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2025 DAILYLAW 35906 (AP)

The State of A.P., v. Suvvada Apparao

CRLA/1062/2009 · 2025-07-29

T Mallikarjuna Rao

Criminal Appealbody2025

Judgment text

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APHC010578722009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3369] WEDNESDAY,THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1062/2009 Between: 1. THE STATE OF A.P.,, REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD. ...APELLANT AND 1. SUVVADA APPARAO, S/O. RAMANNA 17TH WARD, PROP. OF SRI VENKATESWARA SWEET HOME: BY THE SIDE OF SAMRAT HOTEL, R/O. MUDUNURUVARI STREET, TADEPALLIGUDEM WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. 2. SUVVADA SRINIVASA RAO, S/O. APPA RAO MUDUNURUVARI STREET, NY THE SIDE OF HOTEL SRIRAMA, TADEPALLIGUDEM, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT. 3. SUVVADA SURRARAO SURYAYARAO, S/O. RAMANNA VIJAYA KUMAR PHOTO STUDIO, ALAPATIVARI STREET, MURALIPET, 17TH WARD, 4. SUVVADA VENKANNA, S/O. RAMA RAO SWEET CART BY THE SIDE OF MOHAN STUDIO R/O. ALAPHTI VARI STREET MASEEDUPETA TADEPALLIGUDEM, 5. SUVVADA SRIRAM, S/O. SEETHANNA 17TH WARD, ALAPATIVARI STREET, MURALIPETA, TADEPALLIGUDEM, 2 6. NARISE SOMESWARA RAO, S/O. VEERAJU COUNSELLOR, 27TH WARD, TADEPALLIGUDEM, WEST GODAVARI DIST. GEETHARAMAPETA 27TH WARD SEETHARAMAPETA, ...RESPODENT(S): Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to To present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal against the order acquittal of the accused/respondent in S.C. No. 227 of 2002 on the file of the Hon'ble Assistant Sessions Judge Tadepalligudem, West Godavari district, dated 21st day of november, 2007 and prays that this hon'ble court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the accused/respondent for the offense with which they were charged. IA NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 539 OF 2009 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased To condone the delay of "348 days" in presenting appeal against the order of acquittal of the accused/respondents in S.C. No. 227 of 2002 on the file of the hon'ble assistant sessions judge, Tadepalligudem, dated 23rd day of November, 2007. Counsel for the Apellant: 1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) Counsel for the Respodent(S): 1. TURAGA SAI SURYA The Court made the following: J U D G M E N T 1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.227 of 2002 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Tadepalligudem, West Godavari District (for short, ‘the Sessions Judge’) by its judgment dated 21.11.2007, whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted A.1 to A.6 for the offences punishable under section 354, 324, 427, 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’), however, convicted A.1 to A.5 for the offence punishable under Section 323 of 3 IPC and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month each. 2. Heard learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the Appellant / State. None appeared on behalf of the respondents / A.1 to A.6. 3. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 10 and documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.10 and Exs.D.1 to D.6 were also marked. 4. The essential facts giving rise to the present appeal are summarized as follows: (a) The de facto complainant and victim, Smt. Pendyala Kameswari, a widow, manages her family’s gingelly oil business run at their residence, which includes her in-laws and her late husband’s brother. A-1 operates a sweetmeat shop in a wooden shack opposite Kameswari’s house on a poramboke site. When municipal authorities issued notices to remove encroachments for road widening, A-1 requested to rent Kameswari’s verandah for his business, which she refused due to her ongoing oil business there. Suspecting forcible encroachment, Kameswari’s mother-in-law filed suit (O.S.No.459/2004) on 19.08.2004, and secured an Advocate-Commissioner to record the premises’ condition. (b) The next day, while Kameswari was managing the oil business, A-1 and several others forcefully entered her property. A-1 verbally abused and threatened her, threw stones, and others removed and discarded the stones. When A-5 tried to dig a counter-wall with a crowbar, Kameswari confronted him. Subsequently, A-6 tore her saree and jacket and assaulted her. Witnesses, including family members L.W.2 Pendyala Durga Rani, L.W.3 Pendyala Satyanarayana, L.W.4 Pendyala Krishna Murthy, and L.W.5 Pendyala Satyavathi intervened but were attacked. A-1 to A-6 assaulted L.W.3 and Kameswari’s in-laws, tore L.W.2’s saree, and outraged her 4 modesty. They damaged oil tins, causing approximately Rs.50,000/- in losses. Following the assault, Kameswari and the injured parties lodged a complaint at the police station at 1:00 PM. The police investigated, recorded witness statements, provided medical treatment to the injured, and filed a charge sheet. 5. After laying the charge sheet by Investigating Officer, the committal court passed an order under Section 209(a) of Cr.P.C., by following provisions of Sections 207 and 208 Cr.P.C. The case is committed to the Court of Sessions. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.227 of 2006 has been numbered. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the trial court framed charges against the accused, punishable under Sections 354, 324, 323, 427 and 506 of the IPC. The accused did not plead guilty but claimed to be tried. 