2025:JHHC:14205 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (L) No. 6258 of 2009 …. Employer in relation to the Management of Bokaro Colliery of M/s Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd (now Tata Steel Ltd) P.O. Ghatotand, District Hazaribagh now Ramgharh, through Meena Lal, Chief Legal Corporate Services, Tata Steel Ltd, P.O. & P.S. Bistupur, Jamshedpur Town, District East Singhbhum ……Petitioner Versus 1. Their Workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh, D/o Late Durga Prasad Singh, Wife of Sri Choudhary Yuvraj, Resident of TISCO West Bokaro, P.O. & P.S. Ghatotand, District Hazaribagh, 2. Bihar School Examination Board, through the Secretary B.S.E.B. Patna ……Respondents ----- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD ----- For the Petitioner : Mr. G.M. Mishra, Advocate Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate For the Resp. No.1 : Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate Mr. Shatendra Kumar Singh, Advocate Mr. Mrinal Singh, Advocate For the State of Bihar : Mr. S.P. Roy, Advocate …… C.A.V. on 19.09.2024 Pronounced on 02.04.2025 1. The present writ petition has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner for the following reliefs:- (i) Setting aside the Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1(in short CGIT) at Dhanbad, dated – 31.08.2009, (Annexure-5) whereby and where under the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 (CGIT) has declared that the Respondent Workman is entitled to be reinstated to her original job from the date of her dismissal. She is also entitled to full back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of her reinstatement with consequential benefit.” 2025:JHHC:14205 2 (ii) For passing an order to stay and or keeping the implementation of the award in abeyance during the pendency of the writ application. 2. Heard Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the Petitioner assisted by Mr. Manish Mishra, Advocate and Shri Nipun Baksi on behalf of the Respondent No.1 Workman and Mr. S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bihar School Examination Board. 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the impugned Award dated 31.08.2009 passed by the Learned CGIT-I is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that as the learned Tribunal has not framed the preliminary issue on the point of fairness of domestic enquiry and as such the impugned Award is nullity and suffers from perversity and infirmity and as such the impugned award may be set aside. 4. It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal has committed grave error by allowing full back wages to the Workman-Respondent in absence of specific pleading that the workman was not gainfully employed anywhere. It is submitted that the grant of back wages to the Workman is not automatic, rather it has to be proved by filing necessary petition by the Workman and making specific averments that the Workman was not gainfully employed during the period of termination till the date of her reinstatement. 5. It is submitted that the management was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witness of the workman and as such the Award passed by the learned Court below suffers from infirmity and perversity. It is further submitted that in case of gross misconduct, the service of the Petitioner has been terminated. 6. It is further submitted that even the Respondent has not filed 2025:JHHC:14205 3 petition, that she was not gainfully employed anywhere from the date of her dismissal till the date of her reinstatement before the learned Tribunal and hence the impugned Award may be set aside and this Writ Petition may be allowed. 7. It is submitted that the Award dated 31.08.2009 (Annexure-5) passed by the learned Court below is nullity as the learned Tribunal has wrongly held that no opportunity of hearing was given to the Workman- Respondent No.1 in the domestic enquiry. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal has wrongly held that no opportunity was given to the petitioner to appear and contest the domestic enquiry and this is factually incorrect that full opportunity to the given to the Workman-Respondent No.1 to participate in the domestic enquiry but she failed to do so on her own. It is submitted that the matriculation certificate submitted by the Workman- Respondent No.1 was found forged and fabricated and for which the domestic enquiry was conducted and the charges were framed against her and the Enquiry Officer was held that the charges hence proved against the Workman-Respondent No.1 as such she was dismissed from the services on 15.12.1998. 8. It has been vehemently submitted by the learned counsel for the Petitioner-Company that when the learned Tribunal came to its conclusion that the Domestic Enquiry was not fair and proper and / or non-est, then, the learned Tribunal should have given one opportunity to the Management to establish the charges against the Workman Respondent No.1 before passing an Award in favour of the Workman Respondent No.1 due to which Management was deprived of the opportunity on merit as well as the fairness of Domestic Enquiry. They have also taken the plea in absence of pleading and discharge of initial onus that the Workman-Respondent was not 2025:JHHC:14205 4 gainful employed and the Award of full back wages is wholly illegal in violation of judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2006)6 SCC 221 on the principles of no pay with no work. 9. It is further submitted that the Petitioner has filed Supplementary Affidavit on 27.01.2023 and has stated in paragraph-9 that the Management had filed petition before the learned Labour Court below and had prayed that the fairness and propriety of the Domestic Enquiry may be decided on the preliminary issue and in case it is held that the enquiry was neither fair nor proper, then the opportunity may be given to establish the charges by adducing a fresh evidence. However, the learned Tribunal i.e. CGIT-I Dhanbad did not frame the preliminary issue on the point of fairness of domestic enquiry rather the Court below has decided the preliminary issue as well as the order of dismissal/termination passed by the Disciplinary Authority, simultaneously at the time of passing of the Impugned Award and as such the Impugned Award is illegal and perverse and may be set aside. Thus, this Writ Petition may be allowed. 10. Learned counsel for petitioner has relied upon the judgments reported in (2018)4 SCC 483 and (2019)17 SCC 814 Para 10 to 12 on the point of back wages. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Workman-Respondent No.1 submitted that the Impugned Award passed by the learned Tribunal is fit and no interference is required from this Court. It is submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned Tribunal while passing the impugned Award. It is submitted that the domestic enquiry was not fair. It is submitted that the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned Award, has observed that domestic enquiry conducted by the Petitioner 2025:JHHC:14205 5 Company, was not fair and had set aside, the order of dismissal/termination passed by the Disciplinary Authority against the Workman-Respondent No.1. It is submitted that this is a case of dismissal of the workman whose family is “Land Loser” and the Petitioner Company had taken 9.10 acres of land and 2.11 acres of land from one Chotelal Sahu and other co-sharers and for which two sale deeds were executed and thereafter, the Petitioner ‘who is a lady’ had been provided with the job of Clerk Grade-III. It is submitted that even the Workman-Respondent No.1 was promoted from Clerk Grade III to Clerk Grade II on 18.12.1993. 12. It is submitted that there is no jurisdictional error committed by the learned Tribunal while passing the Impugned Award under challenge. It is submitted that the Workman-Respondent No.1 had produced her genuine certificates of qualification at the time of her appointment in the Petitioner Company and which was accepted by the then Officer of the Petitioner Company and then she was appointed in the Grade-III Clerk on 13.05.1991 and thereafter, she was promoted Clerk Grade-II on 18.12.1993. The Petitioner Management has failed to produce any reliable material to prove that the Matriculation Certificate of the petitioner was fake. The Petitioner Management Company never challenged the award of learned Tribunal for not passing any order on the petition of the petitioner management to decide the fairness and propriety of the Domestic Enquiry as a preliminary issue and hence the petitioner Company cannot be allowed to challenge the same at this stage. It is submitted that even the Management Witnesses i.e. M.W. admitted that during his cross-examination that there was no correspondence with the Bihar School Examination Board rather they had made correspondence with the Principal of the 2025:JHHC:14205 6 School of the Respondent Workman. However, neither any Official of School nor any Admission Register of the School of the Workman- Respondent produced during the said enquiry proceeding. 13. It is further submitted that the Workman-Respondent No.1 neither given the copy of Enquiry Report nor any second show cause notice had been served upon her and as such the entire domestic enquiry was vitiated and illegal against her. It is submitted that the learned Tribunal while passing the award in question, had taken note of the fact that the Workman Respondent No.1 in addition to her matriculation acquired the higher degree of passing Intermediate examination had taken note of the same. 14. It is submitted that the Workman- Respondent No.1 was appointed under the Land Loser scheme and also after executing the Sale Deed of the land in favour of the Petitioner Company. Thus, her appointment was under special circumstances and not only on the basis of educational qualification. It is submitted that the award of the learned CGIT-I, Dhanbad is valid and legal and is based on correct appreciation of law and after weighing the evidence before it. Hence, it is not open to the Petitioner Company to reopen the case before this Court by assailing the finding the fact. Thus, the award suffers from no perversity and illegality and hence this writ petition may be dismissed. 15. It is submitted that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated without proper opportunity of hearing and she was dismissed from the services vide order dated 9/12.03.1998 passed by then DGM of the Petitioner Company on the ground of forged Matriculation Certificate. It is submitted that the Matriculation Certificate furnished by the Workman-Respondent No.1 was neither forged nor fabricated rather it was a genuine certificate. It is submitted that the Workman- 2025:JHHC:14205 7 Respondent No.1 had passed Matriculation Examination in the year 1977 and thereafter she had also passed Intermediate Examination. It is submitted that the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna had issued the Matriculation Certificate to the Workman-Respondent No.1 whereas the intermediate counsel has issued I.A. Certificate to the Petitioner Company and thus after appointment of the Workman, the Management suddenly become suspicious of her certificate and had issued unfair disciplinary proceeding against her and she was wrongly dismissed from the services and hence, the impugned Award is correct. It is submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the Management Company as they were given opportunity to examine the witnesses and even the Management had examined its witness before the learned Tribunal and had produced several documents in support of its case. However, the Management deliberately did not cross-examine the witnesses/witness of the Workman Respondent No.1 and victimized her and hence, the impugned Award may be upheld. 16. Learned counsel for the Workman-Respondent No.1 submitted that the Petitioner Company had not challenged the Order dated 17.11.2008 passed by the learned Tribunal by which it was directed by the learned Tribunal that fairness of Domestic Enquiry will be considered at a later stage. The Management cannot take this plea before this Court for the first time that they were not given opportunity to challenge the fairness of Domestic Enquiry before the Tribunal. 17. It is further submitted that the Respondent No.1 namely Meena Kumari Singh had filed the additional affidavit on 24.09.2021 after filing of the counter affidavit by the Secretary of Bihar School Examination Board on 18.10.2021 and the Petitioner has enclosed 2025:JHHC:14205 8 the revised Matriculation Certificate and revised Marksheet certificate issued by Bihar School Examination Board on 13.09.1999, which has been enclosed Annexure-1 and Annexure-2 respectively to this additional Counter affidavit dated 24.09.2021 filed dated by the Workman Respondent No.1. It is submitted that the Workman- Respondent No.1 is on the death bed and she is suffering from Cancer from last several years. It is further submitted that no doubt her reinstatement is not possible but an adequate compensation may be provided to her in lieu of back wages and she may also give the benefits of other financial benefits in the light of Award passed by learned Tribunal. Hence, this writ petition may be dismissed. 18. Perused the records of this case and considered the submissions of both the sides. 19. From perusal of Annexure-1, it would appear that the Workman-Respondent No.1 had applied in the prescribed format of application form for employment, which was issued by the Tata Iron Steel Company Limited, West Bokaro Colliery and Smt. Meena Kumari Singh has also put her signature on 15.06.1990 and her date of birth was shown as 16.09.1963 and she has shown her educational qualification as I.A. Thus, it is evident that Annexure-1 i.e. the application form for employment was provided for the Petitioner Company to apply for job in lieu of Land Loser Scheme although the Petitioner Company has not disclosed the fact of taking land in the said application format or under land loser scheme. Annexure-2 is the Service Card issued by the Tata Iron Steel Company Ltd i.e. (TISCO) in the name of the Workman- Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh daughter of Durga Prasad Singh. It is said to be issued on 25.06.1990 without specifying any service period. 2025:JHHC:14205 9 Annexure-3 is the Appointment Letter dated 29.06.1990 by which the Divisional Manager, West Bokaro had appointed the petitioner as a temporary clerk as Grade-III by informing the appointment as on purely temporary for a period of 85 days w.e.f. 25.06.1990 to 17.09.1990 and it will be automatically stand terminated on the expiry of said period. However, in the above Letter dated 29.06.1990, they have admitted that she will be governed during her employment as per Company’s Standing Order and various company’s rules. They have also admitted that this offer is made to her as Sri Chotelal Sahu and his co-sharers have executed an agreement of sale of 9.10 and 2.11 acres of raiyati land under Khata no.48 and 13 respectively or village Barughuttu and nominated her name for employment. 20. The Workman-Respondent No.1 had also filed her Matriculation Certificate and Provisional Certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board before the Enquiry Officer which have been enclosed at page 37-38 of the Lower Court Records and the Reference case no.197/2000. 21. The Workman- Respondent No.1 has also enclosed her School Leaving Certificate dated 23.07.1977 issued by the Principal of PND Jain High School and also enclosed the photocopy of Marksheet issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna in her name for passing the Matric Exam in the year 1977 at page 34-35 of the Lower Court Record of learned Tribunal at page 36 in the Internal Letter dated 13.05.1996 sent by the Principal to the Divisional Manager (P&A) TISCO. Page 39 of LCR is the Affidavit dated 09.05.1997 send by sworn by the Workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh before the Notary Public, Dhanbad certifying that she had passed her Matric examination from Bihar 2025:JHHC:14205 10 School Examination Board, Patna from PND Jain High School, Isri Bazar, Giridih and in which her Roll Code was 1404 and Roll No.02538 and said Examination held in the year 1977 and stated that her certificate had been lost and she has urgent need of duplicate copies of all the said certificates. At Page-40 of Lower Court Records, contains the photocopy of letter sent by the Workman- Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh through the Principal PND Jain High School, Isri Bazar, Giridih to the Secretary Bihar School Examination Board, Patna requesting him to issue again fresh Marksheet and certificates by sending her Affidavit and also by informing him that her original certificates has been lost somewhere and her Roll Code was 1404 and Roll No. was 02538 when she was appeared in the annual exam of Bihar School Examination Board in the year 1977.) 