OD-2 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SIDE WPO/82/2025 M/s. SAJ FOOD PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. -VERSUS- STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR. Present : The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) For the Petitioners : Mr. Soumya Majumdar, Ld. Sr. Adv. Ms. Sanjukta Dutta, Adv. For the State : Mr. Debapriya Gupta. Adv. Mr. Biswanath Chatterjee, Adv. Mr. N. G. Khaitan, Adv. For the Respondent No.2 : Mr. Rabindra Narayan Dutta, Adv. Mr. Soham Banerjee, Adv. Judgment reserved on : 16.07.2026 Judgment delivered on : 10.09.2026 SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :- 1. The writ application has been preferred challenging an award dated 28.06.2024 passed by the 1st Labour Court, West Bengal in case no.02/2002 under Section 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and published by the Government of West Bengal on 27.08.2024. Vide the impugned award, the learned Judge, 1st Labour Court, Kolkata held as follows: 2 “Thus, viewed from all angles this Court is of considered opinion that as Srikanta Maity was terminated during probation period prior to his confirmation by the O.P./Management, which this Court has held illegal, mala fide, unjustified and as the applicant Srikanta Maity subsequently joined M.C.K.B. Institute of Engineering from where he superannuated, he is entitled to all the back-wages from the date of his termination 18.04.2021 from O.P./Management of M/s. Saj Industries Pvt. Ltd. till the date of his joining at M.C.K.B. Institute of Engineering from where he was superannuated. The management of O.P./Company is directed to make payment as per Order of this Court to Sri Srikanta Maity within 60 days from the date of publication of this Award after adjustments of the payments to him in terms of interim relief, if any made to him by the management failing which the payment amount will also carry interest of 8% per annum from the date of publication of Award till the date of recovery. Thus these issues are decided in favour of the applicant. In result of this application U/S 10(1B)(d) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 succeeds on contest.” 2. Affidavits were filed and parties have filed their respective written notes. 3. The petitioner’s case in the writ application is that the petitioner appointed the respondent no.2 as a chemist on 8th October, 2000 in the managerial rank with terms and conditions delineated thereunder. There is another appointment letter of the same date appointing the respondent no.2 as chemist in the officer rank. The first letter contains a clause for appointing the respondent no.2 on probation for a period of one year. The second appointment letter had appointed the respondent no.2 as a 3 probationer for a period of six months. The respondent no.2 in his cross-examination admitted that he was appointed as a probationer for a period of one year. The admitted date of joining of the respondent no.2 was 10.10.2000. The company did not find him suitable for the work and as such, on 12.01.2001 advised him to look for alternative employment. The respondent no.2 denies receipt of the letter dated 12th January, 2001 and contends that he visited work place on 13.03.2001, 14.03.2001 and 15.03.2001 lastly. 4. Admittedly termination letter dated 18th April, 2001 (after six months) was issued by the company thereby terminating the probationary service of the respondent no. 2. Reference was made to the appointment letter which mentioned the respondent no. 2 to be in the managerial rank, that is, the letter by which he was appointed as probationer for a period of one year. 5. During deposition before the Learned Labour Court, in a Section 10(1B) (d) proceeding of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the respondent no. 2 falsely deposed that after his termination, he was not gainfully employed in another service. Fact remains that he was employed in another Institute from 13th April, 2010. 6. The Learned Labour Court in its award dated 28th June, 2024 held that the termination letter was stigmatic and therefore violative of the principles of natural justice, and lawful proceeding ought to have been initiated against him before issuing termination on 18th April, 2001. The 4 relief of payment from the date of termination till the date of joining the subsequent employer was granted with 8% interest per annum. 7. The following judgments have been relied upon by the petitioner : a. The decision reported in [2002] 1 SCC 520 (Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Anr.) has been relied upon for the proposition that a probationer's service can be terminated without holding an enquiry. The three tests for finding the difference between motive and foundation vis-à-vis the pre-conditions for holding the termination of service of a probationer to be wrongful. b. In support of the contention that mentioning of conduct and language in the termination letter of a probationer is non-stigmatic, and upheld the termination orders of probationers, the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments: (i) (2006) 4 SCC 469 (Abhijit Gupta vs. S.N.B. National Centre, Basic Sciences & Ors.) (ii) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors.) 8. The petitioner has further relied upon the following judgments:  (2011) 15 SCC 180 (Uttar Pradesh State Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Suresh Kumar)  (2008) 17 SCC 61 (District Programme Coordinator, Mahila Samkhya & Anr. Vs. Abdul Kareem & Anr.)  (2001) 10 SCC 87 (A. P. State Federation of Corporation Spinning Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. P.V. Swaminathan) 5 9. Mr. Majumdar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the award of the Learned Labour Court should not be allowed to set at rest. 10. The private respondent, in the present case, has filed affidavit-in- opposition wherein it has been stated that the said respondent was appointed as a chemist on 10.10.2000 under a technical manager of the petitioner company. 11. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that though the respondent no.2 joined the services in the petitioner company on 10.10.2000 and started working under a technical manager and used to report to his superior for collection of sample, maintaining of stock etc., on 11.10.2000, the private respondent no.2 got his appointment letter dated 08.10.2000 from the petitioner company by putting signature on the last page. He submits that the first letter was allegedly changed by the petitioner and that the fist page and the last page have two different dates. 12. It is further submitted that though the petitioner/company has stated that he has worked only for five months, but the respondent no.2 has worked for six full months completing his probation period. The respondent no.2 alleges that the petitioner company has made changes in the appointment letter by replacing several words and due to such mal- practice of the petitioner, the respondent no.2 claims cost and further submits that he is entitled to receive all benefits and is entitled as an employee of the officer rank. 6 13. In reply, the petitioner herein has denied the case of the said respondent no.2 as stated in the affidavit-in-opposition and has categorically stated that the contention of the respondent no.2 that he was a permanent employee just because he was getting house rent allowance or was enjoying casual leave, is wholly misconceived. The respondent no.2 had agreed to be appointed as a probationer and with conferment of certain benefits, which were exhibiting the welfare and bona fide attitude of the management. It is stated that the respondent no.2 was a probationer and could not have received any relief beyond his probationary period of service at the maximum. 14. The respondent no.2, on filing his written notes, has reiterated his case as stated in the affidavit-in-opposition and has further stated that the said award is in accordance with law and requires no interference, as the learned Judge has considered all the materials on record, including the evidence adduced. 15. The private respondent has relied upon the following judgments: i) (2013) 9 SCR 1 (Dipali Kundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) & Ors.); ii) (2004) 8 SCC 222 NICKS (India) Tools vs. Ram Surat & Anr.; iii) 1968 SCC OnLine SC 26 (State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur); iv) (1999) 3 SCC 60 (Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors.) 7 v) (2008) 3 SCC 310 (Progressive Education Society & Anr. vs. Rajendra & Anr.); vi) (1984) 3 SCC 384 (Indra Pal Gupta vs. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, Thora); vii) 1993 (67) FLR 111 (D. K. Yadav vs. M/s. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.) viii) Civil Appeal No.3788 of 2017 (The Manager, S.M.U.P. School & Ors. Vs. M. Noushad & Ors.) ix) 1992 LAB I.C. 657 (Sudhir Kumar vs. M/s. Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd.) x) 1984 (43) FLR 417 (Ved Prakash Gupta vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd.) xi) 2004 (3) SCC 682 (Ranjeet Singh vs. Ravi Prakash) xii) WPA(C) No.16089/2024 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Anil Thomas) xiii) FMA No.2046 of 2018 (The Board of Governors, Ghani Khan Choudhury Institute of Engineering & Technology & Ors. vs. Deb Halder & Ors.) 16. From the materials on record, it appears- i) The appointment letter dated 08.10.2000 issued to the respondent herein notes as follows: “We are pleased to offer you appointment as Chemist in our Company at Calcutta branch, Calcutta on the following terms and conditions:- “1) Your appointment is in our Managerial rank and shall be effective from the 10th day of Oct, 2000. 8 * * * * * * * * * 3) Your appointment is initially on probation for a period of one year. The period of probation may extend upto one year at the discretion of the Management. During the period of probation your services may be terminated by the Company at any time without any notice and without assigning any reason whatsoever or any compensation in lieu thereof. The same condition will apply in case you leave the Company’s services during the probation period. In case, however, the services are terminated on or after expiry of three months of the date of your reporting for duty on probation, one month’s notice or payment one month’s gross salary in lieu thereof would be given by us bringing about such termination. No notice of payment of gross salary in lieu thereof will be due, if services are dispensed with for any misconduct. You shall not be deemed to have become permanent unless your are confirmed in writing.” 17. The respondent’s services were terminated by the petitioner, due to poor performance. One month severance was given. 18. Admittedly, the respondent/employee was appointed as a Chemist on probation for either six months or one year (disputed). He was finally terminated on 18.04.2001. He joined on 08.10.2000. His first termination letter in writing is dated 12.03.2001. 19. Though it is in dispute, that the respondent was terminated within the period of six months or one year, it is not denied that he was still under probation during the period he was terminated. 