2025:HHC:38511 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 368 of 2025 Reserved on: 03.11.2025 Date of Decision: 17.11.2025. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Ramesh Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondents : Mr Jai Ram Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present petition is directed against the order dated 09.09.2023 passed by learned Presiding Officer of National Lok Adalat, District Kangra vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 504, 506 and 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) (Parties shall 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2025:HHC:38511 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 504, 506 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The matter was taken up by the Lok Adalat on 09.09.2023. The statements of the informant and respondents were recorded, in which they stated that they had entered into a compromise (Ext.C1) voluntarily without any influence from any person. The informant did not want to proceed with the matter because of the compromise. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class passed an order holding that since the parties have entered into a compromise, the proceedings could not continue. Hence, the informant was permitted to compound the offences, and the accused were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324, 504, 506 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 3. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the National Lok Adalat, the State has filed the present petition asserting that 3 2025:HHC:38511 Section 324 of the IPC is non-compoundable. National Lok Adalat had no jurisdiction to compound the non-bailable offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the National Lok Adalat be set aside. 4. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State and Mr Jai Ram, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 5. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC is non-compoundable and could not have been compounded by the National Lok Adalat. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the National Lok Adalat be set aside. 6. Mr Jai Ram Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the parties have entered into a compromise voluntarily without any influence from any person. No fruitful purpose would be served by continuing with the proceedings. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 4 2025:HHC:38511 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. Section 324 of IPC was compoundable earlier, but was made non-compoundable by Section 28(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 2005. The Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 2008 (5 of 2009) substituted the table provided under Section 320(1) and 320(2) and omitted Section 324 from the list of offences which can be compounded with or without the permission of the Court. Therefore, the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC is not included in the list of compoundable offences and is non-compoundable. 9. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Abdul Sufan Laskar v. State of Assam, (2008) 9 SCC 333: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 770: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1280, that the offence punishable under Section 324 of IPC became non-compoundable after the deletion of the entry in Section 320 of CrPC. It was observed at page 336: “16. It is no doubt true, as stated by the learned counsel for the appellants, even at the time of the preliminary hearing of this matter, that by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Act 25 of 2005), the above entry has been deleted. In other words, an offence of voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means, punishable 5 2025:HHC:38511 under Section 324 IPC, is no longer compoundable. The Amendment Act of 2005 came into force from 23-6- 2006.” 10. This position was reiterated in Murali v. State, (2021) 1 SCC 726: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 487: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 10, wherein it was observed at page 729: “8. There can be no doubt that Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“CrPC”) does not encapsulate Sec- tions 324 and 307 IPC under its list of compoundable of- fences. Given the unequivocal language of Section 320(9) CrPC, which explicitly prohibits any compounding except as permitted under the said provision, it would not be pos- sible to compound the appellants' offences…” 11. Section 201 of IPC also does not find mention in Section 320 of Cr.P.C., and it is to be treated as non- compoundable. 12. Section 19(5) of the Legal Service Authorities Act provides that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. Thus, the Lok Adalat could not have taken cognisance of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. It was laid down by the Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. Shekhar, 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 14874: ILR 2021 Kar 3550: (2021) 3 AIR Kant R 659: (2021) 225 AIC 345 that a non- 6 2025:HHC:38511 compoundable offence cannot be referred to Lok Adalat. It was observed at page 3556: “10. Reading of the above provisions makes it clear that Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction in respect of the case relat- ing to a non-compoundable offence. xxxxx 12. Reading of Section 20(1) (ii) of the Act and the proviso to the said section makes it clear that the Court can refer a case to Lok Adalat only if the same is appropriate. Again, what is an appropriate case depends on the fact of whether Lok Adalat can take cognisance of such offences and has jurisdiction to decide the same. Proviso to Section 19 (5) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Lok Adalat over a case relat- ing to a non-compoundable offence. Therefore, the logic of the law is that the Court cannot refer a case involving a non-compoundable offence to the Lok Adalat. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 40 of the judgment in United India Insurance Co. Ltd.'s case referred to the supra held that the offence, which is non-compoundable in na- ture, falls outside the jurisdiction of the permanent Lok Adalat. 14. In Urmila Masomat's case, referred to supra, the Patna High Court held that the Lok Adalat constituted under Sec- tions 20 and 22 of the Act has no jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to the offence which is non-com- poundable under any law. Therefore, the Court cannot refer such cases to the Lok Adalat. 15. In this case, admittedly, the offences under Sections 32 and 34 of the Act were non-compoundable ones. There- fore, the order of reference and determination of the same by the Lok Adalat were contrary to Sections 19 and 20 of the Act.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Bankat v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 1 SCC 343: 2005 SCC 7 2025:HHC:38511 (Cri) 316: 2004 SCC OnLine SC 1486 that the Courts do not have jurisdiction to compound the non-compoundable offences. It was observed: - “11. In our view, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent requires acceptance. For compounding of the offences punishable under the IPC, a complete scheme is provided under Section 320 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 provides that the offences mentioned in the table provided thereunder can be compounded by the persons mentioned in column 3 of the said table. Further, sub-section (2) provides that the offences mentioned in the table could be compounded by the victim with the permission of the court. As against this, sub-section (9) specifically provides that “no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section”. In view of the aforesaid legislative mandate, only the offences which are covered by Table 1 or Table 2 as stated above can be compounded, and the rest of the offences punishable under the IPC cannot be compounded. 12. Further, the decision in the Ram Pujan case [(1973) 2 SCC 456: 1973 SCC (Cri) 870] does not advance the contention raised by the appellants. In the said case, the Court held that the major offences for which the accused had been convicted were no doubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise can be taken into account in determining the quantum of sentence. In Ram Lal case [(1999) 2 SCC 213: 1999 SCC (Cri) 123] the Court referred to the decision of this Court in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. [(2005) 1 SCC 347: JT (1987) 2 SC 361] and to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand case [1990 Supp SCC 681: 1991 SCC (Cri) 159]: (SCC p. 682, para 3) “3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission 8 2025:HHC:38511 to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial court shall permit them to compound the offence.” and held as under: (SCC p. 214, para 3) “We are unable to follow the said decision as a binding precedent. Section 320, which deals with ‘compounding of offences’, provides two Tables therein, one containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded by the person mentioned in it, and the other containing descriptions of offences which can be compounded with the permission of the court by the persons indicated therein. Only such offences as are included in the said two Tables can be compounded and none else.” 13. In the case of Y. Suresh Babu [(2005) 1 SCC 347: JT (1987) 2 SC 361], the Court has specifically observed that the said case “shall not be treated as a precedent”. The aforesaid two decisions are based on facts, and in any set of circumstances, they can be treated as per incuriam, as pointed out by the Court, to sub-section (9) of Section 320, which was not drawn. Hence, the High Court rightly refused to grant permission to compound the offence punishable under Section 326. 14. We reiterate that the course adopted in Y. Suresh Babu [(2005) 1 SCC 347: JT (1987) 2 SC 361] and the Mahesh Chand case [1990 Supp SCC 681: 1991 SCC (Cri) 159] was not in accordance with law. 15. The above position was elaborately indicated by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa [(1999) 5 SCC 238: 1999 SCC (Cri) 998]. 14. Therefore, the Lok Adalat could not have compounded the offence as it was non-compoundable. 9 2025:HHC:38511 15. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the order dated 09.09.2023, passed by the National Lok Adalat, is ordered to be set aside. The learned Trial Court shall proceed further in the matter as per the law. 16. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. 17. The matter is remitted to the learned Trial Court for disposal as per law. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 17th November 2025 (Nikita)