6. The learned Sessions Judge examined A.1 to A.6 as required under Section 313 (1)(b) of Cr.P.C., to enable them to consider the evidence that had been led on the part of the prosecution and also appeared against them. But the accused denied the truth of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and Exs.D1 to D.6 are marked during the cross-examination of P.Ws.9 and 10. 7. After considering the necessary material available on record, the learned Sessions Judge found A.1 to A.6 not guilty for the offences punishable under Section 354, 324, 427 and 506 of IPC and acquitted them. But, however, convicted A.1 to A.5 for the offence under Section 323 of IPC and sentenced them to pay a tune of Rs.1000/- each in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month each. 8. I have examined the oral and documentary evidence produced on the record by the prosecution before the learned Sessions Judge. 9. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State contends that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen that the ingredients to 5 constitute offences punishable under sections 323, 324, 354, 427, 506 r/w.34 of IPC are made out by the prosecution against the accused; the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 5 and the evidence of P.W.9, who is the medical officer clearly proves the guilt of the accused for the charges and there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of prosecution witnesses; the learned sessions judge has not considered the evidence of prosecution witnesses in its correct prospective; the other reasons assigned by the learned judge in acquitting the accused are unsustainable. 10. The point for determination is: Whether the Sessions Court was justified in acquitting the accused? P O I N T: 11. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows: "26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence." 12. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the power of appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point has concluded as under: 1 (2011) 6 SCC 279 2 (2007) 3 SCC 755 6 “16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.” 13. In Chandrappa and Others V. State of Karnataka3, while considering the similar issue, namely, appeal against acquittal and power of the appellate court to reappreciate, review or reconsider evidence and interfere with the order of acquittal, this court, reiterated the principles laid down in the above decisions and further held that: “42.....The following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having 3 (2007) 4 SCC 415 7 secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 14. It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this court, is not warranted. However, the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact. In that case, it is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power, and the appellate court is free to arrive at its conclusion, keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to every person, and in criminal jurisprudence, every person is presumed innocent unless proven guilty by a competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court concerning both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, the appellate court must marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. 15. With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal. 16. In order to duly consider the submissions made on behalf of the appellant/State, I have carefully examined the material placed on record. To 8 establish its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 5. According to the prosecution, PW.1, Pendyala Kameswari, is the de facto complainant and P.W.2, Pendyala Durga Rani, who alleged that they were assaulted and that the accused attempted to outrage their modesty. The prosecution examined P.W.3 (Pendyala Satyanarayana), P.W.4 (Pendyala Krishna Murthy), P.W.5 (Pendyala Satyavathi), who are the family members of the de facto complainant and P.W.6 (Raghunadha Shetty) as eyewitness to the incident. However, the record reveals that P.W.6 did not support the case of the prosecution and turned hostile. 17. The main grievance of the Appellant-State is that the learned Sessions Judge failed to adequately consider whether the essential ingredients constituting the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 354, 427 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC were established by the prosecution against the accused persons. A perusal of the trial court's judgment reveals that Accused Nos. 1 to 5 were acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 354, 324, 427, and 506 IPC, while Accused No. 6 was acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. In light of the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal and the submissions advanced, now, I consider whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused of the aforesaid offences. 18. A perusal of the trial Court's judgment indicates that although charges were framed against the accused under Section 324 of the IPC, the trial Court ultimately found Accused Nos. 1 to 5 guilty only of the lesser offence punishable under Section 323 IPC, sentencing each of them to pay a fine of ₹1,000/-. It has not been brought to the notice of this Court whether Accused Nos. 1 to 5 have preferred any appeal challenging their conviction under Section 323 IPC. Furthermore, the grounds of appeal filed by the State do not specifically assail the acquittal in detail, except for a general assertion that the learned Sessions Judge acted contrary to law, the weight of evidence, and the 9 overall probabilities of the case, and ought to have appreciated the prosecution’s case more appropriately and convicted the accused. 19. A reading of the grounds of appeal reveals that the appellant has not raised any specific challenge to the acquittal recorded by the trial Court in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 354, 427 and 506 of the IPC. 20. The trial Court duly considered the charge framed under Section 354 of the IPC against the accused persons. According to the said charge, all the accused unlawfully trespassed into the premises of the de facto complainant on 20.08.2004 at 10:00 A.M. and allegedly outraged the modesty of P.Ws.1 and 2 by tearing their jackets. The trial Court extracted and analyzed the relevant portions of the testimonies of P.Ws.1 to 5 in relation to the alleged offence under Section 354 IPC. The prosecution’s contention is that the accused outraged the modesty of P.Ws.1 and 2 by tearing their jackets and removing their sarees. However, the trial Court took note of a significant lapse in the investigation namely, that the Investigating Officer failed to seize any of the torn jackets or sarees belonging to P.Ws.1 and 2 during the course of investigation. 21. The trial Court also took into consideration that the prosecution’s case is not supported by any independent evidence, but relies solely on the testimonies of P.Ws.1 to 5, all of whom belong to the same family. The trial Court further noted that there were admittedly pre-existing civil disputes between Accused No.1 and P.Ws.1 to 5 prior to the alleged incident. In this context, the trial Court referred to a judgment reported in 2000 (1) Andhra Law Journal (Criminal) 353 in the case of Karri Suribabu v. State of A.P., wherein it was held that it is unsafe to convict an accused solely on the interested testimony of P.W.1, unless it is corroborated by independent evidence or supporting circumstances. 10 22. The trial Court observed that although the prosecution claimed to rely on certain individuals as independent witnesses, those persons were not examined for reasons best known to the prosecution. The only purportedly independent witness examined was P.W.6, Raghunadha Shetty; however, he did not support the prosecution's case. The trial Court also evaluated the testimony of P.W.9, Dr. M.S.R.K. Prasad, the Medical Officer, whose evidence confirmed that P.Ws.1 and 2 had not sustained any visible injuries. The Court further observed that if the accused had indeed torn the jackets of P.Ws.1 and 2, the Investigating Officer would have seized the torn garments during the investigation, or at the very least, some physical signs such as scratches or abrasions might have been evident. Given the absence of visible injuries and the lack of material evidence, the trial Court found the prosecution's version unconvincing and accordingly acquitted all the accused of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC. 23. Coming to the charge under Section 324 IPC, the trial Court meticulously examined the evidence and observed that the Investigating Officer had failed to seize any weapon from the scene of the offence during the course of investigation. In his cross-examination, P.W.9, the Medical Officer, stated that the victims did not mention the use of any specific weapon during the assault. The trial Court referred to the testimonies of P.W.3, Pendyala Satyanarayana, and P.W.4, Pendyala Krishna Murthy. P.W.3 deposed that he sustained five abrasions on his back and neck, attributing the first injury to Accused No.1, whom he alleged beat him with a tin sheet, causing a bleeding injury. P.W.4, another injured witness, testified that all the accused assaulted him on his right leg, resulting in injury. The Medical Officer corroborated that P.W.4 had two abrasions on his right leg, as well as swelling and tenderness on the dorsum of his right foot, and opined that the injuries were simple in nature. Notably, P.W.4 did not specifically attribute the injuries to any particular accused. In view of the lack of evidence regarding the use of any weapon by the accused, the trial Court, in the absence of sufficient 11 material to support a charge under Section 324 IPC, rightly convicted the accused persons under the lesser offence punishable under Section 323 IPC. 24. The trial Court has also considered the charges framed against the accused under Sections 427 and 506 of the IPC. It observed that Ex.P3, the Panchanama, does not disclose the value of the property allegedly damaged. Furthermore, there is no evidence on record indicating that the accused threatened any of the witnesses in a manner that would compel them to do, or refrain from doing, any act they were legally entitled to perform. As such, the evidence does not establish the ingredients necessary to attract the offence punishable under Section 506 IPC. In view of these findings, the trial Court acquitted the accused of the offences punishable under Sections 427 and 506 IPC. 25. It is a settled principle of law that if the trial court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the trial court is a plausible one. Therefore, taking the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, this court is not inclined to reverse the trial court's finding. 26. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the trial court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Judge. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed. Accordingly, the point is answered. 27. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1062 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Tadepalligudem, in Sessions Case No. 227 of 2002, dated 21.11.2007, stands confirmed. 12 Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. ____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 30.07.2025 MS 13 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1062 of 2009 Date:30.07.2025 MS