PW-2 have not supported the prosecution case & Vidyadhar Thethwar (PW-8) has admitted that the appellant has also filed
17 / 18 complaint against him. Further, in para 13, PW-8 has admitted that in the instant incident, an inquiry was also conducted by the office and the same was done by Block Education Officer Mr. Swarnkar. He has also admitted that during inquiry, their statements were recorded by Mr. Swarnkar. He does not know that what conclusion was drawn by the Investigating Officer in the Departmental Inquiry. He cannot tell that whether the conclusion was given in the investigation that the incident he described did not occur. In para 14, he has also admitted that complainant tried to intervene the dispute in the office room and then the alleged incident of uttering caste remark took place. The incident which took place in office room was subsided later and he (PW-8) went from there, thereafter, no incident was taken place with him on the same day. He has also stated that he has no knowledge whether complainant (PW-5) lodged any report in Harijan Police Station on 2-3rd day of the incident or not. Having noticed the above fact, it is clear that the incident took place in the room of the school and as per Section 294 of IPC, it is not a public place. The independent witnesses have also not supported the case of the prosecution.
The prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. So, Section 294 of IPC is also not made out against the appellant. 18 / 18
25. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 07.03.2014 passed by the Special Judge (constituted under SC/ST Atrocities) Act, 1989, Raigarh (C.G.), in Special Case No. 21/2005, is set aside and the Appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him. 26. The appellant is already on bail. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 27. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) Judge pekde Digitally signed by VIJAY BHARATRAO PEKDE Date: 2025.08.11 15:51:33 +0530