1 2025:CGHC:35375-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 1699 of 2024 1. Jaipal Jamde S/o Shri Hemlal Jamde, Aged About 29 Years R/o Village - Parasghat, Thana - Khadgaon, District Mohla-Manpur- Ambagarh Chowki, Chhattisgarh. 2. Hemlal Jamde S/o Late Shri Ramsai Jamde, Aged About 55 Years R/o Village - Parasghat, Thana - Khadgaon, District Mohla-Manpur- Ambagarh Chowki, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Mohla-Manpur- Ambagarh Chowki, District Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki, Chhattisgarh. ...Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr. Rajendra Patel, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Mr. Sakib Ahmed, Panel Lawyer. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice . 23.07.2025 1. Heard Mr. Rajendra Patel, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Sakib Ahmed, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent/State. BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.07.31 18:38:24 +0530 2 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellants under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.07.2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in S.T. No. 79 of 2021, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous imprisonment (for short, ‘R.I.’) for life and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, 06 months R.I. more. Section 201 of the IPC R.I. for 02 years fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, 01 month R.I. more. Both the sentences shall run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Tuleshwari Bai, a resident of village Ranatola, was married to appellant No. 1, Jaipal Jamde, a resident of village Parsghat, around six years prior, in 2021. The couple had two children from the marriage. On 07.04.2021, appellant No. 1 informed Tuleshwari Bai’s family in Ranatola that she had been missing for the past five to six days, having left without informing anyone. Concerned by this, her maternal relatives initiated a search, suspecting foul play, as it was unlikely Tuleshwari Bai would leave her two young children behind. On 10.04.2021, her uncle, Mahesh Chanape (PW-3), along with the village kotwar Lakhan Lal (PW-4), Dheeraj Singh (PW-5), Ranjan Singh (PW-6), Madan Lal (PW- 7), and others, went to Parsghat and informed the village head, Fattu Ram Jangde (PW-1). A meeting was convened involving residents from both villages, including Tuleshwari Bai’s maternal side and the appellants. During 3 the meeting, when questioned, appellant No. 1 (Jaipal Jamde) and appellant No. 2 (Hemlal Jamde, father-in-law of the deceased) confessed that they had killed Tuleshwari Bai on 03.04.2021 by striking her with a tangia (axe) near Jharna Nala in the Pandavani Jungle and had buried her body in a pit. The villagers then informed Khadgaon Police Station. Following this, on 10.04.2021, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Mohla, Shri C.P. Baghel (PW-16), granted permission for exhumation of the body via Ex.P/28 upon request from Khadgaon Police Station. He directed the Block Medical Officer to ensure that a female Doctor was present to conduct the postmortem examination. The SDM also appointed Nayab Tehsildar, Chumman Lal, as the Executive Magistrate vide Ex.P/29 to maintain law and order during the proceedings. On 11.04.2021, at 9:30 a.m., Inspector Kartikeshwar Jangde (PW-24) of Khadgaon Police Station recorded the memorandum statements of the appellants, Jaipal Jamde and Hemlal Jamde, vide Exs.P/5 and P/6 respectively, in the presence of witnesses Fattu Ram and Jungal Singh. The appellants disclosed the location where the body had been buried. 4. Inspector, Kartikeshwar Jangde (PW-24) conducted the exhumation at the location indicated by the appellants, in the presence of witnesses Fattu Ram, Narasingh, Gulab Singh, Kaschitram Jangde, and Om Prakash Bhuary. The exhumation panchnama was prepared vide Ex.P/7. Following this, the body identification panchnama (Ex.P/8) and the body recovery panchnama (Ex.P/9) were prepared in the presence of Fattu Ram and Jungal Singh. The body was sent for postmortem examination via application Ex.P/22. The appellants were arrested under Exs.P/14 and P/15, and their arrests were communicated to village head Fattu Ram. 5. The body of Tuleshwari Bai was found to be decomposed. Dr. Nitin 4 Baramate (PW-18) preserved the viscera for DNA analysis. Dr. Datta Sorte (PW-20) collected a blood sample from the deceased's mother, Santri Bai, for DNA matching. The DNA report, Ex.P/46, confirmed that the body found in the Pandavani Jungle was that of Tuleshwari Bai, daughter of Santri Bai. Since the location of the crime scene fell within the jurisdiction of the Mohla Police Station, Khadgaon Police initially registered the complaint under a zero crime number. The formal complaint (Ex.P/1) and the inquest report (Ex.P/4) were later registered at Mohla Police Station as Exs.P/37 and P/38, respectively. The investigation was completed by Inspector B.K. Choubey (PW-22) of the Mohla Police Station, who recorded witnesses statements and concluded the inquiry. 6. The dead body of the deceased was sent for postmortem to the Community Health Center, Mohla, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.). However, Dr. Devesh Thakur (PW-12) referred it to the Medical College, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) as the body was in an advanced state of decomposition. 7. Thereafter, the dead body of the deceased was sent to the Government Medical College, Rajnandgaon, for postmortem examination. Dr. Nitin Barmate (PW-18), serving as an Assistant Professor at the said institution, conducted the postmortem on 12.04.2021. The body was found wrapped in a polythene bag and placed inside a brown box. It was in an advanced state of decomposition, with most of the flesh decomposed and bones exposed, though some flesh remained attached. The deceased was dressed in a saree featuring red, yellow, orange, and white designs, a cream-colored blouse with a pink hue, a cream-colored petticoat, and a pair of red and white juttis. All garments were soiled with dirt and decomposition material. These clothes were sealed and handed over to the concerned Constable. 