JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. The instant petition has been filed for the following substantive reliefs:- “a) Quash the decision dated 15/10/2009 (Annexure- P/8) taken by the respondent no.2. b) Quash the final seniority list as at 30/4/2010 (Annexure-P/17). c) Quash the proceedings of DPC which was convened on 9/7/2010 in so far it relates to the consideration for promotion to Gr.II. from amongst the Petitioners and the respondents no. 4 to 8. d) Respondents no.1 to 3 be directed to implement the instructions issued by the Secretary (Coop.) to the Government of HP dated 5/10/2009 and the instructions issued by the respondent no.3 on 19/10/2009 for computing the seniority and other benefits to the respondents no. 4 to 8.” 2. The petitioners were initially recruited in respondent No.1 bank (for short, “the bank”) as Grade-IV Employees. They have been promoted to Grade-III w.e.f. 9.7.2001. The private respondents on the other hand have been directly recruited as Grade-III Employees in the bank on 15.11.2000. 3. The dispute herein is with respect to the seniority positions of the petitioners vis-à-vis the private respondents in the category of Grade-III employees of the bank. 4. The petitioners are claiming right to be placed above the private respondents in the seniority list on the premise that they were eligible for promotion to Grade-III since 1998 but the DPC was belatedly held on 28.9.2000 and on that date also, the proceedings could not be finalized for want of final seniority list of Grade-IV employees. Thereafter, the DPC was held on 13.11.2000 but again the proceedings could not be finalized on account of a stay having been granted by respondent No.3 (for short, “the RCS”) in proceedings initiated by one Ms. Satya Devi. In the meanwhile, the direct recruits were appointed on 15.11.2000. Thus, basing their right to have promoted before appointment of private respondents, the reliefs, as noticed above, have been prayed. 5. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent No.2, Board of Directors of the Bank (for short, “the BOD”) after accepting the representation of the petitioners had ordered to place them higher in seniority list than the private respondents. Aggrieved against the said decision, the private respondents had approached the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 3063 of 2004, which subsequently came to be transferred to this Court as CWP(T) No. 16653 of 2008. 6. Aggrieved against the said decision, the private respondents had approached the erstwhile State Administrative Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 3063 of 2004, which subsequently came to be transferred to this Court as CWP(T) No. 16653 of 2008. 6. It has also been alleged that the bank thereafter had issued seniority list of Grade-III employees from 2005 to 2008 successively, showing petitioners as senior to private respondents, but the private respondents did not raise any objection. It was only after the seniority list was circulated on 1.7.2009 that a representation was made, which was accepted by the BOD on 15.10.2009. As a consequence, the petitioners were placed below the private respondents in final seniority list, circulated on 7.7.2010. 7. In the above noticed facts, the petitioners have raised the following grounds:- I) The BOD had assigned no reasons vide its decision dated 15.10.2009 to overturn the decision taken by the BOD in 2003, save and except that the chairman of the BOD had desired so; II) The petitioners were eligible for being promoted as Grade-III employees in the bank since 1998 as their promotion was delayed for more than three years without any fault on their part; III) The jurisdiction of BOD to review its own decision has also been challenged; IV) The impugned decision of the BOD has been alleged to be bad in law on account of having been passed despite the issue being sub-judice in CWP(T) No. 16653 of 2008; V) The respondents could not have challenged the seniority list circulated in the year 2009 after having acquiesced in the seniority lists issued by the bank from the years 2005 to 2008; and VI) The private respondents initially were appointed on consolidated salary for two years and thus their appointments could not be considered to be regular till expiry of two years. 8. In addition the petitioners have paced reliance upon Rule 7 (g) of the Service Rules for the Employees of the Bank, which provide as under: - “If the ratio between promotes and direct recruits is prescribed as X Y, their appointments/placements in seniority list shall be made in such way that there are Y number of direct recruits following X number of promotes.” 9. The bank has filed its reply and has opposed the prayers made in the petition. The bank has filed its reply and has opposed the prayers made in the petition. It has been submitted that no fundamental or constitutional rights of the petitioners had been infringed or violated; the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the petition; the petitioners were guilty of suppression of material facts; the petitioners were estopped to file the petition, as they had alternative remedy; and the bank was an autonomous body to take its own decision without any political influence. 10. It has been submitted that the initial appointment of the petitioners was also on consolidated salary for eighteen months and they were given the regular scale thereafter. Reference has been made to Rule 18 of the Service Rules of the Employees of the Bank to assert that seniority is required to be prepared grade-wise for all employees, confirmed as well as unconfirmed, in each grade at the close of each cooperative year. The cooperative year of the bank is from 1st July to 30th June next year. 11. The fact that the bank had circulated the seniority list of Grade-III category in 2005, 2007 and 2008 and the petitioners were shown higher in the seniority than the private respondents has not been denied. However, it has been submitted that respondent No.5 had filed objections qua the seniority vide representations dated 28.9.2005 and 19.11.2008. The bank has further tried to justify the impugned action of BOD as having been rightly taken in accordance with the rules. The bank has also tried to absolve itself from the reasons that caused the delay in promotion of the petitioners. It has also been submitted that the principle of sub-judice would not apply, as there was no interim direction or stay, issued by the Tribunal or the Court in the matter. 12. The private respondents have also filed their joint reply. The petitioners have been accused of having not made full and complete disclosure of facts. It has been contended that the private respondents were appointed as Grade-III employees in the bank against vacant regular posts. Their appointments were made in the cooperative year 2000-01 and the promotions of the petitioners were in the next cooperative year i.e. 2001-02. The petitioners have been accused of having not made full and complete disclosure of facts. It has been contended that the private respondents were appointed as Grade-III employees in the bank against vacant regular posts. Their appointments were made in the cooperative year 2000-01 and the promotions of the petitioners were in the next cooperative year i.e. 2001-02. In terms of Rule 18 of the Bank Employees Service Rules, the seniority list was liable to be prepared grade-wise for all employees, confirmed as well as unconfirmed, in each grade on the close of each cooperative year. Thus, the private respondents claim that the petitioners having not been borne in the cadre, in the cooperative year in which the private respondents were appointed, could not be placed higher in the seniority. The private respondents admitted to have filed O.A. before the erstwhile Tribunal to challenge the action of the bank in issuing final seniority list dated 23.10.2003, wherein, the petitioners were placed higher than the private respondents. 13. It has also been pointed out by the private respondents that the promotion process for filling up the vacancies of Grade-III employees had been initiated by the bank in the year 1997-98. On both the occasions, names of the petitioners were considered by the staff selection authority, as they were under the zone of consideration but they were not promoted. It has also been submitted that there were four sanctioned posts of Grade-III employees falling to the quota of direct recruits in the year 2000. 14. The applicability of Rule 7 (g) of the Service Rules of the Employees of the Bank has also been contested on the ground that as per Rule 18 (supra), only those officers could be shown in the seniority list, who had been appointed in a particular cooperative year. It has also been pointed out that the DPC for promotion of Grade-III employees could not be convened on 13.11.2000, as one of the constituting members i.e. the nominee of RCS was not present. As per private respondents, the staff selection authority had considered the case of the petitioners for promotion to Grade-III on 11.4.2001. The recommendation was accepted by the BOD on 24.4.2001. The RCS agreed to his approval on 16.6.2001 and finally, the promotion orders were issued on 9.7.2001 i.e. in the cooperative year 2001-02. 15. As per private respondents, the staff selection authority had considered the case of the petitioners for promotion to Grade-III on 11.4.2001. The recommendation was accepted by the BOD on 24.4.2001. The RCS agreed to his approval on 16.6.2001 and finally, the promotion orders were issued on 9.7.2001 i.e. in the cooperative year 2001-02. 15. The RCS has also filed the reply and has challenged the right of the petitioners to file the instant petition. It has been submitted that the bank is a cooperative society under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. It is neither a State nor an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Reference has been made to the judgment passed by this Court in the matter of C.K. Malhotra, upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As regards the other contentions raised by the petitioners, it has been submitted that the bank acts independently in the service matters of its employees and RCS has no role to play save and except where the approval of RCS is required under the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968. 16. It has further been submitted that the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Act, 1979 has been enacted with an object to supplement the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968 in order to facilitate the working  of  the  Cooperative  Agricultural  &  Rural Development Bank in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The allegation that the bank is creation of a statute has been denied. 17. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record carefully. 18. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition against the bank, arguments have been addressed by Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Advocate, representing the private respondents, though no such objection had been raised in their reply filed by the said respondents. He would contend that the bank was a cooperative society without being under the control of the State Government. 18. As regards the maintainability of the writ petition against the bank, arguments have been addressed by Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Advocate, representing the private respondents, though no such objection had been raised in their reply filed by the said respondents. He would contend that the bank was a cooperative society without being under the control of the State Government. Reliance has been placed on the fact that the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agricultural & Rural Development Bank Act, 1979 had been enacted to supplement the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968 in order to facilitate the working of the Cooperative Agricultural & Rural Development Banks in the State of Himachal Pradesh, with a specific view of providing for the grant of long term loans to the owners of land or other immoveable property,  to  carry  out  agricultural  improvements,  to acquire land in the formation of economic holdings and other like purposes to enable them to discharge their debts and thereby to promote thrift and self-help among them. As per the learned counsel for the private respondents, the bank was an autonomous body and the state’s interference was minimal for certain administrative purpose only. 19. Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel representing the private respondents has placed on record a copy of the bye-laws of the bank and further relied upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 (1) SCC 722 , Chandra Mohan Khanna vs. NCERT 1991 (4) SCC 578 , Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & others, 2002 (5) SCC 111 , S.S. Rana vs. Registrar of Cooperative Societies 2006 (11) SCC 634 and Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. State of Kerala, 2013 (16) SCC 82. 20. On the other hand, Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate representing the petitioners has canvassed the maintainability of the petition by placing reliance on a judgment passed by a Coordinate Bank of this Court in CWP No. 8215 of 2013, titled as, RBS Negi & others vs. State of H.P. & others, in which, it has been held that the respondent bank was a creation of statute i.e. Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Agricultural Societies Act, 1968 and by virtue of this fact alone was the state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. He also placed reliance on a judgment passed by this Court on 9.4.2024 in CWP No. 3189 of 2019, titled as, Jeeva Nand vs. State of H.P. & others in which the dictum in CWP No. 3634 of 2012, titled as, Vikram Chauhan vs. Managing Director & others, 2013 Latest HLJ (HP) 742 (FB) and in three Judges Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) 1246 of 2015, titled as, The Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association (Regt.) vs. State of H.P. had been considered to hold that even if the bank was held to be not a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution would have jurisdiction to issue a  writ or order in the nature of writ even against any person or authority, if the fact situation of the case warrants. It was further held that the writ can lie even against the cooperative society, however, its maintainability would depend on the facts of each case. Reliance has further been placed on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in UP State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey & others, decided on 18.12.1998. According to learned Senior Advocate, representing the petitioners in an identical fact situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had upheld the maintainability of filing of writ petition. 21. Noticeably, the private respondents have not laid any factual foundation in the pleadings to oust the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the facts of the case. In Vikram Chauhan (supra), the Full Bench of this Court has held that in appropriate cases, the writ could be entertained. Thus, it was held that there was no absolute rule negating the exercise of writ jurisdiction against the cooperative societies. The said view was affirmed by the Hon’ble three Judges Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Kangra Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association (supra). 22. Whether the jurisdiction is available in a particular case, the adjudication can be made only after analyzing the relevant facts. As noticed above, the private respondents have not even taken an objection in this behalf in their reply, much less to have laid the factual foundation. In absence of availability of pleadings as to necessary facts, the petitioners could also not to expected to rebut the same. As noticed above, the private respondents have not even taken an objection in this behalf in their reply, much less to have laid the factual foundation. In absence of availability of pleadings as to necessary facts, the petitioners could also not to expected to rebut the same. The RCS has also raised a vague objection without laying factual foundation. The bank on its part has again not raised the objection as to the maintainability of writ petition. In such circumstances, the question as to maintainability of instant writ petition cannot be answered for want of foundational facts in the pleadings. 23. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in RBS Negi (supra) has already held the respondent bank to be a creation of statute and thus amenable to the writ jurisdiction being instrumentality of the State. Neither the bank nor the RCS have shown to have laid challenge, if any, to the verdict in RBS Negi (supra). 24. The issue primarily is whether the petitioners, who had been eligible for being promoted to Grade-III even before the initiation of process to fill up direct quota posts, have any right to claim the seniority over the private respondents? 