Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.01.2024 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 24.04.2012 and order of sentence dated 27.04.2012 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘NI’ Act). It was asserted that the accused issued a cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- in favour of the complainant to discharge his legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque to the Punjab National Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement that ‘payment was stopped by the drawer’. The complainant sent a legal notice to the accused, which was duly served upon him. The accused failed to repay the amount to the complainant despite the receipt of the notice, hence the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Krishana Devi (CW1) and himself (CW2) to prove his complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC stated that the cheque was given as security, the deal regarding the cheque was not completed, the cheque was presented without the completion of the deal, without informing him, he had made an application to the bank to stop the payment, and he had not received any notice from the complainant. 6. Statements of Sukh Dev Singh (DW1), Laxman (DW2) and accused Tarun Mahajan (DW3) were recorded in defence. 7. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheque, and a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. 6. Statements of Sukh Dev Singh (DW1), Laxman (DW2) and accused Tarun Mahajan (DW3) were recorded in defence. 7. Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted the issuance of the cheque, and a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden shifted upon the accused to rebut the presumption. The accused set up a compromise (Mark A) to prove his innocence, however, the compromise was not proved as per the law. This compromise was also not put to the complainant in his cross- examination. The accused admitted that the cheque was dishonoured because he had instructed the bank to stop the payment. The notice was duly sent to the accused at the correct address and is deemed to be served. The accused failed to repay the amount; hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of Rs. 2,75,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. It was ordered that out of the fine amount, an amount of Rs. 2,70,000/- be disbursed to the complainant as compensation. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (I) (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the statement of Sukh Dev (DW1) proved that the complainant had agreed to let the shop to the accused to run the business on a monthly rent of Rs. 2000/-. Rs. 2,70,000/- was agreed to be paid as ‘Pagri’ of the shop. The accused issued two cheques for the payment of ‘Pagri’ of the shop, but the complainant failed to deliver the possession of the shop to the accused. The accused was not liable to pay any money to the complainant. The defence raised by the accused was highly probable and rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting this defence. The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court was not sustainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 9. The defence raised by the accused was highly probable and rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting this defence. The judgment passed by the learned Trial Court was not sustainable. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. The statements of the defence witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars, and the learned Appellate Court erred in relying upon them. The accused propounded a false story to save himself from the liability. The agreement was executed in the year 2007, and the cheque was presented in the year 2008. The complainant served a legal notice upon the accused, and the accused did not send any reply to the notice, which falsifies his version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr H.S. Rangra, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for respondent No.1/accused and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.2/state. 11. Mr H.S. Rangra, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court had convicted the accused by passing a well-reasoned judgment. Learned Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the learned Trial Court without assigning proper reasons. The defence taken by the accused was highly improbable. The agreement was not proved as per the law, and there were various contradictions in the statements of the witnesses produced by the accused. Learned Appellate Court erred in relying upon their testimonies. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed, the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be restored. 12. Mr G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for respondent No.1/accused, submitted that the complainant had agreed to hand over the possession of the shop to the accused. The accused had agreed to pay a ‘Pagri’ of Rs. 2,70,000/- to the complainant. He had issued one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- and one cheque of Rs. 70,000/- to the accused for the payment of ‘Pagri’. The accused had agreed to pay a ‘Pagri’ of Rs. 2,70,000/- to the complainant. He had issued one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- and one cheque of Rs. 70,000/- to the accused for the payment of ‘Pagri’. The complainant did not hand over the possession of the shop as promised. Therefore, the accused had no subsisting liability towards the complainant. Learned Trial Court ignored the defence of the accused, and the learned Appellate Court had rightly set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 13. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent No.2/state, submitted that the dispute between the parties is private in nature and the State has nothing to say in the matter. 14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of conviction. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 16. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 17. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had issued the cheque. He also admitted in his statement on oath that he had issued a cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- and Rs. 70,000/- to the complainant as payment towards the shop. Therefore, the accused has not disputed the issuance of the cheque. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the admission of the signatures and issuance of the cheque would trigger a presumption under Section 118(a) and Section 139 of the NI Act that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724 , that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: “9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under of the NI Act. As observed above, of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.” 18. A similar view was taken in Sanjay Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed: “ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE 15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1- Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 , have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra). It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 , have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra). 16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions. 17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is a rebuttable presumption. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 ]. 19. The presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873 as under: “6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence….” 20. Learned Trial Court held that the agreement propounded by the accused was not proved because it was merely a photocopy, and the mode of proving the secondary evidence was not adopted. The agreement between the parties ‘Mark-A’ was regarding the lease of the shop No.110 located in Indra Market w.e.f. 14.08.2007 till 14.08.2012. This agreement was for a lease for more than five years and was compulsorily required to be registered. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Distributing v. Khaja Midhat Noor , (1988) 3 SCC 44 , that a lease for a period exceeding one year is compulsorily required to be registered as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, and an unregistered lease cannot be admitted in evidence in view of Section 49 of the Registration Act. It was observed at page 46: “5. In view of para 1 of Section 107 of the Act, since the lease was for a period exceeding one year, it could only have been extended by a registered instrument executed by both the lessor and the lessee. It was observed at page 46: “5. In view of para 1 of Section 107 of the Act, since the lease was for a period exceeding one year, it could only have been extended by a registered instrument executed by both the lessor and the lessee. In the absence of a registered instrument, the lease shall be deemed to be a “lease from month to month”. It is clear from the very language of Section 107 of the Act, which postulates that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the absence of a registered instrument, it must be a monthly lease. The lessee and the sub-lessee in the facts of this case continued to remain in possession of the property on payment of rent as a tenant from month to month. The High Court so found. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.” 21. Therefore, the agreement ‘Mark A’ was inadmissible in evidence to prove the creation of a lease for five years, and the transaction between the parties has to be taken as the creation of a monthly tenancy, which could have been created orally as well, and the oral evidence to prove the creation and terms of the tenancy would be admissible. 22. Sukh Dev Singh (DW1) stated that the complainant had agreed to hand over the shop to the accused for running a medicine shop. It was agreed that the monthly rent of Rs. 2000/- would be paid by the accused to the complainant. Rs. 2,70,000/- would be paid as security after the delivery of the possession. The accused handed over one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- drawn on Bank of Baroda and one cheque of Rs. 70,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank. He stated in his cross-examination that the accused is his friend. He was not aware of the pendency of the present case and came to know about it after he had reached the Court. The accused had called him to be a witness. The agreement was written at about 12- 12:30 PM. Laxman (DW2) had arrived before him. The agreement was prepared in his presence and was read over and explained to the parties. The accused had not filed any case against the complainant. The accused had called him to be a witness. The agreement was written at about 12- 12:30 PM. Laxman (DW2) had arrived before him. The agreement was prepared in his presence and was read over and explained to the parties. The accused had not filed any case against the complainant. He denied that he had made a false statement. 23. Laxman (DW2) corroborated his version. He stated that an agreement was executed between the parties regarding the lease of the shop. He was called to be a witness. The agreement was prepared on 14.08.2007 regarding the lease of a shop no. 110 to the accused. The complainant was running the shop. The monthly rent was settled as Rs. 2000/-. The accused agreed to pay Rs. 2,70,000/- as security to the complainant. He handed over one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- and one cheque of Rs. 70,000/-. Both parties signed the agreement. He stated in his cross-examination that he was running a shop near the house of the accused. The accused is his friend. He had not testified in any case except the cases pertaining to him. Both parties had called him to witness the agreement. He had known the complainant for about 10 years. Both parties were present. The other witness arrived after his arrival. The agreement was being typed at the time of his arrival. He knew the witness Sukh Dev (DW1), but he was not aware that Sukh Dev was a friend of the accused. He denied that an agreement was executed between the parties and that a false document was prepared. 24. The statements of these witnesses corroborate each other. It was suggested to the witnesses that they were friends of the accused. However, this suggestion will not affect their credibility because, generally, a known party is asked to be a witness to the transaction and not a stranger. 25. The accused Tarun Mahajan (DW3) stated that an agreement was executed between him and the complainant on 14.08.2007. He handed over one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000 and one cheque of Rs. 70,000 to the complainant. This amount was payable after the delivery of possession. However, the complaint did not hand over the shop to him. He demanded the cheque, but the cheque was not returned to him. Subsequently, the complainant filed a complaint based on the cheque of Rs. 70,000, which was dismissed by the Court. 70,000 to the complainant. This amount was payable after the delivery of possession. However, the complaint did not hand over the shop to him. He demanded the cheque, but the cheque was not returned to him. Subsequently, the complainant filed a complaint based on the cheque of Rs. 70,000, which was dismissed by the Court. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not issued any legal notice to the complainant regarding the agreement executed with him. He had not mentioned the agreement in his defence in Court No.3. He admitted that the agreement was not attested by any competent Officer. He denied that a false agreement was propounded by him to defeat the complainant’s claim. 26. It was submitted that the conduct of the accused falsifies his version that some agreement was executed between him and the complainant. He had not issued any legal notice or instituted any suit. This submission will not help the complainant. The parties had agreed that the complainant would deliver the possession of the shop to the accused on the terms and conditions agreed between them. The accused could not have specifically enforced the agreement because it was unregistered and would not create any lease for five years. Therefore, the fact that the accused had not acted upon it would not make the execution of the agreement doubtful. 27. The complainant, Jitender Kumar (CW2), admitted in his cross-examination that he was running a shop in Indira market. This corroborates the version of the accused that the possession of the shop was not handed over to the accused by the complainant. 28. The certified copy of the judgment passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Court No.3 shows that the complainant had instituted a complaint against the accused for the dishonour of a cheque of Rs. 70,000/-. This complaint corroborates the version of the accused that he had handed over one cheque of Rs. 2,00,000/- and one cheque of Rs. 70,000/- to the accused as an advance for taking the delivery of the shop. 29. Learned Trial Court held that the agreement was not put to the complainant, which falsifies the defence of the accused. This finding cannot be sustained. It was specifically suggested to the complainant that the cheque was handed over to him because the accused wanted to run a shop in his possession. 29. Learned Trial Court held that the agreement was not put to the complainant, which falsifies the defence of the accused. This finding cannot be sustained. It was specifically suggested to the complainant that the cheque was handed over to him because the accused wanted to run a shop in his possession. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had erred in holding that the accused had not put his version regarding the taking of the shop to the complainant. 30. Thus, the evidence on record supported the version of the accused that the cheque was handed over as security for taking possession of the shop. Since the possession of the shop was not handed over, the necessary condition for presenting the cheque never arose; hence, the inference drawn by the learned Appellate Court that the cheque was not issued in discharge of the legal liability was a reasonable inference which could have been drawn based on the material placed on record. This Court will not interfere with a reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal, even if another view is possible. 31. No other point was urged. 32. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed and so are the pending miscellaneous, applications, if any. 33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 34. A copy of the judgment alongwith records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith.