Judgment : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.08.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences by extending them benefit of doubt. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147 , 149, 341 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘ IPC ’). It was asserted that the informant/victim Pradeep Kumar (PW11) had gone to the house of Bija Ram on 04.01.2009. He was returning to his home at about 2 am. Ravinder Kumar (PW9), Hariman (PW2) and Surat Ram (PW3) were also going to their home. Accused Raghubir caught hold of the informant Pradeep Kumar (PW11) by his arms and pushed him against the wall. Accused Pappu and Chunni Lal gave him fist blows. Accused Pratap, Ravinder, Santosh, Gita Ram, Raj Gopal and Dinesh also gave him beatings. He shouted for help. Ravinder Kumar (PW9), Hariman (PW2) and Surat Ram (PW3) rescued him. The informant sustained injuries. He talked to Ward Member Sant Ram, who told him that it was a matter of the village and should be settled in the village. The accused said that they would not settle the matter, and the informant could do whatever he felt like. The informant went to the police station and narrated the incident to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ext.PW8/A). HC Pratap Singh (PW10) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW10/A). Pradeep Kumar (PW11) produced his shirt (Ext.P1), which was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with seal ‘T’. Seal impression (Ext.PW10/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to witness Hariman after its use. Doctor D.D. Sharma (PW1) medically examined Pradeep Kumar (PW11) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused within 12-24 hours of the examination by a blunt weapon. He issued MLC (Ext.PW1/A). Seal impression (Ext.PW10/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to witness Hariman after its use. Doctor D.D. Sharma (PW1) medically examined Pradeep Kumar (PW11) and found that he had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused within 12-24 hours of the examination by a blunt weapon. He issued MLC (Ext.PW1/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court put notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 147 , 341, and 323, read with Section 149 of the IPC , to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. D.D. Sharma (PW1) is the Medical Officer who conducted the medical examination of the victim. Hariman (PW2), Surat Ram (PW3) and Ravinder Kumar (PW9) are the eyewitnesses. Ramesh Chand (PW4) was a Ward Member to whom the complaint was made by the informant. Ashok Sharma (PW5) proved the birth certificates. HC Pritam Singh (PW6) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Sandeep Kumar (PW7) produced the birth certificate. Bheem Singh (PW8) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. HC Pratap Singh (PW10) investigated the matter. Pradeep Kumar (PW11) is the victim/informant. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. stated that the witnesses deposed falsely against him and that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; hence, the accused were acquitted after giving them the benefit of doubt. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the informant and Ravinder Kumar (PW9) were ignored. They specifically deposed that the accused had beaten the informant. Their testimonies were corroborated by the medical evidence. Ramesh Chand (PW4) stated that he went to the house of Bija Ram, who admitted that there was a quarrel. The statements of the informant and Ravinder Kumar (PW9) were ignored. They specifically deposed that the accused had beaten the informant. Their testimonies were corroborated by the medical evidence. Ramesh Chand (PW4) stated that he went to the house of Bija Ram, who admitted that there was a quarrel. This evidence was not considered by the learned Trial Court; hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed, and that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Anshul Attri, learned counsel for the respondents/accused. 9. Mr Lokender Kutlheria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/state, submitted that the learned Trial Court has not assigned cogent reasons to disbelieve the prosecution's version. The statements of the informant and eyewitnesses were wrongly ignored. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Anshul Atrri, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that Hariman (PW2), Surat Ram (PW2) and Ramesh Chand (PW3) did not support the prosecution's case. The testimonies of the informant and Ravinder Kumar (PW9) were not satisfactory. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion at which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence. 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence. 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity. 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. There is a force in the submissions of Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, that the judgment of the learned Trial Court is bereft of any reason and is extremely unsatisfactory. The learned Trial Court has held as under: “xxx18. On careful scrutiny of the evidence on record and duly hearing the ld. APP and learned counsel for accuseds, I find force put forth by learned counsel for accuseds and as of record the discrepancies in the prosecution evidence pointed by learned counsel for accused hold good and as of principle benefit thereof goes to accuseds and in the light of the same, it can be safely held that, clouds of suspicion are cast over the story of prosecution and therefore all the accuseds are acquitted of the charges by way of extending benefit of doubt. Their personal and surety bonds stand cancelled and discharged. File after due completion be consigned to records.” 15. The judgment of the learned Trial Court mentions that there were discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence pointed out by learned counsel for the accused, and a cloud of suspicion was cast upon the prosecution’s story. Learned Trial Court did not discuss whether the discrepancies were material or whether they affected the core of the prosecution's case. Learned Trial Court did not assign any reason for disbelieving the testimonies of the informant/victim and the medical evidence. It contains no reasons to acquit the accused. 