22. It reveals from the record that one Chotelal Sahu and other co-sharers had executed two sale deeds on 9.10 acre and 2.11 acre total 11.21 acres of land in favour of the Petitioner- Management Company and thereafter Workman-Respondent No.1 Meena Kumari Singh was appointed as Clerk Grade-III on 13.05.1991 by the Petitioner Company (Tata Steel). Thereafter, she was promoted to the post of Clerk Grade II on 18.12.1993. 23. It transpires that the some officers of Petitioner Company later on suspected the Matriculation Certificate of the Workman Respondent No.1 and then a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her and one Enquiry Officer Shri Prakash George was appointed as an Enquiry Officer and one I.R. Sandys was appointed as Presenting Officer / Management Representative. 24. It transpires that the enquiry was concluded against the Workman-Respondent No.1 in 4-5 dates only. 2025:JHHC:14205 11 25. It transpires that the enquiry proceeding was fixed on 14.05.1997, 16.05.1997, 15.07.1997 vide Exhibit-M-4 dated 09.05.1997, Ext.M-5 is Letter dated 15.05.1997, Exhibit-M-7 is Letter dated 09.07.1997. However, the enquiry could not be held on those days. In the meantime, the Workman-Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh suffered from leg fracture and for which she had sent an application dated 09.07.1997, which was noticed by the Dy. Divisional Manager vide letter dated 12.07.1997 marked as Exhibit M-8 and letter dated 17.07.1997 marked as Exhibit M-9. Still, the Enquiry was fixed on 23.08.1997 vide letter dated 20.08.1997 marked as Exhibit-10 and she i.e the Workman was directed to appear along with her evidence and documents and she was also directed to scrutinize the documents produced by the Management and to cross-examine the witnesses of the Management. However, the enquiry was not done on 23.08.1997. Thereafter, the enquiry was fixed on 01.10.1997 and finally the enquiry was completed and enquiry report was submitted. 26. From the perusal of the Enquiry Report, it is evident that the same was drawn on Ruling Paper in his own handwriting by the Enquiry Officer-cum-Senior Officer (Personal Per) S.G. without mentioning any date. 27. It transpires that even second show cause notice was not issued to the Workman Respondent No.1 and finally vide order letter dated 15.12.1998 i.e. Exhibit M-18, the Respondent No.1 i.e. the Workman was dismissed from the service of the Petitioner Company. 28. It is also evident from the Exhibit M-19 which is the letter dated 15.12.1998 issued by the Petitioner Company that the dismissal of the Petitioner was made effective from 21.12.1998 after re-viewing her case on the request of the Union instead of 2025:JHHC:14205 12 09.03.1998 on the charges of fraud and dishonesty. 29. It transpires that after dismissal the Industrial Dispute was raised by the Workman and the schedule of Reference reads as follows:- THE SCHEDULE “Whether the action of the management of Bokaro Colliery of M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., P.O. Ghatotand Dist. Hazaribagh to dismiss the services of Smt. Meena Kumari Singh Clerk Gr.III is legal and justified? If not, to what relief is the Workman concerned entitled” 30. The Petitioner-Management Company (TISCO) in support of its case got examined in one witness in support of its one as follows:- (i). MW-1 is I.R. Sandys. 31. The Management Company in support of its case got marked with the documents as Exhibit M-1 to M-21 before the learned Tribunal. However, the learned Tribunal has not discussed the document M-1 to M-21 respectively in its impugned Award and hence this Court after going through the Lower Court Records this Court finds the following documents were marked as the Exihibits as follows:- (i) Ext. M-1 is the copy of Chargesheet dated 02.05.1997, (ii) Ext. M-2 is the Reply of Chargesheet dated 05.05.1997, (iii) Ext. M-3 is the Letter dated 05.05.1997, (iv) Ext. M-4 is the Letter dated 09.05.1997 - 2 sheets, (v) Ext. M-5 is the Notice of Enquiry dated 15.05.1997, (vi) Ext. M-6 is the Application dated 16.05.1997 of Meena Kumar Singh alonwith Sick Report, (vii) Ext. M-7 s the Notice of Enquiry dated 09.09.1997, 2025:JHHC:14205 13 (viii) Ext. M-8 is the letter dated 12.07.1997, (ix) Ext. M-9 is the Notice of Enquiry dated 17.07.1997, (x) Ext. M-10 is the Notice of Enquiry dated 20.08.1997, (xi) Ext. M-11 is the Notice of Enquiry dated 19.09.1997, (xii) Ext.M-12 is the Notice of Enquiry dated 06.10.1997, (xiii) Ext. M-13 is the Enquiry Proceeding along with Exhibits, (xiv) Ext. M-14 is the Enquiry Report, (xv) Ext. M-15 is the Abstract sheet of disciplinary proceeding, (xvi) Ext. M-16 is the letter dated 13.02.1998, (xvii) Ext. M-17 is the copy of dismissal letter dated 09.03.1998. (xviii) Ext. M-18 is the letter dated 16.03.1998, (xix) Ext. M-19 is the letter dated 15.12.1998, (xx) Ext. M-20 is the letter dated 21.12.1998, (xxi) Ext. M-21 is the Registered letter issued to Meena Kumari Singh returned undelivered. (i) Ext. M-1 is the carbon copy of the chargesheet dated 02.05.1997 issued by Dy. Divisional Manager (P & S) West Bokaro to the workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh, Clerk Grade-II who was working in Material department. (ii) Ext. M-2 is the Confidential letter dated 05.05.1997 issued by the Divisional Manager (P &S) to Senior Divisional Manager (P & A) West Bokaro by which the explanation given by Smt. Meena Kumari Singh was placed before him i.e. Senior Divisional Manager (P&A) and for further action as per rule may be initiated. (iii) Ext. M-3 is the original copy of show cause notice, (M-1 and M-3 are the same and carbon copy of show cause 2025:JHHC:14205 14 notice) (iv) Ext. M-4 is the carbon copy of letter no.0374/97 dated 09.05.1997 is notice of enquiry issued by Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) (West Bokaro) to the workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh asking her to appear for enquiry before the Enquiry Officer Sri Prakash George, Sr. Officer(P) on 14.05.1979. However, it was signed by Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) on 12.05.1997 instead of 09.05.1997. (v) Ext. M-4/1 is the another carbon copy of the said letter dated 09.05.1997, however the date of signature of Dy. Divisional Manager is not mentioned, (vi) Ext. M-5 is the Second show cause notice of enquiry dated 15.05.1997 issued by the Enquiry Officer, West Bokaro to the Workman Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh, Clerk Material Division by which it has been informed that the enquiry could not be held on 14.05.1997 at 10:00 A.M. and the said enquiry will be held on 16.05.1997 and she was directed to remain present with her witnesses and documents. It was also informed that she was also given full opportunity to cross examine the Management witnesses and scrutinise all the document produced by the management and she will be given full opportunity to defend herself. It was also threatened that if she failed to turn up the enquiry without information and sufficient cause, then the same will be conducted by Ex-Parte. (vii) Ext.M-6 is the letter dated 16.05.1997 by which the petitioner has sent the information to the Enquiry Officer i.e. Senior Officer (i.e. P) Services Group West Bokaro Colliery by which she prayed for time on the ground of sickness and she also 2025:JHHC:14205 15 stated that she will appear for enquiry once she is well and she had also enclosed the sickness certificate no.362 dated 14.05.1997. The photocopy of sick certificate is issued by Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd and which issued under the Signature of M.O. is also enclosed with the said Exhibit M-6. (viii) Ext.M-7 is the letter dated 09.07.1997 send by the Enquiry Officer, West Bokaro to the Workman Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by which it was informed that the Enquiry will be held on 15.07.1997 in his office. (ix) Ext.M-8 is the letter dated 12.07.1997 send by Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) to the Asst. Manager (PSG), West Bokaro by which it has been informed that the Workman Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh is medically unfit and she has a fractured leg. She was also directed to note that this should be treated as the Second show cause notice and not the third show cause notice as mentioned in his letter. (x) Ext. M-9 is the carbon copy of the letter dated 17.07.1997 send by Sr. Officer (PSG) West Bokaro, to Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) by which the Enquiry Officer has informed his superior to inform him soon once the workman resumes her duty to facilitate her in initiate further action. (xi) Ext. M-10 is the Letter dated 20.08.1997 issued by the Enquiry Officer, West Bokaro to the Workman-Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh asking her to appear in enquiry before in his office before him on 23.08.1997 at 10 A.M. and has issued the same caution and threatening as vide Ext. M-5 and M-7. (xii) Ext. M-11 is the carbon copy of the Letter dated 19.09.1997 issued by the Enquiry Officer, West Bokaro to the Workman- Respondent Smt. Meena Kumari Singh asking her to appear in 2025:JHHC:14205 16 enquiry before in his office before him on 25.09.1997 at 10 A.M. (xiii) Ext. M-12 is the another carbon copy letter dated 06.10.1997 issued by the Enquiry Office to the workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by which she has been asked to appear for enquiry on 14.10.1997. (xiv) Ext. M-13 is the minutes of proceeding of Domestic Enquiry dated 01.10.1997 and 14.10.1997. (xv) Ext.M-14 is the Enquiry Report prepared in the ruling paper and duly signed by Enquiry Officer but without having any date (which runs from page 41 to page 55 of the lower Court Records received from the learned Tribunal). (xvi) Ext.M-15 is the abstract sheet for Disciplinary Action issued by the Presenting Officer (illegible) to the Workman- Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by which it has been informed that the Enquiry Officer held her guilty. It is also informed that the Enquiry started on 11.10.1997 and the Enquiry was completed on 14.10.1997, the Enquiry Report was submitted on 17.12.1997 and the findings of Enquiry Officer against the Workman- Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh is “Guilty” and for which they have passed the order of punishment of dismissal and the date of the Seal and the Mohar of the Issuing Authority is vague, illegible and cannot be read properly and the signature of any authority is not found on the order of dismissal. (xvii) Ext.M-16 is the carbon copy of the letter dated 13.02.1998 issued by the Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S), West Bokaro to the Agent (North Group), West Bokaro by which it has been informed that the charges levelled against Smt. Meena Kumari Singh i.e. the Workman-Respondent is of grave nature and it is recommended that she may be dismissed from her services 2025:JHHC:14205 17 from the Steel Company. The above Letter dated 13.02.1998 is also approved by the Agent (North Group), West Bokaro which has Mohar of one Mr. P.S. Dillon and the above Letter dated 13.02.1998 i.e. M-16 is drawn in Internal Communication Form of the petitioner Company. (xviii) Ext. M-17 is the letter dated 09.03.1998 send by the Dy. General Manger, West Bokaro, to the Workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by which it has been informed that she has been dismissed from the services of the company. (xix) Ext. M-18 is the carbon copy of the Letter dated 16.03.1998 send by the Senior Divisional Manager (P&A), West Bokaro to Dy. Divisional Manager, West Bokaro by which it has been informed that Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) had dismissed Smt. Meena Kumari Singh, Clerk which is effective from 16.03.1998 but since the case has been taken upon by their (i.e. Companies) recognised Union and hence it may be kept in abeyance till further information from the under signed by Dy. Divisional Manager West Bokaro. (xx) Ext.M-19 is the Letter dated 15.12.1998 issued by the General Manager, West Bokaro, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. to the Workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by which it has been informed that the charges of fraud and dishonesty is proved against her but her matter was re-examined. Thereafter, she has been informed to be dismissed from company’s services with effect from 21.12.1998. She was further directed to vacate the company’s quarter, if any in her possession along with all other documents of the company. 2025:JHHC:14205 18 (xxi) Ext. M-20 is the Confidential Letter dated 21.12.1998 issued by the Sri A.K. Tiwari, Dy. Divisional Manager, (P&S) to Senior Divisional Manager (P&A), West Bokaro for delivering the Letter dated 15.12.1998 to the Workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh and the said Letter was passed as Internal Communication Form. (xxii) Ext. M-21 is the Returned Envelope send to the workman Smt. Meena Kumari Singh, Clerk of Materials Department, West Bokaro which returned unserved due to absence of Respondent-Workman by which the Dismissal Letter dated 15.12.1998 was communicated. 32. It reveals from the Award of learned Tribunal that the Petitioner Company has filed petition for deciding the preliminary issue on the point of fairness of domestic enquiry but the same was not entertained and it was decided by the final order by passing the impugned Award. 33. It further transpires that the learned Tribunal has held that the Domestic Enquiry was unfair and hence the dismissal of the Workman-Respondent No.1 was illegal, void and ab-initio by relying upon the several judgments of this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also Allahabad High Court. The Tribunal has distinguished the judgment filed on behalf of the Petitioner Company. The Tribunal has further held the dismissal of Workman- Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh is not legal and not justified and she is entitled (for reinstatement) to be reinstated to her original job from the date of her dismissal and she is also entitled for full back wages from the date of her dismissal to her date of reinstatement with the consequential benefits. 2025:JHHC:14205 19 34. The Petitioner-Company has taken the plea that after her appointment the said certificate was found to be forged and fabricated and accordingly the Workman-Respondent No.1 was issued chargesheet by the Dy. Divisional Manager vide Letter dated 25.05.1997 (i.e. Annexure-4 of the writ petition). Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent No.1 submitted her explanation but the same was not found satisfactorily and accordingly an Enquiry Committee was constituted by the Dy. Divisional Manager vide order dated 09.05.1997 (i.e. Annexure-5). Thereafter, the Enquiry Committee conducted the enquiry and submitted its report by holding that the chargesheet dated 02.05.1997 has been satisfactorily established. The photocopy of the Enquiry Report of the enquiry proceeding is enclosed as Annxure-6 in this writ petition. Thereafter, on the basis of said enquiry report, the Workman Respondent No.1 was dismissed by the Agent, (North Group), West Bokaro by order dated 9/12.03.1998 w.e.f. 16.03.1998. The above order marked as Ext. M-X17 before the learned Industrial Tribunal. 35. However, on the representation of the Union, the case of the Workman-Respondent No.1 was reviewed and the steps were taken for verification of the genuineness of the documents submitted by the Workman-Respondent No.1 from ascertaining the position regarding her Matriculation Certificate. However, vide Letter dated 13.05.1998 issued by the Joint Secretary, Vigilance, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna it was communicated that the Matriculation Certificate of the Examination in the year 1977 submitted by Smt. Meena Kumari Singh was forged and the above Letter is marked as Annexure-7 to this Writ Petition. 