Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.12.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337, 338 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and Section 181 of Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC and Section 181 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Ved Prakash, is the owner of the vehicle bearing registration No. HR-38-FT- 1281, which was being plied as a taxi. He was going from Kalka to Shimla on 13.5.2006. When he reached Dohri Diwar, Bye Pass Chowk, at about 9.45 AM, an Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 came from Barog Bye Pass at high speed and hit the car. The Ambulance fell into a gorge after the accident. The driver identified himself as Mohinder Singh. The occupants of the Ambulance sustained injuries. They were sent to the hospital. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, Mohinder, and the high speed of the Ambulance. The matter was reported to the police. An entry in the daily diary (Ex.PW12/A) was recorded. HC Rakesh Kumar (PW12) and other police officials went to verify the correctness of the information. Rakesh Kumar filed an application (Ex.PW12/B) for the medical examination of the injured and obtained MLCs (Ex.PA1 to Ex.PA8) of the injured. Manpreet Kaur had died in the accident. Her postmortem examination report (Ex.PW10/A) was issued by Dr Raj Kumar (PW10), who found that she had died due to intracranial haemorrhage leading to coma because of a temporal bone fracture within four hours of the examination. Amanpreet Singh also died in the accident. His postmortem report (Ex.PB) was obtained. Balbeer succumbed to his injuries at PGI, Chandigarh. His postmortem (Ex.PC) was obtained. HC Rajvinder Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and seized the Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14- 8865 vide memo (Ex.PW5/A). Amanpreet Singh also died in the accident. His postmortem report (Ex.PB) was obtained. Balbeer succumbed to his injuries at PGI, Chandigarh. His postmortem (Ex.PC) was obtained. HC Rajvinder Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and seized the Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14- 8865 vide memo (Ex.PW5/A). Yoginder Kumar (PW6) mechanically examined the vehicles bearing registration Nos. HR-38-FT-1281 and the Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 and found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicles that could have led to the accident. He issued mechanical reports (Ex.PW6/A and Ex.PW6/B). SI MI Khan went to the spot and took photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P9) whose negatives are Ex. P10 to Ex. P18. He prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/A) and seized the vehicles vide memos (Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW2/B). He obtained the RC, Log Book and Authority Letter of Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 from the office and seized them vide memo (Ex.PW5/A). He obtained the appointment order of Mohinder Singh (Ex. PX). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 , 337, 338 and 304-A of IPC and Section 181 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. Prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Arjun Singh (PW1) and ASI Kamal Nain (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Devi Ram (PW2) is the witness to the recovery. Mohan Dutt (PW4) heard the noise and found that the Ambulance had fallen off the road. Harish Kumar (PW5) is the witness to recovery. Yogender Singh (PW6) mechanically examined the vehicles. Dr Prabhu Dayal (PW7) produced the various documents of the Ambulance. HC Rajvinder Singh (PW8), MI Khan (PW9) and ASI Rakesh Guleria (PW12) investigated the matter. Dr Raj Kumar Dharoch (PW10) conducted the postmortem examination of Manpreet Kaur. Dalveer Singh (PW11) identified and received the dead bodies. Jaspal Singh (PW13) proved that his wife and son had died in the accident. Navneet (PW14) was travelling in the Ambulance. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the Ambulance bearing registration No.HP-14-8865 on 13.5.2006, at about 9.45 AM. Dalveer Singh (PW11) identified and received the dead bodies. Jaspal Singh (PW13) proved that his wife and son had died in the accident. Navneet (PW14) was travelling in the Ambulance. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the Ambulance bearing registration No.HP-14-8865 on 13.5.2006, at about 9.45 AM. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that Indica Car collided with the Ambulance. He was taking the patient to Solan hospital from Radha Swami Building at Anji, when the Indica car came from the Deonghat side and collided with the Ambulance. The accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the informant. The driver of the Indica car took advantage of the fact that the accused was admitted to the hospital and registered a false case against him. Statement of Bhag Singh (DW1) was recorded in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the witnesses did not mention the speed of the Ambulance, and their statements that the Ambulance was being driven at a high speed were not sufficient to infer the negligence. The mechanical report made the prosecution’s version highly doubtful because the damage was caused to the front portion of the Indica car and not to the middle portion, which falsifies the prosecution’s version that the Ambulance had collided with the car. The informant was not examined, and an adverse inference had to be drawn against the prosecution. The Ambulance could have fallen off the road due to the impact of the accident, and this was not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to view the prosecution’s evidence in its proper perspective. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were discarded without any cogent reasons. Arjun Singh (PW1) and Kamal Nain (PW3) categorically stated that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused. Navneet (PW14) specifically stated that the Ambulance was being driven at a high speed, and her mother had told the driver 2-4 times to drive the Ambulance slowly. These statements were ignored by the learned Trial Court. Arjun Singh (PW1) and Kamal Nain (PW3) categorically stated that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused. Navneet (PW14) specifically stated that the Ambulance was being driven at a high speed, and her mother had told the driver 2-4 times to drive the Ambulance slowly. These statements were ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Mr H.S. Rana, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the prosecution witnesses categorically stated that the accused was driving the Ambulance at a high speed. This was corroborated by the fact that the Ambulance had fallen off the road. Hence, the principle of res ipsa loquitor would apply to the present case. Learned Trial Court failed to apply this principle. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr H.S. Rana, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that mere use of the term ‘high speed’ is not sufficient to infer the rashness or negligence. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that the examination of the informant was essential to prove the prosecution’s case, and no reason was assigned for his non-examination. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding the informant. The view taken by the learned Trial Court was a probable view, and this Court should not interfere with the probable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , (2025) 5 SCC 433 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: 23. Recently, in Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 535, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus : (SCC pp. 163-64, paras 38-41) “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the princi- ples laid down by this Court governing the scope of in- terference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31 encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) ‘29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa v. State of Kar- nataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to re- view, reappreciate and reconsider the evi- dence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to re- view, reappreciate and reconsider the evi- dence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and suffi- cient grounds”, “very strong circum- stances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseolo- gies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to re- view the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is avail- able to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his ac- quittal, the presumption of the accused's in- nocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” ’ 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appel- late court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.’ 