5 8. During the examination, it was ascertained that all the bones were of a female, estimated to be between 25 to 30 years of age. A reddish contusion was observed on the occipital and left temporal regions of the skull, along with a fracture on the left frontoparietal bone. The brain matter was decomposed, but subarachnoid hemorrhage was noted. No other injuries were found on the remaining bones. Dr. Barmate opined that the cause of death was a head injury, homicidal in nature. The postmortem report was marked as Ex.P/32, bearing his signature. 9. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants before the jurisdictional criminal Court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial from where the learned Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) received the case on transfer for trial and for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 10. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The case proceeded to trial. The appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be falsely implicated, asserting that they had not committed any offence. 11. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence examined as many as 24 witnesses and exhibited 47 documents. The appellants have not examined any witnesses in their support. 12. The learned trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and documentary evidences available on record, by the impugned judgment dated 10.07.2024 convicted and sentenced the appellants in the 6 manner mentioned in the paragraph 02 of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by them calling in question the impugned judgment. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that conviction of the appellants is substantially based on the circumstantial evidence, without there being any eye witness, though the chain of circumstances are missing and not completed to each other. He also submits that the evidences adduced on behalf of the prosecution is suspicious in nature and same is not safe for placing reliance. He further submits that even if the entire case is taken at its face value, the case would not travel beyond Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, therefore, the appellants are entitled for benefit of doubt. 14. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment and submits that there is ample evidence on record to connect the appellants with the offence in question. The learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence and materials available on record, has convicted and sentenced the appellants, which warrants no interference, and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the learned trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 16. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, we have to examine the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution. 17. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased was homicidal in nature ? 7 18. The learned learned trial Court, relying upon the statement of Dr. Nitim Barmate (PW-18), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased, has clearly come to the conclusion that the cause of death was a head injury and the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The said finding recorded by the learned trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants. We hereby affirm the said finding. 19. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. 20. We may also make a reference to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Chenga Reddy & Others vs. State of A.P., reported in (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus: “In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence....”. 21. In Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P. & Others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 79, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests: 8 “(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.” 22. In State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, reported in (1992 Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. 23. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence 9 the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted”. 24. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sailendra Rajdev Pasvan and Others vs. State of Gujarat Etc., reported in AIR 2020 SC 10 180 observed that in a case of circumstantial evidence, law postulates two- fold requirements. Firstly, that every link in the chain of circumstances necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and secondly, all the circumstances must be consistent pointing out only towards the guilt of the accused. We need not burden this judgment by referring to other judgments as the above principles have been consistently followed and approved by this Court time and again. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Suresh & Another vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2018) 18 SCC 654 has observed that cases of circumstantial evidence, the Courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. The Court at paras 41 and 42 has observed thus : “41. The aforesaid tests are aptly referred as Panchsheel of proof in Circumstantial Cases (refer to Prakash v. State of Rajasthan). The expectation is that the prosecution case should reflect careful portrayal of the factual circumstances and inferences thereof and their compatibility with a singular hypothesis wherein all the intermediate facts and the case itself are proved beyond reasonable doubt. 