36. From perusal of Annexure-7 i.e. the photocopy of Letter 2025:JHHC:14205 20 No.364 and dated 13.05.1998 send by Jagdish Singh, Joint Secretary, Vigilance, Bihar Examination School Board to Sri S.C. Verma, Senior Divisional Officer, Personnel and Administration, Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. West Bokaro by which it has been informed that pursuant to the Letter No.364 of 13.05.1998. It is informed that student Meena Kumari Singh daughter of Sri Durga Prasad Singh Roll Code-1404 and the Roll No.2538 had not appeared in Annual Secondary Examination in the year 1977 and hence the student is forged one. However, the Petitioner Company had not produced the said copy of Letter dated 13.05.1998 during the domestic enquiry before the Enquiry Officer which stood concluded on 01.10.1997 and on 14.10.1997 and the dismissal order passed on 16.03.1998 vide Exhibit M-17 and hence the letter dated 13.05.1998 cannot be relied upon. 37. Thus, this is the subsequent act event of the company. Even the petitioner has not produced its own Letter dated 09.05.1998 said to be issued by Sri S.C. Verma, Senior Divisional Officer (P&A, TISCO) West Bokaro, Colliery neither said Sri S.C. Verma, Senior Divisional Manager was examined before the Labour Court i.e. learned Industrial Tribunal. It is not clear as to when the Letter No.364 dated 13.05.1998 said to be issued by S.C. Verma Senior Divisional Officer to the Joint Secretary, Vigilance when the said Letter dated 13.05.1998 was received in the Office of said S.C. Verma, Senior Divisional Officer (P&A). Thereafter, they have further pleaded that the General Manager finally held that it is not a fit case for reviewing the order of dismissal and hence vide Letter dated 15.12.1998 the Workman-Respondent No.1 was dismissed from the service as per provisions of Standing Order of Company to the dismissal Letter dated 15.12.1998 as enclosed Annexure-8 with 2025:JHHC:14205 21 the writ petition. They have come out with further plea that workman has raised Industrial Dispute vide Letter dated 01.09.1999 (i.e. Annexure-9) for reinstatement into the services from the date of dismissal with all the consequential benefits. 38. Thereafter, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central Government Hazaribagh initiated the conciliation proceeding by giving a notice to the Management as well as the Workman- Respondent No.1 and failure of the conciliation proceeding vide Notification dated 29.06.2000 referred the dispute with the Central Government, Industrial Dispute, Dhanbad and the Application dated 29.06.2000 has enclosed as Annexure-10. Thereafter, both the sides filed their respective written statements and the Workman Respondent No.1 submitted her written statement on 11.08.2000 and the Management Company filed its written statement as Rejoinder in February 2001 and which have been enclosed Annexure-11 and Annexure-12 respectively. 39. From the perusal of the written statement filed by the Workman-Respondent No.1, it is clear that she has raised the issue of career and pointed out that while she was working in the Petitioner Company then suddenly the Management has taken biased step against her and she was dismissed from the services. Although, she was appointed on the basis of “Land Loser Scheme” and educational qualification was not the preliminary category for the appointment in the Management Company even the services of the Workman Respondent was good and she was promoted to Clerk grade-III to grade-II vide Order dated 18.12.1993 and she worked continuously thereafter to the satisfaction of the Management. 40. From perusal of the written statement filed by the Management Company (i.e. Annexure- 12) it is also evident that they 2025:JHHC:14205 22 have admitted that the workmen was appointed as temporary Clerk Grade – III by appointment letter dated 29.06.1990/04.07.1990 and also in view of the fact that Sri Chota Prasad Sahu and co-sharers executed the agreement of sale of 9.10 acres of land and 2.11 acres of land (i.e., total 11.21 acres of land) Rayati land of Khata No. 48 and No. 13 respectively at village Barughuttu. They also admitted that she was appointed in Grade–III post, however they have taken stand that the Workman Respondent no.1 had submitted her Secondary School Leaving Certificate No.B153565 and the Roll Code No.1404 and Roll No.02538 indicating that she has passed the Matriculation in the year 1977 from PND Jain School, Isri Bazar, Giridih. However, on verification, the said documents were found not genuine and the said documents have been fabricated with the aid and object for obtaining an appointment on clerical post for which the minimum educational qualification is Matriculation. Her action amounts to fraud and dishonesty and hence she was issued charge-sheet dated 24.04.1997 / 02.05.1997 under the signature of Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) who was the Head of the Department and the Controlling Authority of the Workman– Respondent No.1 and he was also the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the concerned Workman–Respondent No.1. Although, the Workman–Respondent No.1 denied her allegation levelled against her for submitting forged certificate, however the Disciplinary Authority appointed Prakash Geroge as an Enquiry Officer and Sri I.R. Sandys as Management Representative and fixed the date of enquiry on 14.05.1997. Thereafter she was allowed to conduct the enquiry and given opportunity to engage any co-worker of her choice but she did not engage any co-work and she conducted the defence by herself. Thus, the enquiry was conducted fairly and properly in accordance with the 2025:JHHC:14205 23 principles of natural justice. Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer submitted the Enquiry Report holding the concerned Workman- Respondent guilty of the charges levelled against her. After completion of all the formalities the Departmental Authority put up the matter before the Agent, (North Group) West Bokaro and who was superior to the Disciplinary Authority for his consideration and the Agent recommended the dismissal of her service and accordingly, she was dismissed from service by the Dy. Divisional Manager, West Bokaro w.e.f., 16.03.1998. 41. Although, the Union took up the case of Workman– Respondent and the matter was reviewed. However the General Manager, West Bokaro, did not find any merit and no step taken by the Dy. General Manager. Then the General Manager issued Letter dated 15.12.1998 finally dismissing the concerned Workman– Respondent as per the provisions of the Certified Standing Order of the company. Thereafter, the matter was referred before Industrial Dispute, however, by the Impugned Award dated 21.08.2009 the Workman –Respondent was directed to be reinstated into the service with entire back wages. The learned counsel for the petitioner and pleaded that the Impugned Award passed by the learned Tribunal on 21.08.2009 is in violation of law laid (1975)2 SCC 681, (1983)4 SCC 491 and (1973)1 SCC 813 and (2006)6 SCC 325 at page 330 and (2001)5 SCC 435. 42. After filing of Writ Petitioner, the Workman-Respondent No.1 had filed the Counter Affidavit on 02.02.2010 and stated that there is no error in exercising of its jurisdiction by the learned Tribunal nor does written application disclose any perversity in the Award contended Award of the learned Tribunal is based on cogent and reliable evidence adduced before it by the workman and who 2025:JHHC:14205 24 stated on oath that her Educational qualifications are genuine and this assertion has not even challenged by the Management during her cross- examination. Thus, the testimony of the Workman-Respondent No.1 remained un-challenged and un-controverted and accepted by the learned Tribunal that the Workman-Respondent No.1 was denied the just right of the Workman. This was also found by the Tribunal that the only allegation against the workman-Respondent that she has procured a false Matriculation Certificate and adopted the employment in the Petitioner Company but the Petitioner Management has measurably failed to produce any reliable material to prove that the Matriculation Certificate was fake. It has been recorded in paragraph 5 of the Award thereof that while considering the fairness and proprietary of the Domestic Enquiry, it was decided vide order no.35 dated 17.11.2008 to dispose of the issue whether preliminary or otherwise at the same time. The Petitioner-Management never challenged this order of the learned Tribunal which was passed by the learned Tribunal at an earlier stage and it rather acquiesced by continuing to take part in the proceedings that were held thereafter. It is not open to the petitioner-management to now assail the said order and such challenge is barred by the principles of waiver, acquiescence and estoppels. 43. It is further stated that even the Management witnesses has stated that there was no correspondence with the Board rather there was correspondence with the Principal of School. It was also stated that neither any official of School was examined during the domestic enquiry nor any Admission Register was produced in the said enquiry proceeding, whereas the Workman-Respondent No.1, Smt. Meena Kumari Singh stated that her all educational certificates produced by her were genuine and which also remained in 2025:JHHC:14205 25 unchallenged during her cross-examination. It is also pointed out that neither the copy of Enquiry Report nor the second show cause notice had served upon her. In the meantime, the Workman-Respondent No.1 has filed the application Section 17-B of the Industrial. 44. Thereafter, the Petitioner Management had filed Supplementary Affidavit on 13.08.2010 and pointed out that the Workman Respondent No.1 was employed in Saint Peter School, West Bokaro and produced the photocopy of the certificate of Principal as Annexure-8. They have also pointed out that the Workman is presently residing in Ranchi with her husband who is in coal business. The Workman has also two adult sons who are employed in Delhi and Pune respectively. Even the Workman has not vacated the quarter w.e.f. 30.12.1998 after passing the dismissal order dated 15.12.1998 and for which a sum of Rs.2,91,000/- is due from March 2002. 45. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent No.1 had again filed rejoinder to the said Affidavit dated on 18.08.2010 and pointed out that the payment of full back wages is permissible and in violation of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court. They have again taken the plea of forged and fake certificate in the light of Letter received from the Vigilance Department, Bihar School Examination Board. Therefore, the approach of the Management reveals that they have taking all the new plea on every occasion what suits to them. 46. Further, it transpires during the pendency of this writ petition the Workman-Respondent in the light of order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Kumar) of this Court, filed her Matriculation Certificate and also Marksheet issued by the Bihar School Examination Board which have been marked as Annexure-A and A/1 respectively. 2025:JHHC:14205 26 47. It further transpires that in the light of order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Justice Rajesh Kumar), of this Court, the Petitioner Company had filed the Supplementary Affidavit on 08.09.2021, they have taken the same plea that the Joint Secretary-cum-Vigilance has issued Letter dated 13.05.1998 (i.e. Annexure-7 of the writ petition) and which was never controverted by the Respondent in the Counter Affidavit. Thereafter, the fresh letter dated 19.09.2019 alongwith Letter dated 13.05.1998 (i.e. Annexure-1 and 1/1) were sent before the Secretary, Bihar School Education Board, Patna with the view to file appropriate affidavit in the writ petition pending before this Court. However, no such affidavit was filed by the Bihar School Education Board till date 06.09.2021 as such they were bringing on record the copies of the letters issued by the Petitioner Company. They have enclosed the Letter dated on 25.09.2019 sent to the Dy. Secretary, Vigilance / Joint Secretary Vigilance, Bihar School Examination Board Patna that the ‘Roll code 2538’ is not in use as the last roll no.0182. 48. Thereafter, it transpires that on 27.09.2021 the Workman- Respondent had filed the Additional Counter Affidavit to Supplementary Affidavit on 06.09.2021 filed by the petitioner and denied the allegation of the petitioner and stated that she had not produced any forged and fabricated document any time entering into the service Petitioner-Company and the Petitioner Company has failed to prove the false and baseless charges. The petitioner has again enclosed the Mark-sheet issued by the Bihar School Examination Board as Annexure-1. She further pointed out that Matriculation Certificate issued to the Workman Respondent No.1 contained a typographical error in the roll which was mentioned as 2025:JHHC:14205 27 ‘2538’ instead of “253”. The Workman-Respondent No.1 had brought this discrepancy through the notice of the Bihar School Examination Board, which has rectified this anomaly and had issued the rectified certificated dated 13.09.1999 by recording of the serial no. 253 instead of 2538. Workman Respondent No.1 has enclosed the photocopy of Marksheet dated 13.09.1999 issued by the Bihar School Examination Board as Annexure-2 to this Additional Counter Affidavit dated 27.09.2021 and she further pointed out that she has further passed Intermediate Examination from Ranchi University which is also found by the fact in the learned Tribunal. 49. From perusal of Annexure-2 enclosed with the Additional Counter Affidavit dated 27.09.2021 filed by the Workman- Respondent to the Supplementary Counter Affidavit dated 08.09.2021 filed by the petitioner, it is evident that the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna had issued fresh and rectified Matriculation Certificate to the Workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh on 13.05.999 and in which her roll code is shown 1404 and her serial no.258. Therefore, the contention of petitioner company pointing out in Annexure-1/1 which Letter dated 25.09.2019 issued under the Signature of Assistant Secretary / Dy. Secretary Vigilance / Joint Secretary Bihar School Examination Board Patna that the serial no.2538 is not in use. Thus the Annexure- 1 and 1/1 enclosed in the Supplementary Affidavit dated 06.09.2021 by the petitioner is fit to be rejected. 50. This Court is of the view that the Petitioner Company by showing their influence on the officials of Bihar School Examination Board Patna got issued the said certificate Letter dated 25.09.2021 only to deprive and defeat the genuine claim of the workman. 51. It transpires that the petitioner Company had filed again 2025:JHHC:14205 28 rejoinder on 29.09.2021 to the Additional Counter Affidavit filed by Workman Respondent on 24.09.2021 and taken a new plea for the first time before this Court that date of marksheet purported have to issue in the year 1971 Annexure-1 to the Additional Counter Affidavit and the Workman Respondent was aged around 7 years at the time of passing of Matriculation Examination with which seems to be improbable. 52. They have even denied the genuineness of the Marksheet marked as Annexure-2 which showing that the serial No.2538 and thus, it is evident that the Petitioner Company are trying to take each and every time new plea. 53. It further transpires that later on the Bihar Examination School Board filed the Counter Affidavit on 18.02.2021 through one Umesh Prasad Singh who was Law Officer and has merely stated that the Petitioner Company had enquired about the authenticity issuance of the Matriculation Certificate of Respondent No.1 with Board vide its Letter dated 09.05.1998 and pursuant there to, the answering respondent Board through it’s Joint Secretary, Vigilance had communicated to the Company vide it’s Letter no.364 dated 13.05.1998 that no such candidate namely Meena Kumari Singh having Roll Code 1404, Roll No.2538 had appeared at the Matriculation Examination held in the Year 1977. Therefore, the Matriculation Certificate so produced by Respondent No.1 is fake, forged and fabricated. It is stated that the bone of contention between the parties is the alleged Matriculation Certificate which is required to be verified by the answering respondent Board for proper adjudication of the case. 54. Then, upon receipt of the letter no.1154 dated 19.09.2009 issued on behalf of the Company regarding the veracity of issuance 2025:JHHC:14205 29 of alleged Certificate, the answering respondent Board has once again made proper verification from its record and in course of verification it has been found that under Roll Code 1404, Roll No.0182 happens to be the last one, meaning thereby the alleged Roll Code is fake one and non-existent and therefore, the Matriculation Certificate in question is forged and fabricated as it has not been issued by the office of the answering Respondent Board. 55. 55. It transpires that the above referred post verification status of the ‘Matriculation Certificate’ under question has been communicated to the Chief (HRM), Tata Steel Ltd. By the answering respondent Board vide it’s Letter No.6028 dated 25.09.2019. 56. The School Authorities has also enclosed the Letter dated 13.05.1998 and 25.09.2019 marked as Annexure-A and A/1 and Annexure B respectively in the Counter Affidavit. 57. In the meantime, the Petitioner again filed Supplementary Affidavit on 22.01.2023 and again taken the plea of fairness for not given opportunity by the Management by the Tribunal to decide the preliminary issue on the fairness of domestic enquiry is not warranted. 58. It reveals from the Counter Affidavit filed by the Bihar School Education Board i.e. Respondent No.2 through one Jagdish Singh that even the authorities of Bihar School Examination Board are under the influence of Petitioner Company and have misled this Court by filing by such an Counter Affidavit by reiterating the roll no.2538 shown in the marks sheet and certificate of Smt. Meena Kumar Singh is not issued as fake one. However, at the same time the authorities of Bihar School Examination Board have not denied the issuance of the rectified Marksheet dated 13.09.1999 which has been issued by its authority in 2025:JHHC:14205 30 which the roll code of the Workman-Respondent has shown 1404 and Kramank i.e. Roll No.’’253” and they have not denied the said document is enclosed in the Additional Counter Affidavit dated 24.09.2021 filed by the workman Respondent No.1 and the marksheet is enclosed as Annexure-1 and the earlier Marksheet was shown as Annexure-1 which was issued in March 1997 showing his kramank (i.e. Serial No.) as 1404 - 02538. But later on vide Annexure-2 the Board Authorities themselves have issued the marksheet of the Workman-Respondent No.1 Meena Kumari Singh showing her roll no. is 1404 and serial no. 253 dated 13.09.1999. Thus, the Authorities of Bihar School Education Board have not sincerely gone through the Matriculation Certificate dated 13.09.1990 filed by the Workman-Respondent No.1. They have simply reiterated the stand of Petitioner Company who has apparently managed the report. 59. This Court does not appreciate the conduct of Authorities of Bihar School Education Board for filing such an Affidavit to mislead this Court. However, this Court is not inclined to go into the Affidavit filed by the State otherwise this Court could have initiated the necessary proceeding against the Management Petitioner Company as well as Officials of Bihar School Education Board Patna for filing such an Affidavit. This will unnecessarily delay the disposal of this case and cause further harassmentt to the Workman Respondent No.1 who is suffering from Cancer. The Petitioner is mighty Company and the officials of the petitioner company are exercising their influence to coerce any employee at their will and choice and which has resulted into filing such an Affidavit by a responsible Authority like Bihar School Education Board, Patna. 60. However, this Court deprecate the conduct of officials of 2025:JHHC:14205 31 the petitioner company who were and are conducting this case as their personal prestige of the Petitioner Company and also does not appreciate the conduct of the concerned authorities of Bihar School Education Board, Patna for not assisting this Court properly. 61. The Authorities of Bihar School Examination Board, Patna could have also verified the marksheet dated 13.09.1999 issued to Smt. Meena Kumari Singh in which her roll no.1404 and the Kramank i.e. Roll No.253, which is Annexure-2 to the Supplementary Counter Affidavit dated 24.09.2021 but they have not done so. Although, they have all the datas from which they could have verified the Matriculation Certificate of serial no.253 Roll Code No.1404 of the Workman-Respondent No.1 Meena Kumari Singh. 62. This Court finds that grave illegality has been committed by the officials of the Petitioner Company to a great extent by taking plea of 1971 Matriculation Certificate of one another Meena Kumar Singh which was neither produced by the Management during enquiry nor before the learned Tribunal. 63. The Matriculation Certificate of one another Meena Kumari Singh said issued in the year 1971 is not concerned to the Workman Respondent No.1 rather the same belongs to another women because she had passed the Matriculation Examination in the year March 1977. She has also enclosed the Mark sheet issued by the Principal of PND Jain School an/d also enclosed the Markesheet issued in the name of Smt. Meena Kumari Singh by the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna by which it is been shown that Meena Kumari Singh daughter of Sri Durga Prasad Singh has passed the Matriculation Examination in the month of March 1977 and her date of birth is shown as 16.09.1963. 2025:JHHC:14205 32 However, the Management has merely enclosed the certificate issued by Sri Gauri Shankar Headmaster-Principal of PND Jain School dated 13.05.1996 addressed to the Divisional Manager (P&A) of TISCO, West Bokaro, Colliery by which it has been informed that Smt. Meena Kumari Singh daughter of Sri Durga Prasad Singh had passed the Secondary School Examination on 1971 in the Second Division but the relevant records of that period is not available in his Office. This Letter dated 13.05.1996 was issued by the Divisional Manger, TISCO pursuant to letter dated 26.04.1996 addressed to the Headmaster cum Principal of PND Jain High School and the both the Letters (i.e. Letter dated 13.05.1996 and Letter dated 26.04.1996) were not served to the Workman-Respondent No.1 at the time of issuing the show cause notice and the same were seen to the Workman- Respondent No.1 only for the first time on 01.10.1997 by the Management and its Enquiry Officer for the first time during Domestic Enquiry on 01.10.1997 and this has caused serious prejudice to the Workman-Respondent No.1. It is surprising that Internal Communication dated 26.04.1996 sent by the Division Manager (P&A) TISCO and the Letter dated 13.05.1996 sent by the Headmaster cum Principal PND Jain High School were not given to the Workman- Respondent No.1. 64. However, the Workman-Respondent No.1 has enclosed her certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board of Marksheet of 1997. Thus, the Matriculation Certificate of 1971 of Bihar School Examination Board had not been brought on record by the Management or by the Enquiry Officer or by the Presenting Officer and this amounts to itself committing fraud upon the Workman- Respondent No.1. 2025:JHHC:14205 33 65. This Court is surprised to see the approach of the Senior Officers of TISCO that it is well reputed company of this Country for behaving in such a cruel manner which is detrimental to the life of the Workman-Respondent No.1. 66. After the impugned Award was passed on 31.08.2009 and this writ petition was filed on behalf of the petitioner in the year 2009 on 23.09.2009 before this High Court. 67. Thereafter, the writ petition was admitted on 18.01.2010 and impugned Award was stayed by the Co-ordinate Bench (Justice R.K. Merathia as then his Lordship was) of this Court. 68. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent No.1 appeared and filed petition under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act and the matter remained pending on the ground that the Workman has received part of the retirement benefits including gratuity and other benefits. During the course of hearing, it has been informed by the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 that the Respondent Workman has been suffering from Cancer from last several years. 69. It is evident that adding of Bihar School Examination Board as a party in this case by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and for producing the Matriculation Certificate was beyond the reference and terms of this case and cannot be looked into the documents as the said documents were neither available before the learned Labour Court nor before the Domestic Enquiry and hence it cannot be seen for the first time in the Writ Petition and that too particularly in view of the fact that the Authorities are proceeding with the biased and hidden intention by filing a vague and evasive Counter Affidavit. 70. It reveals from the original record of the learned Labour Court that the Reference no.197 of 2000 was instituted on 2025:JHHC:14205 34 02.08.2000 before the Presiding Officer, CJIT-1 Dhanbad. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent appeared on 02.08.2000 whereas the Employer Management appeared on 17.10.2000. The Workman- Respondent had filed its written statement on 19.02.2001 whereas the Management had filed its written their statement on 19.02.2001. Thereafter, the case was fixed for Rejoinder by the Workman- Respondent till 31.12.2001 to 01.04.2002 and on 01.02.2002 the Workman-Respondent had filed her rejoinder. Thereafter, on 28.05.2002, the learned counsel for the Workman-Respondent informed that no document is needed to be filed from the side of the workman whereas the learned counsel for the Management prays for time for filing the enquiry papers and the case was fixed for evidence of the Management on the preliminary issue with regard to the fairness of enquiry. Then on 05.09.2002, the Management had filed few original documents pertaining to enquiry proceeding and prayed for more time for adducing the evidence by the management on Preliminary issue with regard to the fairness of Domestic Enquiry and on the prayer of the Management the case was fixed on 06.01.2003. 71. Then, the case was adjourned on 05.09.2002, 06.01.2003 and 27.05.2003. The Management produced its witnesses for the first time on 20.12.2004 then on 21.04.2005 the Petitioner-Management had filed few original copy of the documents and even on 21.04.2005, the Management took time to adduce the evidence and the case was adjourned on 16.06.2005 and on 16.06.2005 the Management witness was available but the Presiding Officer was on leave. It further reveals that the case was adjourned on 30/.09.2005 / 31.10.2005 / 12.01.2006, 28.04.2006, 04.07.2006 and 30.08.2006. 72. Thereafter, on 30.08.2006 the Management had produced 2025:JHHC:14205 35 the MW-1 I.R. Sandys and also proved the documents marked as Exhibit M-1 to M-21 respectively. 73. The evidence of Management was closed on 30.08.2006 and the point of preliminary issue on the submission of learned counsel for the Management and then the case was fixed for evidence of the Workman Respondent and thereafter on 03.04.2007. 74. The Presiding Officer had fixed the case for adducing the evidence of the Workman Respondent on preliminary issue relating to the fairness of the Domestic Enquiry and it was adjourned on 27.04.2007. Thereafter on 02.09.2007 that the case was not heard and the order sheet reveals that it was placed on 14.05.2008 vide order dated 20.07.2007. On 14.05.2008 the workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Devi Singh filed the Affidavit and also the served the same to the Management and matter was fixed on 17.06.2008 for cross-examination of said witness. The Workman-Respondent No.1 was discharged on 06.08.2008 after cross-examination and the evidence was closed on the fairness of Domestic Enquiry and the case was fixed on 19.09.2008 for argument on the point of fairness of Domestic Enquiry. On 19.09.2008 the Workman-Respondent argued on the point of fairness of Domestic Enquiry but adjournment was taken by the Management and the matter was fixed on 07.11.2008 and. On 07.11.2008 the Presiding Officer heard the argument from both the sides on the point of fairness of Domestic Enquiry and order was reserved. 75. However, on 17.11.2008, the case was fixed on Preliminary Point and learned Tribunal observed that both the parties have adduced their respective evidence. However, the Management has referred the judgment of 1963 SCC (L&S) 527 on the basis of said citation filed by the Management observed that Hon’ble 2025:JHHC:14205 36 Supreme Court has laid down that once dispute has been referred under Section 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of Industrial Dispute Act, the Tribunal should dispose of the issues, whether the preliminary or otherwise, on the same time. It is also observed that when the evidence of both the parties have been completed, it will be proper to hear the case on merit instead of deciding the preliminary point without lingering the case and further. It was fixed the case for hearing on merit on 24.12.2008. thereafter, the case was heard on merit on subsequent dates. 76. Thus, it is evident that it was neither fault on the part of the Management nor also on the part of the Workman-Respondent and still the learned Tribunal decided to hear the case on merit without deciding the Preliminary point in the light of judgment reported on 1983 SCC (L&S) 527. 77. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar Versus Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 at Para 19, 20, 26, 28, 42, 42.1 to 42.5, 43 and 45 as follows:- “Para 19:- The position in law was summarised as under in Ajit Kumar Barat (SCC pp. 96-97, para 7) "(1) The appropriate Government would not be justified in making a reference under Section 10 of the Act without satisfying itself on the facts and circumstances brought to its notice that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and if such a reference is made it is desirable wherever possible, for the Government to indicate the nature of dispute in the order of reference. (2) The order of the appropriate Government making a reference under Section 10 of the Act is an administrative order and not a judicial or quasi-judicial one and the court, therefore, cannot canvass the order of the reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a 2025:JHHC:14205 37 judicial or quasi-judicial order. (3) An order made by the appropriate Government under Section 10 of the Act being an administrative order no lis is involved, as such an order is made on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (4) If it appears from the reasons given that the appropriate Government took into account any consideration irrelevant or foreign material, the court may in a given case consider the case for a writ of mandamus. (5) It would, however, be open to a party to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. Para 20:- At this stage it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of Judgments of this Court." Para 26:- Even in Sapan Kumar Pandir, the Court emphasised that limitation period for making the reference is co-extensive with the existence of dispute, meaning thereby that the dispute should be alive on the day when the decision was taken to make a reference or to refuse to make reference. In the facts of that case, the Court found that dispute remained alive and, therefore, reference was legally made. What is significant is that the Court in that judgment interpreted the words "at any time" occurring in Section 10 of the Act and clarified that though these words, prima facie, indicate that there is no time-limit for making the reference, but such a meaning cannot be assigned to these words and the real test is the existence of a dispute on the date of reference for adjudication. We would like to reproduce paras 8 and 9 elaborating this principle: (SCC p. 226) "8. The above section is almost in tune with Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the difference between these two provisions does not relate to the points at issue in this case. Though no time-limit is fixed for making the reference for a dispute for 2025:JHHC:14205 38 adjudication, could any State Government revive a dispute which had submerged in stupor by long lapse of time and rekindle by making a reference of it to adjudication? The words 'at any time as used in the section are prima facie indicator to a period without boundary. But such an interpretation making the power unending would be pedantic. There is inherent evidence in this sub-section itself to indicate that the time has some circumscription. The words 'where the Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended' have to be read in conjunction with the words 'at any time'. They are, in a way, complementary to each other. The Government's power to refer an industrial dispute for 9 adjudication has thus one limitation of time and that is, it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression 'at any time' terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It, therefore, means that if the dispute existed on the day when the reference was made by the Government, it is idle (sic ideal) to ascertain the number of years which elapsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. 