25. The fact remains that the date of appointment of the private respondents as direct recruits is prior to the promotions of the petitioners to Grade-III. There is a difference of one cooperative year. The petitioners have not been able to establish that their promotion was delayed on account of any malafide action of the respondents or on account of some biasness against them. 26. In K. Megha Chandra Singh & others vs. Ningam Siro & others, (2020) 5 SCC 689 the issue has been set at rest by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has disapproved the nomination of assessment of inter-se seniority between promotes and direct recruits suggested in N.R. Parmar vs. Union of India & others (2018) 18 SCC 20 . It has been held that the  rotation of quota, based on the percentage of vacancies allocated to direct recruitment and promotion in the notified recruitment rules/service rules, shall continue to operate for determining the vacancies to be filled up by the respective quotas in a recruitment year. The term ‘recruitment year’ shall mean the year in which the vacancy arises. It has been held that the  rotation of quota, based on the percentage of vacancies allocated to direct recruitment and promotion in the notified recruitment rules/service rules, shall continue to operate for determining the vacancies to be filled up by the respective quotas in a recruitment year. The term ‘recruitment year’ shall mean the year in which the vacancy arises. However, the inter-se seniority between the direct recruits and promotees, who are appointed against the vacancies of respective quota, would be reckoned with reference to the order in which they are appointed i.e. the order in which they are borne in the cadre or formal appointment orders is issued. Thus, on harmonious reading of the term recruitment and appointment determination of seniority for recruitment would depend on their actual appointment and not the initiation of recruitment process itself, meaning thereby that the seniority of direct recruits and promotees would stand de- linked from the vacancies/year of vacancies. 27. This Court in R.R. Rana vs. State of H.P. & others 2025, SCC Online HP 736, following the above principle as also the law laid down in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Government of West Bengal vs. Dr. Amal Satpathi & others, 2024 SCC Online SC 3512 has held as under:- “19. It is a well settled principle that promotion becomes effective from the date it is granted, rather than from the date a vacancy arises or the post is created. While the Courts have recognized the right to be considered for promotion as not only a statutory right but also a fundamental right, there is no fundamental right to the promotion itself. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to a recent decision of this Court in the case of, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1768, wherein it was observed as follows: "18. It is no longer res integra that a promotion is effective from the date it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself. No doubt, a right to be considered for promotion has been treated by courts not just as a statutory right but as a fundamental right, at the same time, there is no fundamental right to promotion itself. In this context, we may profitably cite a recent decision in Ajay Kumar Shukla vs. Arvind Rai, (2022)12 SCC 579 where, citing earlier precedents in Director, Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty, (1991) 2 SCC 295 and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1999)7 SCC 209 , a three-Judge Bench observed thus: 41. This Court, time and again, has laid emphasis on right to be considered for promotion to be a fundamental right, as was held by K. Ramaswamy, J., in Director, Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Pravat Kiran Mohanty in para 4 of the report which is reproduced below: '4. There is no fundamental right to promotion, but an employee has only right to be considered for promotion, when it arises, in accordance with relevant rules. From this perspective in our view the conclusion of the High Court that the gradation list prepared by the corporation is in violation of the right of respondent-writ petitioner to equality enshrined under Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution, and the respondent- writ petitioner was unjustly denied of the same is obviously unjustified.' 42. A Constitution Bench in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, laying emphasis on Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India held that if a person who satisfies the eligibility and the criteria for promotion but still is not considered for promotion, then there will be clear violation of his/her's fundamental right. Jagannadha Rao, J. speaking for himself and Anand, C.J., Venkataswami, Pattanaik, Kurdukar, JJ., observed the same as follows in paras 22 and 27: 'Articles 14 and 16(1): is right to be considered for promotion a fundamental right 22. Article 14 and Article 16(1) are closely connected. They deal with individual rights of the person. Article 14 demands that the 'State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws'. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that: 'there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State'. They deal with individual rights of the person. Article 14 demands that the 'State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws'. Article 16(1) issues a positive command that: 'there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State'. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that clause (1) of Article 16 is a facet of Article 14 and that it takes its roots from Article 14. The said clause particularises the generality in Article 14 and identifies, in a constitutional sense "equality of opportunity" in matters of employment and appointment to any office under the State. The word "employment" being wider, there is no dispute that it takes within its fold, the aspect of promotions to posts above the stage of initial level of recruitment. Article 16 (1) provides to every employee otherwise eligible for promotion or who comes within the zone of consideration, a fundamental right to be "considered" for promotion. Equal opportunity here means the right to be "considered" for promotion. If a person satisfies the eligibility and zone criteria but is not considered for promotion, then there will be a clear infraction of his fundamental right to be "considered" for promotion, which is his personal