42. Circumstantial evidence are those facts, which the court may infer further. There is a stark contrast between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. In cases of circumstantial evidence, the courts are called upon to make inferences from the available evidence, which may lead to the accused's guilt. In majority of cases, the inference of guilt is usually drawn by establishing the case from its initiation to the point of commission wherein each factual link is ultimately based on evidence of a fact or an inference thereof. Therefore, the courts have to 11 identify the facts in the first place so as to fit the case within the parameters of “chain link theory” and then see whether the case is made out beyond reasonable doubt. In India we have for a long time followed the “chain link theory” since Hanumant case, which of course needs to be followed herein also.” 27. In the present case, the prosecution has proved the following circumstantial evidence against the appellants:- (i) The body was exhumed on 11.04.2021 from near the Jharna Nala in the Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa. (ii) The body exhumed from near the Jharna Nala in the Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa was that of Tuleshwari Bai. (iii) Death of the deceased was caused due to serious injury on his head which is found to be in the nature of culpable homicide. (vi) Based on the memorandum statements of the appellants, the body of the deceased was recovered from the Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa. 28. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The Court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must be’ and not merely ‘may be’ proved guilty before a Court can convict the accused. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical, but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any 12 reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. 29. It is settled law that the suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 30. The Investigating Officer, Kartikeshwar Jangde (PW-24), initiated documentation on 11.04.2021 in conjunction with the exhumation proceedings. He stated that he interrogated the appellants, Jaipal and Hemlal, in the presence of witnesses Fattu Ram (PW-1) and Gulab Singh (PW-2) at village Parsghat between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. According to the officer, appellant No. 1, Jaipal, in his memorandum statement (Ex.P/6), admitted to taking Tuleshwari Bai to the jungle and killing her, while appellant No. 2, Hemlal, stood by and watched. Similarly, in his memorandum statement (Ex.P/5), Hemlal confirmed that Jaipal killed Tuleshwari Bai while he remained a passive observer. Both statements (Exs.P/5 and P/6) further revealed that the appellants concealed her body in a pit near Jharna Nala in the Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa, covering it with soil, stones, and bushes. 31. The witnesses to the appellants’ memorandum statements, Exs.P/5 and P/6, are Fattu Ram (PW-1) and Gulab Singh (PW-2). The defence contends that during cross-examination, both witnesses admitted the appellants did not make these disclosures in their presence and that they signed all documents at the police station. It is true that both witnesses stated they signed the memorandum statements and related documents at 13 the police station. However, their testimonies are inconsistent. For instance, Fattu Ram (PW-1) stated in paragraphs 2 and 13 of his examination that the appellants disclosed the incident to the police but contradicted this in paragraph 16, where he stated that no such information was given. These contradictions cast doubt on the reliability of the witnesses and the authenticity of the memorandum statements. 32. Similarly, although Gulab Singh (PW-2) stated that the proceedings did not occur in his presence, he, along with Fattu Ram (PW-1), admitted to signing the appellants’ memorandum statements (Exs.P/5 and P/6). Their signatures suggest that the statements were recorded in their presence; however, their contradictory testimonies introduce doubt regarding the actual sequence of events. These inconsistencies raise concerns as to whether the witnesses were unable to withstand cross-examination or were uncertain about what they were expected to disclose or withhold. 33. Nevertheless, the prosecution case cannot be entirely discredited solely due to the inconsistencies in these witnesses’ testimonies. Their statements, along with those of other villagers from Parsghat, indicate that on 10.04.2021, following a village meeting, all those present, including the appellants, went to the police station. Later that evening, the police, accompanied by the villagers and the appellants, proceeded to Jharna Nala in the Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa. As nothing was discovered that evening, the search resumed the next day, 11.04.2021, when the police and villagers again took the appellants to the same location. It was then that Tuleshwari Bai’s body was recovered. This sequence of events has been acknowledged by both Fattu Ram (PW-1) and Gulab Singh Halba (PW-2), the witnesses to the memorandum statements (Exs.P/5 and P/6). 14 34. Based on Jaipal’s memorandum statement (Ex.P/6), the Investigating Officer (PW-24) stated that he recovered the tangia (axe) allegedly used in the crime, under seizure memo Ex.P/3. He obtained an expert opinion from Dr. Nitin Baramate (PW-18), who opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased could have been caused by the tangia and recommended chemical analysis. The FSL report (Ex.P/44) confirmed that the tangia, marked as exhibit "B", was examined; however, no blood was detected on it. Therefore, a detailed discussion of the Malkhana register (Exs.P/34 and P/35) and the testimony of Malkhana in-charge Mahesh Taram (PW-19) is unnecessary. It is important to note that this does not materially affect the prosecution’s case, as the tangia could have served as corroborative evidence only if blood had been found on it. 35. The initial portion of the memorandum statements of the appellants, marked as Exs.P/5 and P/6 and recorded by Investigating Officer, Kartikeshwar Jangde (PW-24), pertains to their confessional statements regarding the commission of the crime. Such confessions are not admissible in evidence under Section 25 or 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, the portion of the statements that led to the discovery of the location where the body of Tuleshwari Bai was buried is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Accordingly, the disclosure of the place of burial in Exs.P/5 and P/6 is a relevant and admissible fact, as it directly led to the recovery of the dead body. 36. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states as under: - “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of 15 information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 37. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. 38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Asar Mohammad & Others vs. State of U.P., reported in AIR 2018 SC 5264 with reference to the word “fact” employed in Section 27 of the Evidence Act has held that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. It has been further held that the discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place and it includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. Their Lordships relying upon the decision of the Privy Council in the matter of Pulukuri Kotayya vs. King Emperor, reported in AIR 1947 PC 67 observed as under: - “13. It is a settled legal position that the facts need not be self-probatory and the word “fact” as contemplated in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not limited to “actual physical material object”. The discovery of fact arises by reason of the fact that the information given by the accused exhibited the knowledge or the mental awareness of the informant as to its existence at a particular place. It includes a discovery of an object, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its existence. It will be useful to advert to the exposition in the case of Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. 16 State of Maharashtra, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 253, in particular, paragraphs 23 to 29 thereof. The same read thus: “23. While accepting or rejecting the factors of discovery, certain principles are to be kept in mind. The Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor (supra) has held thus: (IA p. 77) “… it is fallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’ does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added ‘with which I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” 17 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Perumal Raja alias Perumal vs. State, Rep. By Inspector of Police, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 12 has defined the ‘custody’. It held that the expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. 40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Boby vs. State of Kerala, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 50 held that the basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. Section 27 puts a bar to use the confessional statement, but the fact that discovery and information which proved to reliable would be a circumstantial evidence. 41. Applying the well-settled principles of law and considering the facts and circumstances of the case in their entirety, it is evident from the memorandum statement of appellant No. 1, Jaipal (Ex. P/6), that he took Tuleshwari Bai to the jungle and killed her, while appellant No. 2, Hemlal, stood by and watched. In his own memorandum statement (Ex. P/5), appellant No. 2, Hemlal, confirmed that Jaipal took Tuleshwari Bai to the jungle and killed her, while he himself remained present at the scene. 18 Thereafter, both the appellants concealed Tuleshwari Bai’s body in a pit at Jharna Nala in Pandarvani Jungle of Jabkasa, covering it with soil, stones, and bushes. Subsequently, the decomposed body of the deceased Tuleshwari Bai was exhumed from the same location based on the memorandum statements made by both the appellants. It is also established that both the appellants misled others by not reporting the incident immediately, which indicates their intention to destroy evidence by burying the body. Thus, it is an admitted fact that appellant No. 1, Jaipal, took his wife, Tuleshwari Bai, to the jungle, killed her using a tangia (axe), and, with the assistance of appellant No. 2, Hemlal, concealed her body in a pit. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted appellant No. 1, Jaipal, for commiting murder of his wife and concealing her death body. However, insofar as appellant No. 2, Hemlal, is concerned, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that he participated in the act of murder of his daughter-in-law. Nonetheless, he did assist appellant No. 1 in concealing the body, thereby committing an offence under Section 201 IPC. 42. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal filed on behalf of appellant No. 1-Jaipal is partly allowed. His conviction under Section 302/34 IPC is hereby set aside. However, he is convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced as ordered by the learned trial Court. His conviction and sentence under Section 201 IPC is also hereby affirmed. However, criminal appeal filled on behalf appellant No.2-Hemlal is partly allowed. His conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 IPC is hereby set aside. However, his conviction and sentence under Section 201 of the IPC is hereby affirmed. 43. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant No. 2-Hemlal is in jail since 19 12.04.2021 and has completed more than 03 years 05 months of the jail sentence, therefore, he should be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 44. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the CrPC (now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the appellant No. 2-Hemlal is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 45. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant No. 1-Jaipal is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant No. 1 informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 46. The learned trial Court record along with the copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Brijmohan