9. Hence the real test is, was the industrial dispute in existence on the date of reference for adjudication? If the answer is in the negative then the Government's power to make a reference would have extinguished. On the other hand, if the answer is in positive terms the Government could have exercised the power whatever be the range of the period which elapsed since the inception of the dispute. That apart, a decision of the Government in this regard cannot be listed (sic) on the possibility of what another party would think, whether any dispute existed or not. The section indicates that if in the opinion of the Government the dispute existed then the Government could make the reference. The only authority which can form such an opinion is the Government. If the Government decides to make the reference, there is a presumption that in the opinion of the Government, there existed such a dispute." 2025:JHHC:14205 39 Para 28:- The aforesaid case law depicts the following: 28.1 The law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 28.2. The words "at any time" used in Section 10 would support that there is no period of limitation in making an order of reference. 28.3. At the same time, the appropriate Government has to keep in mind as to whether the dispute is still existing or live dispute and has not become a stale claim and if that is so, the reference can be refused. 28.4. Whether dispute is alive or it has become stale/nonexistent at the time when the workman approaches the appropriate Government is an aspect which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and there Cannot be any hard-and-fast rule regarding the time for making the order of reference. Para 42:- On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2- A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a 2025:JHHC:14205 40 condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the 2025:JHHC:14205 41 Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the civil court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived a his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. Pare 43:-We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into 2025:JHHC:14205 42 consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. Para 45:-On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the High Court correctly decided the issue holding that the reference at such a belated stage i.e. after fourteen years of termination without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute.” 78. It appears from the above judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 that though the Hon’ble Supreme Court had set aside the Award on the ground of delay of 14 years on the ground that the Reference was raised after 14 years of termination of service of the Delinquent Workman-Respondent, but the present case the Workman-Respondent had raised Industrial Dispute while he was in service and after getting promotion from Grade-III to Grade-II, he challenged his seniority vis-à-vis one Achyuta Prasad, who was junior to him and who was given promotion in the year 1983 itself, whereas the Workman-Respondent was given notional promotion with effect from 1990 without any financial benefit. Thereafter, the Workman-Respondent had raised the reference in the year 1991 through the Union before the Central Government. However, the Central Government had referred the matter for reference on 17.04.1999, i.e. after a delay of Eight (08) years and thus, for the delay on the part of the Central Government, the Workman-Respondent cannot be found at fault with. Therefore, in view of the delay made by the Central Government the Workman-Respondent cannot be denied his right to be barred by law of limitation, thus, the above judgment is not in 2025:JHHC:14205 43 favour of the Petitioner-Manager on the facts and circumstances of this case. 79. It is well settled that serving a copy of Enquiry Report and Second show cause notice is mandatory and in case of non-supply of enquiry report and not serving second show cause notice to the employee will be violative of principle of the natural justice. 80. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727, at Para 61 to 63 as follows: “Para 61:- It is now settled law that the proceedings must be just, fair and reasonable and negation thereof offends Articles 14 and 21. It is well-settled law that the principles of natural justice are integral part of Article 14. No decision prejudicial to a party should be taken without affording an opportunity or supplying the material which is the basis for the decision. The enquiry report constitutes fresh material which has great persuasive force or effect on the mind of the disciplinary authority. The supply of the report along with the final order is like a post-mortem certificate with putrefying odour. The failure to supply copy thereof to the delinquent would be unfair procedure offending not only Articles 14, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution, but also, the principles of natural justice. The contention on behalf of the Government/management that the report is not evidence adduced during such inquiry envisaged under proviso to Article 311(2) is also devoid of substance. It is settled law that the Evidence Act has no application to the inquiry conducted during the disciplinary proceedings. The evidence adduced is not in strict conformity with the Indian Evidence Act, though the essential principles of fair play envisaged in the Evidence Act are applicable. What was meant by ‘evidence’ in the proviso to Article 311(2) is the totality of the material collected during the inquiry including the report of the enquiry officer forming part of that material. Therefore, when reliance is sought to be placed by the disciplinary authority, on 2025:JHHC:14205 44 the report of the enquiry officer for proof of the charge or for imposition of the penalty, then it is incumbent that the copy thereof should be supplied before reaching any conclusion either on proof of the charge or the nature of the penalty to be imposed on the proved charge or on both. Para-62:- Shri P.P. Rao obviously realising this effect, contended that the enquiry officer being a delegate of the disciplinary authority is not bound by the delegatee's recommendations and it is not a material unless it is used by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the need for its supply does not arise and the principles of natural justice need not be extended to that stage as the officer/workman had opportunity at the inquiry. In support thereof he placed strong reliance on Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] ; Shadi Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab [(1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637] ; Hira Nath Misra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi [(1973) 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260] ; Satyavir Singh v. Union of India [(1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555] ; Secretary, Central Board of Excise & Customs v. K.S. Mahalingam [(1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] . I am unable to agree with his contentions. Doubtless that the enquiry officer is a delegate of the disciplinary authority, he conducts the inquiry into the misconduct and submits his report, but his findings or conclusions on the proof of charges and his recommendations on the penalty would create formidable impressions almost to be believed and acceptable unless they are controverted vehemently by the delinquent officer. At this stage non-supply of the copy of the report to the delinquent would cause him grave prejudice. S.K. George case [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] renders no assistance. It is only an inquiry against malpractice at an examination conducted by the University under executive instruction. Therein the students were given an opportunity of hearing and they were supplied with all the material, 2025:JHHC:14205 45 the foundation for the report. The observations of the Bench of two Judges with regard to the theory of two stages in the Inquiry under Article 311 also bears little importance for the foregoing consideration in this case. It is already seen that this Court held that the inquiry from the stage of charge-sheet till the stage of punishment is a continuous one and cannot be split into two. The reliance in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [(1973) 1 SCC 380 : (1973) 3 SCR 22] is also of no avail. Therein it was pointed out that under Section 18-A of the I.D.R. Act there was no scope of enquiry at two stages and the omission to supply enquiry report, before taking the action, did not vitiate the ultimate decision taken. In Shadi Lal case [(1973) 1 SCC 680 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 293 : (1973) 3 SCR 637] Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Service (Punishment and Appeal) Rules did not provide for the supply of copy of the report of an inquiry conducted by the fact finding authority before inquiry. It was held that the delinquent officer was supplied with all the materials and was given opportunity to make representation and the same was considered. The report did not indicate anything in addition to what was already supplied to him. Under those circumstances it was held that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into an iron cast or a strait-jacket formula. Each case has to be considered and the principles applied in the light of the facts in each case. The effect of the violation of the principles of natural justice on the facts of the case on hand needs to be considered and visualised. The effect of Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio was considered by my brother Sawant, J. and it needs no reiteration. The reliance on S.K. George case [(1969) 1 SCR 317 : AIR 1969 SC 198] in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131] ratio renders no assistance in the light of the above discussion. Since Mahalingam case [(1986) 3 SCC 35 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 374] which was after the Forty-second Amendment Act, the need to supply second show-cause notice was dispensed with, regarding punishment and therefore, that ratio renders no assistance to the case. Hira Nath Misra case [(1973) 2025:JHHC:14205 46 1 SCC 805 : AIR 1973 SC 1260] also is of no avail since the inquiry was conducted relating to misbehaviour with the girl students by the erring boys. The security of the girls was of paramount consideration and therefore, the disclosure of the names of the girl students given in the report or their evidence would jeopardise their safety and so was withheld. Accordingly this Court on the fact situation upheld the action of the Medical College. Satyavir Singh [(1985) 4 SCC 252 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 1 : AIR 1986 SC 555] ratio also is of no assistance as the action was taken under proviso to Article 311(2) and Rule 199 of the CCA Rules. The inquiry into insubordination by police force was dispensed with as the offending acts of the police force would generate deleterious effect on the discipline of the service. Asthana case [(1988) 3 SCC 600 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 869] was considered by my brother Sawant, J. in which the report was not supplied and it was upheld. It should, thus be concluded that the supply of the copy of the enquiry report is an integral part of the penultimate stage of the inquiry before the disciplinary authority considers the material and the report on the proof of the charge and the nature of the punishment to be imposed. Non-compliance is denial of reasonable opportunity, violating Article 311(2) and unfair, unjust and illegal procedure offending Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. Para 63: The emerging effect of our holding that the delinquent is entitled to the supply of the copy of the report would generate yearning for hearing before deciding on proof of charge or penalty which Forty-second Amendment Act had advisedly avoided. So while interpreting Article 311(2) or relevant rule the court/tribunal should make no attempt to bring on the rail by back track the opportunity of hearing as was portended by the Gujarat High Court. The attempt must be nailed squarely. Prior to the Forty-second Amendment Act the delinquent had no right of hearing before disciplinary authority either on proof of charge or penalty. So after Forty-second Amendment Act it would not be put on higher pedestal. The Gujarat High Court's decision is, therefore, not good law. 2025:JHHC:14205 47 However, the disciplinary authority has an objective duty and adjudicatory responsibility to consider and impose proper penalty consistent with the magnitude or the gravity of the misconduct. The statute or statutory rules gave graded power and authority to the disciplinary authority to impose either of the penalties enumerated in the relevant provisions. It is not necessarily the maximum or the minimum. Based on the facts, circumstances, the nature of imputation, the gravity of misconduct, the indelible effect or impact on the discipline or morale of the employees, the previous record or conduct of the delinquent and the severity to which the delinquent will be subjected to, may be some of the factors to be considered. They cannot be eulogised but could be visualised. Each case must be considered in the light of its own scenario. Therefore, a duty and responsibility has been cast on the disciplinary authority to weigh the pros and cons, consider the case and impose appropriate punishment. In a given case if the penalty was proved to be disproportionate or there is no case even to find the charges proved or the charges are based on no evidence, that would be for the court/the tribunal to consider on merits, not as court of appeal, but within its parameters of supervisory jurisdiction and to give appropriate relief. But this would not be a ground to extend hearing at the stage of consideration by the disciplinary authority either on proof of the charge or on imposition of the penalty. I respectfully agree with my brother Sawant, J. in other respects in the draft judgment proposed by him.” 81. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob Vs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court 477 at paragraph no.7 as follows:- “Para:- 7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or 2025:JHHC:14205 48 tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque1 Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and 2025:JHHC:14205 49 Appeals Assam2 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh. 82. The above judgment represents the case of the Workman- Respondent No.1 83. So far as the claim of back wages is concerned, the same cannot be denied to the Workman-Respondent No.1 as there was no fault on her part in the light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court. 