right. "Promotion" based on equal opportunity and seniority attached to such promotion are facets of fundamental right under Article 16(1). * * * * 27. In our opinion, the above view expressed in Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. (1997)5SCC 201, and followed in Jagdish Lal [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 , and other cases, if it is intended to lay down that the right guaranteed to employees for being "considered" for promotion according to relevant rules of recruitment by promotion (i.e. whether on the basis of seniority or merit) is only a statutory right and not a fundamental right, we cannot accept the proposition. We have already stated earlier that the right to equal opportunity in the matter of promotion in the sense of a right to be "considered" for promotion is indeed a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 16(1) and this has never been doubted in any other case before Ashok Kumar Gupta [Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.], right from 1950.' "20. In State of Bihar v. Akhouri Sachindra Nathk, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334), it was held that retrospective seniority cannot be given to an employee from a date when he was not even borne in the cadre, nor can seniority be given with retrospective effect as that might adversely affect others. The same view was reiterated in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272, where it was held that when a quota is provided for, then the seniority of the employee would be reckoned from the date when the vacancy arises in the quota and not from any anterior date of promotion or subsequent date of confirmation. The said view was restated in Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Assn. (Direct Recruit) v. State of U.P (2006) 10 SCC 346 , in the following words: '37. We are also of the view that no retrospective promotion or seniority can be granted from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre so as to adversely affect the direct recruits appointed validly in the meantime, as decided by this Court in Keshav Chandra Joshi v. Union of India held that when promotion is outside the quota, seniority would be reckoned from the date of the vacancy within the quota rendering the previous service fortuitous. The previous promotion would be regular only from the date of the vacancy within the quota and seniority shall be counted from that date and not from the date of his earlier promotion or subsequent confirmation. In order to do justice to the promotes, it would not be proper to do injustice to the direct recruits. 38. This Court has consistently held that no retrospective promotion can be granted nor can any seniority be given on retrospective basis from a date when an employee has not even been borne in the cadre particularly when this would adversely affect the direct recruits who have been appointed validity in the meantime." (emphasis supplied) 20. In the instant case, it is evident that while respondent No. 1 was recommended for promotion before his retirement, he could not assume the duties of the Chief Scientific Officer. Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, clearly stipulates that an employee must assume the responsibilities of a higher post to draw the corresponding pay, thus, preventing posthumous or retrospective promotions in the absence of an enabling provision. Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules, clearly stipulates that an employee must assume the responsibilities of a higher post to draw the corresponding pay, thus, preventing posthumous or retrospective promotions in the absence of an enabling provision. 21. While we recognize respondent No.1's right to be considered for promotion, which is a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, he does not hold an absolute right to the promotion itself. The legal precedents discussed above establish that promotion only becomes effective upon the assumption of duties on the promotional post and not on the date of occurrence of the vacancy or the date of recommendation. Considering that respondent No. 1 superannuated before his promotion was effectuated, he is not entitled to retrospective financial benefits associated to the promotional post of Chief Scientific Officer, as he did not serve in that capacity.” 28. Thus, the petitioners cannot hold the march over the private respondents in so far as the seniority position is concerned. 29. The next question is whether the BOD could reverse its decision? Apparently, there appears to be no such bar as such. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction can only look into the decision-making process and not the decision itself. None of the parties have been able to place before this Court any material evidencing the fate of Original Application filed by the private respondents before the erstwhile Tribunal which later had been transferred to the files of this Court. Noticeably, even after the transfer of O.A. to this Court, the Administrative Tribunal in the State of Himachal Pradesh was again reconstituted and abolished. It is further not in dispute that there was no interim direction in the O.A. which could prevent the BOD from taking the decision. Merely because the private respondents had not challenged the seniority issued in the year 2005 to 2008, cannot be held as an estoppel against them for the reasons firstly that they had already taken up the issue in appropriate legal proceedings before the Tribunal and secondly, having failed to achieve any result in the legal proceedings, their action to make representation to the BOD cannot be suspected to have been tainted with any other purpose but to fight for their seniority positions. 30. In light of above discussions, I find no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. 30. In light of above discussions, I find no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.