16. This Court held in Babu Ram v. Himachal Pradesh University , 2021 SCC OnLine HP 5283: 2021 (2) Shim. LC 910 that the reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker and failure to give reasons amounts to a denial of justice. It was observed: “7. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision- taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform the appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. The right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. 8. The necessity of assigning reason has been repeatedly emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 , wherein after taking into consideration the entire law on the subject, the position of law was summarized as under: — (a) In India, the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on the recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on the recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by the superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to the rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose, which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process, then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber- stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candour (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision- making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candour (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision- making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which requires, “adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”. (o) In all common law jurisdictions, judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for the development of law, the requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “Due Process”. 9. In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:— “38. It is a settled proposition of law that even in administrative matters, the reasons should be recorded, as it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order. 39. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 , this Court has observed as under: (SCC p. 243, para 36). “36……Every State action may be informed by reason, and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary. The rule of law contemplates governance by laws and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is the trite law that ‘be you ever so high, the laws are above you’. This is what men in power must remember, always.” 40. In LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482 , this Court observed that the State or its instrumentality must not take any irrelevant or irrational factor into consideration or appear arbitrary in its decision. “Duty to act fairly” is part of the fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or those under public duty must be received and guided by the public interest. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 and Mahesh Chandra v. U.P. Financial Corpn. (1993) 2 SCC 279 . 41. Every activity of the public authority or those under public duty must be received and guided by the public interest. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 and Mahesh Chandra v. U.P. Financial Corpn. (1993) 2 SCC 279 . 41. In State of W.B. v. Atul Krishna Shaw 1991 Supp (1) SCC 414, this Court observed that: (SCC p. 421, para 7) “7…. Giving of reasons is an essential element of the administration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of the sound system of judicial review.” 42. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides for the requirement to record reasons, as it is now regarded as one of the principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that, except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must record reasons for its decision. 43. In Krishna Swami v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 605 , this Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne out from the record. The Court further observed: (SCC p. 637, para 47). “47……Reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for their erection and the actual conclusions. They would also demonstrate how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated, and their rational nexus and synthesis with the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Lest it would be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violating Article 14 or unfair procedure, offending Article 21”. 44. This Court, while deciding the issue in Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. (2010) 13 SCC 336 , placing reliance on its various earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 345-46, para 27). “27. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial orders must be supported by reasons recorded in it. This Court, while deciding the issue in Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. (2010) 13 SCC 336 , placing reliance on its various earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 345-46, para 27). “27. It is a settled legal proposition that not only administrative but also judicial orders must be supported by reasons recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is for the forum to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of the justice delivery system, to make it known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. ‘3…. The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the court concerned had really applied its mind. The reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order, and without the same, the order becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity with objectivity. The absence of reasons renders an order indefensible/unsustainable, particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before the higher forum. Recording of reasons is the principle of natural justice, and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision-making. The person who is adversely affected must know why his application has been rejected.” 45. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna (1986) 4 SCC 537 , this Court held that on a charge of misconduct, the authority holding the inquiry must record reasons for reaching its conclusion and record clear findings. The Court further held: (SCC p. 558, para 30). “30.…. In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to know why he has been found guilty. The case can be so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act. The Court further held: (SCC p. 558, para 30). “30.