9 20. It appears that the Labour Court has relied upon all judgments relating to termination of a regular employee, losing tract of the fact and evidence on record that the respondent was terminated while on probation. 21. Though the respondent was refused to as in the officer rank, the job allotted was that of a ‘workman’ being technical in nature and nothing supervisory and this issue has been rightly decided by the Labour Court. 22. Regarding his termination as probationer, whether proper and/or stigmatic, the final letter of termination dated 18.04.2001, notes- a) His services were found to be much below the standard required by us even after three months of service in all alternative job provided to him. b) The respondent’s letter to the petitioner company was with proper (bad) mental attitude and that he had described himself as a ‘worker’ by degrading himself. 23. Admittedly, the respondent was asked to leave since 15.03.2001. Later when was given one month’s salary along with salary due, he accepted the same. 24. In Uttar Pradesh State Textile Corporation Ltd. vs. Suresh Kumar reported in (2011) 15 SCC 180, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “6. In the facts of the case we need not examine the effect of the order dated 26-4-1989 whereby the services of the respondent had been terminated as being stigmatic or not as we are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that appointment itself was for a fixed period of three years which would have come to an end on 6-9-1990, no relief beyond 10 that period could have been given to the respondent by the Tribunal or the High Court. We accordingly feel that these orders need to be modified to the extent that the appellant shall be deemed to be in service up to 6-9-1990 and not thereafter. 7. The other question relates to the back wages for a period of one year c and five months. We are of the opinion that the grant of back wages is a matter of discretion vested in the Court and the conduct of an employee is an extremely relevant factor on this aspect. The financial status of the employer must also be kept in mind. We are therefore of the opinion that the conduct of the respondent and the financial status of the appellant does not justify the payment of any back wages.” 25. In District Programme Co-ordinator, Mahila Samkhya & Anr. vs. Abdul Kareem & Anr. reported in (2008) 17 SCC 61, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed: “11. We feel that the High Court has seriously erred in interfering with a well-merited conviction passed by the trial court on the respondent. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and restore the conviction passed on the respondent by the trial court for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 12. Now, we have to decide the quantum of sentence to be passed on the respondent. We must point out, in this context, that the occurrence happened on 17-4-1976 when there was no legislative compulsion on the court to impose any minimum punishment for the offence of rape. A quarter of a century had elapsed since the occurrence and the respondent was in jail for a long period. We, therefore, sentence him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. On completion of the sentence the jail authorities shall release him from jail as he continues to be in jail even now.” 11 26. In A. P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. & Anr. vs. P.V. Swaminathan reported in (2001) 10 SCC 83, the following view was expressed: 3. The legal position is fairly well settled that an order of termination of a temporary employee or a probationer or even a tenure employee, simpliciter without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by the court. But the court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior to the issuance of order of termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same order. If the court comes to a conclusion that the order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order would not be interfered with, but if the court comes to a conclusion that the so-called inefficiency was the real foundation for passing of order of termination, then obviously such an order would be held to be penal in nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate procedure has not been followed. The decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr K. Ram Kumar also stipulate that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing an order of termination, it will be open for the employer to indicate how and what was the motive for passing the order of termination, and it is in that sense in the counter-affidavit it can be indicated that the unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the employer acted in accordance with the terms of employment and it never wanted to punish the employee. But on examining the assertions made in paras 13 and 14 of the counter-affidavit, in the present case it would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand, the appellant-employer really terminated the services in accordance with the terms of the employment and not by way of imposing the penalty in question. * * * * * * * * * 5. The period of appointment of the respondent being for a period of 3 years, it stood expired on 6-8-1994. The order of termination was 12 passed on 10-6-1993. Notwithstanding the conclusion that the order of termination is vitiated, the respondent cannot seek enforcement of reinstatement by way of a mandamus but all the same he would be entitled to all his benefits flowing from the terms of appointment for the period 10-6-1993 to 6-8-1994. The appellant Federation is therefore directed to pay the necessary pecuniary benefits flowing from this direction of ours to the respondent within a period of 3 months from today after deducting the wages for 3 months which had been paid to him while passing the order of termination in lieu of notice. The b appeal is disposed of accordingly.” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment and order dated 29th May, 2026 passed in Civil Appeal No.4714 of 2017 (General Manager, Bank of Baroda & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Singh & Ors.) held as follows: 40. Nevertheless, following the advice, the Respondent No. I was terminated from the service on the very same date, i.e. 05.11.2005 under Regulation 16(3)(a) of 1982 Regulations. The termination order is relevant and hence reproduced below as thus: "You were appointed as Probationary Asst. General Manager (Networking) in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the offer of appointment dated 17.12.2003. Accepting the terms and conditions contained in the said offer of appointment, you have reported for work on 05.01.2004 whereupon you were assigned to work as AGM (Net Working), Department of Information Technology, H.O. Bangalore. Accordingly, you were initially placed on probation for a period one year from 05.01.2004. Since your performance during the period of probation was not found satisfactory, the said period of probation was extended for a further period of six months effective from 05.01.2005 In terms of Clause 3 read with Clause 2 and 8 (c) 13 of the Offer of Appointment dated 17 12.2003 Once again your performance was reviewed as at the end of extended period of probation and as it was not found satisfactory the period of probation was further extended for a period of six months effective from 05.07.2005 vide order dated 04.07.2005. I have carefully reviewed your performance during the entire period of probation/and is of the opinion that it is not satisfactory. Hence, in terms of Regulation 16(3)(a) of the Vijaya Bank (Officers') Regulations, 1982, read with Clause 3 of the Offer of Appointment dated 17.12.2003, your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect. In lieu of the period of notice contemplated under Regulation 16(3)(a), please find enclosed a cheque No. 884001 dated 05.11.2005 for Rs. 30,925.47 (Rupees Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Five and Paise Forty Seven Only) (sic) representing one month's emoluments. 41. On perusal of the records, it is clear that the termination order was primarily predicated upon the 'misconduct' alleged against the Respondent No. I It cannot be said that Respondent No. 1 was terminated from services because his work was found to be simply unsuitable. Upon consideration of the material placed on record, it is evident that the alleged misconduct was for all intent and purposes, the motive as well as foundation for the termination, even though the formal order ostensibly cites unsatisfactory performance. 42. This Court, relying on Dipti Prakash Banerjee (supra), in Mathew P Thomas v. Kerala State Civil Supply Corpn. Ltd. & Others10, further observed as thus: "11 An order of termination simpliciter passed during the period of probation has been generating undying debate. The recent two decisions of this Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta [(1999) 3 SCC 60] and Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences [(2002) 1 SCC 520] after survey of most of the earlier decisions touching the question observed as to when an order of 14 termination can be treated as simpliciter and when it can be treated as punitive and when a stigma is said to be attached to an employee discharged during the period of probation. From a long line of decisions it appears to us that whether an order of termination is simpliciter or punitive has 10 (2003) 3 SCC 263 ultimately to be decided having due regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Many a times the distinction between the foundation and motive in relation to an order of termination either is thin or overlapping. It may be difficult either to categorize or classify strictly orders of termination simpliciter falling in one or the other category, based on misconduct as foundation for passing the order of termination simpliciter or on motive on the ground of unsuitability to continue in service. If the form and language of the so-called order of termination simpliciter of a probationer elearly indicate that it is punitive in nature or/and it is stigmatic there may not be any need to go into the details of the background and surrounding circumstances in testing whether the order of termination is simpliciter or punitive. In cases where the services of a probationer are terminated by an order of termination simpliciter and the language and form of it do not show that either it is punitive or stigmatic on the face of it but in some cases there may be a background and attending circumstances to show that misconduct was the real basis and design to terminate the services of a probationer. In other words, the facade of the termination order may be simpliciter, but the real face behind it is to get rid of the services of a probationer on the basis of misconduct. In such cases it becomes necessary to travel beyond the order of termination simpliciter to find out what in reality is the background and what weighed with the employer to terminate the services of a probationer. In that process it also becomes necessary to find out whether efforts were made to find out the suitability of the person 15 to continue in service or he is in reality removed from service on the foundation of his misconduct." 