JUDGMENT : RAKESH KAINTHLA, J. 1. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 16.9.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11.4.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 3, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Batan Singh (PW1), was working as Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) in the HP State Electricity Board (HPSEB), Bilaspur Circle. He was driving the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-23B-1459 on 18.5.2007. He reached the Ghumarwin Bazar, where Jagdish Singh (PW2) and Daulat Ram met him. They boarded the vehicle, and all of them proceeded towards Dadhol. A truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5259 came from the opposite side at Ghumarwin Bridge at about 6.15 PM. The truck was being driven at a high speed and towards the wrong side of the road. The informant stopped his car on the roadside to enable the truck to pass; however, the truck hit the car. The informant and Jagdish Singh sustained injuries. Chiranji Lal (accused) was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The accident occurred due to his negligence. The injured were taken to the hospital, and intimation was given to the police. An entry (Ex.PW9/A) in the daily diary was recorded. HC Amar Nath (PW9) and Constable Daulat Ram were sent for verification. Amar Nath (PW9) recorded the informant’s statement (Ex.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex.PW4/A) was registered. He filed an application for medical examination of the injured. Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5) examined Batan Singh and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt weapon. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW5/A). Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5) also examined Jagdish and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within six hours. He issued an MLC (Ex.PW5/B). Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5) examined Batan Singh and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt weapon. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW5/A). Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5) also examined Jagdish and found that he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within six hours. He issued an MLC (Ex.PW5/B). Amar Nath (PW9) went to the spot where he prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/B) and took photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P4), whose negatives are Ex.P5 to Ex.P8. He seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-22-5259 and the car bearing registration No. HP-23-1459, along with documents vide memos (Ex.PW2/A and Ex.PW1/C). HHC Dev Raj (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle and found that there was no defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ex.PW3/A). The car was handed over to Batan Singh vide memo (Ex.PW1/B), and the truck was handed over to the owner, Bimla Devi. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Batan Singh (PW1) is the informant. Jagdish Singh (PW2) is an eyewitness. HHC Dev Raj (PW3) mechanically examined the vehicle. Pritam Singh (PW4) signed the FIR. Dr. N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5) medically examined the injured. Bimla Devi (PW6) owned the truck. Suresh Kumar (PW7) witnessed the recovery. Puran Chand (PW8) prepared the challan. Amar Nath (PW9) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case except that he was driving the vehicle. He stated that the witnesses were interested and had deposed against him falsely. He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He initially stated that he wanted to lead evidence in defence, but subsequently did not produce any evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not disputed that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He initially stated that he wanted to lead evidence in defence, but subsequently did not produce any evidence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the accused had not disputed that he was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The statements of witnesses and the photographs show that the truck had hit the car after crossing the central line and leaving sufficient space towards its side. The Investigating Officer admitted that the site plan was not correctly prepared because curves were not properly described. However, it was insufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. 13 ft. of metalled and 2 ft. of unmetalled space remained towards the left side of the truck. Driving the vehicle towards the right side of the road constituted negligence. Minor contradictions in the statements of witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. The medical evidence proved that the informant and Jagdish had sustained injuries. Hence, the accused was convicted for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and was sentenced as under:- 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the truck towards the right side of the road, which was evident from the photographs, wherein the truck was shown to be on its right side after crossing the centre line. Driving a vehicle towards the right side of the road constituted negligence. Therefore, he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and the offences involving the motor vehicles were to be dealt with severely. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the accused was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below did not appreciate the facts and law properly. Investigating Officer Amar Nath (PW9) admitted that the spot map (Ex.PW9/B) was factually incorrect. This made the whole of the prosecution's case doubtful. The photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P4) did not pertain to the accident, because one of the photographs (Ex.P4) showed a lady. Investigating Officer Amar Nath (PW9) admitted that the spot map (Ex.PW9/B) was factually incorrect. This made the whole of the prosecution's case doubtful. The photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P4) did not pertain to the accident, because one of the photographs (Ex.P4) showed a lady. The Investigating Officer admitted that the lady shown in the photograph had nothing to do with the case. Jagdish Singh (PW2) admitted that 6-7 persons were present on the stairs; however, none of those persons was examined. Informant Batan Singh, on the other hand, stated that there was no one on the spot. This shows that the prosecution witnesses were making incorrect statements. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Rohit for the petitioner/accused, and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State. 10. Mr. Ajay Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. It was admitted by the Investigating Officer that the site plan did not depict the correct spot position. Therefore, no reliance could have been placed on it. The photographs also pertained to some other case because the lady shown in one of the photographs did not pertain to this case. The learned Courts below erred in relying upon the photographs and the spot map. Negligence of the accused was not proved, and a person cannot be presumed to be negligent simply because an accident had occurred. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the truck was taken towards the right side of the road, which is a violation of the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989. Driving the truck towards the right side of the road amounts to negligence, and learned Courts below had rightly convicted the accused for the commission of the charged offences. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. Driving the truck towards the right side of the road amounts to negligence, and learned Courts below had rightly convicted the accused for the commission of the charged offences. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:- “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: 14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) “5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis. 16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 17. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 18. Amar Nath (PW9) admitted in his cross-examination that he had not shown all curves at Points B and C in the site plan (Ex.PW9/B), and the site plan was wrongly prepared. It was submitted based on this admission that the prosecution's case was to be discarded. This submission will not help the defence. The site plan depicted the position of the vehicle on the spot. There is nothing on record to show that the position of the vehicles was not correct. It is not shown that the position of the curves was material for adjudicating the negligence; therefore, their absence from the site plan will not make it doubtful. 19. Amar Nath (PW9) also admitted in his cross-examination that the photograph (Ex. P4) was of some lady who had no connection to the present case. It was submitted that the photographs became doubtful because of this admission. This submission is not acceptable. Merely because the photograph of some other case was annexed to the case does not mean that the other photographs showing the vehicles and their position would have to be discarded. The negligence of the Investigating Officer in collecting the irrelevant evidence will not invalidate the relevant evidence collected by him. Therefore, the admission in the cross-examination made by the Investigating Officer is not sufficient to invalidate the prosecution's case. 20. Batan Singh (PW1) stated that a truck came from the opposite side at a high speed and hit the car at Seerpul, Ghumarwin. He and Jagdish sustained injuries in the accident. He stated in cross-examination that the accident occurred at 5.45 PM. The police remained on the spot for half an hour. There was a curve at the place of the accident. He denied that the truck was being driven at a slow speed. He admitted that a boy was also travelling in the truck. He admitted that the stairs led towards the bazaar from the place of the accident. He denied that many people were going down the stairs. 21. His statement was corroborated by Jagdish (PW2), who had sustained injuries in the incident, and whose presence on the spot cannot be doubted. He admitted that a boy was also travelling in the truck. He admitted that the stairs led towards the bazaar from the place of the accident. He denied that many people were going down the stairs. 21. His statement was corroborated by Jagdish (PW2), who had sustained injuries in the incident, and whose presence on the spot cannot be doubted. He stated that he was travelling in the vehicle being driven by the informant. A truck came from the opposite side at Seerpul and hit the car on the right side of the road. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the truck. He sustained injuries and was taken to the hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that the accident occurred at about 6.00 PM. He remained on the spot for about 5-7 minutes. He admitted that there were stairs on the spot, and 5-7 people were getting down the stairs who had seen the incident. He corrected himself to say that he was unaware of this fact. He denied that he and the informant had consumed alcohol. He admitted that there was a curve at the place of the incident. The police had reached the hospital after 10-15 minutes. He admitted that the site plan was wrongly prepared. 22. It was submitted that there is a discrepancy in the testimony of Batan Singh (PW1) and Jagdish Singh (PW2) regarding the time. The informant stated that the incident occurred at 5.45 PM, whereas Jagdish Singh stated that the incident occurred at about 6.00 PM. Statement (Ex.PW1/A) mentions the time of the accident as 7.15 PM. The discrepancy in the time makes the prosecution's case suspect. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 that people make their estimates by guesswork regarding the time on the spur of the moment, and one cannot expect people to make very precise or liable estimates in such matters. It was observed:- “(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. It was observed:- “(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person.” 23. Therefore, the testimonies of the witnesses cannot be discarded because of a discrepancy in the time, such a discrepancy is bound to come because of the different time sense of individuals. 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed:- “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096: ( AIR 1983 SC 753 ) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 : AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP ( AIR 1959 SC 1012 )” 25. The testimonies of these witnesses are duly corroborated by the site plan (Ex.PW9/B), wherein the place of the accident is shown at Point (C). It shows that the total metalled road was 26 ft., out of which 13 ft metalled, and 2 ft. unmetalled road was towards the left side of the truck. The vehicles were moving from the side of the truck. The photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P3) also show that the truck had crossed the central line and moved towards its right side, whereas the car was towards the left side of the road. 26. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. The photographs (Ex.P1 to Ex.P3) also show that the truck had crossed the central line and moved towards its right side, whereas the car was towards the left side of the road. 26. The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. It was laid down in Fagu Moharana vs. State, AIR 1961 Orissa 71, that driving the vehicle on the wrong side of the road amounts to negligence. It was observed: “The car was on the left side of the road, leaving a space of nearly 10 feet on its right side. The bus, however, was on the right side of the road, leaving a gap of nearly 10 feet on its left side. There is thus no doubt that the car was coming on the proper side, whereas the bus was coming from the opposite direction on the wrong side. The width of the bus is only 7 feet 6 inches, and as there was a space of more than 10 feet on the left side, the bus could easily have avoided the accident if it had travelled on the left side of the road.” 27. Similarly, it was held in State of H.P. Vs. Dinesh Kumar, 2008 H.L.J. 399, where the vehicle was taken towards the right side of the road, the driver was negligent. It was observed: “The spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A would show that at point 'A on the right side of the road, there were blood stain marks and a V-shape slipper of deceased Anu. Point 'E' is the place where P.W. 1 Chuni Lal was standing at the time of the accident, and point 'G' is the place where P.W. 3 Anil Kumar was standing. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The jeep was going from Hamirpur to Nadaun. The point 'A' in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is almost on the extreme right side of the road.” 28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj, 2009 Cri. L.J. 1922, and it was held: “16. The evidence in the present case has to be examined in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court. In the present case, some factors stand out clearly. The width of the pucca portion of the road was 10 ft. 6 inches. On the left side, while going from Dangri to Kangoo, there was a 7 ft. kacha portion, and on the other side, there was an 11 ft. kacha portion. The total width of the road was about 28 ft. The injured person was coming from the Dangri side and was walking on the left side of the road. This has been stated both by the injured as well as by PW-6. This fact is also apparent from the fact that after he was hit, the injured person fell into the drain. A drain is always on the edge of the road. The learned Sessions Judge held, and it has also been argued before me, that nobody has stated that the motorcycle was on the wrong side. This fact is apparent from the statement of the witnesses, who state that they were on the extreme left side, and the motorcycle, which was coming from the opposite side, hit them. It does not need a genius to conclude that the motorcycle was on the extreme right side of the road and therefore on the wrong side.” 29. In the present case, the truck was taken towards the right side of the road, and the learned Courts below had rightly held the driver to be negligent. 30. The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was the driver of the truck. The learned Courts below had rightly held that this part of the statement could be relied upon. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 : 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 : 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the accused made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari [ (1967) 3 SCR 708 : AIR 1968 SC 110 : 1968 Cri LJ 95]. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. [1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468 ] held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730], this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1963) 3 SCR 678 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730], this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-Section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 31. This question was again considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, and it was held that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but a part of such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:- 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar [ (1969) 1 SCC 347 : AIR 1969 SC 422 ]: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book and his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post-mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 32. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. It was observed at page 275:- “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 33. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417 : 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761:- 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [ (1992) 3 SCC 700 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 705] held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh [Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933] held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh [Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468 : 1953 Cri LJ 1933] held that the answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab [(1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678 ], this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh [(2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514] held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla [ (2005) 9 SCC 15 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185] and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam [ (2007) 11 SCC 467 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766]. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 34. It is apparent from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Court can rely upon the statement of the accused made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to lend assurance to the prosecution’s case. Therefore, there is no infirmity in relying upon the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 35. Batan Singh (PW1) and Jagdish Singh (PW2) stated that they had sustained injuries. This is duly corroborated by the statement of Dr N.K. Bhardwaj (PW5), who found multiple injuries on the persons of the injured, which could have been caused by means of a blunt weapon within six hours of the examination. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that the defence has not disputed his testimony. Therefore, it was duly proved on record that Batan Singh (PW1) and Jagdish Singh (PW2) had sustained multiple injuries in an accident. Since the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused; therefore, he was rightly held guilty of the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. 36. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the learned Courts below failed to consider this aspect. This submission will not help the accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 that the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of IPC. It was observed: “11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus : "Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces." 12. In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.” 37. A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v. Balwinder Singh, (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held:- 13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [ (2000) 5 SCC 82 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208]. 38. It was held in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 278, that the legislature should revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304A of the IPC. It was observed at page 196: “25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 39. Thus, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 40. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.” 39. Thus, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused. 40. Learned Trial Court had imposed a sentence of six months each for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. The Court has to take the deterrent view in the offence involving the use of the motor vehicle as noticed above, and the sentence of six months imposed by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court cannot be said to be excessive. Hence, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court. 41. No other point was urged. 42. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 43. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. 44. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.