…. In fairness and justice, the member is entitled to know why he has been found guilty. The case can be so serious that it can attract the harsh penalties provided by the Act. Moreover, the member has been given the right of appeal to the High Court under Section 22-A of the Act. To exercise his right of appeal effectively, he must know the basis on which the Council has found him guilty. We have already pointed out that a finding by the Council is the first determinative finding on the guilt of the member. It is a finding by a Tribunal of the first instance. The conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee does not enjoy the status of a ‘finding’. Moreover, the reasons contained in the report by the Disciplinary Committee for its conclusion may or may not constitute the basis of the finding rendered by the Council. The Council must, therefore, state the reasons for its finding.” 46. The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, and reasons are at least sufficient to indicate an application of the mind of the authority before the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out the reasons for the order made, in other words, speaking out. The inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 10. Earlier to the aforesaid decisions, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , after an exhaustive review of its earlier pronouncements as also the views expressed in other jurisdictions and by expert committees, summarised and explained the law as under: — “The decisions of this Court referred to above indicate that, with regard to the requirement to record reasons, the approach of this Court is more in line with that of the American Courts. An important consideration which has weighed with the Court for holding that an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions must record the reasons for its decision is that such a decision is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution as well as the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and that the reasons, if recorded, would enable this Court or the High Courts to effectively exercise the appellate or supervisory power. But this is not the sole consideration. The other considerations which have also weighed with the Court in taking this view are that the requirement of recording reasons would (i) guarantee consideration by the authority; (ii) introduce clarity in the decisions; and (iii) minimise chances of arbitrariness in decision making. In this regard, a distinction has been drawn between ordinary Courts of law and tribunals and authorities exercising judicial functions on the ground that a Judge is trained to look at things objectively, uninfluenced by considerations of policy or expediency, whereas an executive officer generally looks at things from the standpoint of policy and expediency. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions, and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions, irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions, we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect, the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity.” (P 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice.” (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn., P. 548).” 11. Arbitrariness in the making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Non- application of the mind by the authority making the order is only one of them. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the person making the order. Arbitrariness in the making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Non- application of the mind by the authority making the order is only one of them. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the person making the order. Application of the mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind by the authority making the order, and disclosure is best done by recording the reasons that led the authority to pass the order in question. The absence of reasons either in the order passed by the authority is clearly suggestive of the order being arbitrary, hence legally unsustainable.” 17. In the present case learned Trial Court failed to assign any reason for acquitting the accused, and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is not sustainable. 18. The logical consequence of holding that the judgment of the learned Trial Court was not sustainable would have been to remit the matter to the learned Trial Court to write a fresh judgment. However, considering the fact that the incident had occurred in 2009, the appeal remained pending before this Court till today, remitting the matter to the learned Trial Court would prolong the litigation as the parties would be put to economic burden of fresh adjudication and the appeals, since the matter was argued at length before this Court, therefore, it is being decided by this Court by re-appreciating the evidence instead of remitting it to the learned Trial Court. 19. Hariman (PW2) stated that he saw during the night that blood was oozing out of the mouth and eyes of Pradeep Kumar (PW11). His clothes were blood-stained. Pradeep disclosed that he was beaten by someone, but he could not name them. The police visited the spot on the next day and seized the blood-stained shirt of Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied in the cross- examination by the learned APP that he, Pradeep Kumar (PW11), Ravinder (PW9)and Surat Ram (PW3) came out of the House of Bija Ram. He denied that Pradeep Kumar (PW11) shouted after sometimes and he, Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Surat Ram (PW3) went to the spot. He denied that Raghubeer was beating Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He denied in the cross- examination by the learned APP that he, Pradeep Kumar (PW11), Ravinder (PW9)and Surat Ram (PW3) came out of the House of Bija Ram. He denied that Pradeep Kumar (PW11) shouted after sometimes and he, Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Surat Ram (PW3) went to the spot. He denied that Raghubeer was beating Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He denied that Ravinder Kumar (PW9), Santosh, Geeta Ram, Raj Gopal, Bija Ram and Dinesh came to the spot and gave beatings to Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He denied the previous statement recorded by the police. He denied that he was making a false statement to help the accused. 