28. In the present case, there are materials on record to show that the petitioner employer tried to accommodate the respondent in service by posting him in other departments but the respondent failed to perform and the statement as to misconduct has been made considering the contents of letters written by the respondent to the petitioner/company and his claim that he is ‘workman’. 29. The statements appear to be general in nature and were not a ground for termination (thus not founded on it) which being solely for the reason of unsatisfactory performance, and, thus not ‘punitive’ in nature. 30. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences & Anr. reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520 the Supreme Court observed that: “19. Thus some courts have upheld an order of termination of a probationer's services on the ground that the enquiry held prior to the termination was preliminary and yet other courts have struck down as illegal a similarly worded termination order because an inquiry had been held. Courts continue to struggle with semantically indistinguishable concepts like "motive" and "foundation"; and terminations founded on a probationer's misconduct have been held to be illegal while terminations motivated by the probationer's misconduct have been upheld. The decisions are legion and it is an impossible task to find a clear path through the jungle of precedents. * * * * * * * * * 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to 16 the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. * * * * * * * * * 28. Therefore, whenever a probationer challenges his termination the court's first task will be to apply the test of stigma or the "form" test. If the order survives this examination the "substance" of the termination will have to be found out. 29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. 30. As was noted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences ¹2: (SCC p. 73, para 28) "28. At the outset, we may state that in several cases and in particular in State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das it has been held that use of the word 'unsatisfactory work and conduct' in the termination order will not amount to a stigma." 31. Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellant's "work and 17 conduct has not been found to be satisfactory". These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipti Prakash Banerjee case12 as clearly falling within the class of non-stigmatic orders of termination. It is, therefore safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic. 31. In the matter of Dipti Prakash Banerjee vs. S. N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors. reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 29. We may advert to a few cases on the question of stigma. We shall refer initially to cases where a special rule relating to termination of a probationer required a particular condition to be satisfied and where the said condition was referred to in the order of termination. In Hari Singh Mann v. State of Punjab the probationer was governed by Rule 8(b) of the Punjab Service Rules, 1959 and the fact that the word "unfit" as required by the Rules was used, was held not to be a ground for quashing the order on the ground of "stigma", for to hold that it amounted to a "stigma" would amount to robbing the authority of the right under the Rule. Similarly, where a rule required a show-cause notice to be issued and an enquiry to be conducted before terminating probation, such as Rule 55-B of the Central Civil Services (CCA) Rules, there would be no question of characterizing the simple order of termination as one founded on the allegations which were the subject of the enquiry. That was because, in such a case, the purpose of the enquiry was to find out if the officer was to be continued in service and not to find out if he was guilty (State of Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das, Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. Union of India. In State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh C. Bhargave the termination order merely referred to Rule 12 (bb) of the Indian Police Service (Probationer) Rules, 1959. It was contended that the 18 reference to the said Rule 12(bb) itself amounted to a stigma but this was rejected following Ram Narayan Das cases. 30. We shall next advert to some more cases and to particular words employed while passing orders of termination of probationers. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasadas a show- cause notice was given seeking a reply to the allegation regarding the officer's bad reputation and in regard to certain perverse decisions given by him in his judicial functions during the period of probation. The termination order stated that certain facts were brought to the notice of the Government about his unsatisfactory work and conduct and that grave doubts had arisen about his integrity which indicated that he was a corrupt and an unreliable officer. It was also said that confidential enquiries revealed that he was a corrupt officer and that annual confidential reports of his superior officer referred to his bad reputation and therefore his work during the period of probation was not satisfactory. The Constitution Bench of this Court held that it was a clear case of stigma and the matter indeed required a full-fledged departmental enquiry under Rule 55 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. In Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India