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a mis- reading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: “21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. 13. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: “21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The site plan (Ex.PW9/A) shows that the accident occurred at a road junction. The Indica car was coming from Dharampur towards Solan, whereas the Ambulance was being driven on the Barog Bye Pass from the right side of the vehicle coming from Dharampur. 16. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations in the exercise of power conferred under Section 118 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 17. Rule 8 of the Regulations provides that the driver of the motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction, a pedestrian crossing or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection, junction or crossing until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon. 18. Rule 9 provides that the driver of a motor vehicle shall, on entering a road intersection, at which traffic is not being regulated, if the road entered is a main road, designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road, and in any other case, give way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right-hand side. 19. 19. A combined reading of these two Rules shows that a driver of a motor vehicle is supposed to take precautions before entering the junction. He is to give way to the vehicles moving on his right side. Therefore, the driver of the Indica was supposed to give way to the vehicles proceeding along the Barog bypass towards his right side. 20. Yogender Kumar (PW6) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicles and issued reports (Ex.PW6/A) and (Ex.PW6/B). He noticed that the front bumper, engine, bonnet, mudguard pillar, fender, both headlights, air cleaner, hose pipe, chassis and front engine of the Indica car were damaged. He also noticed that the bumper, doors, windscreen, glasses, wood, and cabin dashboard of the Ambulance were bent. The photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P18) show the damage to the front portion, clearly suggesting that the accident involved the front portions of the vehicles. This would show that the driver of the Indica car had not given way to the traffic proceeding towards its right side and had hit the front portion of the Ambulance. 21. Arjun Singh (PW1) admitted in his cross- examination that the place of the incident was a chowk. Many people were moving on the road because of the Satsang on that day. The statements of Arjun Singh and the site plan show that the accident had taken place at an intersection of the road, and therefore, the drivers of the motor vehicles were required to follow the Rules of the Road Regulations. 22. Devi Ram (PW2) stated in his examination-in-chief that the Ambulance was being driven at a high speed and fell off the road. He stated in his cross-examination that he saw the Ambulance after it had fallen on the Subathu road. He came to know of the accident after hearing the noise and saw that a vehicle was falling off the road. His statement shows that he had not witnessed the accident. He came to know of the accident after he had heard the noise. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly discarded his testimony. 23. Arjun Singh (PW1) stated that an Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 came from Barog Bye Pass at a high speed and hit the Indica Car. The Ambulance fell off the road. He came to know of the accident after he had heard the noise. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly discarded his testimony. 23. Arjun Singh (PW1) stated that an Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 came from Barog Bye Pass at a high speed and hit the Indica Car. The Ambulance fell off the road. He stated in his cross-examination that the speed of the Ambulance was high, but he could not tell the approximate speed of the Ambulance. The speed of the Indica car was less than the speed of the Ambulance. 24. He has specifically stated that he could not mention the approximate speed of the Ambulance and has merely used the term ‘high speed’. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 25. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493 , wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 26. This Court also held in the State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 27. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 28. Therefore, his statement is insufficient to establish the negligence. 29. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 28. Therefore, his statement is insufficient to establish the negligence. 29. Kamal Nain (PW3) stated that an Ambulance bearing registration No. HP-14-8865 came from Barog at a high speed and hit an Indica car. The Ambulance fell off the road. This witness has also not provided the estimated speed of the vehicle. Therefore, his testimony that the Ambulance was being driven at a high speed is not sufficient to conclude the negligence of the accused. 30. Navneet (PW14) stated that the accused was driving the Ambulance at a high speed. Her mother told the accused repeatedly to drive the Ambulance slowly, but the accused continued to drive the Ambulance at a high speed. She stated in her cross-examination that she came to know of the accident after the Ambulance had fallen on the field. She was not aware that the Indica car had hit the Ambulance. She was told by her father that the driver of the Ambulance was driving it at a high speed. She admitted that her father had filed a claim petition before MACT. 31. The statement of this witness is not sufficient to prove the negligence of the accused. She has not even mentioned the approximate speed of the vehicle and has used the term ‘high speed’. She stated that the accused was told by her mother to drive the vehicle slowly, which shows that her inference of the Ambulance being driven at a high speed is based upon the statement of her mother. She admitted that her father had told her about the high speed, which shows that she is making the statement as per her father’s version. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly discarded the statement of this witness. 32. It was submitted that the witnesses deposed about the negligence of the accused, and the learned Trial Court erred in not relying upon this part of their testimony. This submission will not help the prosecution’s case. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. This submission will not help the prosecution’s case. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 32. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 33. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the fact that the witnesses have deposed about the negligence of the accused. 34. The prosecution did not examine the informant. He was the best person to depose about the negligence of the accused. Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly drawn an adverse inference against the prosecution for withholding him. 35. No other point was urged. 36. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, which was possible based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 37. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 38. This Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. 37. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. 38. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 39. Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with copy of the judgment.