20. It is apparent from his testimony that he has not supported the prosecution's case regarding the beatings given by the accused, and the prosecution cannot derive any advantage from his testimony. 21. Surat Ram (PW3) stated that Pradeep Kumar (PW11) told him that he was beaten and the blood had come out of his nose and mouth. Pradeep Kumar (PW11) did not disclose who had beaten him. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he saw Raghubeer beating Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He denied that Pappu, Chuni Lal, Pratap Singh, Ravinder, Santosh, Gita Ram, Raj Gopal, Bija Ram and Dinesh came to the spot, who also gave beatings to Pradeep Kumar (PW11). He denied that he, Hariman (PW2) and Ravinder Kumar (PW9) rescued Pradeep from the accused. He denied the previous statements recorded by the police. 22. This witness had also not supported the prosecution's case and stated that Pradeep Kumar (PW11) had disclosed about the beatings given to him, but had not disclosed the names of the person who had beaten him (Pradeep). Thus, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 23. Ramesh Chand (PW4) stated that Ranu Ram told him on 05.01.2000 that Pradeep Kumar (PW11) was beaten. He went to the House of Bija Ram and enquired from Bija Ram, who replied that the children had quarrelled. It was their mistake, and the matter was to be settled; however, the matter was not settled. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that Ranu Ram had disclosed the names of Raghubir, Ravinder, Pratap, Santosh, Bija Ram, Gita Ram, Raj Gopal, Pappu, Chuni Lal and Dinesh as the assailants. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police. 24. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that Ranu Ram had disclosed the names of Raghubir, Ravinder, Pratap, Santosh, Bija Ram, Gita Ram, Raj Gopal, Pappu, Chuni Lal and Dinesh as the assailants. He denied his previous statement recorded by the police. 24. This witness has also not supported the prosecution's case that the names of the assailants were disclosed to him, and his testimony does not establish the prosecution's case. 25. It was submitted on behalf of the State that Bija Ram had admitted guilt, and this was a valuable circumstance to corroborate the prosecution's case. This submission will not help the State. Bija Ram had only told the witness that children had quarrelled, which was their mistake. He had not mentioned the names of the children or that the accused had assaulted the victim. Therefore, his testimony cannot be used to conclude that he had confessed to the commission of the crime. 26. Ravinder Kumar (PW9) stated that he returned from the house of Bija Ram at about 2:00 AM. Pradeep Kumar was going ahead. He heard some noise. He and Surat Singh went to the spot and saw that Raghubir Singh was beating Pradeep Kumar. The other accused were also beating Pradeep Kumar (PW11). The villagers came to the spot. Pradeep Kumar (PW11) had sustained injuries. He and Hariman (PW2) had rescued the victim from the accused and took him to his home. 27. The witness has not named any person except Raghubir and has used the word ‘accused persons’. The accused were also not got identified from him in the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad , AIR 1955 SC 216 , that it is unsafe to rely upon the omnibus statement that the accused had committed the offence. It was observed: “Rasikabai says that the "accused" raised their axes and sticks and threatened her when she called out to them, but that again is an all-embracing statement which we are not prepared to take literally in the absence of further particulars. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking. They are often apt to say "all" even when they only saw "some" because they are too lazy, mentally, to differentiate. Unless, therefore, a witness particularises when there are a number of accused, it is ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus inclusions like this at their face value.” 28. Therefore, the generalized statement made by him that accused persons had beaten the informant is not sufficient to hold the accused guilty. 29. This witness has not identified the accused present in the Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tukesh Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1110, that the identification of the accused sitting in the Court by the witnesses is highly important, and the statement of a witness naming the accused is not sufficient. It was observed:- “21. In a case where there are eyewitnesses, one situation can be that the eyewitness knew the accused before the incident. The eyewitnesses must identify the accused sit- ting in the dock as the same accused whom they had seen committing the crime. Another situation can be that the eyewitness did not know the accused before the incident. In the normal course, in case of the second situation, it is necessary to hold a Test Identification Parade. If it is not held and if the evidence of the eyewitness is recorded af- ter a few years, the identification of such an accused by the eyewitness in the Court becomes vulnerable. Identifi- cation of the accused sitting in the Court by the eyewit- ness is of utmost importance. For example, if an eyewit- ness states in his deposition that “he had seen A, B and C killing X and he knew A, B and C”. Such a statement in the examination-in-chief is not sufficient to link the same to the accused. The eyewitness must identify the accused A, B and C in the Court. Unless this is done, the prosecution cannot establish that the accused are the same persons who are named by the eyewitness in his deposition. Such a statement in the examination-in-chief is not sufficient to link the same to the accused. The eyewitness must identify the accused A, B and C in the Court. Unless this is done, the prosecution cannot establish that the accused are the same persons who are named by the eyewitness in his deposition. If an eyewitness states that “he had seen one accused assaulting the deceased with a sword, another accused assaulting the deceased with a stick, and another accused holding the deceased to enable the other accused to assault the deceased.” In such a case, the eyewitness must identify the accused in the open Court who, accord- ing to him, had assaulted the accused with a stick, who had assaulted the deceased with a sword and who was holding the deceased. Unless the eyewitnesses identify the accused present in the Court, it cannot be said that, based on the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the guilt of the accused has been proved. 