the use of the words "undesirable to be continued" in service was held by the Constitution Bench to amount to a stigma. This case was followed in State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan Nagar where the order said that the officer had "outlived his utility" and such an order was held to amount to a stigma. Jagdish Mittere was approved by the seven-Judge Bench in Samsher Singh cases on this point. But in Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Hill Electronics Corpn. Ltd. the termination order used the word "unsatisfactory" and the same was upheld as it did not amount to a stigma. In two cases arising under industrial law, one in Chandu Lal v. Pan American World Airways and Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways Inc. where the termination order used the word "loss of confidence", the said 19 orders were held to contain a stigma and therefore punitive. In Jagdish Parsad v. Sachiv, Zila Ganna Committee the termination order stated that the officer had concealed certain facts relating to his removal from an earlier service on the charge of corruption and therefore not suitable for appointment. This was held to amount to a stigma. But in Union of India v. R.S. Dhaba where the order merely said "found unsuitable", it was held not to amount to a stigma. In Allahabad Bank Officers' Assn. v. Allahabad Bank the order was one of compulsory retirement and said that a Special Committee had unanimously recommended for the officer's compulsory retirement, that the Chairman and Managing Director agreed with the Committee's views regarding "want of application to the Bank's work and lack of potential" and that the officer was also found to be not "dependable". This Court after referring to a number of the facts of the case and not as an aspersion on his reputation but in relation to his work and were to be understood in that sense in the setting of the words "want of application" and/or "lack of potential". It was observed: "Any person reading the letter or the order of compulsory retirement would not be led to believe that there was something wrong with Appellant 2 as regards his conduct or character. They would only indicate that he had ceased to be useful to the Bank in his capacity as a Manager." Again in High Court of Judicature at Patna v. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha it was held that termination of a probationer on the basis of uncommunicated adverse remarks was valid. * * * * * * * * * 41. We shall next take up the second aspect relating to stigma. We shall assume that the words used in the impugned order do not contain any stigma. We shall then refer to the three other letters to which the order makes a reference. In the first letter dated 30-4-1996, we do not find anything objectionable. Coming 20 to the next letter, we however find that para (iii) refers to the scuffle between the appellant and one P.Chakraborty regarding which the appellant made a complaint on 28-5-1996. An Enquiry Committee is said to have been appointed and it gave a report. The extract from the report of the Committee dated 15-7 -1996 is found in the counter of the respondents. The Enquiry 1 Committee found the appellant's "behaviour reprehensible" and it confirmed that the appellant was "involved in a scuffle and did misdeeds like obtaining false signatures", and said that the appellant was "guilty of inefficient performance or duty, irregular attendance without permission, rude and disorderly behaviour and wilful insubordination". Whatever may be said about the other words, the words used in connection with the finding of the Enquiry Committee about the scuffle and about the appellant obtaining false signatures, are, in our opinion, clearly in the nature of a stigma. Further, the Enquiry Committee said he must be "punished". It did not say that proceedings for disciplinary action were to be initiated. Thus on the ground of "stigma" also, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. * * * * * * * * * 43. As pointed out in Bishan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana an ordinary enquiry by a show-cause might be sufficient for the purpose of deciding whether the probationer could be continued, but where the findings regarding misconduct are arrived at without conducting a regular departmental enquiry, then the termination order will be vitiated. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent relied upon Hindustan Paper Corpn. v. Purnendu Chakrobarty where it was held that for termination of a "lien", no detailed enquiry was necessary and that if that be the position, termination of probation stands on a lesser footing. But the case turned upon a special rule in that case which specifically provided that for "termination of a lien", a regular enquiry was not 21 necessary. That case cannot therefore be of any assistance to the respondents.” 32. The judgments relied upon by the respondent/employee principally apply to termination of regular employees. 33. Thus the finding of the 1st Labour Court, West Bengal in the award dated 28.06.2024 passed in case No.02/2002 under Section 10(1B)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, published by the Government of West Bengal on 27.08.2024 being not based on proper appreciation of evidence and materials on record, is perverse and thus, quashed and set aside. 34. WPO/82/2025 is allowed. 35. Connected applications, if any, also stands disposed of. 36. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities. (SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.) A.Sadhukhan