84. It is held in the case State vs. Workmen reported in 2019 (18) 814 at Para 10, 11 and 12 as follows:- “Para-10. In our considered opinion, the courts below completely failed to see that the back wages could not be awarded by the Court as of right to the workman consequent upon setting aside of his dismissal/termination order. In other words, a workman has no right to claim back wages from his employer as of right only because the Court has set aside his dismissal order in his favour and directed his reinstatement in service. Para-11. It is necessary for the workman in such cases to plead and prove with the aid of evidence that after his dismissal from the service, he was not gainfully employed anywhere and had no earning to maintain himself or/and his family. The employer is also entitled to prove it otherwise against the employee, namely, that the employee was gainfully employed during the relevant period and hence not entitled to claim any back wages. Initial burden is, however, on the employee. Para-12. In some cases, the Court may decline to award the back wages in its entirety whereas in some cases, it may award partial depending upon the facts of each case by exercising its judicial discretion in the light of the facts and evidence. The questions, how the back wages are required to be decided, what are the factors to be taken into consideration awarding back wages, on whom the initial burden lies, etc. were elaborately discussed in several cases by this Court wherein the law on these questions has been settled. Indeed, it is no longer res integra. These cases are, M.P. SEB v. Jarina 2025:JHHC:14205 50 Bee [M.P. SEB v. Jarina Bee, (2003) 6 SCC 141 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 833] , Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh [Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 716] , U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey [U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 250] , J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal [J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal, (2007) 2 SCC 433 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 651], Metropolitan Transport Corpn. v. Venkatesan [Metropolitan Transport Corpn. v. V. Venkatesan, (2009) 9 SCC 601 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] , Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board [Jagbir Singh v. Haryana State Agriculture Mktg. Board, (2009) 15 SCC 327 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 545] and Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] .” 85. Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised technical plea that the learned Tribunal has committed grave error, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by not deciding the preliminary issue of fairness of Domestic Enquiry. However, the learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Management had examined one witness and had filed several documents which were marked as Exhibit M-1 to M-21 respectively and thus, it reveals that even if the fairness of Domestic Enquiry was not decided at the first instance, the learned Tribunal below had given full opportunity to the management to contest the case on merit and to adduce its evidence and produced documents in support of its case and thus the plea raised by Mr. G. M. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. 86. It is submitted the impugned Award is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kurukshetra 2025:JHHC:14205 51 University Vs. Prithvi Singh reported in (2018) 4 SCC 483. “We are constrained to observed that first, the Labour court committed an error in not making a “preliminary issue” for deciding the legality of domestic enquiry and second, having found fault in the domestic enquiry committed another error when it did not allow the appellant to lead independent evidence to prove the misconduct/charge on merits and straightaway proceeded to hold that it was a case of illegal retrenchment and hence the respondent’s termination is bad in law.” However, the above judgment is not applicable on the fact and in the circumstances of this case. 87. 87. It is evident that the above judgment is not applicable in view of the fact that no prejudice is caused to the Petitioner Company even if the Court had not decided the Domestic Enquiry. 88. In support of the learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the judgments in the case of Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai Faizullabhai, reported in (1976) 3 SCC 832 at para 7 which read as follows:- “Para-7:- Fairness to respondent's Counsel constrains us to consider in limine a flawsome plea forcibly urged that the union figured as the appellant before us but being no party to the dispute (which was between the workers on the one hand and the establishments on the other) had no locus standi. No right of the union qua union was involved and the real disputants were the workers. Surely, there is terminological lapse in the cause title because, in fact, the aggrieved appellants are the workers collectively, not the union. But a bare reading of the petition, the description of parties, the grounds urged and grievances aired, leave us in no doubt that the battle is between the workers and employers and the union represents, as a collective noun, as it were, the numerous humans whose presence is indubitable in the contest, though formally invisible on the party array. The substance of the matter is obvious and formal defects, in such 2025:JHHC:14205 52 circumstances, fade away. We are not dealing with a civil litigation governed by the Civil Procedure Code but with an industrial dispute where the process of conflict resolution is informal, rough-and-ready and invites a liberal approach. Procedural prescriptions are hand- maids, not mistresses, of justice and failure of fair play is the spirit in which courts must view processual deviances. Our adjectival branch of jurisprudence, by and large, deals not with sophisticated litigants but the rural poor, the urban lay and the weaker societal segments for whom law will be an added terror if technical misdescriptions and deficiencies in drafting pleadings and setting out the cause title create a secret weapon to non-suit a party. Where foul play is absent, and fairness is not faulted, latitude is a grace of processual justice. Test litigations, representative actions, pro bono publico and like broadened forms of legal proceedings are in keeping with the current accent on justice to the common man and a necessary disincentive to those who wish to bypass the real issues on the merits by suspect reliance on peripheral, procedural shortcomings. Even Article 226, viewed in wider perspective, may be amenable to ventilation of collective or common grievances, as distinguished from assertion of individual rights, although the traditional view, backed by precedents, has opted for the narrower alternative. Public interest is promoted by a spacious construction of locus standi in our socio- economic circumstances and conceptual latitudinarianism permits taking liberties with individualisation of the right to invoke the higher courts where the remedy is shared by a considerable number, particularly when they are weaker. Less litigation, consistent with fair process, is the aim of adjectival law. Therefore, the decisions cited before us founded on the jurisdiction under Article 226 are inept and themselves somewhat out of tune with the modern requirements of jurisprudence calculated to benefit the community. Two rulings of this Court more or less endorse this general approach: Dabholkar [Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 : (1976) 1 SCR 306] and Newabganj Sugar Mills [Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025:JHHC:14205 53 (1976) 1 SCC 120] .” 89. It has been held in the case of Hindustan Tin Works v. Employees, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 80 in paragraph 9, 11, 17-18 as follows:- “Para-9:- It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law's proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully 2025:JHHC:14205 54 employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away there from. On top of it they were forced to litigation up to the Apex Court now they are being told that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away there from on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them. A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal [(1971) 1 LLJ 508 (Guj)] and a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Postal Seals Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Labour Court II, Lucknow [(1971) 1 LLJ 327 (All)] have taken this view and we are of the opinion that the view taken therein is correct. Para-11:- In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a 2025:JHHC:14205 55 motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield [(1891) AC 173, 179] ). Para-17. Now, undoubtedly the appellant appears to have turned the corner. The industrial unit is looking up. It has started making profits. The workmen have already been reinstated and, therefore, they have started earning their wages. It may, however, be recalled that the appellant has still not cleared its accumulated loss. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this case it would be appropriate to award 75% of the back wages to the workmen to be paid in two equal instalments. Para-18. It may well be that in appropriate cases the court may, in the spirit of labour and management being partners in the industry, direct scaling down of back wages with some sacrifice on management's part too. We were, even here, inclined to saddle the condition that till the loss is totally wiped out the Managing Director and the Directors shall not charge any fee for the services rendered as Director, no dividend shall be paid to equity shareholders, and the Managing Director shall not be paid any overriding commission, if there be any, on the turnover of the company since this will account for the pragmatic approach of common sacrifice in the interest of the industry. We indicate the implications of Article 43-A in this area of law but do not impose it here for want of fuller facts.” 90. It has been held in the case of Jayanti Bhai Raoji Bhai Patel v. 2025:JHHC:14205 56 Municipal Council, Narkhed, reported in (2019) 17 SCC 184 in paragraph 11-15 and 17 as follows:- “Para-11:- The Court further clarified that while the payment of full back wages would be the normal rule, there can be a departure from it where necessary circumstances have been established: (Hindustan Tin Works case [Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] , SCC p. 86, para 11) “11. In the very nature of things there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular (see Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield [Susannah Sharp v. Wakefield, 1891 AC 173 (HL)] ).” Taking note of the financial problems of the appellant Company, the Court granted compensation to the extent of 75% of back wages. The principle laid down in Hindustan Tin Works [Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] has been followed by other decisions of this Court. [PGI of Medical Education & Research v. Raj Kumar, (2001) 2 SCC 54 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 365; Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 528; Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] 2025:JHHC:14205 57 Para-12:- In Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court [Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1980) 4 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 16] , the termination of the services of the appellants was held to be in contravention of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Labour Court, but the appellants were denied the payment of back wages. In appeal, a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed : (SCC p. 447, para 6) “6. … Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-à-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted.” Para-13:- In Deepali Surwase [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , the appellant had been employed as a teacher in a 2025:JHHC:14205 58 primary school run by a trust. The services of the appellant had been terminated by the management of the school pursuant to an ex-parte inquiry proceeding. The School Tribunal quashed the termination of the appellant's services and issued a direction for the grant of full back wages. In appeal, the High Court affirmed [Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1296 : (2012) 1 Mah LJ 370] the view of the Tribunal that the termination was illegal, but set aside the direction for grant of back wages. In appeal, a two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down the following principles : (SCC p. 344, para 22) “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. … The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.” (emphasis supplied) Para-14:- The Court laid down the following principles to govern the payment of back wages : (Deepali Gundu Surwase case [Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , SCC pp. 356-58, para 38) 2025:JHHC:14205 59 “38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. 38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. 38.4. The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved, then it will have the discretion not to award full back wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for 2025:JHHC:14205 60 award of full back wages. 38.5. The cases in which the competent court or tribunal finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior courts should not exercise power under Article 226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give a premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. 38.6. In a number of cases, the superior courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [Hindustan Tin Works 2025:JHHC:14205 61 (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53]. Para-15. In the present case the first inquiry resulted in a report which came to the conclusion that the charge of misconduct was not substantiated. Upon finding that the convening of a fresh inquiry without recording reasons was contrary to law, the High Court would have ordinarily granted liberty to the Municipal Council to take a fresh decision after due notice to the appellant. Such a course of action was, however, rendered impracticable by supervening events. The writ petition instituted by the appellant before the High Court in 1996 remained pending for nearly eighteen years. The appellant had been removed from service on 29-6-1996. Considering the lapse of time, reopening the proceedings would not be expedient in the interest of justice particularly when the appellant had, in the meantime, attained the age of superannuation in 2005. Relegating the appellant to a protracted course of action by restoring the proceedings before the disciplinary authority would also not be fair and proper after a lapse of nearly fourteen years since his retirement. Para-17. The ends of justice would be met by directing that the appellant be paid an amount quantified at Rs 5 lakhs in full and final settlement of his claim for back wages for the period between the date of the order of removal and the date on which he attained the age of superannuation. This payment to the appellant shall be made in addition to the retiral benefits to which he is entitled in terms of the order of the High Court. The payment of Rs 5 lakhs shall be made within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.” 91. Thus, this Court finds that this is a case of land losers and the Respondent Company had acquired 11.21 acres of the Petitioner’s family, dismissed the case later on the ground of fake matriculation certificate. Even (2019) 7SCC 184 and (1976) 3SCC 832 and (1979) 2 SCC 80 support the case of Workman Respondent No.1 and hence the Respondent No.1 is entitled to full back wages. 92. It is evident from the Additional Supplementary Counter 2025:JHHC:14205 62 Affidavit filed on 27.09.2021, that the Bihar School Education Board had issued fresh Mark sheet on 13.09.1999 to the Respondent namely Meena Kumari Singh and the marked as Annexure-1 and Annexure-2 respectively. 93. It transpires that the writ petitioner has stated the Workman-Respondent was employed in the Petitioner Company as a temporary Clerk Grade-III disclosing her qualification as I.A. in the Application dated 15.06.1990 and she also admitted that the case of the Respondent Workman No.1 for employment in the petitioner company was under the land loser scheme and for which the employment was given in the category of Majdoor and yet in the case of workman-respondent No.1, she was appointed on 25.06.1990 as temporary Clerk as she claimed to have passed the Intermediate in Arts, and hence she was appointed for specific period which was communicated vide Letter dated 29.06.1990 / 04.07.1990. They have enclosed the photocopies of application dated 15.06.1990, 25.06.1990 and 04.07.1990 as Annexure-1,2 and 3 respectively. Then the petitioner is only praying to direct the issues involved in this case. 94. It is evident that neither the Petitioner Company nor the Respondent No.1, Bihar School Examination Board had controverted the averments of the Additional Counter affidavit filed dated 06.09.2021 on behalf of the Workman Respondent. 95. It is further evident that the Domestic Enquiry was held in most unfair manner and the enquiry was completed in haste and hurried manner by the depriving the Workman Respondent No.1 to defend herself in the departmental proceeding while her leg was fractured. 96. The Enquiry Report reveals that the charges were established against the Workman-Respondent No.1. 