22. In the present case, in the case of two eyewitnesses, in the cross-examination, it is brought on record that the accused persons named by them were sitting in the Court. However, they did not identify a particular ac- cused by ascribing him a role. None of the eyewitnesses has specifically identified any of the accused in the Court. 23. In this case, the failure of the eyewitnesses to identify the accused in the court as the accused they had seen committing the crime is fatal to the prosecution's case...” 30. Hence, the testimony of this witness is also not sufficient to convict the accused. 31. The victim Pradeep Kumar (PW11) stated that he, Hariman (PW2), Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Surat Ram (PW3) were returning to their home. Raghubir caught hold of him by his arm and pushed him against the wall. Dinesh, Pratap, Bija Ram, Raj Gopal, Gita Ram, Santosh, etc, gave him beatings with kicks and fist blows. Hariman (PW2), Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Surat Ram (PW3) rescued him. He told this fact to the ward member. The accused stated that he could do whatever he felt like. 32. He stated in his cross-examination that other people were dancing. He and 5-6 people came out. He could not disclose their names. He filed the application in writing. He denied that he fell in a state of intoxication and sustained injuries due to a fall. The accused stated that he could do whatever he felt like. 32. He stated in his cross-examination that other people were dancing. He and 5-6 people came out. He could not disclose their names. He filed the application in writing. He denied that he fell in a state of intoxication and sustained injuries due to a fall. Statements of Ravinder Kumar (PW9), Hariman (PW2) and Surat Ram (PW3) were recorded in his presence. Hariman (PW2) is related to him. He denied that he was making a false statement. 33. Dr DD Sharma (PW1) admitted in his cross- examination that the injuries mentioned by him in the MLC (Ext.PW1/A) can be caused by fall on a hard surface. Thus, this witness has not ruled out the possibility of sustaining injuries in a fall. 34. The incident occurred during the night at about 2:00 AM. The FIR (Ext.PW8/A) was recorded at 6:00 PM. The distance between the police station and the place of the incident is recorded to be 15 kilometres. No explanation has been provided as to why the matter was not reported immediately on the next day. Pradeep Kumar (PW11) stated in his cross-examination that he had reached the police station at 8:00 AM and filed a written complaint with the police. This is contrary to the FIR, in which the time of receiving the information has been mentioned as 6:00 PM. Bheem Singh (PW8) recorded the FIR. He specifically stated in his cross-examination that no written complaint was filed by the informant. Therefore, there is no explanation for the delay; rather, a false statement was made by the informant that he had reported the matter to the police on the next day at 8:00 AM by means of a written application. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. It was observed: "FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8." 35. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: - “12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 ; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].” 36. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. , (2024) 2 SCC 176 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182: “14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.” 37. Therefore, the prosecution’s case would become suspect due to the delay in reporting the matter to the police. 38. The informant stated that he, Hariman (PW2), Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Surat Ram (PW3) were returning to their home after the conclusion of the function. This is falsified by his further cross-examination, where he admitted that the people were dancing, but he and other persons had come out. This shows that the function had not concluded. Ravinder Kumar (PW9) has also contradicted the informant's statement by stating that he was inside the house, and Pradeep Kumar (PW11) had gone towards his home. Therefore, the informant’s version that he, Surat Ram (PW3), Ravinder Kumar (PW9) and Hariman (PW2) came out of the function to go to their home is also not corroborated. 39. It is an admitted version that a function was being held, and the people were dancing and singing. Many people had gathered on the spot. However, the prosecution relied upon the statements of Ravinder, Hariman and Surat Ram. Ravinder admitted in his cross-examination that he is the uncle of Hariman (his maternal grandfather). Pradeep Kumar (PW11) stated in his cross-examination that Hariman was related to him. Thus, it is apparent that the prosecution has cited the related witnesses and withheld the independent witness. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. 40. As already stated, Hariman (PW2) and Surat Ram (PW3) did not support the prosecution's case. Pradeep Kumar (PW11) stated in his cross-examination that Hariman was related to him. Thus, it is apparent that the prosecution has cited the related witnesses and withheld the independent witness. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. 40. As already stated, Hariman (PW2) and Surat Ram (PW3) did not support the prosecution's case. The statement of Ravinder Kumar (PW9) is not sufficient as he did not name the accused nor did he identify them in the Court. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is difficult to rely upon the sole testimony of the informant to record the conviction, and the learned Trial Court had rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the accused. 41. Thus, on the re-appreciation of the evidence, the view taken by the learned Trial Court, although without reasons, that the accused are entitled to a benefit of doubt, is sustainable and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 42. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 43. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure ( Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- each with one surety each of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondents on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 44. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.