2025:JHHC:14205 63 However, from going through the entire Enquiry Report, it is evident that the Enquiry Officer was under the influence of the Officers of Petitioner Management to establish the charges against the Workman-Respondent No.1 and also in complete violation of principles of natural justice only to coerce, harass and humiliate the workman and her family members. 97. On the one hand, neither the Management nor the Enquiry Officer had produced the Matriculation Certificate of Smt. Meena Kumar Singh of the year 1971 although the Workman- Respondent No.1 in rebuttal had produced her Matriculation Certificate of the year March 1977, still the Enquiry Officer was so much biased against her that he found the charges true proved against the Workman-Respondent No.1. This is a case of grave injustice done by the Enquiry Officer under the influence of the Senior Officials of the Petitioner Company. This Court can see the attitude of the Management that harassment and humiliation is meted out to the Workman-Respondent No.1.) 98. It is further evident that the Respondent Workman was neither allowed to adduce the evidence during nor departmental proceeding nor she could produce any evidence in support of her case. Therefore, on this ground alone dismissal order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is set to be set aside in the interest of justice. 99. It is further evident that even during the enquiry before the learned Tribunal in Reference Case No.197 of 2000 and the Petitioner had produced the Matriculation Certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board and there was no rebuttal of the evidence of Respondent Workman and thus the Tribunal has rightly answered the Award in favor of the Workman by directing the Petitioner to reinstate her and to grant full back wages to the 2025:JHHC:14205 64 Respondent from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement with all the consequential benefits. 100. However, the Petitioner Company being a very big Company and has chosen to prefer this writ Petitioner only to victimize the Respondent No.1- Workman because on the one hand they have acquired not only 11.21 acres of land from the family of the Respondent No.1– Workman on the other hand they have dismissed her from the charges of producing fake matriculation certificate in haste manner and ex-parte proceeding and which cannot be accepted. The Management must have proved and verified the certificate from the Workman at a time of her appointment in the year 1991 and thereafter, even if she was appointed and promoted in the year 1993. Suddenly, the Management–Officials have found fault in the Matriculation Certificate produced by the Respondent, which was found forged according to them, without offering her reasonable opportunity to prove her case and thus, they not only deprived the Petitioner of rightful employment but victimized her for none of her fault, and which seems to led to her cancer disease also which she is suffering. The dismissal castes stigma and causes acute mental agony to any employee and the same can happen with the Workman also. 101. This Court is well aware that the Petitioner Company is very renowned Company and has taken several beneficiary measures for the welfare of its Workmen and even for the Officers and Employees of its Company but the approach and conduct of some of the officers and senior officer of the Petitioner Company do not appear to be correct and proper. Although, the Company is having a good reputation but the conduct of some of the officers of the Company is not proper and the case of Workman Respondent appears to be the case of victimization. This Court is not making any 2025:JHHC:14205 65 comment on the Petitioner Company but this court is seriously drawing adverse interference against some of the officers of the Petitioner Company at the relevant time for passing such an order of dismissal in undue haste and hurried manner and as a result of which the Workman Respondent has suffered a lot and which has resulted for suffering from the diseases like cancer. 102. It is further evident that M-13 has been prepared in the ruling paper which is being use in school and college by the students by the Enquiry Officer of the Petitioner Management Company. 103. The Officers of the Petitioner Company by using the might and finance of the Company have preferred this writ petition only to save themselves from the wrong committed by them and even this Court finds that the delay has occurred in hearing this writ petition after being admitted in the year 2010 by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. 104. This is a case of gross violation of principles of natural justice by the Enquiry Officer and the Superior Disciplinary Authority of the Petitioner-Company is also Superior Officers of Management Company. 105. The Management has initiated the disciplinary proceeding against Workman- Respondent No.1 on the ground that she has produced fake Matriculation Certificate of the year 1971 said to be issued by the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna for passing the said Matriculation Examination from PND Jain High School, Isri Bazar, Giridih and for which internal communication was made on 28.04.1996 by the Dy. Divisional Manager, (P&S) to the Principal of PND Jain High School and the Letter dated 13.05.1996 send by the Principal of PND Jain High School to the said Dy. Divisional Manager (P&S) West Bokaro. 2025:JHHC:14205 66 However, the Matriculation Certificate of the year 1971 allegedly issued in the name Smt. Meena Kumari Singh was never brought on record neither during the Domestic Enquiry in presence of the Workman-Respondent No.1 nor before the learned Tribunal i.e. CGIT-I, Dhanbad nor before this Court. It clearly shows that the Management of Petitioner Company has unnecessarily harass and humiliated the Workman – Respondent No.1 to large extend which led even to the ailment like Cancer which may caused her death any time. The conduct of the Management Company is duplicated by this Court for harassing the Workman- Respondent No.1. 106. It is further evident that copy of Enquiry Report was not served upon the Workman-Respondent No.1 Smt. Meena Kumari Singh and even the copy of second show cause notice of proposed punishment was also not served upon her for dismissing from the service and thus the Impugned Award dated 16.03.1998 i.e. Ext. M-17 and her further dismissal Letter dated 15.12.1998 marked as Ext.M-19. Thus, Ext.M-19 is illegal, arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law and have been passed in violation of judgment reported in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in 1993 (4) SCC 727 and judgment reported in Aureliano Fernandes Vs. State of Goa reported in 2024 (1) SCC 632. 107. It is further evident that no witnesses were examined by the Management in support of its case during the Domestic Enquiry nor any documents were proved by any witnesses. 108. It has been held in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, at Para No. 14 and 15 as follows:- “Para 14:- Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi- 2025:JHHC:14205 67 judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties. The purported evidence collected during investigation by the investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The management witnesses merely tendered the documents and did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have been treated as evidence. Para 15:- We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.” 109. Moreover, it will not be proper to remit the case before the learned Tribunal only on the ground that the Management had not given proper opportunity to the present its case and the learned Tribunal has not decided the preliminary issue on the point of question of fairness of enquiry domestic as more than of 27 years passed from passing of dismissal order and if this plea is accepted that if Workman-Respondent No.1 will deprive of decisions from the judicial side in the name of mere technicalities. 2025:JHHC:14205 68 It is evident that neither the Management nor the workman could brought or produce any new documents which were not produced during the domestic enquiry and which was held by the officials of the Petitioner Company. The documents which was provided was on the basis of Award of the passed by the learned Tribunal and the new documents cannot be filed on the Writ Court at this stage. 110. Even in the case of Management of Regional Chief Engineer, Public Health and Engineering Department, Ranchi vs. Their Workman represented by District Secretary reported in (2019) 18 SCC 814, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has granted 50 % back wages to the Workman Respondent. However, in the above case the dismissal of the 37 Workmen were set aside after holding that dismissal order, even confirmation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act, whereas the case of the Workman-Respondent No.1 is on different footing. Even in the above judgment passed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Thus, this Court is of the view the above judgment is not wholly applicable on the facts and circumstances of this case. 111. It is well settled that the Domestic Enquiry has to be done in fairness by the Enquiry Officer by providing full opportunity to the charge-sheeted employee and if the Enquiry Officer fails to perform his duty then the learned Tribunal can interfere with the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority. It is also well settled that the High Court will not interfere with the findings of the learned Tribunal if the Award is not perverse, illegal or suffers from jurisdictional error. 2025:JHHC:14205 69 112. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, at Paragraph no.21 as follows:- “Para 21:-With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 113. It has been held in the case of A.K. Kraipak and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262 at Para 20 as follows:- “Para 20:- The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given 2025:JHHC:14205 70 against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala [1968 SCC OnLine SC 9] the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.” 114. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 at Paragraph nos.12 and 13 as follows:- “Para 12:- Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be 2025:JHHC:14205 71 useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) Para 13:- In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 115. It has been held in the case of Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa reported in (2024) 1 SCC 632 at Para 40 to 45 as follows:- Para-40:- In the captioned case, citing the judgment of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India [Rustom Cavasjee Cooper (Banks Nationalisation) v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248] , wherein it was held that fundamental rights are not a watertight compartment, the Court observed [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] as under : (Maneka Gandhi case [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , SCC p. 284, para 7) “7. … The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non- arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and 2025:JHHC:14205 72 the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14.” The emphasis was on the Court's attempt to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution rather than attenuate their meaning and content by a process of judicial construction. Relying on the minority judgment rendered by Fazal Ali, J. in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228] , this Court went on to hold in Maneka Gandhi case [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] that the procedure required to be prescribed under Article 21 must include four essentials, namely, notice, opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course of procedure. It was observed that even on principle, having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21, the concept of reasonableness must be projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21. Para-41:- In DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress [DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1213] , a five-Judge Bench of this Court highlighted how essential it is to afford a reasonable opportunity to an employee to put forth his case in a domestic inquiry and the requirement of an employer to comply with the principles of natural justice and fair play, in the following words : (SCC pp. 706 & 758-59, paras 202 & 316) “202. … It is now well settled that the ‘audi alteram partem’ rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the application of the rule has been expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the case here. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Law which permeates our Constitution demands that it has to be observed both substantially and procedurally. … Rule of law posits that the power is to be exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room for 2025:JHHC:14205 73 discrimination. *** 316. Thus it could be held that Article 14 read with Article 16(1) accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent with the principles of natural justice. Any law made or action taken by the employer, corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article 12 must act fairly, justly and reasonably. Right to fair treatment is an essential inbuilt of natural justice. Exercise of unbridled and uncanalised discretionary power impinges upon the right of the citizen; vesting of discretion is no wrong provided it is exercised purposively, judiciously and without prejudice. Wider the discretion, the greater the chances of abuse. Absolute discretion is destructive of freedom than of man's other inventions. Absolute discretion marks the beginning of the end of the liberty. The conferment of absolute power to dismiss a permanent employee is antithesis to justness or fair treatment. The exercise of discretionary power wide off the mark would breed arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair actions and would not be consistent with reason and justice. The provisions of a statute, regulations or rules that empower an employer or the management to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of an employee, must be consistent with just, reasonable and fair procedure. It would, further, be held that right to public employment which includes right to continued public employment till the employee is superannuated as per rules or compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordance with the procedure established by law is an integral part of right to livelihood which in turn is an integral facet of right to life assured by Article 21 of the Constitution. Any procedure prescribed to deprive such a right to livelihood or continued employment must be just, fair and reasonable procedure. In other words an employee in a public employment also must not be arbitrarily, unjustly and unreasonably be deprived of his/her livelihood which is ensured in continued employment till it is terminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure. Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void.” 2025:JHHC:14205 74 (emphasis supplied) Para-42:- The significant role played by procedural fairness in the backdrop of internalising the principles of natural justice into the Constitution cannot be overstated. This aspect has been highlighted by a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us, [Hima Kohli, J.], was a member, in Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India [Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 13 SCC 401 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 366] . Speaking for the Bench, D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J. stated : (SCC para 55) “55. The judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] spearheaded two doctrinal shifts on procedural fairness because of the constitutionalising of natural justice: 55.1.Firstly, procedural fairness was no longer viewed merely as a means to secure a just outcome but a requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. In view of this shift, the courts are now precluded from solely assessing procedural infringements based on whether the procedure would have prejudiced the outcome of the case. [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379:“The non- observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”; also see Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664.] Instead, the courts would have to decide if the procedure that was followed infringed upon the right to a fair and reasonable procedure, independent of the outcome. In compliance with this line of thought, the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds. [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545; C.B. Gautam v. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 78; Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT, (2008) 14 SCC 151; Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 13 SCC 733] 55.2.Secondly, natural justice principles breathe reasonableness into the procedure. Responding to the argument that the principles of 2025:JHHC:14205 75 natural justice are not static but are capable of being moulded to the circumstances, it was held that the core of natural justice guarantees a reasonable procedure which is a constitutional requirement entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet of audi alterum partem encompasses the components of notice, contents of the notice, reports of inquiry, and materials that are available for perusal. While situational modifications are permissible, the rules of natural justice cannot be modified to suit the needs of the situation to such an extent that the core of the principle is abrogated because it is the core that infuses procedural reasonableness. The burden is on the applicant to prove that the procedure that was followed (or not followed) by the adjudicating authority, in effect, infringes upon the [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] core [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] of the right to a fair and reasonable hearing. [ See para 12 of Bhagwati, J.'s judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.] ” (emphasis supplied) Para-43:- In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] quoting with approval the judgment H.K. (An Infant), In re [H.K. (An Infant), In re, (1967) 2 QB 617 : (1967) 2 WLR 962] , this Court held that : (A.K. Kraipak case [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262] , SCC p. 272, para 20) “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely : (1) no one shall be a Judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is 2025:JHHC:14205 76 that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry.” (emphasis supplied) I. Fair Action and Impartiality in Service Jurisprudence Para-44:- In the context of service law, it is, therefore mandatory to afford a government servant or an employee, a reasonable opportunity of being heard before an order is passed. In Mangilal v. State of M.P. [Mangilal v. State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1085] , this Court declared that even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, principles of natural justice must be observed. This is what the Court has held : (SCC p. 454, para 10) “10. … Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, 2025:JHHC:14205 77 (1981) 1 SCC 664] ) Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves.” Para-45:- In Tulsiram Patel case [Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672] , observing that violation of the rules of natural justice would result in arbitrariness which would amount to discrimination, the Constitution Bench made the following observations : (SCC p. 476, paras 95-96) “95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs thus : violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14 : therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of “State” in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially. 96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanation thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decided against 2025:JHHC:14205 78 him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses who are to give evidence against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing need not, however, conform to the judicial process in a Court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi-judicial or administrative inquiry. If we look at clause (2) of Article 311 in the light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that that clause is merely an express statement of the audi alteram partem rule which is implicitly made part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 as a result of the interpretation placed upon that article by recent decisions of this Court. Clause (2) of Article 311 requires that before a government servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank, an inquiry must be held in which he is informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges.” (emphasis supplied) At the same time, a note of caution was added in the captioned case and the Court observed that the rules of natural justice are neither statutory rules nor are they cast in stone. They are flexible and can be adapted and modified by statutes, depending on the exigencies of different situations, the facts and circumstances of the case and the framework of the law [ Also refer : A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 and Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458] .” 116. This Court further finds that the finding given by the learned CGIT-I, Dhanbad is proper and the learned Tribunal has correctly held that the enquiry was not fair and proper and even if the learned Tribunal has not decided the preliminary issue as to whether the 2025:JHHC:14205 79 domestic enquiry conducted was fair or not, this Court finds that no illegality has been committed by the learned Tribunal while passing the Impugned Award in view of the facts and circumstances mentioned above. 117. This Court further finds that the application of the Workman Respondent No.1 for grant of back wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Dispute Act remained pending and the Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajesh Kumar) vide order dated 03.07.2019 has observed that the learned counsel for the Employee has informed that the employee has retired and as such he is not pressing the present Interlocutory application of the Industrial Dispute Act vide order dated 03.07.2019. 118. It further transpires that vide order dated 26.08.2019 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had directed the Petitioner Company to implead the Bihar School Examination Board Patna through its Secretary as Respondent No.2 in course of the day as a party and the Respondent No.1 was directed to bring on record the alleged Matriculation Certificate which is bone of contention between both the sides by filing Counter Affidavit within a week. 119. It further reveals from the order dated 26.08.2021 passed by Co-ordinate Bench (Hon’ble Justice Ananda Sen) of this Court that one I.A. was filed for early hearing of this writ petition and it was informed by the learned counsel for the Workman that she i.e. the workman has already superannuated and so she could not be reinstated into the services and the Court has to decide only on the issue of payment of back wages. It was also informed that the Workman-Respondent No.1 was suffering from severe ailments i.e. Cancer and she needs money for her treatment and the case was fixed on 15.09.2021 ‘for hearing’. 2025:JHHC:14205 80 120. Thereafter, this case was adjourned time and again for other reasons and the matter was placed before this Court on 22.07.2024. Thereafter, this Court had found that Original lower Court Records from the learned CGIT-I, Dhanbad have not been called for and accordingly the Lower Court Records were called for. Thereafter, the case was placed before this Court and the Judgment of this case was reserved. 121. This Court further finds that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 26.08.2019 has directed to implead unnecessarily the Secretary of Bihar School Examination Board as a party in this case and has directed the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 to bring on record the alleged Matriculation Certificate of the Workman-Respondent No.1 although the same was already on record before the learned Tribunal and as she i.e. the Workman had already produced her marksheet of Matriculation Certificate and Intermediate Certificate which were marked as Exhibit W-1, W-2 and Exhibit W-3 respectively before the learned Tribunal. 122. The learned Tribunal has rightly held that the allegation of not showing Matriculation Certificate by the Workman-Respondent No.1 is prima-facie is illegal and unfortunate because the Workman- Respondent No.1 has already passed her Intermediate Examination and even the learned Tribunal has further observed that the Management miserably failed to prove the charges of submitting forged Matriculation / Intermediate Certificate. The Management even did not examine the alleged Principal / Head Master of the School in the domestic enquiry or in the Tribunal. The workman submitted that non-examination of witness on whose alleged letter the management reached the conclusion of submitting a forged 2025:JHHC:14205 81 certificate by the workman ipso facto illegal and void-abinitio. 123. It is held in the case of Santosh Kumar Dubey Vs. Steel Authority of India reported in (2008)4 JLJR 608 at para 6 and 7 which is as follows:- “Para-6:- On being charged, the petitioner submitted his written report making specific plea that displacement certificate No. 297 dated 15-2-1971 (which has been annexed in this application as Annexure 4) relates to the petitioner whereas displacement certificate of Rashik Mahto of village Sanjori bears No. 227 dated 17-11-1970 (Annexure 6) and hence, request was made to get it verified from the concerned authority but no enquiry seems to have been made on it, still the finding was given by the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner failed to put in satisfactory explanation with respect to discrepancies in between those two certificates but the explanation given itself shows that displaced certificate concerning to Rashik Mahto never bears the number as 297 dated 15-2-1971 rather it has got different number and has also been issued on different date and not only that the petitioner's displaced certificate relates to village Patherkata whereas Rashik Mahto seems to be the resident of village Sanjori and, therefore, the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is not only bad rather it can be said to be perverse. Further I do find that the charge was levelled on the basis of a letter No. 75 dated 4-3-2002 received from DPLR that the name of the petitioner does not appear in the family chart of village Patherkatta. In order to meet this charge, the petitioner seems to have made request to the Enquiry Officer to supply the document but that never seems to have been supplied. However, the petitioner took the plea that after making survey of the family of the displaced person of village Patherkatta, a report was submitted along with the chart showing name of the petitioner as the displaced person of the family of Devendra Nath Pandey which chart has been annexed with this application as Annexure 3 and request was made to get it verified from the original but without making any enquiry report was submitted by the Enquiry 2025:JHHC:14205 82 Officer that petitioner, as per the report of DPLR dated 4-3-2002, is not a displaced person of village Patherkatta which finding in view of the document placed before the Enquiry Officer showing the petitioner as a displaced person is quite bad. Moreover, DPLR, on whose letter finding arrived at that the petitioner is not a displaced person, was never examined by the Enquiry Officer nor such letter was ever supplied to the petitioner and, therefore, departmental enquiry certainly gets vitiated on account of that fact. Furthermore, findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer is unsustainable in the eye of law for the reasons discussed above. Consequently, the order of dismissal passed by the respondent No. 2 is also bad and is unsustainable in the eye of law. Para-7:- Accordingly, the order dated 8-3-2003 (Annexure 13) passed by Deputy General Manager (DNW), Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro, respondent No. 2 whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service of the Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro is hereby set aside.” 124. The learned Tribunal has rightly relied distinguished the judgment reported in (2008)1 SCC (L&S) page 890, (2008)2 SCC (L&S) page 298 and (2009)1 SCC (L&S) page 126. 125. After appreciating the judgment of learned Labour Court has correctly held that the above judgments were not applicable on the facts and circumstances of this case. 126. This Court further finds that the learned Tribunal has correctly held that the Enquiry conducted by the Management was not fair and proper. Moreover, the Workman-Respondent No.1 was not given second show cause notice. 127. In view of the above, this Court finds no infirmity and perversity in the impugned Award passed by the learned Tribunal Court. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed 128. This Court is further of the view that the Workman- Respondent No.1 could not be reinstated into the services in the light 2025:JHHC:14205 83 of Award passed by the learned Tribunal but this is a case of continuing high handedness on the part of the Management Company and gross example of violation of Principles of natural justice and as such this Court directs that the Workman-Respondent No.1 shall be paid full salary to her with the relevant increments along with the full back wages till she attained the age of sixty (60) years in the company of the petitioner. 129. This Court has allowed one time lumpsum compensation of Rs.50,00,000/- (Rs. Fifty Lakhs) in favour of the Workman- Respondent No.1 against the Petitioner Management Company but this Court finds that the land of 11.21 acres of lands of the family members of the respondent were taken by the Petitioner Company in the name of providing job in the year 1991 and she hardly worked for six (06) years when the order of dismissal were passed against her on 16.03.1998 and thereafter it was reviewed that dismissal order w.e.f 21.12.1998 vide Letter dated 15.12.1998 marked as M-19. 130. The Workman-Respondent No.1 could have secured the future promotion and she could have given proper pay scale also and she had allowed to work in the company. Hence, taking into consideration the exceptional circumstances of this case and great harassment meted out to Workman-Respondent No.1 at the hands of the Officials of Petitioner Company, this Court further directs the Petitioner Company to pay further compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty Lakhs) to the Workman-Respondent No.1 if the Award is not implemented within three months from the date of receipt the copy of this judgment. 131. However, considering the approach of the Petitioner Company, this Court in exercise of its power confer under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directs the Petitioner Company to 2025:JHHC:14205 84 pay the entire full back wages to the Workman Respondent No.1 along with all the consequential benefits within twelve (12) weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment, failing which it will be open to the Workman-Respondent No.1 to take all possible coercive action against the Petitioner Company and the learned Court below i.e. the Labour Court is directed to execute the petition filed on behalf of the Workman- Respondent No.1 for implementation of the Award. 132. The petitioner Company i.e. the Management is directed to implement the Award within three months from the date of receipt a copy of this judgment, failing which the petitioner-Management will be liable to pay further compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rs.Twenty Lakhs) to the Respondent-Workman as the Management has taken over 11.21 acres of land from the family members of the Respondent-Workman and hence this Court directs that if the petitioner Company i.e. the Management fails to comply this order within two months from the date of receipt a copy of this order then the Workman-Respondent No.1 will be entitled for further compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rs. Twenty Lakhs) with nine (09) percent per annum interest apart from the benefits deriving from the Award passed by learned Tribunal. 133. Let a copy of this order be sent to all the concerned Offices for taking appropriate action for the needful. (Sanjay Prasad, J.) NAFR Nishant/-